ML19332A571

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Forwards Response to NRC Request for Addl Info Re Reactor Sys Branch Question 210.1,Item 3 Re Cavitation & Air Entrainment
ML19332A571
Person / Time
Site: Farley Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 09/08/1980
From: Clayton F
ALABAMA POWER CO.
To: Schwencer A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8009160415
Download: ML19332A571 (3)


Text

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= Alab:m3 Power Ccmpany a

600 N rtn 18th Street Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291

. Telephone 205 250-1000 m

F. L CLAYTON, JR.

Senior Vice President MObOllld bWCT the sournem electre system September 8,1980 Docket No. 50-364 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer Gentlemen:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Request for Additional Information Enclosed is Alabama Power Company's response to NRC Reactor Systems Branch question 210.1, item 3.

Alabama Power Company will respond to item 4 by March, 1981.

If you have any further questions, please advise.

Yours very tdy,

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F. L. Clayton, Jr.

Enclosure cc: Mr. R. A. Thomas Mr..G. F. Trowbridge Mr. L. L. Kintner Mr. W. H. Bradford O

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Enclosure Item 3 The resolution of the concerns noted below plus the previsions of adequate NPSH under non-debris conditions, and adequate housekeeping practices are expected to reduce the likelihood of problems during recirculation. However, in the event that LPI recirculation system problems such as pump cavitation or air entrainment do occur, the operator should have Lthe capability to recognize and contend with the problems.

Both cavitation and air entrainment could be expected to cause pump vibration and oscillations in system flow rate and pressure. Show that the operator will be provided with sufficient instrumentation and appropriate indications to allow and enable detection of these problems.

List the instrumentation available giving both the location of the sensor and the readout.

The inciden':e of cavitation, air entrainment or vortex formation could be reduced by reducing the system flow rate. The operator should have the capability to perform indicated actions (e.g.,

throttling or terminating flow, resort to alternate cooling system, etc.).

Show that the emergency operating instructions and the operator training consider the need to monitor the long-term performance of the recirculation system and consider the need for corrective actions to alleviate problems.

.T Resoonse The following list of instrumentation and indications is sufficient to allow and enable detection of both cavitation and air entrainment:

RHR (LHSI)'5ystem 1.

PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE INDICATOR Sensor Location: Pump Discharge, outside of containment Readout Location: Main Control Board 2.

RHR FLOW INDICATOR Sensor Location: Downstream of RHR Fump and Heat Exchanger, outside of containment.

Readout location: Main Control Board.

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RHR Pump ~Corrent Indicator Sensor Location:

F and G 4160. Buses Readout Location: Main Control Board CTMT SUMP.

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CTMT SUMP LEVEL' INDICATOR Sensor Location:

CTMT Sump Readout Location: Balance of Plant Panel (Main Control Room)

The operator will monitor the above parameters in accordance with emergency operating procedures.

If there is indication that one sump (train) is experiencing clogging, then flow through the affected train will be terminated or throttled to prevent pump cavitation.

If conditions warrant termination of RHR flow, the screen could be backflushed using water from the RWST.

In addition, surveillance on the unaffected train and Component Cooling Water flow to the unaffected RHR-heat exchanger would be increased to ensure maximum cooldown capability.

Operator training includes instruction on the emergency operating procedures and discussion of general corrective action to alleviate pump

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cavitation, air entrainment, and sump clogging ~ problems.

The operator is supervised by and consults with the Shift Supervisor who is further_ backed up by-Operations Department Management, and the l

Emergency Director (i.e., Plant Manager or his designee).

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