Text

Transcript of 800710 Briefing by Executive Branch on Intl Safeguards in Washington,Dc.Pp 1-62
	ML19329G029
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Issue date:	07/10/1980
From:	; NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	;
References
	REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8007110486
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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BRIEFING BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH ON j

3 INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS g

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l (Closed to Public Attendance)

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Chairman's Conference Room

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6 1717 H Street, N.W.

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1 Washington, D. C.

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1 8 3 Tuesday, July 10, 1979 q

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9 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m.,

'; Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.

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PRESENT:

l 12 :l Chairman Hendrie l

Commissioner Gilinsky 13 Cormissioner Kennedy j

Cc.missioner Bradford

(

Commissioner Ahearne 4

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)

15-ALSO PRESENT:

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16 J.

Boright, DOS j

G. Helfrich, DOS l

17 L. Nosenzo, DOS T.

Piakering, DO,

J. Me1.zel, ACDA 13 H. Bengelsdorf, DOE j

J. Ebetino, DOE 13 j R.

Liimatainen, DOS f

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NRC:

J.

Becker, R.

But.lett,

K. Cohen, J. Devine p

W. Dircks, G. Eysymontt, T.

Gibbon,

.V. Harding 2,

D.

Hassell, M.

Peterson, I.

Rothschild, J.

Shea, i

T.

Sherr, J.

S teph er.a.

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'23 (NOTE:

This transcript was produced from a tape 2 ',

recording, July 24, 1979.)

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lL PROCEEDINGS 2 !l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I have now started the tape i

3 machine.

4 This'is a meeting of the Commission, a briefing by 5-the Executive Branch on International Safeguards.

It is a 4

6 closed meeting of the Commission, and the classification. level, 7

so far as I know is Confidential.

g Is that adequate, Tom?

MR. PICKERING: I think, at this point, Joe, that would 9

1 be adequate.

We would like to signal if it becomes inadequate.

j 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Yes, please.

People keep in mind if the classification level should go up, stop and say so before 12 you get some material on the record beyond the Confidential level.

I' guess our purpose here is to provide us all an opportunity.to discuss what NRC conceivr.s to be its information lLS needs with regard to IAEA safeguards as they relate to U.S.

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16 exports, and in particular, matters in countries, specific 17 I

information, and in general, unresolved items associated with

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18 the proposed format for Executive Branch analysis, which we have 19 "been. creating a certain amount of discussion on over the last I

20 weeks.

21 Jim, if I stop there, can you provide us with the 22 balance of any preface that we need.

23 MR. SHEA:

Right, if I might just say a little bit

4 8labout the scope here.today.

I believe we want to focuse primarily on the question l

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of safeguards information needs, and the exchange of letters 2 3 that you had with Tom.

If possible, I think it might be P

1 3-desirable to talk a little bit about the question of technical p

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economic justifications for high-enriched uranium and pit.tonium 5-exports, although I think we have' made a good deal of progress j

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in talking to Lou on that issue an an the other items' in the l

format, in a meeting we had yesterday, which if time pern;its 7

I think we can discuss these at the end, the proposed approach 8

that State had on that and shere we stand in relation to the 9

10 I think basically, we should focus on safeguards and cover that as far as you can and let the others fill in at the n

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.I end.

13 CilAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Okay.

Tom.

MR. PICKERING:

Thank you, Joe.

I would just like to say we appreciate the opportunity 16 to come back and talk to you further about this question.

I hope';

17 that as a result of this discussion, we might all end up, both 18 on our side and your side, with a clear sense of what are the 19 l

pieces of information which are prepared and exchanged or 20 provided to you, and what are the limitations and our capacity.

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to acquire information.

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I want to address first, what we provide you, the answeg l

23 to-which'is essentially very simple.

It is encompassed in 24

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the one word, "all".

Then talk to you about our limitations

! on the acquisition of information, which I think ha's some h

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1 :;; concerns both on our part and your part that we need to clarify 2

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and get out on the table.

3 Finally, talk to you a little bit about how we see 4

the statute and its relationship to information in terms of 5'

the jobs both of us have to do with respect to foreign licensing.

6 Jim mentioned, and I should say initiall'y, the question 7

of economic and technical data in connection with the highly-8 enriched uranium shipments.

We are prepared to address that.

9 I should say as a matter of introduction that my 10 expertise in the area of safeguards is a great deal more 11 superficial than my expertise in other areas, which, in this 12 particular range of 6ctivity is also superficial.

I brought 13 Lou and John, ar.d Hal Bengelsdorf from the DOE, together with 14 Jorge Menzel from ACDA to handle the indepth questions, which

]Iknowyouaregoingtowanttogetintowhichwillgo'far 15 16 beyond my own competence.

I expect probably to learn a great 17 deal more in the next hour or so than,I can impart.

Nevertheless, I have put down soine initial ideas and 18 want to run over those with you as a way of introduction, and

,2.9 perhaps we can move from there, if you want, to specific 20 g

questions that we have.

3 The first question that I think we should address

.is the issue of provision of information to the NRC by the

. State Department and the Executive Branch.

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'my opening remarks, I frankly, don't think we have an issue l

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. some uncertainty in the Commission.

3 As I stated in my letter to Joe, quote:

.,. all of 4

the information obtained through these various routes is

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available to the NRC,"

unquote.

I want to make it clear

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6 that the NRC ought to have, in our mind, and does'have access 7

i to all information.

I want to catalogue for you want we mean 8

b:( "all information," because I think we ought to put, clearly

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9 on record, what it is that we conclude is the corpus of 10 information from which we derive the word "all".

