ML19329F493

Forwards Testimony of Rl Whitelaw,Va Polytechnic Inst & State Univ.Rl Whitelaw 711228 Ltr to I Like w/710930 Attachment & IEEE Transactions,Pp 363-375,May 1969,encl

ML19329F493
Person / Time
Site:	Midland
Issue date:	01/05/1972
From:	Like I REILLY & LIKE
To:	Murphy A Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8006300702
Download: ML19329F493 (18)

Text

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RzztLY, LrxE Awn' SCHNEIDER COUNSEI.I. ORS AT I.AW 200 WEST MAIN STREET BABYI.ON, N. Y.11702 BENM ND . H E ll.I.T U DMSS wt Lte tJ N fi. SC 8tN E t des REME UEONUR 830FF h N

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Hon. Arthur W. Murphy, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing. Board Columbia University School of Law Box 38, 435 West 116th Street -

New York, N.Y. 1002 7 Re: In the Matter of Consumers Power Company, Midland lant, Units 1&2 Docket Nos. 150-329 anc 50-330 v

Dear Professor Murphy:

In behalf of Mapleton intervenors, we serve herein, as the testimony of Robert L. Whitelaw, Pro-fessor of Mechanical & Nuclear Engineering, his letter:

to Irving Like dated December 28, 1971, with attach-ments dated September 30, 1971 and pp. 363-375 of the May 1969 issue of I.E.E.E. Transactions.

Respectfully submitted REILLY, LIKE & SCHNEIDER

. Irving Like IL:mc Encs.

bers THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS Secretary POOR QUAUTY PAGES .i All counsel of record 8 0 0 6 3 0 o 7 0'L b

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() 'x COI1EGE OF ENGINEERING e 1- D

^ky $ VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY Blechburg, Virginia 24061 DEPARTMENT OF MICHANICAL Exc wasanwc December 28, 1971 Mr. Irving Like i

200 W. Main Street-Babylon, New York 11702 ,

Re: Safety of Midland Nuclear

' Powerplants ~#1 sand #2

Dear Mr. Like:

Under seperate cover, dated September 30, 1971, I have submitted a prepared list of ten questions which I believe are pertinent to the insnediate safety of nuclear powerplants and to the long term public interest in their development.

P The first seven questions deal with a particular category of nuclear plant safety in which I believe I have established Boch competence and extensive experience, by virtue of twenty-three years ' experience in responsible engineering design and development of powerplant pressure vessels and heat exchangers, including twenty years' experience and special postgraduate studies in nuclear technology.

This category of nuclear safety pertains to the integrity attainable in the design and assembly of a complex' system of high pressure pipes, fittings, and large pressure vessels such that every conceivable leak involving radioactive material can be con-tained, and in particular, that no explosive failure anywhere in the system can re-sult in flying parts that can destroy a, containment system designed on the assunption that.no such explosive ruptures will ever occur.

There is no question that American technology, since the early days of steam power, has attained a record of pressure vessel safety that is the envy of the engineering world.

Nevertheless, explosive pressure vessel ruptures still occasionally occur

.with devastating results, and while no actual reactor vessel has yet exploded, the facts of the matter appear to be that ,

(1) no nuclear equipment manufacturer is yet prepared to give an ironclad guarantee that a pressure vessel he sells will never rupture either explosively or non-4 explosively, or that if it does, he,will pay all consequential damages; and (2) many nuclear powerplants designed today, possibly including the Midland plants, are not designed to maintain radioactive containment in the face of explosive rupture of vessels in the primary system.

While there are other nuclear plant ssfety problems of equal concern to the public, in most cases adequate precautions, procedures, interlocks, etc. are being demon-strated to the A.E.C. by the designers and operators. Hence the safety problem

.pcsed by the two items listed above, in my judgment,. constitutes the greatest hazard or " maximum credible accident" which every operating plant must be able to withstand

, and against which the public needs protection.

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Mr. Irving Like Page 2 December 28, 1971.

Questions #8 and #10 represent matters which the nuclear power industry as a whole, and the A.E.C. in particular, should be compelled to face, for the simple reason that if they are not answered, and soon, the projected proliferation of nuclear powerplants throughout the land makes very little sense, and may well leave our children an inheritance of unmanageable radioactive wastes and hundreds of obsolete nuclear plants far beyond what was really necessary, The substance of these concerns was first raised by the well-known consulting engineer, Mr. A. J. Ackerman, in his noteworthy paper " Atomic Power - Who Looks After Public Safety?" and in my comments on this paper.

The paper, and my comments on it, were published in the May, 1969, issue of I.E.E.E.

Transactions, pp. 363-375, of which I attach a copy.

Yours very uly, JL[ ' '

Rob t L. Wh telaw Professor of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering RLW/mf1 Enclosure ,

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September 30/71 Questions Concerning Midland Nuclear Powerplant,-Units #1 and #2 By: R. L. Whitelaw, Prof, of Nuclear & Mech. Eng., V.P.I.&S.U. ~

1. What is the probability of an explosive rupture of the reactor vessel or of large elements of the primary loop, resulting in flying parts at high I velocity and momentum? 1.e. can it be shown that such a failure has never happened in the history of high pressure vessels, or is extremely unlikely today?

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2.

What is the probability of a failure in the reactor vessel head bolts, or in the control rod head nozzles or retention bolts that would result in the entire head or a control rod drive being ejected upward at high velocity?

Has such a failure ever happened yet?

3.

Is there a conceivable combination of events or combination of failures in the control rod drive system that could permit the reactor pressure to i drive a rod upwards at high velocity sufficient to rupture and keep on going?

4. What is the probability that any of the flying parts in any of the three failures above would rupture either a) the wall of the containment vessel, or b) ct.e of the vulnerable points in the containment, such as a penetration bellows?

5. During the expected operating life of the reactor vessel, will the embrittle-ment of its steel due to radiation increase the probability of the failures above? If so, by how much? What is this operating life? What is-the

I latest embrittlement (NDT) data to support this conclusion?

6. Is it possible for the safety injection system to subject the reactor vessel to thermal shock, so that it would be unsafe to operate ag .in? What is the maximum local cooling rate the steel might experience in this event?

7. An explosive rupture of the steam turbine high pressure or cross-over l

l piping or casings can occur, as it has in other power stations. It can l

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T cause or be associated with a generator failure and consequent hydrogen fire. Can such an explosion and fire in any way result in a rupture of the containment vessel? Or could such a sequence be a logical consequence of a non-explosive primary system failure inside the contain=ent vessel?

8. Does this unit promise a significant gain in U238 conversion over previous reactors of this type. If not, is it to our long-term advantage to multiply non-breeding reactors, without a significant gain in conversion ratio from one generation to the next1

9. Is it compatible with the long-term water supply plans of this area to add nuclear plants on the Tittabawassee River? Any water purification and reuse downstream would be jeopardized by a nuclear plant upstream.

10. Since nuclear fission, as presently employed in non-breeding low efficiency water reactors, is by no means the long-term answer to the nation's electric power necds, has the operating company put significant study, research, and development into better long-term means, such as Drilled Geothermal Power. If not, what not? And if such a better means of generating

' power (with no radioactive wastes, nor hasards, and an almost inexhaustible source of energy right under our feet) is almost sure to come, should not the Consumers Power Company be supporting research and development on it, and scheduling an installation on its system as soon as it can be made feasible?

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• .* l Introduction In resiewing the emerging technology of atomie power, this paper is primarily concerned with questions of basic policy and public safety, and with the defteiencies in these Atonn.e Power-Who areas. There is an urgent nece cor rectifying current j trends in the power industry, and this ca!!s for renewed LOOhS After emphasis on the obligations ofleear utiiity managements and their Chief Engineers u ho have the ultimate responsi-Pubh.c Safety? binty for.pubirc safety. The adopiion of higher standards of safety for the protection of the public is of utmost im-portance;,furthennore, this is a valid and feasible objec-Anot.ru J. Achtas:AN. Senior hiemtvr. IEEE tive.

