ML19330A881
| ML19330A881 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1980 |
| From: | Bayne J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| JPN-80-36, NUDOCS 8007290692 | |
| Download: ML19330A881 (3) | |
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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 6F NEW YORK 10 CoLUMous CincLE NEW YORK. N. Y.1o019 (212) 397.6200 O EO Rp E,T,.a s,R R y g oq cniar 4
TRustass JOHN W. BOSTON JO H N s.OysON c~'~'~
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RICH ARO M. 8"LvNN EmanNsse ROSERT 4. MILLON18 LEROY W. SIN LA P REDE RICK R. CLARIC July 25, 1980
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Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wash?ngton, D.
C.
20555 Attention:
Mr. Thomas A.
Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Operating Reactors
!3ubject:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Effect of a DC Power Supply Failure on ECCS Performance
Reference:
Letter, Thomas A.
Ippolito (NRC) to George T.
Berry (PASNY) dated April 25, 1980
Dear Sir:
Attached please find the information requested in the above referenced letter concerning the effect of a DC power supply failure on ECCS performance.
If you have any further questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours,
(
P.'Bayne
' Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation lOIS S
ll U" 90 D
ATTACHMENT I POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A.
FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Response to Question of NRC Letter Dated April 25, 1980 QUESTION It has generally been recognized that the loss of a direct current (DC) power supply could disable several emergency core cooling system components and thereby could result in a limiting single failure condition for some breaks.
The enclosed letter report was submitted to the NRC staff by the General Electric Company to pro-vide a definitive, generic, reference analysis of the effects of DC power supply failures on ECCS conformance calculations.
The NRC staff is reviewing the analysis which compares the peak cladding temperatures associated with various postulated DC power supply failure (ECCS equipment availability) cases to the peak cladding temperatures for a HPCI (small break) failure and LPCI injection valve (large break) failure cases.
Since the study was based on plant design information which may have been incomplete or out-of-date, some uncertainty exists whether the worse ECCS system availability combinations have been identified for your operating BWR's.
Ac-cordingly, in order that we may have an adequate level of assurance that the systems combinations assumed in the generic analysis are conservative for FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, we request that you confirm the conclusion of the reference study regarding the minimum j
ECCS equipment availability with a DC power supply failure.
Include l
in your response a list of the ECCS equipment that would be available for large and small (1) recirculation loop discharge breaks, and (2) recirculation loop suction breaks.
The listing of equipment available should take into account not only DC power supply failure, but also loss of equipment due to water spillage.
RESPONSE
The Authority has reviewed GE's generic study with regard to minimum ECCS equipment available during a DC power supply failure for the specific case of James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
This review included investigation of availability of all ECCS equipment such as pumps, motors, motor operated valves and initiating and actuating sensors.
Attached Table I lists the ECCS equipment available for both large and small recirculation loop suction or discharge breaks concurrent with four possible cases of a DC power supply failure.
Impact of water spillage on ECCS equipment was also considered and it was found that no ECCS equipment will be lost due to this cause.
It is therefore concluded that the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant is within the envelope of the worst case considered by GE in their report.
TABLE I MINIMUM ECCS EQUIPMENT AVAIIABLE DURING A DC POWER SUPPLY FAILURE DC TRAIN "A" (RED)
DC TRAIN "B" (BLUE)
LPCI-A LPCI-B FAILURE FAILURE' DC SYSTEM DC SYSTEM FAILUPI FAILURE 1
HPCI HPCI HPCI LPCI (One Pump in LPCI (One Pump in LPCI-A, B LPCI-A, B Each Loop)
Each Loop)
CSS-B CSS-A CSS-A, B CSS-A, B l
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