11 First, we would put confidential briefings such as 12 this one and discussions with the Executive Branch, and all 13 matters of interest to the NRC, and I repeat again, we are always prepared to come and discuss.with you, either at your 14 15 initiative or if there are issues, I 'would feel that it would be pr per in.my case to take my own initiative to come to you.

16 17 secondly, the SIR and the apalyses that we have made 18 f it or that have been made of it in the ' Executive Branch.

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We certainly,

, want to'make available 7

to you, the relevant Executive Branch instructions, policy 8

papers, analyses and summaries.

These are often contained in 9

the cables, and therefore, we routinely and regularly distribute 10 those to you.

11 Full participation in the NRC staff in the action plan, 12 which we have worked out, and together, we have worked with 13 the IAEA in which the staff participates.

14 Finally, the access that you all have directly to 15 senior IAEA officials, Gr mm and E klund, for example', both 16 avaiiable to you and to the NRC staff in Vienna and Washington.

77 Now, thcre is only one further caveat which comes l

l to mind that I should mention with respect to detailed 18 information.

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7 I also want to say, as I have said before up here, 8

that our proposal is to work with the NRC in a program to 9

improve the state systems of accounting and control in this 10 Particular area.

11 Now let me, if I can for a minute, address the question,

12 which I think is important, and I hope it would be of value to 13 you, to ha e an understanding ~on this, what we consider to be 14 the limitations on the availability of information.

This-15 basically extends from the nature of'the safeguards system its u,1f.

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10 11 12 The principal element of safeguards, as we see it, is 13 the general respect for the confidentiality of information-14 which is obtained by the IAEA.

This is true on grounds of Pr Prietary, as well as other concerns of tha inspected state.

15 We are mmitted to this, as you well know, through 16 our Board and agency memberships, as yell as a party to the 7

safeguards agreements.

It was interesting, just as a sidelight, in my discussions w.:.h John Glenn on the voluntary offer, 19

,g a' coupla of weeks ago on the Hill

/he issue:

"How are we 3

going to protect the proprietary information given by U.S.

21 firms in the IAEA system " pWWe had to make'the case, as I y

22 believe we should make the case, that it is a system based 23 on confidentiality.

Confidentiality, in our judgment, has to 24 cut both ways, j

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The U.S. has had a very good working relationship with 2

the IAEA, and on a large part, this is because we have taken~

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a very supportive. position with the agency.

I would like to i

4 i mention here the technical programs that ye have worked out l'

ftoassisttheagencyandourrecognizedseriousinterest.as 5

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b a country in the objective of-non~ proliferation; to say nothing, 7

obviously, the great impetus we gave originally at the 8

'beginning of the agency.

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We believe that this is a common objective that we both,

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3 The basic approach of the IAZA, as you know, is that 4

i it applies a general uniform set of safeguards which treats i

5 similar plants in different countries on a similar basis, or 6

on a common basis.

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9 10 11 12 13 14 There is, as you know, generic information available.

15 This comes to you in the fomm through the SIR of such things 16 as how the IAEA is going to approach safeguards on LWRs as a 17 matter of general interest.

18 Country-specific information on~a comprehensive basis 19 is not available, and we don't believe necessarily it would be 20 useful in improvement of safeguards.

The SIR is a better 21 verview and an indication of how the type of export will me covered, rather than a country-specific indication of past j

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Ifow, let me briefly address what is basically, at 2,) this point, a theological question, but one, nevertheless, I

]thinkisonyourmind,andtherefore,weprobablyshouldcome j

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4 to grips with.

i 5'I Let me say, in beginning the preface to the addressing 6

of the theological issue that it is theological

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judgment, because at the moment, within the constraints of what 8

we can obtain you do receive all information.

I have no t

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, hesitancy in saying it.

Therefore, it may apply more to the theology within the constraints of information, what more should l' 10 11 be attempted to be acquired, rather than anything else.

12 However, in that context let me just state that as 13 we tried to make clear in the letter of last December, we are concerned and we would like the Commission to be careful to g

distinguish between three principal factors with respect to 15 information.

One, information required to determine whether specific export criteria are satisfied in the main things that appear in Section 127.

Information of importar.ce in making 1.he further 20 judgment under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act that an 21 export will not be inimical to the common defense and security.

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Finally, the third point, information which the 5'

! ommission believes desirable.As' background in examining C

6 particular export cases.

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Now, specifically we believe that Section 127 (1),

8 which states that, quote:

"IAEA safeguards, as required by F

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. Article 23 of the Treaty will be applied..."

unquote, does 1

10 not require a judgment, in our feeling, as to the adequacy of 11 safeguards.

I 12 In our view, this requires an appropriate safeguards j

13 agreement with 'the IAEA, and.that IAEA safeguards are being

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14 applied, including on-site inspections, access, sampling, i

measurements on which to arrive at conclusions regarding the 15 i

16 l diversion or misuse of nuclear material or equipment.

Those 17 sorts of things.

By contrast, under Criterion 3

'the Congress 18 specifically provided that such a determination be made with 19,,,,

respect to physical security by indicating, quote:

edequate 20 physical security measures will be maintained..."

unquote; 21 and secondly, that the Commission issue regulations to 22 3

- establish appropriate levels of protection to provide a basis i.for the determination of adequacy.

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i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Tom, could I interrupt there?

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Yes.

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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Those are the views of your Counsel as well, I assume?

6 MR. PICKERING:

We have consulted with our lawyer on 7

this, is that right?

O MR. NOSENZO:

Yes.

9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I just wanted to be sure, and 1

10 that they reflect his judgments as to the legislative history.

11 MR. NOSENZO:

That's right.

