ML19329E736
| ML19329E736 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1975 |
| From: | Bauman R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 1669, NUDOCS 8006170893 | |
| Download: ML19329E736 (22) | |
Text
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Consumers 0
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..s General Off.ces: 212 West Micnigan Avenue. Jackson, Micn6gan 49201. Area Code $17 788-0550 July 21, 1975 s U.II?! /,.
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kb Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch 2-3
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s Division of Reactor Licensing
,i US Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission Washington, DC 20555 MIDLAND PLANT DOCKET NUIBERS 50-329, 50-330 REGULATORY GUIDE REVIEW MEETINGS FILE: 0505.2 SERIAL: 1669 Our letter of July 3 discussed a program for an in-depth review of Regulatory Guide implementation on the Midland Project.
We are trans=itting herewith three copies of the Consumers Power Company position on Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.9, 1.11, 1.12, 1.22, 1.32, 1.kl, 1.45,1.47,1.53,1.62,1.63,1.73,1.75 and 1.81 which vill be discussed during the first Regulatory Guide Review Meeting on Electrical /Instru=entation.
Positions to be discussed in subsequent meetings will be submitted in accordance with procedures to be developed during the July 22 Project Management Meeting.
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R. C. Bauman
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REGULATORYCUIDLj1.6 INDEpENDENCN. BE'111CEN REDUNDANT STANDBY
-(ONSITE) p0WER SOURCES AND BEWEEN TilEIR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS RESP 0NSE TO RECULATORY POSITION The onsite pouer sources and their distribution systems have been designed in complete accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.6.
Details of the design of sources and systems are as follows:
3 1.
The Class IE onsite power system, of cach unit is divided into two mutually redundant load groups so that loss of any one group will not j
prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed.
2.
Each essential AC load group has connections to a preferred (offsite) power supply and to a single diesel generator, which has no automatic connection to any other redundant load group.
I 3.
Each 125 Volt DC load group bus is energized by one battery and two 1
mutually redundant battery chargers which are supplied from mutually redundant Class IE AC systems.
Each battery and its two chargers are exclusively conracted to a singic 125 Volt DC load group bus.
1 There are two 125 Volt DC load groups for each unit.
4.
a.
The diesel generator for one load group can not be automatically
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connected in parallel with the diese,1 generator of its mutually redundant. load group.
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b.
No provision exists for connecting one load group to its mutually redundant load group when the first load gro*up is supplied by its diesel generator.
f c.
No provision exists for automatically transferring loads between redundant power sources.
d.
When diesel generators are supplying power, interlocks prevent an operator error which would connect the generators in parallel.
5.
Each AC load group in each unit has an exclusive standby power source, which consists of a single generator driven by a single diesel engine prime mover.
r.
July. iL7', 1975 JUL 151975
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m REGULATORY GUIDE 1.9 SELECTION OF DIESEL GENERATOR SET CAPACITY FOR STANDBY POWER SUPPLIES RESPONSE TO REGULATORY POSITION l
1.
The continuous rating of each diesel generator is presently
'i greater than the sum of the conservatively estimated loads needed to be powered at any one time.
2.
Only two diesel generator set ratings are recognized by DEMA, the 8760-hour continuous rating and the 2-hour short time rating.
The continuous 8760-hour rating of the diesel generator units will be greater than the sum of the maximum emergency loads required.
When the sets have been purchased and its ratings are established, the final rating of the diesel generator may be such that the pre-dicted loads will not exceed the smaller of the 2000-hour rating, or 90 percent of the 30-minute rating of the set.
3.
Preoperational testing will verify predicted loading.
4.
The diesel generators will be designed:
I To sequencially start and accelerate to rated speed, a.
all engineered safety features and emergency shutdown loads.
b'.
Power quality is in accordance with IEEE Standard 308-1974, Section 4.3.
At no time during the loading sequence will the frequency or voltage drop to a level which will degrade the perform.ince of any of the loads below their minimum requirements.
