ML19330A313
| ML19330A313 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1980 |
| From: | Shepley S, Spessard R, Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19330A309 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-80-24, NUDOCS 8007170103 | |
| Download: ML19330A313 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000373/1980024
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-373/80-24
Docket No. 50-373
License No. CPPR-99
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL
60690
Facility Name:
LaSalle County Nuclear Station, Unit 1
Inspection At:
LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL
Inspection Conducted: April 1 - May 9, 1980
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Inspectors:
R. D. Wa ker /..-
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S. E. Shepley
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R. L. Spessard, Chief,
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Approved by:
Reactor Projects Section 1
Inspection Summary
Inspection on April 1 thru May 9, 1980 (Report No. 50-373/80-24)
Areas Inspected: Routine, resident inspector, preoperational inspection
consisting of licensee action on previous inspection findings, licensee
responses to IE Circulars and Bulletins, emergency abnormal procedures,
followup on inspector identified problems, licensee's proposed technical
specifications, activities preparatory to license issuance, operator's
staff training, and a plant walkthrough including operational status
review. The inspection involved 203 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC
inspectors.
Results: One item of none wpliance (Infraction-failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion ~ V - Paragraph 6) was identified.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- H. Holyoak, Station Superintendent
- G. S. Reardanz, Quality Assurance Engineer
G. J. Diederich, Station Operating Assistant Superintendent
R. D. Bishop, Technical Staff Supervisor
C. W. Schroeder, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
R. Raguse, Senior Operating Engineer
J. M. Marshall, Operating F.ngineer
J. Renwick, Operating Engineer
W. Huntington, Technical Staff
H. J. Hentschel, Technical Staff
E. Wendorf, Reactor Construction Field Engineer
The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees including
members of the technical, operating, and construction staff as well
as certain licensee contractor employees.
- Denotes persons present at management interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
a.
(Closed) Unresolved Items (373/80-05-02 and 373/79-38-34):
Final inspector review of IE Bulletins 80-02 and 79-18.
For
-these IE Bulletins the inspector verified that the written
response (if required) was within the time period stated in the
bulletin, that the written response included the information
required to be reported, that the written response included
adequate corrective action commitments based on information
presentation in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that
license management forwarded copies of the written response to
the appropriate onsite management representatives, that informa-
tion discussed in the licensee's response was accurate, and .
that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described
in the written response.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/79-33-12): Final inspector
review of licensee response to IE Circular 78-02.
The inspector
verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management,
that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the
circular was applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective
actions were scheduled or taken.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
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3.
Review of IE Bulletins Received Since Last Inspection Report
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The licensee has received IE Bulletins79-03A, 80-07, 80-08, and
80-09 since the last inspection report written by the inspector.
The inspector verified that IE Bulletin 80-07 was received by the
licensee for information only. This bulletin will be applicable to
the licensee when the construction phase of the plant is completed
and the startup/ operating phase is entered; therefore, the licensee
should provide an answer to the bulletin for the inspector's review
prior to license issuance. Final review of the licensee's response
to IE Bulletin 80-07 is assigned Open Item Number (373/80-24-01).
The inspector verified that the licensee is still formulating the
required response to IE Bulletins79-03A, 80-08, and 80-09, and the
inspector's final review of these responses remains open [0 pen Item
Numbers: IEB 79-03A (373/80-24-02), IEB 80-08 (373/80-24-03), and
IEB 80-09 (373/80-24-04)].
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
4.
Review of IE Circulars Received Since Last Inspection Report
The following IE Circulars have been issued since the last inspec-
tion report written by the inspector:
80-05, 80-06, 80-07, 80-08,
P0-09, and 80-10.
The inspector verified that the licensee has
initiated a review of IE Circulars 80-05, 80-08, 80-09, and 80-10
for applicability, but this review has not been completed. Final
review of the licensee's response to these IE Circulars remains open
[0 pen Item Numbers: IEC 80-05 (373/80-24-05), IEC 80-08 (373/80-24-06),
IEC 80-09 (373/80-24-07) and IEC 80-10 (373/80-24-08)]. The inspector
verified that the licensee reviewed IE Circular 80-07 for applicability
and found it not applicable. The inspector agrees with the adequacy
of this review, and the item is closed. The inspector verified that
IE Circular 80-06 was issued by the NRC during this inspection
period, but was not sent to the licensee because it is not applicable
to ftcilities with a reactor operating license or construction
permit. This item is closed.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
5.