12 MR. PICKERING:

Finally, the Executive Branch 13

' believes that the adequacy of safeguards probably falls into 14 the second category, that is, information which should be 15 I considered along with other pertinent information concerning 16 a country's non-proliferation credentials in making the overall 17 inimicality determination.

That is related more to the 18

. special cases where inimicality might become a serious question 19 rather.than to the large number of routine questions where the 20 inimicality questien can probably be answered by the enumerated criteria of Section 127.

21 Now, that's a theological view.

I think it might be 22 useful if you want to talk -further about it, but I would just 23 j

urge that as we talk further about it, we talk about it against 24 i the backdrop that we have tried to make clear in our first 25 l

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i:l is also available to you, and we work hard to try to make it t

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9 10 11 12 That, Joe, is an overview.

I recognize that doesn' t.

13 answer all questions, but I hope it provides enough of a 14 beginning point and food for thought to carry forward with your

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16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Let me see if other Commissioners 17 who havent had a chance to comment have any questions.

18 Vic?

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yes.

You referred to this 19 question as to what the safeguards information applies to, with 20 Part of our responsibilities as a theological question, but you 21 made a pretty strong point of it in your letter.

i 22 I must say that I am a little troubled about you 3

interpreting our responsibilities for us, but I would like to 4

clarify, just to get it clear, just exactly what it is you are.

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1 saying.

Are you saying that there is 'no information about~ the, 2

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MR. PICKERING:

We are saying basically that the n

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inspections is relevant.

Those kinds of information.

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In our view, this requires an appropriate safeguards 1

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agreement with the IAEA, and that IAEA safeguards are being 9

.. applied, which includes on-site inspections, access, sampling, l

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COMMINSIONER GILINSKY:

How do we know that they are 11 d

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being applied?

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Is it fair to ask,, in your 14

[, view,whethertheIAEAismeetingitsownstandardshere?

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Yes, I believe it is.

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16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: We !.2, it seems.to me, at tha.t i

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I mean, that gets you right into the j

details of'even if you don't reach the question of whether 19 I those standards are themselves adequate compared to something 20 d

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These are matters that are not Ahet covered by the I

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I don' t think there 24 I is any way of evading the question / of just what is the IAEA up

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standards, in fact, adequate?"

So I think it is highly 3

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Let me just make a statement, Vic, that 5'

I don't think there is an issue of whether adequacy of safeguards 6

is relevant to the exports or not.

I think we al'1 agree that 7

theadekuacyofsafeguardsisanimportantelement.

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the discussion that we are having was in the determination of j

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meeting Criterig 1 is adequate -- Is that where you take 10 adequacy into consideration, or do you take adequacy into 11 consideration more broadly in terms of the inimicality of the 12 situation?

W 13 Our reading of it is that what the Criter y 1 gets 14 at and is legally and the legislative history supports that is j

y 15 whether there is a safeguards agreement there-( whether the IAEA 16 is, in fact, implementing safeguards.

17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Up to its own standards?

MR..PICKERING:

No.

Without reciourse to the 18 19 standards, but rather, are they implementing safeguards as they generally do throughout the world.

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :

How do you know that?

MR. PICKERING:

We have, for example, queried them at your request, and we are doing it -- now they have included in the SIR, an indication, first of all, where there are

' facility attachments to indicate that there are procedures for

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implementing those safeguards..

Where the facility attachments 2

are nc.t in place, we have gotten assurances from the IAEA W

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,;have reasonable assurance.---

5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

You see, I'm not about to say I;

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Should you have information that says that 11

!l they are not doing what they are supposed to be doing, I think lthat'shighlyrelevant.

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13 1;j system is applied in the way that we expect it to be applied, 14

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4 forthatincertaincircumstancesonemaywanttoassureone's 17

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MR. PICKERING:

Nor does it suggest that if w'e 19

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Well ---

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Or that that's going to be withheld, i

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Okay, well, that's the way I q

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take your remarks, but what then do you mean when you say, "In 25 l

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that light we believe Ehat it is clear that Section 127(1)..n d 2

, so on,-does not require a judgment of the adequacy of IAEA 3

safeguards?"

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MR. PICKERING: We believe that 'the question of 5 '

country-specific adequacy is related more to a finding of i

6 ininicality than it is to a finding of Criterion.1 that 7

safeguards are applied.

8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Having said that, Tom, can 9

. you describe what you mean and how you s ue it applying in the l

10 context of inimicality?

How is it done?

Who does it?

IIWhat does it comprise?

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I would say that as guestions of j

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! inimicality, let's look at a more specific issue.

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I think that that's the sort of 2

distinction we want to make here.

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.I guess I'm still not clear.-

i From what Lou says -- this is just a little box and

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, you check it if there is an agreement and that is what I am 6

interpreting what Lou is saying.

7 Now, that's not the way I interpret it, and it is j not clear to me how you interpret it.

On the one hand it is 8

9 clear that you don' t think that a specific finding of 10

{ adequacy in each case is r.equired, but is information on the Ill safeguards performance in the IAEA relevant to a finding in i

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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I think everybody must, agree that 14

',5 something further than checking the box is reasonable, because 15 we ask at somebody's request or other whether there is a 16 facility attachment, and if not, is it clear that indeed ther.e

L7 will be appropriate ir.spection activities. -As far as I know, l State has supplied that information both on their side and 13 i

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Everybody must feel this is a further check 20 l

n them.

It is.something beyond just a simple check.

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. MR..PICKERING:

I suppose that ps another sub-box is,are inspections _being carried out?

Is the process going

_,ss forward where it needs'to go forward?

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MR. PICKERING:

In terms of Criterion 1.

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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Yes, probably capability over 8

i inimicality, too.

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

If I misunderstood you, I

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Yes, I think you did.

