ML19329D271
| ML19329D271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry, Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1977 |
| From: | Campanella V, Goldberg R, Hjelmfelt D CLEVELAND, OH, GOLDBERG, FIELDMAN & HJELMFELT |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002260879 | |
| Download: ML19329D271 (19) | |
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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
)
The Toledo Edison Company and
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Docket Nos The Cleveland Electric Illuminating )
50-500A Company
)
50-501A (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station )
Units 1, 2 and 3)
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The Cleveland Electric Illuminating )
Docket Nos. 50-440A Company, et al.
)
50-441A (Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
ANSWER OF CITY OF CLEVELAND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF APPLICANTS FOR STAY OF LICENSE CONDITIONS I-2 b-9 9 On January 6,1977, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Licen-sing Board) issued its decision in this antitrust proceeding. The Licensing Board found that the Applicants were the dominant electric entities in the relevant markets and that Applicants had acted to entend their dominance.
The Licensing Board said (Slip Op. pp.14-15):
Certain of the actions employed by Applicants to increase their dominance in and of themselves constitute violations of the antitrust laws. These include territorial allocations, attempts to fix prices, refusals to deal and group boycotts.
The Licensing Board concluded (Slip Op. p. 16):
.. that Applicants have a prolonged history, both indivi-dually and collectively, of misuse of their dominant position 2M 8002260[27
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, within the CCCT and their respective service areas to achieve anticompetitive results and what to us is a clear nexus between activities under the license and the anti-competitive situation Applicants have nurtured within the CCCT convinces us that the imposition of license condi-tions is necessary to effect the statutory purpose of Section 105(c).
On January 12, 1977, City of Cleveland (City) filed its motion with the Li-censing Board seeking clarification of licensing conditions. On January 13, 1977, Applicants filed a motion for an extension of time for filing exceptions and briefs with the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (Appeal Board).
Under Applicants' proposed schedule, the final briefs would not be filed un-til July 19, 1977, approximately the date Applicants now say Davis-Besse Unit I will go commercial. On January 14, 1977, Applicants filed their motion for a stay of licensing conditions with the Appeal Board. City oppo-ses Applicants' motion for a stay.
Applicants filed their motion with the Appeal Board claiming that the Licensing Board had rejudged the issues raised in their motion against Applicants. Any suggestion that the Licensing Board would not fairly apply the criteria of Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. FPC, 259 F. 2d 921 (1958) is belied by the record of these proceedings. It must be remem-bered that although the Licensing Board found that Squire, Sanders and Demp-4 sey should be disqualified from representing CEI in these proceedings, it stayed its order pending appeal. There is nothing whatsoever in the record to suggest that this Licensing Board cannot or will not fairly consider Appli-cants' motion requesting a stay in this instance also.
By order of January 17, 1977, the Appeal Board referred Applicants'
, motion to the Licensing Board for decision and directed that all answers to Applicants' motion be filed with the Licensing Board.
APPLICANTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE FOR GRANTING A STAY A.
Applicants Have Failed To Show A Likelihood Of Prevailing On Appeal Applicants have failed totally to make the showing required by Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association. At pages 7-10 of their motion,
. Applicants attempt to meet the requirement that they make a strong show-ing that they are likely to prevail on the merits of their appeal. Applicants do no more than list exceptions they may take on appeal. Aside from a few general allegations such as that the Licensing Board's treatment of nexus was " simplistic and overly-glib", there is no offer of evidence or law as to wherein the Licensing Board erred. Mere allegations of error can in no way constitute a strong showing of likelihood to prevail on the me rits. The burden here is on the Applicants to make a substantial show-ing of probable success on appeal. Virginia Petroleum Jobbe rs, supra.
Applicants have failed to make a substantial indication of success with respect to a single issue. Nowhere do Applicants set forth law or facts which would even hint that there is a possibility, let along a likeli-hood, that Applicants would prevail on appeal. The closest Applicants' approach even attempting to making such a showing is on page 9, fn. 3, i
I where it is erroneously asserted that the Licensing Board failed to consi-I t
. ' der the evidence offered by Applicants and instead relied habitually on the-opposing parties' direct evidence. This attempt fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on appeal because (1) there is no support offered for
- the allegation; (2) evidence is not unreliable merely because it is offered by opposing parties in their direct case; and (3) much, if not most, of the evidence offered by the opposing parties and relied upon by the Licensing j
Board was documents prepared by and obtained from Applicants and depo-sition testimony of Applicants' officers and employees.