1250 Sherman Asenue This review is directed primarily to the " decision-Madison. Wis. 53703 makers" and " policy-makers"-past and present-und no, reflection is intended on the peop!c currently em-ployed in this new technology. Obviously, the sincerity and dedicated efforts of all these people are not in ques-tion, but the policies under which they have been obli:ed Editor's Note: This paper unarks a departurefrorn our ~

to work arc very much in question.

usual practice of publishing corninunications as corre. The objective here is to promote a highcr level of spondence. The Jiscussions preparedfor the ASME .ifect- integrity in atomic power policy, both in industry and ingfolfmr directly after the text. government, and higher standards of engineering in which Although this paper deals analnly srith the use of atornic the ultimatc tesponsibility for public safety is clearly power in generatin: stations, it is included because G-AES Identified.

is concerned uith pms cr generation in space and possibly, Such a review is not only in keeping with our profes-sorneday, the nucleur-engined rirplane. sional right of analysis and discussion; it is,in fact, a pro-fessional duty-and responsise to the purpose for which pur professional societies have been established. It is also Abstract responsive to the philosophy of Ciecro: "The safety of In this new technobrgy the history to date adds up to a scry small record th8 PeoPl e shall be the highest law."

In tk new and unpmee&nd snee dame mergy, of operating experiences, along with a sariety urcs. At this stage the denlopraent of stonu.c power suffers from a of denciencies and fail- .unfortunately, the philosophy of enumeerine r bih.ty has been allowed to fall by the wava.d", e or it has surge of mer-optimistic promotion plus a general 1:rcaLdann in engi- ~

been deliberately dismissed. This is a matter of such im .

neering rcMwensibility and control of safet) that could culminate in a portance that a Conclusive expodtion could fdl a book; national catastrophe.

hence, a brief review such as this can only sound an alert on current deficiencies.

This initiative, of necessity, is a highly personalized re-

,sponsibility, reflecting professional experiences and judg.

ments which extend beyond conventional technical anal-yses and conclusions d:rised from statistics. In essence.

this teview reflects a dceade of continuing analysis of the social, economic, and political experiences in this new technology of atomic power. There is only one objectise-to serve the best interests of the public and of the engi-necring profewion.

l. Re:ponsibility for Public Sofety The public health and safety are, first and foremn:l. the responsibilities of profewinnal men. The distincti.e marh Manu'.cript recched Nmemtvr 25,19fM. of a profenional man include a motite of scrsiec to meet a Eh paper was presented at the Winter Annual M(etin of the American &ciety of Mechamcal En;;incors, New York, N. Y., bihty, and a committnent to uphold the ethies of his pro-Ihnrnfact 1 5.1964. fession. The application of science and technology is a su r in4Nurnemt oN ArumrAct aron s icnerimr' mrem vor. As.s-5, m. 3 MAY19f.9 363

r3 e s .

dillicult and personalimi art in which the engineer in financial responsibility, and under deliberate censorship charge commits himself to ser ing the public interest of any opposition.

abose all other>. and he carries this resru.sibility in his Notwithstanding the magnitude of such projects, there conscienee. On him rests the ultimate responsibility for ' are relatively few " experts" employed in this type of plan-public safay. ning. Unfortunately, most of them tend to ignore the in .19N Thaddeus Merriman, the former Chief Engi- harmful implications. In addition, many politicians are neer of the Board of Water Supply for the City of New cager to make long-term commitments, supposedly for York, declared [l]: plausibic objectives-but also to maintain their political The engineer's duty does not lie only in saving a ' Positions. They encroach on engineering indeper.dence masimum of his client's money. It demands absolutely and respcasibilities, they dominate the establishing of that the publie be atforded a masimum of safety. If the debased planning policies for monumental projects, and client is unwdlin; or unal;!c to pay for that maximum they insist upon open-ended fmancial commitments and then hs _hould not have his project. And what is true in the use of arbitrary " legal" strategies. The net result is a the case of a private client is just as importantly true breakdown in de areas of professional responsibilities, when ,the engineer acts for public authority-he must ethical standards, the rule of law, public safety, financial still protect the publie-no one else can perform that controls, and the accountine for public funds.

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This debased planning technique is en:erging currently And " responsibility" has been clearly dermed by on a large scale and on a nationwide basis. The most terri-Admiral llyman G. Rickover [2]: fying example is to be found in the development of Re,ponsibil;tv is a unique concept:it can only reside atomic power, where the traditional proledanal disci.

and inhere in a$ing!c indisidual. . . . If responsibility is plines and responsibilities of the independent engineer rightfully y ours. no evasion, or ignorance or passing the have been completely disrupted.

blame can shift the burden to someone else. Unless you To understand how this came about, we need to go back can point your finger at the man who was responsible to 1957 when Congress was persuaded to adopt a revolu-when somethin; goes wrong, then you have never had tionary change in insurance practices through the enact-anyone really responsible. . ment of the Third Party Liability (Price. Anderson) Act.

Sersice ceases to be professional if it has in any way Under this act, in the event of a failure or accident in an been dictatej by the client or employer. The role of the atomic power plant, the major part of the cost of the profesuonal man in society is to Icnd his special knowl.

dcotruction in life and property will be transferred to th:

edge. his uc!!.tramed mtellect, and lus dispassionate .. .

vicums and to the taxpayers of the nation. This Icgislat. ion habit of visual; ring problems in terms of fundamental princip'es to wluteser specific task is entrusted to him. must be regarded as a great historical tragedy for two Professional independence is not a special privilege but reasons: 1) it has destroyed the traditional concepts of rather an inner neceuity for the true professional man, rc5Ponsibility and corporate liability, and 2) it has led to and a safeguard for his employers and the general pub- the exploitation of public confidence in the engineering lic. Without it, he negates everything that mak':s him a profession and in the American system of private enter-pmicuianal nrson i and he becomes at best a routine prise. (The history of this revolutionary change has been technician or hired hand, at worst a hack. examined in greater detail elsewhere [3].) In essence this This concept of an encincer's responsibility together new law relieves the utilitics and insurance companies of with the confidence of the publie in the eneineering pro- a huge financial risk against damages which could execed fession comprise a rich heritace which stand as the pri. 5 to 7 billion dollars. Private insurance companics are mary bulwark for the protection of the public in the ap- c rrying only ne percent of the peri!, and the law autho-plication of science and technology. Political interference rizes payments of another ten percent of the estimated or arbitrarv esecutise displacement of a Chief Em'incer's Peril, a maximum of 5500 000 000 from the public trea-responsibil'ities would clearly be a violation of'public sury, on any one failure of an atomic reactor.

trust. The public has a right to capect absolute intellectual U. S. Congress ignored Warning honesty m matters of publie health and safety. Ilerbert flooser has stated most precisely that " technology with. When this legislation was being considered in 1957 by out intellectnal hone.ty will not work." ,

the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), and in the U. S. Congress, Representative Chet flolifield, as t;c Abdication of ProfesAnci Responsbility low d wenting member of this ISmember committe ,

declared himself opposed to the Price. Anderson Act it.

Regrettably, howeser, this concept of responsibility is these words (4}:

not beine perpetuated in the new pastwar technolouies,

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and the cneineerine profewinn is a!!owing itself to h[sub-atomic power deselopm;nt without any commensurate ordinate <l to posernmental authority. I)uring *the past benctits to taxpayers and power consumers. It would decades we hase seen many proposals for impressive place upon the federal government an enormous poten.

scientille and engineering projects, but they are being pro- tial liability that couhl reach several hundred billion

. moted under political domination, completely devoid of do!!ars. . . .