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l dOMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I would like to have that corrected, the mischaracterization corrected.

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was that:."Sure, we are going to supply you that information, l

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-! has nothing to do with criterion 1."

l I guess what I'm saying is, I think it has a lot to 20

, do with Criterion 1, depending on the nature of the information.

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MR. PICKERING :

That's the important point, Vic.

24 I think what we have to try to distinguish here 4

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Now look.

Without accepting your 12 characterization, there is no question at all that we bcth 13 join together in an action plan, and one aspect of this is, 14 obviously, to achieve to the extent.that va can, declassification i.

15 in the IAEA context of safeguards confidential information j

i 16 which clearly doesn' t warrant that sort of protection.

17

'So I don't think we have ignored that, and I think 18 that that's an imporr. ant aspect of where we ought to be going i

19 and the kinds of ways that we ought to be proceeding.

20 COMMISSIONEE GILINSKY:

21 22 f

MR. DICKERING Lou, do you want to talk about that.

23

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1 :4 MR. SHEA: We could get into that at 3:00 this 2 j afternoon.

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MR. SHEA:

Okay, i

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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Good, I won't declare the level 7

raised then.

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8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let me make just one more i

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comment.

10 j'

11 12 13 14 'I f

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16 17 18 19 20 MR. PICKERING:

I think that we, obviously, come at 21 this with somewhat different presumptions, and they may come 22 as the result of the differcnt jobs we have to do, Vic, but it j

23

!seemstomethatwehavemadeaconsciouspolicydecisionto

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f We recognize that that has disadvantages, because 3 !!

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that we have strong U.S. participation, we even have U.S.

6 inspectors.

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13 that it is working, at least adequa'tely.

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18 19 than the one you feel incumbent on you in the NRC to take, but 20 it is clear we have got a different set of starting points or I

g j this if that's the case.

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fi 10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Tom, could you elucidate a little

! bit on your view of the extent to which the United States has 11 1

la}andIthinkthewordwasused" oversight" responsibility in 12 l

13 connection with IAEA's performance of its safeguard function?

$R. PICKERING:

Well, I would think -- I'm not an 14 j

i 15 expert on this and I will call on my experts in a minute, but i

T 16 I would think as a responsible member of the. agencpes and as a 3

i member of the Board of Governors, we have a responsibility in 17 that context to be sure that we are satisfied that the agency 18 is doing its job or if it is not doing its job, it is doing all lo that it can in the context of an international agency, and all 20

,y u of that implies, to pull up its socks.

I think.we have generally 4

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anything on that?-

MR. NOSENZO:

Our agreements, the way we have 24

'j! interpreted them, generally with our fallback safeguard rights, 25 j

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1 EL: if we believe that the agency is not applying safeguards on an 2 !if effective basis that we have the right to apply safegards 3

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But I think what we have been trying to do is to-recognizf.ng that the IAEA' is not a perfect. instrument, and I 1

5' think the point that we made previously, it doesn't have to be a perfact instrument, but it has to be effective -- somehow, l

6 7

quote:

" effective" in deterring countries from diverting 8

material.

Then the question is:

What represents this level 9

of capability that would provide that effective return?

10 We purh very hard to get the IAEA to accept, as a first; i

11 step, self-analysis, a critical analysis,' the SIR.

It started 12 with the Special Safeguards Implementation Report and now it is l

l 13 routine every year.

14 We have pressed on the agency very hard that this is 15 a fine first step, but if you don' t follow up on the things that ;

16 are in the SIR and identif t as deficiencies, that it seems.

17 like the j'cb is only half done, to keep identifying the same 4

18 deficiencies year after year does not make a lot.of sense,i?

19 it is not in the interest of the agency.

So we have been b

20 Pressing very hard on them, on Grgmm, on Epklund and on Fisher, l

l' to set up a task force which would be specifically oriented to' 21 try to correct some of these problems.

And they are in the 22 1

23 i pr ess of doing it.

It is very hard to get them to do it, f r a number of reasons.

Budgetary reasons, reluctance by the 24 1

' Board 7 members chemselves to have the agency Secretariat look.

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including not only the Executive Branch, but the NRC people, we, 6

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effectiveness that will allow us to be able to take the statement l.

9 i of the agency when it makes it in the SIR that in their view i

10-there have been no significant diversions of material on its 11 face value, and believe it.

But I think that this problem is 12

i. one.that we have to tackle generically and examine generically, 4 which we have been doing, rather than on a country-specific 13 14 basis.

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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 With regard to your comment, Vic, on a lot of the 22

.inf rmation that is safeguards confidential and it shouldn't I

.. be, I don't think there is anybody that disagrees with that.

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I think the facility attachment, the

' one that they are now publishing, is a good example of some 4

success that we have had.

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14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

l 15 16 MR. NOSENZO:

17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yes.

i 18 MR. NOSENZO:

Yes.

19 MR. PICKERING:

Vic, could I say one thing, because itseemstomewemaybecomingfromprettyfarapart,/om 20 du 21 some of the things you have said, at least, leads me to believe 22 that in practical terms, we can talk about it in flwr operational erms, we are n so far apart, if there is a general acceptance 23 4

on your part that leaving aside our differing views in the theology, which must remain, I suppose, differing views given I

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i;' from where we come from, but I think are less relevant to the,

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11 12 Now, if it is the other way around, you will certainly, 13' as a member of'the Commission, want to stand on your. view of 14 the commission's legislative responsibilities, and I can't, 15 again, say that.

I can only give you mine or the Executive 16 Branch'.s views.

17 18 19 That 20 may be'something that is more discussable, more cettled by 21 staff, and something that is a little more amenable to reaching an agreement between us than the question of trying to argue the issue of where we both come from on it.