5.
The suitability of each diesel generator set will be confirmed by prototype qualification tes; data and pre-
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operational tests.
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July 17, 1975 i
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s REGULATORY GUIDE 1.32 USE OF IEEE STANDARD 308-1971
" CRITERIA FOR CLASS IE ELECTRIC SYS'TEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS" RESPONSE TO REGULATORY POSITION The offsite power supply design and battery chars;er supply design are in complete accordance with General Design Criterion 17.
1.
Availability of Offsite Power Two physically independent circuits from the switchyard to the onsite electrical distribution system are provided. Both are available within a few seconds of an outage. The availability of both circuits conforms to Criterion 17.
2.
Battery Charger Supply The capacity of the battery charger supply is based on the largest combined demands of the various steady-state locds and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the plant during which these demands occur.
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July.17,.19.75 A
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REGULATORY GUIDE 1.41 PREOPERATIONAL TESTING OF REDUNDANT ONSITE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS TO VERIFY PROPER LOAD GROUP ASSIGNMENTS RESPONSE TO REGULATORY POSITION I
AC Systems l.
The onsite electric power system, designed in accordance with Safety Guides 6 and 32, will be tested as part of the preoperational testing program or after major modifications.
The tests will be performed in accordance with the pro-cedures outlined in Chapter 13 of the PSAR.
These will verify the independence between the redundant onsite power sources and their load groups.
2.
The Class IE power system is isolated from the preferred (of f site) transmission network by direct actuation of the Class IE undervoltage relays monitoring the incoming side of the supply breakers, resulting in tripping of the supply breakers.
3.
The Class IE system is functionally tested, one load group at a time, by allowing one load group to be powered only by its associated diesel generator.
The redundant load group is and remains completely disconnected from its associated standby diesel generator.
4.
A safety injection signal is simulated to start the standby diesel generators and cause automatic sequencing.
Functional performance of the loads is checked.
Each test is of sufficient duration to achieve stable operating conditions and thus permits the onset and detection of adverse con-ditions which could result f. rom improper assignment of loads.
5.
During testing of one Class IE load group, the buses and loads of the redundant load group not under test are monitored to verify absence of voltage on these buses and loads.
July 17, 1975
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.41 II bC Systems In compliance with this regulatory guide, the Class IE 125-V de subsystems designed in accordance with Safety Guides 6 and 32 will be tested as follows:
1.
Testing of the de power system will be performed prior to unit operation, and after major modi-fications or repairs in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 13.
2.
The charger, battery connections and charger supply are checked for proper assignment of ac load group.
3.
Class IE 125-V de subsystems are functionally tested along with the associated ac load group by disconnecting and isolating the other ac load group, its ac power sources and associated dc subsystem.
Each test includes simulation of an SIS, start-up of the standby diesel generator and the lead group under test, sequencing of loads and the functional performance of the loads.
During these tests, the ability of the 125-V de sub-system to perform its intended functions (e.g. control of diesel' generators and Class IE ac switchgear) is checked.
4.
During the testing of the Class IE 125-V de subsystem associated with one ac load group, the buses and loads of the 125-V de subsystem associated with the ac load group not under test are monitored to. verify absence of voltage.
1 July 17, 1975 e
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REGULATORY GUIDE 1.63 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES RESPONSE TO REGULATORY POSITION:
Electric penetration assemblies are diocussed fully in subsection 5.1.2.1 of the PSAR and are in conformance with IEEE 317-1972 and Regulatory Guide 1.63 except for the qualification of Regulatory Position C-1 discussed below:
1.
The electric penetration assemblies are not furnished with self-fusing characteristics.
2.
The circuit overload protective devices, either circuit breakers or fuses, do not conform to the criteria of IEEE 279 with respect to on-line testability, bypassing, or jpg manual initiation.
3.
Backup overload protection is provided for power circuits and high-energy level control circuits.