Review of Emergency / Abnormal Procedures
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The inspector reviewed all of the Emergency / Abnormal procedures
(LOA's) for Control Room Panel 1-H13-P602. This consisted of 110
procedures. These procedures were reviewed in detail for format,
clarity, and breadth and depth of technical content. The inspector
found no major problems with the procedures reviewed. The inspector
communicated to the licensee certain minor concerns which are considered
to be generic to the Emergency / Abnormal Procedures. As the affected
procedures are currently undergoing internal review, the licensee
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has agreed to address the specific minor concerns during this review.
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The inspector has no further questions on this matter.
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No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
6.
Followup on Inspector Identified Problems
a.
The inspector determined during a review of the Shift Engineers
Log on April 12, 1980, that control rod drives 06-31 and 06-35
had not been uncoupled from their control rods prior to-attempted
removal of these control rods from the reactor vessel. The
inspector pursued this item to find out how this occurred. The
inspector interviewed the Station Construction Field Engineer,
the Station Operating Engineer, and the Station Operating Fuel
Handling Foreman, all of whom were involved in planning, prepar-
ing, and executing the removal of the control rods for cleaning.
The inspector determined that station construction was running
the job. Howaver, Operations Department personnel were consulted
by station construction before the job started and made certain
recommendations which could have prevented this problem if the
suggestions had been followed. These recommendations included:
(1) Requiring communications with the reactor control room
operator when a control rod was being moved, so that the
operator could assure the control rod and drive was
uncoupled by observing the Rod Position Indication System
prior to complete withdrawal of the control rod from the
Core.
(2) Venting of the CRD Hydraulic lines for the control rod
being removed, so that the hydraulic lock is removed from
the control rod drive. This action minimizes potential
damage to a control rod drive that might accidentally
remain coupled to the control rod that is being removed.
Venting also provides a better opportunity for a control
rod drive to settle away from the control rod when the
control rod coupling plug is manually disengaged from the
control rod drive. The latter action keeps the control
rod and control rod drive from recoupling.
(3) Use of a load cell between the control rod and the overhead
crane to ascertain, by limits on the load cell, whether
the control rod or both the control rod and control rod
drive are being pulled by the crane.
(4) Use of a lifting device with more refined control mechanisms
than the overhead crane.
(5) ~ Establishment of radio communications between the overhead
crane operator and personnel in the reactor cavity when
the overhead crane is in use.
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10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V requires that activities
affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions,
procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circum-
stances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these
instructions, procedures, or drawings. Commonwealth Edison
Company Quality Assurance Manual, Quality Requirement No. 5.0,
states in part, "The quality assurance actions carried out for
design, construction, testing, and operation activities will be
described in documented instructions, procedures, drawings,
specifications or checklists. These documents will assist
arraring that important activities have been
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perfo rmed.
These documents will also reference applicable
acceptance criteria which must be satisfied to assure that the
quality related activity has been properly carried out."
Contrary to these requirements, no procedure was implemented
for removing the control rods from the reactor vessel on
April 12, 1980, and consequently 2 control rods and their
drive mechanisms were potentially damaged. This is considered
to be an item of noncompliance of the infraction level
(373/80-24-09).
In responding to this item, the licensee
should discuss those changes to be made, as necessary, to
strengthen his management controls as related to the Station
Operations / Construction interface when performing activities
affecting quality.
The inspector continued to follow closely the control rod
removal from the vessel and noted that an approved procedure
incorporating most of the previously described comments was
implemented before control rod removal was resumed. The follow-
ing concerns were identified, and these will be followed up at
a later date.
(1) Damage to control rod drives 06-31 and 06-35 from the
occurrence previously described.
(0 pen Item Number
373/80-24-10)
(2) Damage to control rods 06-31 and 06-35 from the occurrence
previously described.
(0 pen Item Number 373/80-24-11)
(3) Damage to control rod 18-51, which occurred when this
control rod was bumped against the moisture separator
during transfer to the cleaning rack.
(0 pen Item Number
373/80-24-12)
(4) Damage to control rod 22-11 and the core upper grid, which
occurred when a'J-hook (used for uncoupling) bound against
the upper grid while being removed from the vessel.
(0 pen
Item Number 373/80-24-13)
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(5) Review of the Quality Assurance Check Off's for initial
installation of the control rods to ascertain why and how
control rod 30-31 was installed in the reactor vessel with
an approximately 24 inch portion of the control rod covered
with duct tape.
(0 pen Item Number 373/80-24-14)
b.