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COMMISSIO3ER AHEARNE:

I wonder if I could make a I

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5' It appeared to me before, and I think the meeting 6

has really just reconfirmed or reemphasized that you might j

7 1 say that in my view there are at least -- there were three 8

questions and they are of a different character.

9 First is, should the NRC address adequacy?

And i

10 that's your theological point, Tom.

And I think that there are 11 several differences that are not only where we are, but it is 12 the overall approach.

I think the State Department, by its 13 general nature, approaches things in a more or less subjective 14 fashion, and ---

15 MR. PICKERING:

I think that's a nice comment.

16 Not very often do people say that.

We should get those 17 inscribed in bronze.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Did you s'ay " objective"?

18 19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

I said, subjective.

MR. PICKERING:

Oh, I thought you said " objective".

20 (Laughter) 21 I

MR. PICKERING:

A communications problem.

t COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Whereas, I think a regulatory

!; agency tends to try through the regulations, particularly, I 24 25 7*

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Here are what are 3

required to be met, are they met.

There is certain detailed 4

infor. nation that has to be provided to ensure that they are 5'

met, and then it, at least in principle, is a straightfoward 6

conclusion, yes or no.

7 Therefore, when a regulatory agency is brought into 8

this arena of trying to assess something in the international 9

sphere in working with the State Department you have this 10 fundamental conflict.

On the one hand, your mode is to work 11 wi th -- you work with so many grey areas so of ten that I think 12 you feel a lot more comfortable in trying to address or reach 13 a resolution of an issue pulling together all of those grey 14 areas.

Whereas a regulatory staff.is very uncomfortable in 15 that and will attempt to acquire the kind of detailed 16 information that they are more comfortable with, and in their 17 view, if y'u have a

statute that says something that's the 18 way y u live up to a statute.

yg Now, it gets down into this question of whether or n t the statute requires us to make an NRC determination of 20 adequacy.

_Now, adequacy, in our view I think, or at least in 21 i

the staff's view would end up being adequacy as the same

, question of Erwin with regard to fuel services.

Do they have

. adequate safeguards?

24 ti I wouldn' t be surprised, no matter how hard we have 25 i

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t but what little I have not read that much on. it, 4

and history.

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face, to what extent can

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10 same kind of standards that they would apply domestically, that M

11 really is a much tougher ste.nding than I enink you people are 12,

A prepared to have us apply, or. that the system is really ready l

13 14 l for us to apply.

Could I make just one comment.

1, 15 i

MR. PICT RING:

leave our attitudes alone.-

I think I would add here, 16 i

. and if you can, talk about the ade,quacy of the international.

17 y system of which we are a memberj $[ts capacity to provide the 18 information.

19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But you see, Tom, the point 20

' y u made is that the United States is in an agreement that the' o

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21 IAEA will provide international safegards.

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MR. NOSENZO:

But in terms of adequacy, I thought 1

2 the point Tom was making is that one looks generically at the IAEA in terms of adequacy.

Not in terms of adequacy, but in

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Well, but " apply" then gets j

5 directly into the questions Vic was. raising.

You have to ask very specifically what is done where.

I'm not saying that I have reached that point, but that seems to me, in the background.

9 The second question was, "Do we have all of the 10 information that you people have?"

I hope we do, so you can 11 put that to rest.

12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Could I ask a question in J' that category?

13 14 Tom, I got from what you say;we, at least, have access 15 Ito all of it, but I guess I'm a little unclear on the procecs 16 of delivery.

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 MR. PICKERING:

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The things ' that Tom liste'd, the 7

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channel by which it comes to us. Some of them you see in t

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So I think if you go down that list j

11 you will be able to identify ---

12 MR. NOSENZO:

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I COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Well, that's what I was ---

15 MR. NOSENZO:

and do we record that in 16 what we provide you?"

77 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Yes.

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I think the answer to that is, i

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Negative, if you had it.

l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

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10 11 12 I think, at the moment, I have the feeling that we 13 could continue'to come and sit around this table, but the 14 staff doesn't do a similar thing.

15 MP.. PICKERING:

John, could I just add two points.

'16 First, I appreciate your very clear explanation of 17 the different points to which we are. coming.

That was part 18 of what I was trying to articulate when I ' talked. about the 19 fact that Vic and I or others might disagree, and I think 20 that that's'right.

I think also, your suggestion of the solution is veGr 21 much in sympathy with the sort of approach I would like to take. I 22 How practically can we resolve the question, which at this 23 p int, seemingly is a crisis of confidence between the NRC l

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' and.the State Department, try to remove that so that there is

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at least some feeling of understanding of what each does and i

2 where it comes froa, even if we have a little better sense of 3

.Ii where we can't meet your requirements.

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let's go back to your letter i

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for a moment.

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Whereas the inimicality question 3 !i. allows one to consider a broad range of foreign policy 4 !

! considerations.

S l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But that, it seems to me, is 6

something that ought to be looked at for the Commission to 7

decide how it interprets its specific responsibility.

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MR. PICKERING:

Okay.

Well, what we were doing is 9

wanting to put down a marker in response to the marker we felt 10 that came to us in Joe's letter, as governments will do, even 11 in conversing among themselves about a particular thesis or i

12 theological point of view which was expressed there.

13 l Now, 'I think that certainly we could sit here ar.d 14 enjoy ourselves all day arguing about that.

It isn't my i

! judgment of how to spend our time --

15 16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

No, we can't either.

i 17 MR. PICKERING:

-- in the best possible way.