3r.l firs taAssAcinss os ArPosFAQ A*;D rfICTitoNif* sYvrt.*,fs MW 19@

.p (s This bill liput forth by its proponents as a bill for the These words should liave touched everyone's con-protcethm of the public. This amounts to making a vir- science. But, unfortunately, this respon>ibic warning has tue out of a subsidy. The bill is protectise oflarge utili- remained unheeded to this day.

ties, industrial companiet, and insurance companies Only on rare occasions were appeals heard for a more which are not udling to adhere to the tenets of free deliberate approach in doeloping " engineered factors of s b It i[not a minor technical amendment to thesafety" and economie principles of application. Reports Atomic Energy Act, it is a major piece of legislation. It i and Profess,onalpapqs were diflicult to find on operatmg goes far beyond anythin; I know in committing the problems and on dehe,encies t or titilures experienced m federal government to future liabilities without any cicar the first group of atomic power plants, although the art of understanding or basis in esperience as to the nature or engineering is advanced through the lessons learned from the nugnitude of those liabilities. failures. However, over the years, and generally under Later, during the debate in the llouse of Representa, 5 Pedal drcunntanus, a few signqant stauments m &

tives, Holitield declared [5}: light of day, such as "We Are Bemg Misled on Nueicar Power" by a former member of the AEC's General

. . . You Members of Congrc>s are taking upon your Advisory Committee [8] and my own paper [3].

shoulders the personal responsibility for writing an Furthermore, with liiroshima and Nacasaki still verv' indemnity bill which will give the>c people the coverage ntuch in the public mind, some local groups of citizens that they wantfinancial/y and you wdl have upon your hearts and upon your minds and upon your souls the banded toSether and registered violent opposition to the responsibility in case there is a blowup in this field. build.mg of atomic power plants m populated areas. Th.is resulted m several important projects bemg canceled as, Unfortunately this historic warning was ig'nored. The for example, in Queens, N. Y., and B0dega Bay, Calif.

f lobbying or this bill apparently had been managed so Despite all the deficiencies and confusing concepts that skillfully that the Act was passed by both liouses of inevitably appeared during the first decades of this new Congress wahout even recording the vo,rmg. technology, the engineering profession (through its ofli-cial societies) has made very little e! Tort to oppose un-High-Pressure Propagando sound policy trends or to bring about a sound reorienta-Once the Price-Anderson Act had passed, it brought tion in professional responsibility.

with it a new concept (or "fou'rth dimen? "omic power development-the perrersion of ,and The Problem of Pub!Ic Safety is Token to Court the widespread application of "crno?it... .agineering."

The first court action in defense of public health and As a consequence an aggressive promotional cliort was. safety was filed in 1956, not by the engineering profes-launched, ostensibly to accelerate the development of slon, but by a labor union, which opposed the construc-atomic power. Advertisements dctcriorated into unsup-tion of the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant' near '

portabic claims of low cost, safety, and abundance of Detroit. After this case reached the U. S. Court of Ap-electncity for everyone, and into emotional propaganda, peals it handed down a decision in June 1960 [9]:

Engineering conferences invanably featured the wonders 1 of this great new energy resource, and professional papers in our opinion the { Atomic Energy] Commission's l forecasting a new utopia were .gisen special recognition. lindings regarding safety of operation are not sum- l Against the traditional piofessional disciplines and mod- cient. . . . We think it clear from the Congrc>sional con-erating inflodeey of responsible engineers and fully re- cern, for safety that Congress intended no reactor

sponsible insuraned companies. the new atomic scientist- she'uld, without compel!ing reasons, be located w here it administrators argued [6). "This simultaneous pursuit or will expose so large a population to the possibility of a programs of research, development and constructior' has nucicar disaster. . . . Beeuuse we think the safety find-become standard ist the fast moving field of atouic ings msumcient, we mut set aside the Comnussion's

,,, .. . grant of a construction permit. . . . .

A few year later a new warning was heard when engi-neer Abel M)olman, lion. M. ASCII, testified m 1960 The case was carried to the Supreme Court i of the Um.ted St:ttes on appealin the fall of 1960 [103 . This pro-before a (.onerewnmal (.omnnitee [.,.j:

vided an opportunity for contributin; an amiru: curiac li i, only with re carth for criteri . fc,r radiatinn limih i , brief to the Comt [1l] in whi<;h the profenion:d and that one find. tint it should be swrmi..ib!c to kill peup!c legal toponsibilities of en rineers were defined and recom-to attain kntfit, to society.1his has undoubtedly been mendations were ofTered'for returninu to the traditional

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act I r; k;n1 r$ u\c n r en Practices of engineering and construction under the rate r i

>cany. . . An a;rted au.sphnce of a nmober of con.e. UI I"**

tguent di,ahditi , is not an appealin;*. Imis for the d:- Unfortunately, the Ca. ort held that since only a con-veloporent uy,of nu6 fear power. /,n/rntry ail /t/o bcster 5'f"CII"n permit had been granted there could he no legal alzan rest up.*n surh an offrant to nuan. i hsuc oscr operating safety until the plant had Iseen cor..

(Empha:.is added) structed and an opern/lirg permit was under considera-Af r.IksfAy; AioatlC 343Wg g ANgp get:HI ft" 54ll rY Ma$

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' tion. Again>t this the minority opinion of the Court , j

a. __ f dedared [.9:

n5!allis tincil /

The le;islatise hi> tory nuko clear that the time w ben OfIlilllC!!T II:lM3 the inue of" safety" mu t tv resohed is before the Com- *

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mis, ion inues a conaruction permit. The con >truction ,, m 1920 -1961 , /.

f ghen the Act by the Comminion (and today approsed)

• h, with all deference. .t lightheaited approach to the  ! ,/ g '

most auewme, the most deadly, the mo>t dangerous , j m

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process that nun has eser conceised. ,/

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The net etTeet of the Court's decision on atomic power j

. . . . - - ' ' ' *,4' desetopment has been to disrupt a traditional safeguard *************

fjj ,;m n for prospectise imotors and to weaken the ethical disei-

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plino of the engineering profenion in the areas of eco-g$ h{.hhqggg{g.j

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nomics, finance, and public safety. , ,,,, ,,,, ,,,, ,,,,

Pig, t. Instelled capodty and onnvol energy production by U. s

• orie "';r.eies, t 920-1964112. p. 7401. tnote rhet ene scale for nocteor

!!. Responsibilities of Management power generation is enforged 1o tienes for visibility.1 The problems of corporate liability in the event of a catastrophie failure of an atomic power plant continued to plague a number of responsible utility managements and their Boards of Directors. The chief reasons for their concern were 1) the continuing refusal by the insurance changes of policy in the power industry, and the ethical

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companics to write the same kind of comprehensive Third issues inherent in the application of nuclear science. The Party Liability Insurance as is available for fossil. fueled majority appear to be unaware of the new and subtle steam plants; 2) the absence of an adequate record of sue- influences that are uadermining the welfare of their own cessful operating esperience from which sound judgment companics, as well as the public safety. Some of them couhl be drawn for major commitments into the future; seem to rely on someone else's opinion, or on the fact that

3) a high degree of public concern about the peril of radio- "everybody's doing it." A more cynical comment is some-active fallout, as reflected in the actise opposition to sev. times heard mat " Directors don't direct."

eral atomie power projects; and 4) the fact that the Pricc* At a recent hearing before an Atomic Safety and Li-f Anderwn Act was operable for only a limited period of censing floard these deficiencies in' corporate manage-l

! ten years and was due to espire in 1967. ment were identified in the following testimony (14):

As recent as June,1967, there were only four public Trie intr duction of a major perit, with a potentiality utility atomic power plants in operation in the U. S. with H d"'.ructi n gre ter than was experienced at thro-capacities exceeding 75 000 kW, and only one of these .

shmia, is a tremendous responsibih,ty. This is, frst of had a ratine as high as 265 GC0 kW. All of them, includ- all, a responsibility resting on the indicid.wl Directors of in; sesen smaller plants, were considered largely experi- ,fu. paar, company-and on the Directors of the par-mental. The total capacity of nuclear pneratton, melud- ticipting power companies. Commisdoner James T.

ing the smaller units, came to about 1000 000 kW, or less Ramey of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission has than half a percent of the total electrical capacity in the declared: "It must never be forgotten, however, that United States of about 230000000 kW (Fig.1). (The responsibility for safety of the plant rests with the deliciencies in these atomic power developments, and the owner or operator. The regulatory groups, no matter .

how thoroughly the y carry out their function, cannot unutisfactory operating experiences, base been critically~

Provide complete av;urance that public health and resiewed elsew here (12l, [13].

safety will be adequetely protected in a power reactor

. projcd. . . ." (AEC Authorizing Le;,idation-19fd, p.

Pespen.;hilitMs of Curds of Directors 3m)

The propo,cd atomic power plant reprctents a revo.

Our great An.eri:an system of free enterprise is founded I"'IO. nary departure from traditional corporate respomi-on the inte;;rity of each company or corporation, and on bility and from the traditional confidence reposed in their u rl/in~ ness to rintimefullrespmnshtlity for their acts. *" Y o unin rmed public. There is little At that lesel, obsious!v. only the !!oard of Dhectc,rs c:m mdication# $** t hatoy util.