Since Applicants have failed to point to any particular findings which it is claimed are not supported by the record, it is not possible for City to demonstrate record support without in effect incorporating by reference the proposed findings of City, NRC Staff and the Department of Justice. It ought to suffice to point to Applicants' total failure to make the required showing.
B.
Applicants Have Failed To Demonstrate Irreparable Iniury Applicants' allegation of irreparable injury, like its allegation of substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits, is defective. The Court in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers said, with respect to this test, at page 925:
The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Me re injuries, however substanial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough.
Applicants argue at pages 10-14 that a stay should be granted be-(1) Applicants cannot do what the licensing conditions would require cause
. them to do; (2) the licensing conditions will have an unsettling impact on relationships between Applicants and non-Applicants; (3) Applicants may sustain financial injuries; (4) the license conditions under certain specu-lative conditions might result in higher costs to Applicants' customers; (5) power from the Davis-Besse and Perry units might be sold to entities outside of the CAPCO service area; and (6) Applicants and their custo-mers may incur increased transmission costs if non-Applicant entities require a certain unspecified and purely speculative level of transmission se rvice. In a footnote on page 12, Applicants also argue that license con-dition 9a is ambiguous. Even if it were ambiguous, that would not be grounds for a stay. Applicants are free to file a motion with the Licensing Board seeking clarification or if the need arises litigate the matter in en-forcement proceedings before the Commission. At this point, any harm to Applicants from the alleged ambiguity in condition 9a is purely specula-tive.
It is clear that the injury to Applicants from the immediate effec-tiveness of the license conditions is primarily possible increased costs.
In several instances any increase in costs is speculative. Under Virginia Petroleum Jobbers mere increased costs are not such injuries as justify staying the effectiveness of a decision.
Applicants' first argument that the license conditions are impossible to perform is completely without any specificity as to which license condi-tions are impossible of performance. Nor do Applicants offer any explana-tion as to why it is impossible to comply with the conditions. Applicants
.- cannot meet their burden of showing irreparable injury with mere generalized assertions devoid of specification and support in fact or law.
Applicants' second argument regarding the unsettling effect of the licensing conditions on relationships between Applicants and non-Applicants fails even to assert injury to the Applicants. Instead, Applicants stated thatit is the consumers of electricity not the Applicants that will bear the costs of re-aligning these relationships. Moreover, if Applicants were to prevail on this point, it is difficult to conceive of license conditions in an antitrust proceeding which would not be stayed. The very purpose of the license conditions is to alter the long standing anticompetitive nature of the relationships between Applicants and non-Applicants. Mo reove r, in any renegotiations of these relationships Applicants can insert contrac-tual language providing for the eventuality that the licensing conditions are subsequently modified or stricken.
Applicants' third argument is predicated on the incorrect a s sump-tion that the licensing conditions provide non-Applicants with preferential access to the nuclear units.1/ It is further premised on the speculative assumption that non-Applicant entities in fact elect to purchase shares of these units in amounts Applicants claim to be preferrential. Until such election is made, there is no basis in fact for finding injury to Applicants.
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While it is true that the opposing parties did not examine Dr. Pace with respect to this portion of his testimony, Dr. Pace was examined by the Licensing Board (Tr. 11,720 et seq. ).
Nor does the decision of the opposing parties not to cross-examine mean that Dr. Pace's testimony was uncontroverted.
- To the extent that the costs of such " preferential" elections are passed through to Applicants' customers, Applicants have failed to demonstrate any injury. The key to this argument by Applicants is found on page 13 of their motion where it is stated:
The waste caused by such planning in response to an anticipated flood of ' premature' requests will, of course, be passed through to Applicants' customers in the form of higher costs.
Applicants' current anticipation of a fl. od of requests for nuclear power is directly contrary to the arguments in their post hearing brief.
At page 542 it is asserted that no electric entity in areas served by Chio Edison and Penn Power has ever asked for access to nuclear plants.
Duquesne Light argues that the only municipal utility in its service area has never requested access to nuclear power (Brief pp. 349-50) and is unlikely to do so (Brief p. 671). Similarly, Toledo Edison argues that the
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City of Napoleon has never requested access to nuclear plants (Brief p.
477). Moreover, Applicants have argued throughout these proceedings that their wholesale customers obtain all benefits that will flow from nuclear generation. If this were true, there would be no reason to anti-cipate a " flood" of requests for access to nuclear power. In addition, it has been argued that municipals in Ohio are precluded by law from pur-chasing shares in nuclear units.