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,.But I would say, in all frankness, I just'want to be straight-

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19 forward and frank, that having received the letter we ought.

that it would be better to be on record in response that a 20

[ view that was our own view of how the situation should be 21

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42 li COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Another reason why staff

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That's

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But, you knou, you can.'t get 14 there from here.

That's a massive jump from the first to 15 the 10th floor and one can only do that through a series of 16 steps.

How do you take those steps?

Who makes.that judgment.?

l' 18 MR. PICKERING: Can I say two things on that, Dick.

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17 And yccc question is addressed to the issue of when we have a practical one, what are we going to 18 do.

19 I will say that I will come here as a reasonable 20 guy, or Lou, and tell you when we can't make it and why and 21 hope we can gather enough support from you all to make the l

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23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

You are assuming that 6

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Exactly, right.

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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I commend you for that point.

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I think it is all the way around, y or hope it is, yes.

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Let me just say that in the past the 1

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We haven't had any about i;

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to undertake, but it has got its limits.

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system so perfect that we can enforce that. view, because it is l

5'i generally conceded to be right.

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where we are now.

8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I mean, there is no provision 9

j, in the IAEA, say for the Indians coming in, that they are 1

10 worried about the Pakistanis and could you send in another 11 inspector.

I 12 MR. PICKERING:

I wish there were.

'fhat might help 13 L us.

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Whether or not it is exercised, there is no way for anybody to do that.

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The Secretariat.

3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: " hat's right.

4 MR. PICKERING:

5 6

7 8

9 10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

We read that in the New York 11 Times.

12 MR. PICKERING:

N 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 That, I don't think was in the New York Times.

20 Can we raise the last five minutes, Joe, to the 21.

Se ret level?

Is that a problem?

22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

No problem.

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All right, shall we do that now 2 s,

- 13;; or retrospectively.?

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sort of by the facility specific and not country specific, 14 TheSIRgivesyoutheinformation,CB) i

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15 So p to t.ake the dili% know how bad the situation is, and (b) 16 So it is not clear why you would need llstepstoimproveit.

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u 21 had gone by, though, and that same item aas continuing t.o g

appear in the SIR without having been able to be improved at 23 3;

ii;l all ---

But that was the plan I was trying to 24 ii MR. BORIGHT:

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get at before, because there is another car-4ar-which'is the j

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You just really don't have the technology I

to'be able to appropriately handle.that.

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On the SSAC, it is a matter of encouraging these 7

untries and working with them.

As you know, last year we 8

[ made an offer to help countries bilaterally with their SSACs, 9

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to help them improve their SSAC.

i! example, 12 We also, as~part of the next part of physical 13 llsecurityinspections, are offering experts in accoun'tancy and 14 f:: control on the teams to discuss accountancy and control with-15 4 our technical people.

We have bilateral cooperation, and I 16 li

!: think they will be receptive to it in that framework.

You know, 17 l-y we have had some indication of the receptivity.

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But again, the question of approaching it generically j rather than approaching it through the export licening process.

20 li MR. PICKERING:

Peter, cculd I make one point here.

E 21-It would seem cases that you are raising are initially, at least,Aaccepteble to improvement of safeguards-23 by careful examination of the deficiencies on a facilities 24 basis in the SIR.

That ought to be our first effort.

One shotic 25

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if that continues to reappear in the h.

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Let me see, Tc;.t, I'm thinking f

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of a-specific case.

Highly-enricted uranium.

As I read ihtheagency'srulesittalksaboutinspectingstocksofhighly-

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The SIR tells you they don't come close to that 12 a year.

l sort of a standard, and that's highly-enriched uranium in 13 I am concerned about whether the IAEA is, in 14 front of you.

meating its standard which, I must say, I regard as 15

fact, inadequate in itself, as a minimum that they are meeting their 16 ri standard.

17 18

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19 MR. PICKERING:

Well, I think the appropriate 20 j!.inquiriesshouldbeonagenericbasiswithrespecttoall--

i 21 l to meeting all of their inspection standards with respect to 3

22 5

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i 23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

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Now, it is one thing if the SIR was saying, you know, i

2 i yes, the standard is being met and you could still say, well, jhowdoIknowitwillbemeti'nthiscase, and there is no 3

fendtothekindsofquestionsyoucanraise.

But you have 4

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I to assume

-- there are certain presumptions of adequate 5

performance that' you have to make, but wh&n their. reports say 6

l lthattheyaren'tccmingclose,andIdon'tregardtheIAEA 7

as being an agency that exaggerates criticism of its own performance, and that's a matter of considerable concern to me.

9 L

I MR. BORIGHT:

Yes, I have meant to comment.

10 hCommissionerGilinskyhasusedthephrase, "The IAEA standards," in several questions, and I think we have been 12 through this before, but we do have to remember that the j

L3 i

situation is that the IAEA has never adopted a specific 14 interpretation of that paragraph in 153 that says timely l

15

detection.

16 I

17

,We have worked very hard and pressed on them, a g

l certain set of goals on that assumption -- the feelings that 18 i

without something specific in mind, you couldn't put their i

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19

! feet to the fire sufficiently.

And we have suceeded in having l

t j them adopt a set of specific timelimits and sensitivity goals 2

20 n

21 as goals, and in fact, they are writing the SIR measuring 22 against those goals.

But their instructions from the Board, 23 which is the only capable organ to give them instructions is j

24 very clear that those are goals and not requi'rements.

In fact, 25

.I there is some unhappiness with the last Board in particular, withh.

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Just for the record, when you say their standards, 3

o it ir that they are standards used by the Secretariat in 4

l absence of anything else, that they are not adopted standards, 5~

and one has to keep that in mind.

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6 As a footnote ---

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7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But where does that lead you?