Instrumentation and low-energy level control circuits are not provided with backup overload protection when analysis demonstrates that a sustained maximum overload cannot produce an un-acceptable temperature rise within the electric penetration that would jeopardize its mechanical integrity.
Note:
Compliance with ANSI N45.24 will be discussed in Midland regulatory guide responses to be discussed in the Quality Assurance / Operations meeting.
July 17, 1975
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.75 PHYSICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS RESPONSE TO REGULATORY POSITION The Midland Plant separation criteria complies with the re-quirements of R.G.
1.75, Rev. 1, with the following excep-tions:
I.
BALANCE OF PLANT 1.
Reference:
Paragraph C-1 of R.G.
1.75 The Midland separation criteria considers power cir-cuit breakers actuated by accident signals to be isolation devices.
2.
Reference:
Paragraph C-4 of R.G.
1.75 The Midland separation criteria will treat, identify and color-code the associated cables in the same way as the Class IE cables they are associated with.
When leaving Seismic Category I structures, the associated cables will be routed in exclusive non Class IE race-ways.
3.
Reference:
Paragraph C-9 of R.G.
1.75' The Midland criteria will permit cable splicing in
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electrical penetration areas on a restricted basis.
The Midland criteria will permit tray filling above
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side rails for single layers of single conductors, three conductors, and triplexes' power cables.
4.
Reference:
Paragraph C-10 of R.G.
1.75 The Midland criteria will require that raceways and cables be marked at distances not to exceed 15 feet, except for embedded and underground raceways and cables in conduits and ducts which will be marked at the points of entry and exit only.
II NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM 1.
Reference:
Paragraph C-16 of R.G.
1.75, Rev. 1 E'xception is taken to the imposition of IEEE 384-1974, Section 5.6, to instrumentation cabinets.
The following specific exceptions are to Section 5.6 of IEEE 384-1974.
s July 17, 1975
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REGULATORY GUIDE 1.75 a.
Reference:
Paragraph 5.6.2 of IEEE Std. 384-1974 The' minimum separation distance of six (6) inches is not applied within the cabinets, where the potential hazards (Paragraph 4.1) are limited to internally generated occurrences.
The use of isolation amplifiers and relays is employed throughout the systems when conveying signals between channels and between the channels and other systems and components.
In addition, single failure analysis has been done to support areas where redundant channels are inputs to a single device (e.g.,
trip logic modules).
b.
Reference:
Paragraph 5.6.3 of IEEE Std. 384-1974 Identification per 5.6.3 begins at the terminal strips and continues outward to field wiring.
In-ternal cabinet wiring is identified on a functional basis using i.ndustry cabinet wiring practices.
Identification of cabinets and equipment makes the class of equipment easily distinguishable.
Factory system functional and preoperational testing is used to ensure proper wiring.
c.
Reference:
Paragraph 5.6.4 of IEEE Std. 384-1974 The provisions of Paragraph 5.6.2 are not met where redundant circuits are terminated on a common de-vice.
The nature of protection system logic and the modular design of these systems (to meet IEEE 279, 4.21) is such that redundant signals must come together to provide the proper coincidence.
The RPS and ESFAS cn the Midland Plant contain four and two coincidence logic respectively, each of which is housed in a separate system cabinet.
No two redun-dant logics are powered by the same vital bus.
Single failure analysis performed on the coincidence logic modules-has shown that single failures do not degrade the system below minimum safety level.
The modules and equipment used on the Midland Plants are of the Oconee type which have shown excellent operational perfor-mance.
d.
Reference:
Paragraph 5.6.5 of IEEE Std. 384-1974 All nonprotection signala from protection channels are generated in isolation' devices such as isola-tion amplifiers and relays.
The quality of wiring within the' cabinets is uniform throughout with respect to flame retardancy, etc., the only difference being functional in nature.
For these reasons, the
-separation distances (5.6.2) are not followed within the cabinets.