Applicants' argument that non-Applicant entities may purchase an excess amount of capacity for the purpose of transmitting that " extra" power out of the area for other than purposes of coordination is purely
- spe culative. No such threat has been pointed to as existing anywhere but in the mind of counsel.
Similarly, the argument that the license conditions may result in increasing costs for transmission is speculative. In fact, there is not even any allegation that the existing or planned transmission facilities of Applicants are not adequate to handle a11 foreseeable requests fcr ser-vice by non-Applicant entities. No specifics are provided. In claiming increased expense Applicants here, as elsewhere, make no reference to the fact that any non Applicant entity taking advantage of the licensing conditions will pay a just and reasonable rate for any capacity, energy or service obtained from Applicants. Even if Applicants' speculative scenario should come to pass, there is no showing that Applicants' own requirements would not grow to utilize any added capacity. Mo reove r, since the non-Applicant entities either buy at retail from Applicants or, with the exception of Painsville and Orrville,are all requirements or partial requirements customers of Applicants, the issue is likely to be one of which party owns the power and energy and serves the customers rather than one of adding capacity.
Applicants have failed to demonstrate that immediate effectiveness of the license conditions will cause them irreparable injury.
C.
Issuance Of A Stay Would Substantially Harm Other Parties Interested In The Proceedine.
Whereas no irreparable harm would be done Applicants if the license conditions are not stayed, the City would suffer substantial harm if the li-
. cense conditions are not immediately effective. 2/ After a long and ex-haustive inquiry into the relationships between City and CEI and the other Applicants covering a period from the early 1960's to 1976, the Licensing Board found Applicants guilty of a myriad anticompetitive acts. Many of those acts persist to this very day. The Licensing Board has found that City and CEI compete for customers in a sizeable portion of the City of Cleveland (Ff. 30). Rates and quality of service are the principal elements of this competition (Ff. 31). CEI has a competitive advantage in reliability and economy resulting from its interconnections with others and its parti-cipation in CAPCO (Ff. 33). The current interconnection between City and CEI places an " unusual and unjustifiable" reserve burden on City and effectively denies City the full benefits of coordinated operation and develop-ment (Ff. 56). City has requested access to nuclear generating units being constructed by CAPCO. Applicants offered access to those units upon conditions which the Licensing Board found to be an " outrageous affront to the policies underlying the antitrust laws" (Ff. 62). The Licensing Board found that "in order to remain or become a viable competitor Cleve-land must have both access to nuclear power and third party wheeling" (Ff.
63).
The Licensing Board found "that at least from August 20, 1967 forward Applicants were a party to a joint plan or combination, one facet of which was to exclude participation by municipals" (Slip Op. p. 193 fn. ).
2_/ The City has now decided not to sell its electric system ta CEI.
The -Licensing Board held (Slip Op. p.104):
We further hold that the CAPCO agreement was an agree-ment in restraint of trade in that it extended services and
' benefits to parties to agreements not to compete which it denied to their would-be competitors. We hold that these denials were not accidental or unintended but were the re-sult of consideration of the consequences of these actions.
i Given the stipulated dominance of Applicants' of generation and transmission within their service areas and their col-lective dominance within the CCCT, the denial of member-7 ship opportunities was an act of monopolization and also constituted a group boycott. Thus we hold that there were violations of both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act resulting from the form of CAPCO agreement which Applicants sdopted knowingly. (footnote omitted)
At this point in the proceedings the issue is whether a stay of the license conditions would substantially harm other parties to the proceed-ing s.
There is no need to show that the harm to City would flow from activities under the license. The decision of the Licensing Board clearly depicts the egregrious anticompetitive situation in the CCCT which has in i
the past and continues today to cause substantial harm to City and to other entities in the CCCT. No justification for continuing that harm has been put forth by Applicants. For each day that the present anticompetitive situation is allowed to continue, City is denied low cost PASNY power.
CEI has itself recognized that receipt of PASNY power would improve the 5-City's competitive position. City would incur substantial damage in being forced to continue to deal only with CEI for purchased power. 3/
i 3_/ Although City here focuses only on harm to City, the Licensing Board is well aware that other entities in the CCCT would also suffer substan-tial harm from a stay of the License conditions.
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. While it is not required that City show that it would be substantially harmed by activities under the license, it clearly would be. Applicants argue at pages 15-16, that for a period of at least five months, Davis-Besse Unit I will not be put into commercial operation. Thus Davis-Besse Unit 1 may be expected to be in commercial operation by June 1, 1977. 4/
The Appeal Board has granted an enlargement of time for filing briefs which extends the briefing date to June 13, 1976. After briefing, it may be anticipated that at least 2 months will pass before oral argument be-fore the Appeal Board. In the Consumers Power antitrust review appeal oral argument was held in April 1976 and no decision has been issued.