Direttors have t<nmined the pet.

. supply the answers to que tions of corporate puh.ey. son:d und.cthica' vefomibilities inve,1ved in introduc-Granted that there are many fin: directors of high mtc3* in; such a peril. It is respectfully sugpted that cach rny sersm; on the lierds of the great power and manu- Director be given an opportunity to re-examine his f.u.turmg comp.mies It is .ncserthe!cw, distrewing to see rcipomibihtio and publicly declare his position as part h,ow few hase pnblicly cludienged ' the resolutionary of this hearing record-n, c ,,ou, n, e., on 3, mmc r. co r, ,,,,,,,,,c n 3,, y, u y 19,o 3r4 ,

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Very' few utility directors apgurently hate been gisen sion (4 from the coal industry and I independent consult-the oppm tunity to b. dance their ju Igment through a carc- ing enginect) (16].

fut study of the f nhero .mst m/rrne cArcriences in atomic - The promotional efTorts and " emotional engineering" power development. and the lewom to be learned from in support of this legi>!ation were something remarkable them. "Ihew esperiences include the public protests which to behold. The preparatory work by most witnesses was led to calling oli pl.ms for the 1000 000.kW ltnenswood estemise, and a solid front was presented by the spokes- 4 plant in New York and the 325 000.kW ILidega Bay men for the electricat industry. _

plant near San Francisco in 1964; the deferment of the These hearings brought forth some strange testimony.

162 000.kW Malibu plant near Los Angdes in 1966; the For example, two witnesses who adsoeated the extension abandonment of the 150000.kW Enrico Fermi reactor of the Price-Anderson Act inadvertently esposed some near Detroit in 1965 and the decision of the Detroit important'factors that impinge directly on business Edison Company directors to ent.trge their sptem until ethics.

1972 with a coal. burning steam plant: the closing down The first one, a reactor manufacturer, was asked what of the Oak Ridge plant in 1966 after 557 000 000 had been effect it would have on his company's actisities in the spent on it: the dismantling of the Itallam, Neb., plant nuclear field if the price. Anderson Act were not extended.

in 1966 after an expenditure of 555 000 000; the intermin- lie replied (16, p. 95]. " . . . Of course. my opinion would able operating dimeulties uith smaller plants in La Crosse, be that that probably would deter us from taking on fur.

Wis., Elk Riser. Minn., and Puerto Rico; the diseosery ther work-a conservative approach by the Board of late in 1967 of more than a hundred cracks in,the Oyster Directors. . . ."

Creek prenure vessel: and the disapproval by the AEC in The second one, a spokesman for the Nuc! car Energy 1967 of the 2 000000.kW plant in Ilurlington, N. J., Liability insurance Association, was asked what the im-

"because of its prosimity to major population centers." pact would be on the insurance industry and the nucicar Furthermore. Directors could to advantage examine the liability policies they issue if Price. Anderson were allowed complete lack of operating experiences in large-sized reac- to espire. lie responded (16, p.196], "It would be my tors, the lack ofintegrity in the massive promotional cam- guess that the system of economic channeling that Price-paigns, the efronts to brainwash the public, the problem Anderson more or less stimulates might very well break

, of radioacdse waste disposal, and sescral other technical down . . . and it would depend largely on thir financial problems of equal importance. responsibility and integrity of each twelear operator" There me some fundamental defects also in basic eco- (en phasis added). .

nomics in comparine the cost of electricity produced from atomic reactors with the cost of cicetricity producect Test; mony by Concerned Citizens from fossil fuels. Comparatise costs in terms of " mills Such hearings also provide an opportunity for inter-per kWh" are being relied upon by Directors for making ested citizens to contribute important information; and huge financial and long. range policy commitments, when the omeial reports on such hearings are published, despite the fallacies to be found on the subject of" cost of they are available to all citizens for detailed study. Obvi.

atomie energy." We wouhl do well to remind ourselvcs of ously, anyone who speaks out in dissent against popular

, the notable opinion exprewed by a former AliC Director ideas assumes a special burden in volunteering to testify.

of Reactor Daelopment who declared (15]: And, depending on the adequacy or inadequacy of the judgment developed from these hearings, the future of our Figures in the htcrature on estinuted cost of atamic enem vary by at teet a f.ictor of 10. I am not ;;oin; to natmn and its people is comnutted accordmgly.

The fact remains, howescr. that the public is confronted j try at this tinw to gne you more accurate cost fi;ures for three ve.ry pood remons: with a highly sophisticated new technology, and the con- 1 trwer al inues (such as tite " safety factors" in atomic

, 1) 'they do not esist even with the Atomic Energy , ,

Comminion. . Power plants)de3pite their m!portance are understood by 1

2) If they did esist, they couhl not he releawd for tery few peopic. This was confirmed by the general lack of j scemhy renom.

public interest and conecrn in the announcement of

1) If the y di.! esi.: anil if they cnahl 1:e actea ed, I Augint 31.1965: "The Senate proceed.:d to comid.r bill

. wouWt Ishoe th.m anyway. (S.3012). *Estendin; ar.d Amendinj the Price Anderson

. Indemnity Provisions of the Atomie Energy Ae.t of 195 "

and paned it**-..without a record of the voting (17).

lit, tiew Conryessional Hearings ,

in June l'M the Joint Conunittee on Atomic Fncryy JCAE Hearinip of Septwber 1967

.hdri new heasin; .'in the nation's Capitol on the que, tion The mer.t recent opportunity for reesamining basiciwnes of extendin~ the Price. Anderson Act for another ten was at the JCA E IIcaring in the U. S. Capitol on Septern-years. A total of 35 witmsses were heard of widch 3t) ber 12-14.1967. The hearings prmided a review of cur-advocated esten. inn of the Act amt 5 oppo.at such esten- rent procedures (IF.] and comments were imited on I-  : Af ht pttt 4*4* A go* Hf; tanW1 P. ANf 3 l'oalf IC W t iT M7

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ggQ.--.I Fig. 3. Undergrovad setting for atom:c power pioat.Luceae, swiriertoad (3. p. 681. In ttds design the otomic power plon' is loco'ed completely underground la solid rock, o well.recognised technique employed for the economic development of hydroelectric power in many ports of the world.

F.g. 2.

cw=wtotive ther,not.efectric energy production cf U. s. electric operations have been under constant surveillance by sci-

.em..e i9:3-i944 ti r, p. 7471. tuote rhoe ehe icole for no:leor powe' eene.otion i. ensorged so t.me. ror whme r.1 entists and physicists who have had superior training.

flowever, as in the case of the historical doelopment of  !

w -

steam boilers, majorfailures in momicpower plants cren- '

I I

$ tually will preside important lessons and ser e as a guide

(** E

/(. for future developments, tNr$.

cr us tbwc uim.ts

.' , 2) The nuclear industry undoabtedly is taking many important steps m the desclopment of this new technol-tw-m /..@i.L ogy. But it has not adopted the design and siting criteria j ,, ffh which would guarantee complete safety to :he public liv-

- /,,,TM;','gMing in the surrounding region. (The feasibility of such sip

}c

/* C- T j ing has been demonstrated by the underground testing of

/,c j atomic bombs.)

. 9 uranee lawyers in the prisate utility industry unless they are pre-policies on their homes they are not covered against pared tojeopardir.e their future by challenging the policy i nuclear reactions or fallout. . . . commitments introduecd by these few but influential

8) In summary, the following recommendations for executives. As a consequence the process of critical anal-Congres>Ional consideration were otTered: ysis is suppressed on the most important and controversial issue ever to confront that industry.

a) that Congress repeal the Pn.ce Anderson Act; 2) A representative of one of the nation's leading manu-b) that the inwrance companies remogc the rmelear facturers of nuclear reactors testified: "We simply could

_ exclusion proustons from all homeowners insur- not afford to jeopardize our sery substantial investment ance pohcies: in this industry, and perhaps in other businesses, by as-c) that full responsibility for pubh.e safety be placed on suming safety risks. I have no doubt at all that the entire the Directors of the utility company or power industry holds this view /* In a matter as imprtant and as agency operating an atomic power plant: controversial as the question of public safety this declara-d) that the power company s own Chief Eng.mect for tion tends to silence professional engineers and lawyers the project be publicly identified as having the full employed in that industry who should be speaking out responsibility for dtrectmg the design and construc-tion of an atomic power plant-wah the overridmg a ainst such an " affront to man." This testimony was reminiscent of the notable opinion handed down b.h Fed-duty to protect the puhhe mterest and safety; eral District Judge J. Cullen Gancy in 1961 in the Price-c) that atomic power plants be located underground p g m solid rock.