8 MR. BORIGHT:

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17 18 19 20 2,

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But is isn't as if the il

!! standard is very strict, really, it's stocks of highly-enriched 22

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1 2 j MR. BORIGHT: Yes.

Four insoections a year on HEU

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standard we are talking about.

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But that standard is not i

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met.

7 MR. BORIGHT: All right, that's th' e kind of a problem l

8 that we should be working on, but the standard that we are f

9 talking about is something like jl week inspections ou j

10 That's the timeliness that should be achieved.

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11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, on one SIR a day --

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12 MR. BORIGHT:

But they use the same standards under i

13 the same goals.

j 14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I don'.t know where it leads you, l

i Vic.

15 i

16 On the one hand, you say you recognize the imperfec. tion]

17 f the system and you agree with the. thrust to work in it.

l Then you say, you don't think they are meeting whatever their j

18 own standards are, understood-in the sense of goals, and you yg don' t agree that those are adequate even if they were met, and 20 what are f'ou going to do with this export.

21 Question: What are you going to do?

Should we simply

.2 1

!justshutdowntheexportbusiness?

Is that a national policy 23 j

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iwhich you would agree to?

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, let me turn this around.

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Nell, each CommiIssioner has 7

got to decide for himself, I suppose.

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It seems to me that you have a choice here.

To-go t

-9 one way -- t oo far in one direction, you have made the point!-- f j

10 you have used the words, but the common phrase is that we are t

11' undermining the IAEA.

In the other dihection, it seems to be 12 we.are underming the NNPA and it is clear the choices are going i

13 to have to get'made here, but we have also got to be concerned i

14 about the latter.

f 15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: That's why I'm interested in i

16 having staffs do a little bit more work together.

At some 17 point the conclusion may be that that kind of a fundamental dichotomy really will be seen and we will'have to go back to' 18 19 Congress.

MR. NOSENZO:

Victor, on the HEU point in 20 I

Particular, I don' t argue with you on the inspection 21' frequency and the need for it.

I think that the rationale 22 f r pushing very hard on the agency to improve their 23 ability to inspect stockpiles or facilities that have HEU,,

4 and need to put on some minimism kind of conditions. But I h

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tend to take off capabilities in other directions.

4 agency has, in fact, done that.

It, of course, pays more attention to HEU critical facilities, bulk-handling facilities 5'

6 et cetera, than it does, for example, to LEU and. reactors.

What would have to happen is that both things we 7

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have been pushing for, more focus on what (inaudible) and two, and also, an increase 9

an increase in the number of inspectors, in the speed with which they get accredited by their various 10 i

i 11 countries.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It secms to me everybody 12 i

I would like to wants their system to be improved, cbviously, 13 see them improved and I would like to see the agencies do 14 l

but at the beginning of any ef fort in this direction /

that, 15 ceems to me is an accurate and clear appraisal of what is, i

16 in fact gding on.

17 MR. NOSENZO: The SIR indicates that, I. mean, that's 18 where you got your frequency numbers and the reason they 19 are in there is because (inaudible) 20 COMIIISSIONER GILINSKY:

21 22 23 24

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differ, I think, although you indicate there is an ambiguity, 4

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5 l John, I would really say there r'eally is no ambiguity based I

n the negotiation history of the.. law, otherwise the word 6

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g The nonproliferation considerations that go into inimicality, 10 i

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for example, are they an NPT party?

._1 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

That is something, it seems 12 to me, you ought to leave to us.

'I mean, I understand j

perfectly Ohy you prefer to have it that way, but you know, 14 i

I given that we pass on these exports,.just as to where we 15 !

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allocate the information and which part of the findings, j

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we are all into, that is something that ---

17 MR. NOSENZO:

It is obviously something each 18 Commissioner has to decide for himself.

s IS What I was conveying was ---

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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: On the other hand, the law is I

h ardly NRC's privat'e_ property.

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!h 22 MR. PICKERING: That's right, and I was going to make

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that a point.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

The Executive Branch has a clear responsibility and right to put down the wap it reads that ;

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a secondary statutory obligation on us to provide information, e

4 and we, obviously, have to have a view as to the initial

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6 Listen, we have gone until 11:00, 7

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

8

. which appears ---

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Stay for lunch.

9 9

10 (Laughter)

We are running out of the assicned 11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

i felt there was a convergence in the 12 time, and I must say, if I discussion that I could perceive, why I would be willing to go 13 l

on a little bit longer, but it seems to me there is not 14 convergence and I can't see just exercising the same points.

15 Peter, do you have -- You haven't said much so why 16 don't I give you the last round.

17 j

COMMISSICNER BRADFORD: Okay.

I'm not sure it is 18 a different question and if it seems as though it is going 19 ltotakeyoulong,maybeIcandoitanothertime.

20 I wonder if you could just look quickly at the I

h Attachment in Joe's February letter regarding safeguards

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2.,

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information, and flag out which of those items is reasonably I

23

!I.available (background noise, inaudible.)

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numbered paragraph 2, It-1 3

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1 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: As to Item-1, then, is that i

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not a particularly troublesome ---

6 MR. PICKERING:

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i 22 MR. SHEA:

i a ed h willingnen to work wM NRC in

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l, ii reaffirming that, I gather.

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.: we discussed two ways to do it.

2 One way was through a direct NRC,and their equivalentj 3

cooperative arrangements, which is one way to get at one; and 4

\\ the other one was, well, how else could we do it through 5

l bilateral cooperation.

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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But y Page 4 of that list 4 10 has a couple of headings:

Missing material and unauthorized 11 g

applications, occurdnce of a significant MUF.