There is good reason to believe that Davis-Besse will operate commercially for at least one year before an Appeal Board decision is rendered.
The Licensing Board said (Slip Op. p.13):
... Applicants are of the opinion that these units will produce economies of scale and will provide for long term generation costs well under average system costs which could be obtained either compared to the cost of operating their present generating equipment or in com-paris 6n to new generation relying upon fossil-fueled units.
Thus, the operation of the Davis-Besse and Perry stations will have a substantial effect upon both the supply and the cost of electricity within the CCCT area.
Applicants argue, at pages 15 and 16, that their " policy commitments" will eliminate any harm to City. Suffice it to say that the Licensing Board has found the " policy commitments" themselves to be anticompetitive.
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Fuel loading is expected to commence in February, 1977.
. IT IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO STAY THE LICENSE CONDITIONS In Virginia Petroleum Jobbers, supra at 925, the Court described the test to be applied in measuring the public interest in ruling on a request for a stay as follows:
In litigation involving the administration of regulatory statutes designed to promote the public interest, this factor necessarily becomes crucial. The interests of private litigants must give way to the realization of public purposes. The public interest, may, of course, have many faces -- favoring at once both the rapid ex-pansion of utilities and the prevention of wasteful and repetitive proceedings at the taxpayers' or consumers' expense; both fostering competition and preserving the economic viability of existing public services; both ex-pediting administrative or judicial action and preserving orderly procedure.
The license conditions ordered by the Licensing Board do not in any way hinder the rapid expansion of utilities. Indeed, no real allegation has been made that the license conditions would delay expansion of utilities.
By providing small entities access to facilities which provide economies of scale, the conditions promote the public interest in preventing wasteful ex-penditures on less economic means of production and transmission of elec-Moreover, the license conditions were specifically designed to tricity.
r promote the public interest by both fostering competition and preserving the economic viability of existing public services such as the electric se.
vice provided by City. Neither a grant nor a denial of Applicants' motion would expedite administrative action while on the other hand, a denial of a stay would preserve orderly procedure.
_- In their motion at pages 17-19, Applicants fail to address in any meaningful fashion, the criteria set out in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers for measuring the public interest. Applicants' initial argument is simply a general restatement that Applicants are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal and that in an absence of a stay Applicants and their customers will suffer irreparable harm. Since the matters of irreparable harm and likelihood of success on appeal are set forth as separate and distinct fac-tors to be considered, this argument fails to address the public interest.
Apparently, Applicants believe that what is good for Applicants is good for the world.
l Applicants' second argument is predicated on broad unsubstantiated charges that the Department, Staff and Intervenors have engaged in " nuclear blac kmail". It is argued that failure to stay the license conditions will have some " chilling effect" on parties seeking licenses and will promote negotiated settlements of antitrust issues. The same may be said of a final decision affirming the opinion in this case. License conditions will not be imposed unless Licensing Board first finds that the activities under the license will create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. An i
innocent Applicant has nothing to fear. Finally, assuming, arguendo, that 4
" nuclear blackmail" exists and was applied in this case, it has been singu-larly ineffective. The most that could be argued is that maybe sometime in the future some Applicant would be deterred from contesting antitrust contentions because it believed it likely that the result would be a finding that it had engaged in anticompetitive conduct and, accordingly, license
. conditions would be imposed which would not be stayed pending appeal because on the facts of this case no stay were granted.
Applicants' third argument is that the public interest is not served by imposing license conditions on Applicants. Once again, Applicants fail to distinguish between their own interests and the public interest. No-where in their motion do Applicants undertake to show how the imposition of the license conditions fails to comport with the public interest rather than the private interest of Applicants.
e APPLICANTS' MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED Applicants, after having recognized that Virginia Petroleum Jobbers provides the test for measuring a motion seeking to stay the Licensing Board's order, fails to make even a rudimentary effort to meet the test. There being no justification in the record or Applicants' motion, the motion should be denied.
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15-WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Applicants' motion for a stay of licensing conditions, pedente lite, should be denied.
Respej:tfully submitted,
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Reuben Goldberg David C. Hjelmfelt Goldberg, Fieldman & Hjelmfelt, P. C.