What is really at stake here is the survival of the kind of economy under which this country has grown great, the lack of Responsible Criticism in JCAE Hearings free enterprise system. . . .The conduct of these corpo.

rati ns and individuals has flagrantly mocked the The author's testimony reviewed in particular "The ImaSe of the CC nomic 5Dicm f free enterprise which Duty to Dissent"and his concern that the Joint Commit. the country, and it has destroyed the we pr fess tee, while dealing with one cf the most important re- .

model w hich we olTer today as a free world alternative to sponsibih. .ues m the history of the world,is bem.gdem.d e state control, to socialism, und eventual dictatorship, the full benefits of "the loyal opposition." In a suppie-mentary communication to the Committee this issue was 3) The Chairman of JCAE referred to the fact that "in

' identified in greater detail, from which the following is the Turkey Point licensing proceedings there was consid-summarized [18, pp. 791-794), erable discussion of the need for an applicant to make The former editor orthe of!icialjournal of the IEEE has specific prosision in design for sabotage or other enemy recently reviewed the obstacles confrontine an eneincer action." lie asked a leading public utility executisc (18, when his conscienes dictates that he must record a dihent.p. 779]: "Do you believe consideration should be given ing opinion where the public interest is at stake. lie in such matters of design of nuclear power plants?"

' declared editerially [19): There was no spen and forthright answer to this ques-tion, ahhou:h '

it is one of the most important questions on Is it true . . . thit editorial space for prewntation of an public safety ever posed in the history of our country.

unpopular wcwpomt u virtu dfy impowb!c to obtam in Furthermore, no Proposal was offered bY this executise to a reputab!c techmeal joarnal? Alas, it is true- . . . . ,

consult the engineering profession which has the ultmiate Dis.cntin; opinions are likely to be unpopular. . . .

Many claim that it iidisloy:J to protest. Sometimes the TCSPonsibility for public safety.

penahy-disapprmal, low of status, esen vitification- 4) The Chair. nan aho remarked that th: Atomic -

can b: wwe. Th : ren,hy for negfe:t of this duty. how. Energy Commission had decided that protection against cwr, em I.e minh smac evere. . . . sabotage was not to be an iswe in the Turkey Point licens-ine proce ture. It i, interesting to note that this particular

• IL; r[;.imsibihtio restiny on the Joint Conunitte: on . ruie, applicable tu all atomie power plants, was puNhhed Atonne F.nerry ase tremendous, and the Committee has earlier in 1%7 in the Fed:ral itegister where it apparently shown a wd, linpyui, to ljear a divessity of ideas,includinE attracte i very little attention (Feha uary 11 and April 5, fosthey, ht entient. prni oppoatu m llo..ever, there was 1%7). This terrifyine rule did not base the hendit of open

, ~

. a netahfe Iatk of entical te.tinnpny as may be illus.trated analysis ami debate witlJn the engineering and le+d pro-hy peveral m , culent s. fewi Acconfin to the Al;Ci public document file.

9

~ 1) A ipotesman,-claimin;tto represent "l78 investor- only three comments were received, one from a reacto-

- ow n al cles trie pow. r comp.mih sersing more than three< manufacturer concurring,in the order, amt two in opposi-4 - - u n e nio: Arne ,.wne w. rune n un er ' ya q

~

-m. -

?

tion -.one from an independent consulting engineer [21] brief period of 13 months of 1966-1967 a total of 97 large and one from an independent attorney p2). (The current atomic generating units, aggregating, 73 000000 kW, rule on t% >abotage peril, as an open insitation to catas- were ordered or projected for installation during the trophe. is ef such great importance that it calls for a sepa- period 1969-1975. .\ lost of these units have ratings of rate > tory.)

S00 000 to I 000 000 kW, far beyond any reactor in com-mercial operation today (23).

IV. New Program of Atomic Power Development "" " 8

"? so issued flouse of Representaines Report 1266 on Aptd I, us that tk KM Estending the Price Anderson Act for another ten 196S, in which it expressed concern ab'out "the band-year, has had the net etTeet of greatly enlarging the wagon rush"into atomie power, and warned a portion of "f.mrth dimension" in atomie power deselopment-slic the utility industry that it " lacks a full appreciation of percersion of responuMity and the abandonmen ef pri- the job confronting the utilities at this time."

ntary concentforpuNic safety by sarious Daards of Direc-tors aho decided tojoin the bandwagon rush into atomic Need for Return to Fundamentals '

power. .

In this overpowering new science the experiences of the Furthermore, it has opened the door for a new cam-past decade have demonstrated that the traditional struc-paign of emJtional engin6 : ring at all levels. For example, in an etTor t to brainwash v. worried pnblic the management ture of corporate and professional responsibilitie been undermined by resolutionary changes in insurance of a national magazine of the " family type" was per- philosophy and engineering philosophy. Today atom suaded to publish a propaganda article on the "New Age" of atomie power, authored by a free lance writer- power technology is in the hands of a small but influential group whose members have cominced themselves that a type of article no responsibic executive or independent engineer would write. To gise the artic!c more "charac* "all is well." Responsible protests are dismissed as being "beyond human credibility"-a kind of dismissal remi-ter " it was first " planted" in the ollicial magazine of an niscent of the few desperate protests against the international service club of business and professional of the gas chambers in 1942-1945.

men, and then " reprinted" for the nation's families.

l he latest elTort to brainwash the public was a so-called There is a crying need for vigorous and open debate "public opinion" poll in California which reported, and for freedom of communication to clearly identify the "Sesenty three percent agreed that nuclear plants are monstrous gamble with human lives which has grown out necewary for additional electricity for California's of the current perversions of responsibility. A reappraisal growth . . . and 64 percent agreed that opponents of of these responsibilities is inevit'able--the choice being nuclear plants spread fahe rumors and try to scare only whether to undertake it now or in the aftermath of a catastrophe.

people." flowever, apparently none of those intersiewed were toki that the insurance companies (untler a standard It would be a sad day if an iron curtain eventually were "nuelear esclusion clause" in the line print) specifically to descend and keep independent engineers from exer ing theirjudicial professional responsibilities in the areas deny homeowners compensation in the event of damage of public safety. If this were to happen it wou from the failure of a nearby nuclear plant.

'Ihe more uggrevive reactor m,anufacturers stepped up another step in the relentless trend towards the te their sales initiatise with o!Terings of" turn. key contracts" cratic petri lIcation of our nation'sfreedom.

for atomie power plants of unprecedented sire; this in-eluded all costs of engineering, comtruction and installa-V. The importance of Maintaining Perspective tien of et;nipment under an AEC construction permit, without knowing in advance whether AEC would ever A tiew Event in Hvenon History  :

grant an <,perating permit wijen the plant is completed. Today we are confronted with the terrible respe"tsi- .