July 17, 1975
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REGULATORY GUIDE 1.75 e.
Reference:
Paragraph 5.6.6 of IEEE Std. 384-1974 The protection system cabinets are designed for bottom cable entry.and'will accept cable and/or con--
duit from the cable tray system on the Midland Plants.
2.
Reference:
Paragraph 5.8 of IEEE Std. 384-1974 as Im-posed by Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 1 Specific acceptability requirements have not been determined in the application of this paragraph to plants 2
of this design type.
Compliance cannot be determined and cannot be claimed until the above acceptability require-
'ments are clarified.
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- I July 17, 1975 3
REGULATORY GUIDE 1,47 BYPASSED AND INOPERABLE STATUS INDICATION FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY SYSTEMS RESPONSE TO REGULATORY POSITION The Midland Plant status indication system ccmplies with the
-requirements of R.G.
1.47 (May 1973) with the following interpretations:
1.
Reference:
Paragraph C.1 of R.G.
1.47 The status indication system will be mounted on the main control boards.
Automatic indications will be limited to thoce bypass or inoperable status conditions as limited by paragraph C.3, that result from a deliberate operator action.
" Deliberately render inoperable" is interpreted to exclude failures, maintenance following a failure, or operator errors that could disable an applicable system.
2.
Reference:
Paragraph C.4 of R.G.
1.47 2'
Manual capability will be provided in the control room to activate each system-level indicator.
" System-level" is interpreted to mean the redundant channel of any ESFAS subsystem.
SUPPLEMENTARY CLARIFICATIONS 3.
The status indication system will be arranged on the main control board to permit the operator to assess readily the redundant status of each safety system.
4.
. Bypasses in shared systems will be indicated on both units.
5.
Since the indicating system only supplements the admin-istrative procedures, means to cancel erroneous indi-cations are not required, audible annunciation will not be provided, and the system will not be made redundant.
July 17, 1975
. Regulatory Guido l.47 Page 2 b
6.
Since the automatic indications will provide information related to safety to the operator, the indication system will be designed to the requirements of IEEE Standard 279-1971, utilizing Seismic Category I equipment supplied from vital power sources corresponding to the channel indicated; and wiring designed to the same standards as associated circuits.
However, procedures will not requdpe immediate operator action based solely on the dh bypass indications.
7.-
The indicating system will be designed and installed in a manner that precludes any adverse effects on the safety system from a failure in the indicating system.
8.
Testing features, including lamp test, will be provided to assure the operable status of the indicating system.
9.
If, when a system falling under the scope of the Regu-latory Guide is bypassed or removed from service, the protective action takes place or the coincidence required for protection is reduced (2 out of 4 becomes 1 out of 3), then that condition need not be monitored.
10.
Only the means of bypassing specified in the operating procedures must be monitored.
For example, the pro-cedures call for the technician to rack out the breaker before he works on the associated pump.
Although he may render the pump inoperative by closing the suction valve or disconnecting the power leads in the controller or in other ways, only the rack-out contacts need be monitored.
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July 17, 1975
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.53 APPLICATION OF THE SINGLE-FAILURE CRITERION TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEMS RESPONSE TO REGULATORY POSITION The Midland Plant application of the single failure criterion to the design and analysis of plant protection systems complies with the requirements of R.G. 1.53 (June 1973) with the following comments and exception:
1.
Reference:
Paragraph C.3 of R.G. 1.53 C. 3 (a) appears to contradict C.3 (b), which allows redun-dant circuits to be controlled by one switch if separation is maintained greater than 6 inches or suitable barriers
.are provided.
To be consistent, C. 3 (a) should read, "An individual switch section supplies signals to redun-
~
dant channels," or " redundant channels are supplied from a common wafer of a switch."
2.
Reference:
Paragraph C.4 of R.G. l. 53 The failure mode and effects analysis for the reactor protection system and the emergency core cooling actuation system are included in B&W Tcpical Report BAW-10003, Revision 3, " Qualification Testing of Protection System jg Instrumentation," issued in March 1974.