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20006 Telephone (202) 659-2333 Vincent C. Campans11a Director of Law Robert D. Hart First Assistant Director of Law City of Cleveland 213 City Hall Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Telephone (216) 694-2737 Attorneys for City of Cleveland, Ohio January 26, 1977 g
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
_Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
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The Toledo Edison Company and
)
Docket Nos. 50-346A The Cleveland Electric Illuminating )
50-500A Company
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50-501A (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station )
Units 1, 2 and 3)
)
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating )
Docket Nos. 50-440A Company, et al.
)
50-441A i
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that service of the foregoing " Answer of City of Cleveland in Opposition to Motion of Applicants for Stay of License Con-ditions" has been made on the following parties listed on the attachment hereto, this 26th day of January,1977, by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid.
2,Jc sk/M D5VID C. HJfLMFKT Attachment 1
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ATTACHMENT Douglas V. Rigler, Esq. Chairman Christopher R. Schraff, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Assistant Attorney General Foley, Lardner, Hollabaugh and Jacobs Environmental Law Section 815 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
361 East Broad Street, 8th floor Washington, D. C.
20006 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Ivan W. Smith, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board John M. Frysiak, Esq.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, D. C.
20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Richard S. Salzman Jerome E. Shariman Andrew C. Goodhope, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 3320 Estelle Terrace U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wheaton, Maryland 20906 Washington, D. C.
20555 Robert M. Lazo, Esq., Chairman Howard K. Shapar, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Washington, D. C.
20555 Daniel M. Head, Esq., Member Mr. Frank W. Karas, Chief Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Public Proceedings Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary Washington, D. C.
20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Abraham Braitman, Esq.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Antitrust and Indemnity Washington, D. C.
20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa shington, D. C.
20555 Joseph Rutberg, Esq.
Jack R. Goldberg, Esq.
l Frank R. Clokey, Esq.
Office of the Executive Legal Director Special Assistant Attorney General U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Towne House Apartments, Room 219 Washington, D. C.
20555 l
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105 Benjamin H. Vogle r, E sq.
Edward A. Matto, Esq.
Roy P. Le s sy, Jr., Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Office of the General Counsel Chief, Antitrust Section R e gulation 30 East Broad Street, 15th floor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Columbus, Ohio 43215 Washington, D. C.
20555 y
.. ATTACHMENT (continued)
Melvin G. Berger, Esq.
David McNeill Olds, Esq.
Joseph J. Saunders, Esq.
William S. Lerach, Esq.
Steven M. Charno, Esq.
Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay David A. Leckie, Esq.
Post Office Box 2009 Janet R. Urban, Esq.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Antitrust Division Department of Justice Terrence H. Benbow, Esq.
Post Office Box 7513 Steven B. Perf, Esq.
Washington, D. C.
20044 Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts 40 Wall Street Karen H. Adkins, Esq.
New York, New York 10005 Richard M. Firestone, Esq.
Assistant Attorneys General Alan P. Buchmann, Esq.
Antitrust Section Squire, Sanders & Dempsey 30 East Broad Street, 15th floor 1800 Union Commerce Building Columbus, Ohio 43215 Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Russell J. Spetrino, Esq.
Leslie Henry, Esq.
Thomas A. Kayuha, Esq.
Michael M. Briley, Esq.
Ohio Edison Company Roger P. Klee, Esq.
47 North Main Street Fuller, Henry, Hodge & Snyder Akron, Ohio 44308 Post Office Box 2088 Toledo, Ohio 43604 John Lansdale, Jr., Esq.
Cox, Langford & Brown James R. Edgerly, Esq.
21 Dupont Circle, N. W.
Secretary and General Counsel Washington, D. C.
20036 Pennsylvania Power Company One East Washington Street Richard A. Miller, Esq.
New Castle, Pennsylvania 16103 Vice President and General Counsel The Cleveland Electric H1uminating Co.
Donald H. Hauser, Esq.
Post Office Box 5000 Victor A. Greenslade, Jr., Esq.
Cleveland, Ohio 44101 The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
Post Office Box 5000 Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Esq.
Robert E. Zahler, Esq.
Thoma s J. Munsch, Jr., Esq.
Jay H. Berstein, Esq.
General Attorney Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Duquesne Light Company 1800 M Street, N. W.
435 Sixth Avenue Washington, D. C.
20036 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Docketing and Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary Washington, D. C.
20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
c L3-ATTACHMENT (continued)
Joseph A. Rieser, Esq.
Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay 1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 John C. Engle, President AMP-0, Inc.
20 High Street Hamilton, Ohio 45012 Michael R. Gallagher, Esq.
630 Bulkley Building 1501 Euclid Cleveland, Ohio 44115 O