1 he engineering firms on these projects, in effect, became bility of contro!!ing a scientific power great enough whenntraetm s or drafting sersiees and gase up their pro- destroy all life. Ilut this power of total destruction 0 is at:

Y femioul ind 1 endence and frsedom to challyng the a power that can he made to serve mankind ifit is applie nmit, of m.h proj sts. The nst c:Teet of all tl.is has been according to the wi!! of the Creator.

a bre.d d.mn in profuJonal disciplines and ethies in this The tremendous ruponsibility of interpreting this

- nev. technology. and a soluntary retreat " rom the obliga- power to all the world,a!ong with the duty of deterr tion to >erse the public safety and interest ahme all ethens what is to be done with it in the coming centuries,is pres-ently in the hands of the Joint Conunittee on Atomic (laims e

that pn. pxti e reneratinp cmts from atomic Energy of the U. S. Congress.11ut it is also a re,ponsi-pe r planty in the years ahead will be lower than from bility of the Amerie:m engineering profewion, an;d this en d or oil-thed steam plants were diweminated with an respomihility is of a unique type which no gmerntnental Am ton reminheent or th_e "Jr inch' yardstick costs" of aycney or politically constituted body can fulfdl. It is the' c.oher days It iinothing short of frightening that in the respomihility at th,:lew! of professional ethics.  :

UU' 1 118 8!1p ANut'INsNs o*4 AFPfnPArY ANf3 f f.f trrHrstac Wstr?11 STAY 190

The Overriding Irnportonca of Profesdon- hics of the following specilie t  : lines chieli may be derived Ethies are a preluct .of conscience- on the same lesel directly from our Code of Ethics.

with faith and trust and integrity-and founded on intel. 1) It shall be deen.ed unethical for an engineer to apply lectual honesty. Ethies are the dominating influence on his talents and responsibilities to the location, design and the truly re>ponsible engineer. In the past, for example, construction of an atomic power plant with such a low ethies base prosided the self-disciplined cuidelines for factor of safety that,in the esent of accidental failure or thousands of engineers in creating the miracle of safe sabotage, eatastrophie damage will resuit to the surround-drinking water in the communities throughout America. ing region and its people. (Under current official regula-The people take this standard of sersiee for granted and tions the peril of sabotage may be disregarded in the place their complete trust in the integrity of the eneineers.'

design and location of an atomic power plant.)

It is a trust which every profewional eneineer must 2) It > hall be deemed unethical for an engineer to apply respect. Knowing more than the people do about the his talents and responsibilities to the location, design and clTeet his work will hase, his first duty i> to serre rhepuNic constructi5n of a low-cost atomic power plant, with a low intrrest abore allothers, no matter w hat his employer may factor of safety, on the assumption that,in the esent of a want or what some gosernmental regulation may permit. major accident or sabotage, the nation's taxpayers will "Ihis is particularly important in the resolutionary new compensate the survisors for damages. (Such compensa-technology of atomic power where we'are confronted tion is present. day official governmental policy.)

with new responsibilities of unprecedented magnitude, and where there has been no opportunity to develop the VI. Summary requisite rules of law. Chief Justice Earl Warre'n of the U. S. Supreme Court has alerted us to such responsibili- Today we are struggling with the controversial ques-ties in these words (fotming part of an address delisered tion of how to apply this revolutionary discoscry of on Nosember 12, 1962): stomic energy for the benefit of man. In particular, we Society would come to grict whhout Ethics, which is are groping for the right answer to the ultimate question unenforceable in the Courts, and cannot be made part of how to consert the enerSy of the atom into electricity of I aw. . . without peril to the public-and without violating the Not only does Law in cisilized society prest ppose rights of the citizens under our constitutional system of ethical commitment; it presupposes the existence of a government.

broad area of hunun conduct controlled only by cthical Measured in these terms, our progress, if any, has been norms and not subject to Law at all. . . . feeb!c, indeed; and the question "Who is responsible in The individual citi/en may engage in practices which, the event of a major failure?" is passed around in a on the advice of coun el, he believes strictly within the sicious circ!c.

! citer of the Law, but uhich he also knows from his own Certainly, all mankind has a richt to expect something conscience are outside the bounds of pro,sriety and the ~

right. Thus, whea he engages in such pracuees, he does better than to acknowledge the possibility of a catastro-so not at bn own perd -as when he violates the Law- phe and to provide for coscrine 10000 graves with a but at petit to the structure of cisitir.ation, involving blanket of gtecnbacks! If the cager prophets who ar.c greater stakes than tuiy po,sible pcril to himself. Proclaimmg the blessmgs of atomic power were to This Law beyond the Law.as distinct from Law,is the examine the other side of their coin, they might see that creation of civili/ation and is indispen able to it. . . . such a catastrophe (from the failure or sabotaging of an A person able to diseern the right in the midot of great atomic power plant) would precipitate a violent public confusion and to pursue it, is a person of character. A resu!sion against our most important industry and its i person may be learned or ignorant; he may be old or directors-and ultimately against our entire system of

>oung, rich or poor, well or sick; whatever hi> condition free enterprise for hasing condoned such an appalline he has to act, and his actions h we their clTect on hirmcif irresponsibility in the application of this new science.  ;

and generally aho on his fellow men.

The education of both mimsters of reh,g,.on and of L

.Ihc time has arrived for a thorouch review of the dis- l speci.ihsts, qualified to help the ennfuted Ond lumself illusioning m;y collapse ofintegrity and for facine -

up to the I the nu/c of ethi.,d probicm, in my opinion, one of onunous c aHenge a ince eight years agm ,

the urpnt nm!, of Westctn demmra:y. as it attempts An agreed acceptance of a num5cr of conwquent dis-l to pre trve its irmbrian of freedom in competition with abilities is not an app;aling, basis for the dweiopment, I riva! 9 sten 6 of life. . . . , say, of nuc! car powcr. IMustry will do better than rest i upon such an affront to man. l W!ein sesnee ha , pnt in the han,l. of policy-makers I a tremer.dou , t.cw lescrape in w hi.h the mivakes can now Our free enterprisc system smnr provide a better answer. '

be rucedingly large; and the ,mportance of the e,hiral Atomic power stations as currently designed present a quotion has escabicd acemdingly. From this perspective unique and incredible haeard to human life. Where in copineers wo.:.ing in the n"w technology of atomie power industry is tnt leader with the requisite courare and in- l owe it to themsdve,'o search their conwiences in terms territy to promote 1) the repeal of the Price-Anderson 9 rermm nosnr onw.n e.o renue sain v 371 4

_ _. . . _ ._ ~ _ . _ _ , . . -

(

~ ' ^

Aet, and 2) the repeal of the AEC'sIegulation 10 CFR v. laternational Union or rlwirical workers. Art..Clo e, /.,

'I " " '

part l1.4 which authorites the design and location of [g g y ['j, M'r i Ni. . i), r4 , i ir tN essi.of[10%

atomie power plants without complete protection of the see[31 publie aeain>t the perils of sabotage of all types? These (12) , "Atomie gwer planto :ah:u's urong with themr*

' ' 7 two stepI alone wouhl go far towards reestablishing engi. gg3g (j,j"'[;""'. ((. 1]3'y , hI 'g'4) g p,gg necting and corporate responsihihty founded on mlegrity safety," Rosarjan (Esansion. Ill.). pp. .t2 35. DwemNr 1966; and on primary concern for the public interest and safety, also Reader Comnwnts. //>id., April 1967.

lI4] A. J. Ackerman, testimony given at hearings on Vernunt Nuclear Pouer Sution t$1 sonn kW). tiran'et oro. Va.,

" " " " * ' August I,1967.

[15] " Atomic power and private enterprise." JC.fE //earin:r. p.

[1] T. sternnun, "Nau;ht but the N>t," Ciril /~ngry., pp. 701- 132, 1952.

702. DwemNr 1939 [16] A. J. AcLernun, testimony. " Proposed estension of AEC l2] I1. G. RicLover.' testimony, " Radiation safety and reguta. indemnity legislation."/C.sc //,wrurgt (June 22-24,1965), pp.

tion." /C.lE //rurines tJune 15, 1961). 155-176.

[3] A. J. Ackernun. " Atomic pimer, a railure in engineering 'l7 C,nryrenle=aal Rcrord(Senate) p. 21461. August 31. 1965.

respon<il'ility," Trans. ASCE. vol.12S. pt. 5.1963. 13 " Licensing and regulation of melear reactors." /CAE Hrar.

[4 Congrenianal Remed (Senate), pp. 98,6-7, June 19.1957. ings (SeptemNr 12-14.1967) pp. 733-801.

l5 Canerrtiisural R,rord(llouw). p.10716. July I,1957. [19) C. C. Cutler. " Duty to dissent," IEEE Spretrinn, vol. 4, p. 47,

[6 lirief for the Petitm~ rs. IJnited States and Atomic Energy June 1967 Commiwion Nfore the U. S. Supreme Court, no. 454. p. 45, [20] J. G. Fuller & Gentleuren Contp/rators. New York:

OttoNr 10.1960. Grove,1962. pp.101-102.

[7] "Raduiion protation criteria and standards: their basis and [21] A.J. AeLernun. letter to Atomic Energy Commission, Afarch use." /C.lE // earings, pp. 34-35. 196 1 13,1967. See also [IS, p. 796).