This analysis has been accepted as the basis for licensing B&W supplied protection systems for all Oconee-type units and further analysis for this generation of equipment is unnecessary.
4 I
July 17, 1975
s REGULATORY GUIDE 1.62 e!ANUAL INITIATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RESPOUSE TO REGULATORY POSITION Provisions for Midland Plant manual initiation of protective actions are made in accordance with R.G.
1.62.
Compliance will be based on our interpretation cf the requirements as discussed below, which we feel meet the intent'of the Guide:
1.
Reference:
Paragraphs C.1 and C.3 of R.G.
1.62 Means will be provided for manual initiation of each protective action at the system level.
" System level" is interpreted to mean each redundant actuation channel of each ESFAS subsystem (containment isolation, contain-ment spray, auxiliary feedwater actuation, etc.).
Each ESFAS subsystem may be manually initiated by actuation of either of two redundant control switches in the main control In addition, the protective action of each component room.
may be initiated from its individual control switch.
2.
Reference:
Paragraph C.4 of R.G. 1.62 The amount of equipment common to both manual and automatic initiation will be kept to a practical minimum.
The manual initiation will not use the logic network of the protection system.
The manual initiation will operate through the actuation system of each channel of the protective system.
Manual initiation at the component level is available in the control room, and therefore the action-sequencing functions and interlocks will be common.
No single failure will prevent initiation of the protective action in the redundant channel by manual or autcmatic means.
, July 17, 1975
d REGULATORY GUIDE 1.81 SIIARED EMERGENCY AND SEUTDOWN ELECTRIC SYSTEMS FOR MULTI-UNIT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS RESPONSE TO REGULATORY POSITION The requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.81 are met.
Each unit of a multi-unit nuclear power plant is provided with separate and independent onsite ac and de electric systems capable of supplying' minimum ESF loads and the loads required for attain-ing a safe and orderly cold shutdown of the unit, assuming a single failure and loss-of offsite power.
't 4
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i July 17, 1975
-s REGULATORY CUIDE 1.11 INSTRUMENT LINES PENETRATING PRIMARY REACTOR CONTAIt01ENT RESPONSE TO PIGULATORY POSITION Presently, no instrument lines penetrate the reactor butiding. If any are included later in plant design, they will conform to Regulatory Guide 1.11.
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July 17, 1975
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REGULATORY GUIDE 1.12
' RESPONSE TO REGULATORY POSITION Regulatory Guide 1.12 references ANSI N18.5, " Earthquake Instru-mentation Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants."
Exceptions to Regulatory Guide 1.12 are based on Revision 1 of the guide dated April 1974 and ANSI N18.5 - 1974 issued January'9, 1974.
The seismic instrumentation provided will comply with Regulatory Guide 1.12, except as follows:
1.
Peak recording accelerographs will not be located within the containment structure as specified in sections C.l.a(1) and C. l.a (2) of the guide.
Temperature and radiation limi-tations of presently available instruments of this type renc ar them unacceptable for use in the containment en-viroament.
Peak strain gages will be provided at select loct ions on equipment and piping within the containment in lieu of peak recording accelerographs.
These peak strain gages will be located at criticsl design points specifically selected to display significant strain under earthquake excitation.
2.
Response spectrum recorders specified in sections C.l.b and C.l.c of the guide will not be supplied.
Data from these instruments is not required immediately following the earthquake and is used only in the subsequent post-earthquake analysis.
Time-history strong motion accelerometers will be provided at the locations now specified for response spectrum recorders.
Data from these instruments will be analyzed to produce response spectra as required.
A response spectrum analyzer will be suppli d in the control room to determine a
the earthquake spectro immediately following the earthquake.
3.
Since the Midland safe shutdown earthquake maximum founda-tion acceleration is less than 0.3g, section C.3 of the guide is not applicable.
4.