The inspector determined from review of the Shif t Engineer's
Log on April 23, 1980, that portions of the Units 1 and 2
Reactor Buildings were flooded by water from the Unit 2 Spent
Fuel Pool during a construction test of the pool. This vas
caused by a vacuum breaker on a return line to the fuel rool
being taped over allowing a siphon action to occur through an
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uninstalled valve in the line. The water lost through the line
was estimated to be 100,000 gallons. The following equipment
in Unit #2 was doused with water:
SF pumps 2A cnd 2B, RHR
pumps 2B and 2C, and MCC's 234X-1 and 221Y. The RIII RC&ES
Branch Project inspector will pursue the resolution of any
damage to this Unit #2 equipment during his routine inspections.
All Unit #1 equipment affected by the water was subsequently
meggered out and returned to service, and the inspector has no
questions regarding these actions.
One item of noncompliance was identified in this area.
7.
Review of Proposed Technical Specifications
The inspector and two other NRC regional personnel attended a meeting
of the licensee's DC Systems Task Force on April 30, 1980. The
meeting addressed regional concerns with the Battery Technical
Specifications.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
8.
Inspection Activities Preparatory to License Issuance (Status of
Licensee Procedures and Preoperational Testing Program)
a.
Operating, Maintenance, Surveillance, Abnormal, and Emergency
Procedure Status
The licensee projects 4711 procedures to be required in these
areas.
Currently the licensee has approved 4321 procedures,
318 procedures have been drafted but not reviewed, and 72
procedures remain to be drafted.
b.
Preoperational Testing Program Status
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The licensee projects 115 Preoperational Tests / System
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Demonstrations. The licensee reported that all of these proced-
ures have been approved for use. The licensee reported that 94
systems have been turned over for preoperational testing,
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that 84 Preoperational Tests / System Demonstrations have been
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started, that 15 Preoperational Tests / System Demonstrations
have been completed, and that the preoperational testing program
is approximately 49% complete at this time. The licensee
stated that no final Preoperational Test / System Demonstration
results are ready for the NRC review,
i.e.,
the entire test is
complete and the results have been reviewed and accepted by the
licensee.
c.
Deficiency Status
The licensee is currently listing 846 Station Operations
deficiencies and 5645 Station Construction deficiencies as
outstanding items. The licensee is attempting to segregate
these deficiencies into those that will impact fuel load and
those that won't.
The inspector will review the status of this
attempt on a subsequent inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
9.
Review of Operating Staff Training
The licensee has initiated the final phase of the operator training
for NRC Cold License Examinations. The course consists of:
a.
Systems and component description lectures.
b.
A review of proposed technical specification safety limits,
limiting cotiitions for operation, surveillance requirements
and their bases, as applicable to the systems and components
being discussed.
c.
A review of selected FSAR described transients.
d.
Plant walkthrough of systems and components being discussed.
e.
Weekly examinations covering the lecture material.
The inspector observed the conduct of each of these items for about
70% of the material persented over the last 5 weeks. The inspector's
findings were positive in all respects and the conduct of the course
met the full intent of the FSAE 'nd licensee training program commit-
ments.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
10. -Plant Walkthrough/ Operational Status Review
The inspector conducted walkthroughs and reviewed the plant opera-
tions status including examinations of control room log books,
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routine patrol sheets, shift engineers log books, equipment outage
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logs, special operating orders, and jumper tagout logs for the
period of April 1, 1980 through May 9, 1980.
The inspector observed the operations status during 4 offshifts
during the same period as above. The inspector also made visual
observations of the routine surveillance, functional, and preopera-
tional tests in progress during this period. This review was con-
ducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with
the requirements established under 10 CFR and administrative proced-
ures.
The inspector conducted tours of Units 1 and 2 reactor, auxiliary,
and turbine buildings throughout the period and noted the status of
construction and plant housekeeping / cleanliness. With respect to
housekeeping / cleanliness, conditions appear to be adequate in Unit
1, but a plan for improving and maintaining cleanliness still needs
to be implemented. Unit 2 housekeeping / cleanliness, needs substantial
improvement. The inspector observed that fire hazards were being
m.'nimized despite these cleanliness concerns.
The inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that plant component
status and problem areas were being turned over to a relieving
shift.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
11.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph
1) et the conclusion of the inspection period. The inspector summa-
rized the scope of the inspection findings. With respect to the
item of noncompliance (Paragraph 6.a), the inspector is concerned
with why a procedure was not implemented and why the operations
department recommendations were ignored or not implemented by station
construction prior to the start of control rod removal.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's findings and concerns.
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