ML19329E382

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Forwards IE Circular 77-16, Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Trip Lock-Out Features. No Action Required
ML19329E382
Person / Time
Site: Monticello, Midland  
Issue date: 12/13/1977
From: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Howell S
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
NUDOCS 8006120696
Download: ML19329E382 (1)


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a Docket No. 50-329 Docket No. 50-330

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-Consumers Power Company 1

AIT3: Mr. Stephen H. Howell

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Vice President 1945 West Parnall Road Jackson, MI 49201 1

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The anclosed IE Circular No. 77-16 is forwarded to you for information.

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If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office,

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Sincerely, J

James G. Keppler Director d

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IE Circular No. 77-16 2.

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8 December 13, 1977 IE Circular No. 77-16.

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRICAL TRIP LOCK-OUT FEATURES Description of Circumstances:

On June 15, 1977, Duquesne Light Company (Seaver Valley 1) reported that during the performance of a test of the diesel-generator (D/G) trip lock-out features in the emergency mode of operation, the D/G circuit breaker opened when the field voltage trip interlock output This is contrary to a requirement for this facility that, was tested.

in the emergency mode, all D/G output breaker trips except generator The engine differential and overcurrent be automatically disabled.

overspeed trip, which shuts down the diesel engine (but does not affect breaker operation) is also expected to be operable during the emergency mode of operation.

An investigation conducted by the licensee disclosed that the unexpected opening of the output breaker was due to deenergi-ing a field voltage sensing relay which was supplied by the vendor but had not been discon-nected during the on-site acceptance testing of the D/G nor disabled A redundant field voltage relay by the protection circuitry logic.

which was supplied by the licensee is correctly by-passed during fast start conditions and emergency operation.

A design change was initiated by the licensee which removed the fiald This was accomplished by disconnecting the set voltage trip feature.

of relay contacts to the trip circuitry of the D/G output breaker.

Subsequent testing of the D/G was performed by the licensee which demonstrated satisfactory operation.

This is an example of an event which resulted from inadequate test The procedures as performed had not previously procedure performance.

identified the type of deficiency described in this circular.

The safety significance of this situation is that the premodified protection circuitry would have opened the circuit breaker if a loss of field voltage occurred while running in the emergency mode of operation.

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IE Circular No. 77-16 December 13, 1977 The D/G Units for the above facility were supplied by the Electro Motive Division (EEJ) of General Motors. The model numbers for the D/G Units are:

Engine Model No. 20-645-E4 Generator Model No. A-20-C2 Control Panel Moiel No. 999-20 All holders of operating licenses or construction permits should assure that the appropriate D/G protection trip circuits are provided with automatic by-pass features that prevent them from negating automatic starting or tripping of D/Gs during fast start or emergency operations.

It is recommended that the following be considered in your reviews of this matter:

1.

Tacility procedures should specifically detarmine whether the protection circuitry that trips the D/G set or the associated output breaker is in accordance with the facility Technical

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Specifications.

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2.

Test procedures for your D/G sets (e.g. acceptance preopera-l tional and surveillance tests) should be reviewed to assure that D/G system performance is demonstrated by these tests to be in accordance with related operational requirements specified in the facility Technical Specifications.

3.

Strengthening of management controls should be reviewed as necessary j

to assure adherence to D/C test procedures by plant personnel.

No written response to this circular is required.

If you require additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

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LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1977 l

C}RCULAR SUBJECT FIRST DATE OF ISSUED TO NO.

ISSUE 77-01 Malfunctions of 1-4-77 All holders of Limitorque Valve OLs or cps Operators t

j 77-02 Fotential Heavy 2-15-77 All affected l

Spring Flooding holders of OLs l

77-02A Potential Heavy 2-16-77 All affected Spring Flooding holders of cps I

77-03 Fire Inside 2-28-77 All holders of a Motor Control OLs and cps Center 77-04 Inadequate Lock 3-17-77 Safeguard Group i

Assemblies I, II, IV, V, l

Licensees 1

77-05 Liquid Entrapment 3-24-77 All holders of in Valve Bonnets OLs and cps 77-06 Effects of Hydraulic 4-1-77 All holders of Fluid on Electrical OL's and cps Cable 77-07 Short Period During 4-12-77 Holders of Reactor Startup BWR OLs 77-08 Failure of Fcedwater 4-13-77 All holders Sample Probe of OLs l

77-09 Improper Fuse 5-25-77 All holders of Coordination In HWR BWR OLs or cps Standby Liquid Control System Control Circuits 77-10 vacuum conditions 7-15-77 All holders of Resulting in Damage to OLs Liquid Process Tanks i

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r3 IE Circular No. 77-16 December 13, 1977 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1977 (Continued)

CIRCULAR SUBJECT FIRST DATE OF ISSUED TO NO.

ISSUE 77-11 Leakage of Con-9-6-77 All holders of OLs tairment Isolation and cps Valves with Resilient Seats 77-12 Dropped Fuel Assem-9-15-77 All holders of BWR blies at BR Facili-OLs or cps ties 77-13 Reactor Safety Signals 9-22-77 All holders of OLs Negated During Testing and cps 77-14 Separation of 11-22-77 All Power and Contaminated Test Reactor, k'ater Systems Fuel Cycle, and From Noncontaminated major Ey-product Plant Systems material processor facilities with OLs or cps 77-15 Degradation of Fuel 12/1/77 All holders of OLs Oil Flow to the and cps Emergency Diesel Generators t

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