Section C.4 of the guide specifies values for dynamic range, frequency range, and damping of response-spectrum recorders.
Response spectrum recorders will not be supplied.
The dy-namic range of time-history strong motion accelerometers is 100:1 zero to peak.
The frequency range of time-history strong motion accelerometers is 1 to 150 Hz.
Damping re-quirrrants are not applicable to accelerometer electronic sistems.
July 17, 1975
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.12 5.
Exception must also be taken to sections of ANSI N18.5 not addressed in section C of the guide, as follows:
a.
Seismic triggers will not comply'with ANSI N-18.5, section 5.4.1.
The lower limit specified is unusable because it causes spurious triggering of the strong motion accelerometers due to normal plant vibrations.
Additionally, the specifications listed in section 5.4.1 cannot be applied to seismic triggers located at elevations greater than the base slab due to the normal amplification in structures.
Seismic triggers designed for use on the base slab will have an actuating level adjustable over a minimum range of 0.0lg to 0.03g.
Seismic triggers designed for use at an elevated location will have an actuating level adjustable over a minimum range appropriate for that trigger location such that all triggers will actuate J
at approximately the same earthquake severity.
b.
The instrument station accuracy required by secticn 6.6 of ANSI N-18.5 is not consistent with the instru-ment maintenance and calibration capabilities at nuclear power station facilities.
An overall error
^
of not more than 5% of full scale will be supplied for the strong motion recording system and peak motion accelerometers.
Other seismic monitoring instrumenta-tion will be supplied with the best commercially-obtainable accuracies available at time of purchase.
l 1
J61y 17, 1975 1.
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.22 PERIODIC TESTING OF PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION FUNCTIONS RESPONSE TO REGULATORY POSITION The reactor protection system incorporates a testing scheme which complies with this guide using the methods given in Section D, paragraphs 2 (b) and (d).
Utilizing logic test switches on the front face of the RPS reactor trip module, the output from any RPS channel can be tripped so that the associated control rod drive control system trip device (trip breaker) will open.
This operation can be performed without disrupting station operation since at least two trip devices in parallel must trip in order to cause rod-insertion.
Test circuits allow the operator to com-pletely test the reactor protection system channels at any time during reactor operation.
The emergency core cooling system actuation and the engineered safety features system actuation comply with this guide using the methods given in Section D, paragraph 2 (b) or 2 (d) depending on whether the equipment can be actuated on-line.
July 17, 1975 J
r REGULATORY POSITION 1.45 REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE SOUNDARY LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS RESPONSE TO REGULATORY POSITION The Midland Plant RCPB leakage detection system complies with the requirements of R.G. 1.45 except as discussed below:
1
Reference:
Paragraph C.G of R.G.
1.45 All' leakage detection systems are designed to remain functional following an OBE; however, the airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system is not designed to remain functional following an SSE.
The particulate radioactivity monitoring system is an operational system only and is not required to perform any safety function.
Other instrumentation is provided to assess plant conditions during and following an accident.
,8 July 17, 1975 e
-n QUALIFICATION TESTS OF ELECTRIC VALVE OPERATOR INSTALLED INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS REGULATORY GUIDE 1.73 (January 1974)
Electric motor operated valves located inside containment are grouped for purchase as being in the NSSS vendor's scope of supply or being part of the balance of plant.
Respective responses to the regulatory guide are as follows:
POSITION FOR NSSS VENDOR SUPPLIED VALVES:
An electromatic relief valve on the pressurizer and two pressu-rizer spray control valves are the Seismic Class I valve opera-l tors located in the containment.
These valve operators are l
not required to meet Regulatory Guide 1.73 since their opera-tion per IEEE 382-1972 is not essential to safe shutdown and icolation of the reactor or whose failure could result in significant release of radioactive material.
The design philosophy for these valve operators agrees with i
this position in that they were not taken credit for in the Safety Analysis of the Midland Units.
l From a component consideration these operators were purchased 4$L l
in July 1970 prior to the issuance of Regult. tory Guide 1.73.