4 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 l

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ii 21 MR. NOSENZO:

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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

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,l MR. NOSENZO:

8 9

But remember, that is the key, really and probably the major 10 It is not only an issue which 11 area identified in the SIR.

it is a is one that is related to the country, though, 12 technological issue, we don't have the capability for the 13 inspector to really do a good job.

14 The other one is the inventory taking, and it has 15 got to be a combination of advance in technology, plus the 16 to insure, coordination between the agency and the oper 17 kind of minimum interference, yet ability'to accurate 3

18 inventories.

.l 19 COMMISSIONERBRADFOy:

But there could then, be a y

I 20 W

bulk-handling facility which ae having significant difficultie~s 21 with material accounting and control, which then could be but which would not be reflected in your reported in the SIR, 23 assessment to us of safeguards related to the country.

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assessment to you is we V

MR. NOSEN20:

Well, our 25 o

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I guess that standpoint would be accurate, 3'

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4 issue.

l 5

i COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Yes.

But I'm not sure I know 6

what I would do if there were a large MUF.

7 8

9 ji MR. NOSENZO:

1 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

One lLst item, Tom.

11 I see that we have some -- we both have letters from 12 Senator Glenn, and I think that we can answer them separately,,

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13 but it appears to me that the staffs might do some check ---

14 MR. PICKERING :

Yes.

If I might say, in answering 15 l the question that he addressed to me, 'here seemed to be an c

16 effort to make some difference between full substance and j

17 all information.

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19 20 21 l A

22 However, we are pprepared to respond exactly the 23 p.way 'ae have responded to you today, by saying we provide all of the information and then list the information that is 24 d relevant.

And in fact, we might even attempt to take another i

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ay look at the testimony to make certain that we are very clear.,

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substance and everything in my copy.

I liaven' t seen yours,

4 so I don't know what he is really driving at, but there is Q

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obviously some concern on the Committee staff, which I think f

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.is misplaced.

7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: There might have beer some 8

point that had been (inaudible) and in your transcripts t

l 9

you said you would endeavor to provide full substance, 10 however (inaudible) and the implication could be then reached N

11 that you give 2.im documents which you have to.

12 MR. PICKERING:

Yes, we can straighten that out.

}

13 We can leave the "in confidence" and it applies both to you 14 and us, and "in confidence" also applies to the SIA.

There is 15 no "however".

I i

16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: We.ar-e-also are requested to supply 17 the relevt.nt correspondence between ourselves and you, and 18 if you have any objection to our attaching our answers to the 19 letter, why ---

1 MR. PICKERING:

I think we are going to do the same 20 Ging, so if you have no objection, we'll send them duplicates.

21 0

We have to make certain that our staffs know that we both

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22 1

have the came view of the relevant correspondence.

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l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That's right, the collections.

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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: We can always solve that by 25 h

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4 bundling up everything that exists and shipping all that I

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'ip and let them decide what is relevant.

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3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Okay, let's see. I can' t think lE 4

of any othe urgent matters.

speaking for the 5

MR. SHEA:

I was going to say thatj

[

staff, we certainly will endeavor to follow up with Lou's 6

peopic,asCommissionerAhearnesuggestegtotrytomake 7

initially that we have all of the. available 8

sure, I guess, informationf it is so scattered that we may simply not have 9

9 10 it if it is older.

y Or within the Commission and 11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

12 you cannot collect it.

13 MR. SHEA:

That's right, or maybe in peop1.e's heads So we would like to be sure we have 14 and not written down.

15 all of that.

ou want to say anything about the technical 16-ggpid economic mis t;2LuL on for high-enriched or just pass af on that gne 3'et 17 and maybe Lou could say --

18 I think it needs some talking, usually MR. NOSENZO:

19 can we get into the theological question of whether that material

~

20 in your export licensing process for' is, in fact, appropriate 21 making a determination 4het either on the export criteria or i

But in practical matters, we have,.i 22 n the inimicality questica.

23

[ in the past supplied background information on what the '

24 situation is with regard to HEU and the potential conversion of 25 1

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' 1 F it consistent with the President's policy.

You are aware of the President's policy.

gtM Also, the NRC staff is on i* "ack and therefore, 4

l all of the economic rationale r technical rationale, for A

e 5~

example that is prepared by Argonne, Ware available to you, 6

and if there has been any problem in the past, I would assume 7

th;at there would be no problem in the future.

8 Again, though, I would point to the theological 9

question of whether this is a matter of policy, Presidential 10 policy and if we are facing this policy whether this is ---

11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That is the issue.

12.

You may not understand that when you are dealing 13 with a theological institution, theology becomes terribly 14 important.

15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Okay, very good.

16 I think we could usefully withhold thia tape and 17 I will ask~your vote.

Those in favor?

18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Aye.

19 COMISSIONER AHEARNE: Aye.

1 COMISSIONER KENEDY: Aye.

20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

So ordered.

3 (Whereupon, the meeting in the a'aove-entitled matter g

was concluded at 11:10 a.m.)

24

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6 i:

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REDULATORY COMMISSION

^

WASHIN GTON, D.C. 20SS5

%,*****y/

July 8, 1980 OFFICEOF THE SECRETARY

-COMMISSION DETERMINATION REGARDING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT OF:

Transcript of Briefing by Executive Branch on International' Safeguards, July 10, 1979 Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.10P (c), the Commission has determined that the attached portions of the subject transcript should be released to the public.

The remaining portions of the transcript are being withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 9.104 as noted below:

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FuU110 NS

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56/6 56/21 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 57/6 57/9 10 CE R 9.104 (a) (1) 57/12 57/25 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 58/3 58/9 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 59/6 59/9 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 59/17 59/21 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 1 l __-

o n C.

oy e j

Acting Sec etary of th Commission e

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ML19329G029

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