[5] R. E. Wdson. "% are bein; nridrd on nuclear power " Power l22] P. Siegel, letter to Atomic Encr;y Commission, N! arch 10, Induitry, pp.14-15. January 1959. 1967. See also [IS, p. 796].

19 280 F.261. 615.19A. [23] M. Shaw," Nuclear power - the nest decade of development,"

[10 Pou r R. actor Development Company and AEC Petitioners, IEEESprtraint, vol. 4, pp. 73 30. OctoNr 1967.

Adolph J. Ackerman (SM'49) was born in New Ulm, Minn., on April 21,1901. lie attended Martin I.uther College, and received the 11.S.E.E. and C.E. degrecs from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, in 1926 and 1933, re<pectively, liis c.xperience in the planning and construction of power plants includes a six.

, ~ year awi;nm,:nt in lirazil, where he was in charge ofdesigning and building a million.

kilowatt power program including the first large underground hydropower plants in '

s- the Western IIemisph.re. For a number of years he served the World flank, making feasibility reports on power developments heated chielly in South America and India.

.. , With the ativent of the new technology of atomic power he has p tid particular atten-tion to the planning and lesign of underground atomie power plants, and dtuing the

{

~

., past ten years ha, m..intained a comprehensive review of atomie power developments in the i1. S. Since 1952, he has bee an independent consulting engineer on cicettic

power and water resource development.

Mr. Ackerman is a member of the American Institute of Consulting Engineers,

,[

n j American Society of Civil Engineers. American Society for Mechanical Engineers,

/

i t Fta Kappa Nu, Tan I! eta Pi, and Chi I?psilon. Ile is a Registered Profewinnal Fngineer

.j in the states of Pennsylvania, New York. Tennewee. Califmnia, ant! Wiveonsin.

172 u n om wrms ov eme.ws: orn o on,ovic syso ,n uwtwo

3 '

~rL

. Disassion~ The prescription for sue. ,ful voluntarf indisidual con.

l'rederic A 1.ang (Good I fore Itoad. !.andenivrg, pa.195.ty duct has been thoroughly covered by the great religious Engineers hase need to know each of the seldom told stories teachers of history. Engineers are, after all, indhiduals, and, of pubbe safety problems that are concurrent with great as such, are subject to per>onal responsibility for decisions strides forward in technology Too often the safety aspects of ti:st atYeet the lives and safety of nuny other people. Thus they such_conquois are hidden by company pobey hvause fu11 bmc their ** Nodes

• keeper" by reason of their superior pubhc knowledge of potential safe;y problems would roult in knowhdce of the nuterials and forces with which thev deal.

precautionary slacLenmg of the rush forward. The author is The Eplication of this overriding principle of sulcessful j human c'oeduct >pecifically to the engineer has been u cil estab-commended for ha per onal ctrort in belulf of pubbe safety and profesional ettnes. I shed in its fundamental aspects by Merriman [1], flooser We shouh! keep forcer before us the author's key state- [24), AcLcrnun [25], and others. Further doelopment for ment w hich ! quote,"K now, m g more than the people do about adjustment to current problems will depend on tbc degree of the eCeet hn wos L will base, his (the engineer's) fir >t duty is t courage displa)ed in ansact to the question of how much serre the public intesest abose all othets, no nutter what h.is wei ht shan be ghen espediency in view of an inercase of cen-employer rnay want or what somd gmeinmental regulation tral gosernment and its effect on the decision of encincers. !s will rernyit." Such ettueal conduet n our only hope of solu,ng compromise with principk' possible for enginects? Can intcl-the pubhc safety problems m the ab>ence of specific laws and lectual honesty be right or, some occasions and wrong on others?

governmentyegulation* .

We are confronted here with a matter of extreme importance

, Corporations by definition are not acte to nuke cth.'a caldeci-sions. Industrial cargwations nitt for the sole purpose of in the development of civilization-of even more importance making a profit. Only humans, meloding engineers, make the than'the profession itself. For without a fertile political, moral needed ethreal deCNons. O[Gourse, CorpofJte mtCr,est m maXt- and economic clinute, the profession, per se, would cease to midng the profit from power generation and other business exist, and the progress of society would come to a halt-per-endeavors is under some control by mdividual engineers wh haps even ebb-plunging the world into a new dark age.

can use their oun ctfueal stand.uds to present a nud rush for I refer particularly to the cunent trend in this country away profits and potential catastrophe. The author properly appeal' from the principics of individual freedom, moral responsi-to these engineers to undertake their professional duty on bility, and personal independence on the basis of w hieh we, as safety nutters. Americans, have been able to acquire the highest standard of If membc 3 of ot:r profess. ion fail to !*ced tlu,s appeal, they living the world has ever know n. In place of thesc bright tenets may espect that pubhe safety will thereafter be derived from d r% we arc substituting the dogma of a debilitatina gasernnent regulatimw deugned to protect the puolic front collectivism w hich, if not stoutly resisted, will engulf all th l

the d.mgers of othern,n e uncontrolled en;ineering pmjects of profc>sions, redacing their members to mere technicianr. and -

freat consequence. The need for profeoional societics ws!! be puppets of ignorant or umerupulous politicians and bureau.

reduced if engineers choose to abdicate th:ir reponsibi:stics t crar.-who are even now forming a new elite to w hich all the the public on safety prob cms. rest of us will be subser icnt.' ^

l The engineering profession occupies a critically important position in this situation for two re:nons. First, without its i .stanuscript rtvehd Nmembur 25.19M. supporting knowledge and skilh, the bureaucracy would .bc l

helpless in nuny areas of prime importance to the furtherance of its aims. Second, the profewion, with its very exntence ut stake, can easily lose by default unless it maintains an aggres-Lui 0; tram (2fil 1*ast Copland thhe, Orlando, fla. y nmral and ethical attitude of unswerving inte;rity in 32 Win %e author has clearly identified the area of profo. "5" P"

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sion:d ecsponsibil:t3 under the violently changing conditions 1.ct us be sure we underwand the issue before us. It n not that base been precipitated by the advent of atomic power. w hether atomic power shou!d, or should not, be daeloped. It sierttufore, nural function within the profew!on has been wii be, as the need arises. The timely and vitally important i langdy talen for granted under intuitne cpplication of po,tu- """ "'"f.how and where.

l lates that worked re.nonably well under normal conditions. he pu e n con,tamly kng bombarded by mmive claims The arrival, hmner, of this spectacular but in.ullicienth, and dehberate pmpaganda that the

• how"is all sett!cd by the und-roond and hh b!v d. macron umre- ofi mwer brin *, with' oTerinp of the reactor manufacturcrs. I am not so sure! The it the t:r.ent n:-l for'a tia.'oeugii realTra;ed of the enI in xr's "hoos" . shou ld m, elude du:rtgard for safety of the puh!*c. par-l ou.u.!! in9ral obbration if he i, to setain profe.,ioird$.tatus. N'" Y" "' " ^N " " ' " I#"@ "O I

'I he prohkm i. ren !cred e'pecially acut, Iw.use of the dany peate thin cwr p"I c exidenced by nun. And as com; fication, and ihlh. uftie, tesulting Imm an expan, ion of

. ny huono bem, gdsyn and build and operate, there wd!

! t!e unual r.u.enanent. Any tali. tie noal),is, therefore, mu.t e ninta . and accidents. l'urthermore. any engineer or.other tale into con.i fa. tion t!v nony f. net, of thi, form of rowrn- pason m r.:ofe u,onal uatu,who lends him,cif o the p!annm; m: .: ulnL re.ieeing tic rdation.hi;i of the en inver to hi. am! hu mg of an atonuc pimu pluu whhout pdnory dedi- l

' profc,.iuo to hi, dient. m.d to the public - the t!'ed pasty to canon to de sakt,v of tk puMe b af,mgug Ms profq. l ewr3 contract, otn thouzh tiut contract nay be only an sional re.pon.dnhty and Ntrayed his tsu,t to hunwir, to hn cmp!mo emp!oyee aswiation.

pmfewion. and to M feHos um The "where" is an.worrd in conjunction with the "how."