They are a part of the Standard D&W 177 F.L.
System Design
which has been licensed for operation on previous plants.
From a system consideration, two spray valves are furnished
. operating in parallel instead of the conventional one (1) per standard plants, which adds to the operating capability and availability of the pressurizer spray system over that of previous B&W 177 F.A. plants.
POSITION FOR BALANCE OF PLANT VALVES:
It is our intent that all Class IE solenoid valves which are l
in the balance of plant scope 6f supply and are located inside i
containment will comply with Regulatory Guide 1.73.
Class IE electric motor operated valves which are located inside con-tainment have been purchased and type tested to IEEE-382-1972 l
draft 13.
i July 17, 1975
~
__NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL (TEMPORARY FORM)
CONTROL NO:7976 FILE:
FROM: Consuc;ers Power Co.
DATE OF DOC DATE REC'D LTR TWX RPT OTHER Jackson, Michigan R_C.
Rauman 7_?1_79 7_ p e: _7 5 g.,
~ 'lilG CC 'OTHER 6ENT NRC PDR m O
TO:
Mr. A. Schwencer 1-signed 2
SENT LOCAL PDR CLASS UNCLASS PROPINFO INPUT NO CYS REC'D DO NO:
3 0-329 nd 330 DESCRIPTION:
ENCLOSURES:
V Ltr re their 7-3-75 Itr furn info concerning Regulatory Guide Implementation on the in depth review of Regulatory Guide Midland Project Impicmentation on the Midland Project p,-
trans the following:
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PLANT NAME:
Midland 1 & 2 FOR ACTION /INFORMATION 7-29-75 JGB j
BUTLER (L) dCHWENCER (L) ZIEMANN (L)
REG AN (E)
W/ Copies W/$opies W/ Copies W/ Copies CLAR K (L)
STO LZ (L)
DICKER (E)
LEAR (L)
W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies PAR R (L)
VASSALLO (L)
KNIGHTON (E)
SPIES W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies KNIEL (L)
PURPLE (L)
YOUNGBLOOD (E) APM Syc M W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies W// Gopies 3
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION m
G FI TECH REVIEW DENTON LiC ASST A/T IN D.
R f HROEDER GRIMES R. DIGGS (L)
BRAITMAN OGC, ROOM P-506A ATACCARY GAMMILL H. GE ARIN (L)
SA LTZMAN GOSSICK/ STAFF KNIGHT KASTNER EGOULBOURNE (L)
ME LTZ CASE PAWLICKI BALLARD P. KREUTZER (E)
GIAMBUSSO SHAO SPANGLER J. LEE (L)
PLANS BOYD STELLO M. RU3HER00K(L)
M DB ALD
/rf00RE (L)
HOUSTON ENVIRO S. REED (E)
CHAPMAN DEYOUNG (L)
NOVAK MULLER M. SERVICE (L)
DUBE (Ltr)
SKOVHOLT (L)
ROSS DICKER S. SHEPPARD (L)
E. COUPE GOLLER (L) (Ltr)
IPPOLITO K
HTON M. SLATER (E)
PETERSON P. CO LLINS TEDESCO UNGBLOOD H. SMITH (L)
HARTFIELD (2)
DENISE J. COLLINS REGAN S. TEETS (L)
KLECKER yG OPR LAIN AS g)'I],OJECT LDR G. WILLI AMS (E)
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EXTERN AL DISTRIBUTION
/- LOCAL PDR Midland, Michigan 1 -TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10) - NATIONAL L AB?
1 - PDR SAN /LA/NY 1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN) 1 - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT 1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB 1 - ASLB 1 - CONSULTANTS 1 - G. ULRIKSON ORNL 1 - Newton Anderson NEWM ARK /BLUME/AG B ABI AN
- ACRS HOLDING /SENT p(
.