Why tac imdue risk. wIrn they tan 14: avoided by inu!cr-

'Amnaipt nohl Nm.mhei 25, run gmund in,tallations as ro;onune'nded by AcLennri? The j A*'s 9."1 A*y A p r t;e es .g 3 g- e.1, pg.ga p

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dr.C's undenyound testing of bombs is helping to demon. the insurance companies were unable or unwilling toproside strate the feasibility of contining atomic fallout under the most insurance against all but a small portion of the potentut tisk, estreme conditions, and thus avoid esposing the public to an the Government stepped in with the Price Anderwm Aa unpresedented peril. ,

which prosides switiw awurance that no one who might be liom the halls of Congress D6] we luse been warned that liable in the esent of a nustear power plant accident will hase "at any point in history the state of the art' imposes definite to bear one cent of liability out of his own pocket. l'or this limits on ulut is technologicdly feasible. Failure to probe, awurance, industry pap a nominal annual indemnity fee to deline, and recognite these limits leads to the choice of un. the Atomie Energy Commission which is in no way related to realistie and generally oserly cycosite goals which in turn the actual risk. In other words, the public is requited to lead to technical failures." To this Ackerman, on another anume the very risk which industry refused to assume.

occasien pr>}, has added that "the >dence of the engineering With climination of the deterrent effect of potential lia-profession (or the supprewion of competent engineering anal. bility, the public's protection must rest with 1) " engineered pis) on these conuoversial issues has allowed the reitien to safeguards" designed to minimite both the posubility and the drift into the pre >ent perilous situation. It adds up to an arro. consequences of an accident. and 2) stringent gosernment gant esploitation of publie confidence in traditional profes. regulation to assure adequate safety precautions. But the gov.

sional escellence." crnment regulation is admittedly de>igned to provide for So far as I am aware, this paper by Adolph J. Ackerman is safety without placing any crippling obstacles in the path of the first on this momentous subject which has l'een presented dcsclopment of this new technology; and because nuclear to the members of the American Society of Wehanical Engi. power technology le tpfrogs cycrience, the " engineered safe-neers. There should be much mose discussion of this >ubject guards"lind their validity in the pn'dictise judgment of seien.

and Ihe time is scry late, tists and engineers and not in wisdom deriscd from experience.

Oliver Wendell flotmes wrote "the life of the law is experi.

"" 8 "act S ence." Although I am no expert in engineering, I suspect that

[2 3) II. C. Ilomer. T4e C/ualenge to Libcery. New Yoik: Serib. engineering ethics are based. implicitly at least, on the prin-ners.19.u. ciple that "there is no substitute for experience." The funda.

[Mj A. J. .;',dttman. "Ihe enginect's ol ligation to disclose all the mental question which Ackerman raises when he discusses facts. Cird Ln:rre.. March 19fA . .

[26] "Andlo and esedlence . . ," <fm. Eng/nar (Letters). Alarch " responsibility,, .is whether . .it is right-as a matter of law, of 19r,s. policy, and of ethics-for the public to be required to assume a risk of unprecedently catastrophic proportions on the basis of predictise judgments by experts-who are, after all, fallible humans--where these judgments are not rooted in experienec Ilarold I'. Green (National Law Center, George Washington IJniversi'y, Washington, D.C.): As an attorney, I feel no little . ,

tr:pMation m commenting on questions of the professional responsibility and ethics of engineers. I do so, however, Itobert L. Whitelaw (Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacks-l because Ackcrman's paper deals essentially with a prob!cm burg, Va.): I wish to endorse fully the principal argument I which impinges upon a matter of fundamental concern to advanced by A. J. Ackcrnum in his paper and, perhaps, lawyers as well as en ;incers: to what societal institutions does strengthen the impact of his paper with this brief discussion.

the public look for awurance that technology will be prac- llis principal argument has beensconfirmed by mr own ticed i a t.unner consistent with protection of the health and esperience of the past fifteen years on nucicar projects and safety of the publie? prob! cms of sarious kinds. This c.sperience included preparing At the thre. hold,it must be recognized that a serious acci. proposals and nuelcar haranis evaluations on a variety of j dent in an atomic power plant could result in injury to the nuclear power plants, both commercial and military.8 l livo, heahh, and property of the public many ordets of magni. It has been my observation that, despite the enormous l tude greater tlum might result from any presiously known amount of meticulous detail which the ACitS regularly technology. Present national policy encourages and supports requires on every projected power plant to satisfy it.self that development and practice of nuclear power technology be- there is no " credible accident" that can threaten the public i c:mse of the enormous benelits which are expected to result. (or even the operators) -and despite the volumes of paper I 'l N puNie iucquired to awume the risk of a catastmphic acci. and hours of prewntation, consumed on this topic, and no dont 6 h -ertully, just as it pay 5 ta .cs, to support nation:d objec. doubt well-intentioned -there is still by common consent an l t i . i.s. unwritten a ;reement to treat as "increihble" the most fearful l In a nmmal industry, corporate executises udbid think' of all nuc! car anidents that can occur in any plant with a

twice (at lent)Ivfore they in este<l in a technology with such highly prewurized piimary system. Such an accident is, of

destructhe potenti.d ' ;cma e of the enorn

ous publie liahiSty course, the explosive rupture of the primary vcwelitw!f, whirh l whi.h mi:ht nri>c u the e.cnt of an aci.ident. I' rom the is ruled out of the list of credible accidents for the simple lawyci; standpoint, on : of the functions of legal liability is to reason that there is no adequate answer short of puttin; the di courage estra.haiantous actisitie,. Indeed, it is clear that plant underground or in ide a rnountain, as Ackerman has American indstay wa, unwilling to ime t in nuelcar power poinkd out.

without firm m.wran. e Ih it it would l'c reticeed of all powihte Inhility uhith was not imurah!c on an econ mie basis. Since M.muwript received l'chruary 7,19m.

8 Prof. Wlur chw was fiumerly Projtet 17nr.innr for the design Nianv.t ryt ruched Mwmlrr M. lW. and consuintion of the emer plant of the N. S. Savannah.

Mi n s F u.hrne a e>N Auee,s u n. m: n n prowc son as my F#,9 I

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. .: J It is true that the AEC requiro ocry reactor builder to Ois the one hand, we are insisting on long tange pbr ning to ghe esery powible awurance of the integrity of the scactor rotore the purity of our public streams imd eity air and ocean sowl (not a "gu.u:.ntee," howoer!), but much more than tvaches. On the other hand, those who blithely project that thh is required so psotect apinst powible fadure of all other electricity udt be almost completely mglear by the year 300 comienents md 9 stems thdy the se.ietor is esempt from i.e., almost a 100.fokt increase oser proent nuclear power ceuos!.ny peotection apinst aiesplashe ruptune uhow generat. ion- hase )ct to show any long range pbn by which nortlir g fiagmruts tuuld easil 3 open the reactor to the >Ly in the prodigious quantities of fuel reproeosin; wastes, both wn) t.'. S. pLmis today!'t he quotion is whether this esemp- p>cous and particulate, can be isolated with absolute assur-so is v.ise, especially in the light of the histos) of esplosions anee.

in d.c si;nm piewure sewel businew. despite the bot of pre- ' != it possible that some cf this unwillingnen to face xpuiety e.;udons; espiosions ~dut aie happd> r.ne, but noertheless u// the ha/asds, and u// the future problems of nuclear power l g riou>. and ecit.nnly not guaranteed noer to hargvn by any generation, stems from the " atom bomb guilt-comples," and re.,vnsible fam. the " Atoms-for Peace" mani.i generated after the war, by 1he futther quotion, which AeLernun has'wiwly raised,is which nuny feel compel, led to promote the growth of nuclear why such an is>ue should not be oivnly aired and discuswd, power, no nutter how great the ultimate cost, as a salve to the ar d the pubbe cleasly appraised of its ri>Ls. national conscience?

~ Fir. ally, dopite the curient widespread concern (both~ Finally, is it also pos>ible that this obsession to see nothing mdonal and hstal) oier the po!!ution of our prinury roources but a nuclear future for the power business may well be b!ind-

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of air cad water, there >eems to be a curious >ilence on the part ing the cycs of both nunagement and gosernment, and deter-cf ;;evernment bedo over the'!ong-range menace whigh the ring competent engineering from investigating better and more mwlear power industry may well be to both air and water. duruble sources of power for the long-range future?

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