ML19329C888
| ML19329C888 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry, Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1975 |
| From: | Reynolds W CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE, TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002200868 | |
| Download: ML19329C888 (11) | |
Text
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- a-November 25, 1975 1
9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before'the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the'Matteriof
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- HE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY and
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l THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC. ILLUMINATING
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Docket No. 50 346-COMPANY
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(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,
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UnitL1)
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4-
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THE. CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
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Dochen Nos. 50-440:'.
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
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50-441A Units 1 and 2)
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THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.
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(Davis-Besse. Nuclear Power Station,
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Docket Nos. 50-500A Units 2 and 3)
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50-501A APPLICANTS' STATEME:'T OF PROCEDURAL MATTERS TO BC CONSIDERED l
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In a conference call initiated by the Chair-
- man of the Licencing ~ Board on November 14, 1975, the Eighth Prehearing Conference was set for November 2C, 1975.
In conjunction with this scheduling, counsel for Applicants was requested to identify preliminarily the procedural matters he intended to raise at that conference.
Counsel responded that he planned -to. request a ruling frcm the Board "[rle-l
. quiring that the other parties specify, both with respect to their documentary and testimonial evidence, which Applicant (s) the evidence was directed against, l
2.
The request-for that ruling was premised in l
8002200 868 A
4 w-g
. large measure upon the concern of Applicants' counsel that allegations of predatory practices directed against only one Applicant not be used indirectly as evidence of intent against any of the other Applicants unless and until their complicib/ in some overall conspiracy has been established.
This principle is well established.by law.
- See, e.g.,
Glasser v United States, 315 U.S.
60, 74-75 (1942); Oltman v Miller, 407 F.2d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v Bentvena, 314 F.2d 916, 949 (2d Cir. 1963).
There clearly is no basis at this stage to draw any inference of conspiracy.
The filing of a joint application for a nuclear permit or licensa does not allcw such an inference; nor does partici-pation in the CAPCO pool arrangemert.
See Kline v Coldwell.
Banker & Co.,
500 F.2d 225, 231 (9th Cir. 1974); Metropolitan Bac : Pacer Distributica Associaticn v FTC, 240 F.2d 341, 344 (2d Cir.), certiorari denied, 355 U.S.
817 (1957); Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. V FTC, 139 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1943).
3.
If conspiracy is indeed alleged in this case, the charge is well camouflaged.
Applicants have yet to be adviced, for e:: ample, of the date when any putative conspiracy began, what the purpose of that conspiracy might be, which of the Applicants comprise the confederates, and which of the many alleged anticompetitive practices are considered to have been performed in furtherance of the " conspiracy."
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i Without knowledge of the commencement date, Applicants will have no way of knowing which of the alleged practices fall within the time-frame of the so-called conspiracy.
- See, e.g.,
Harms v. United States, 272 F.2d 478, 482 (4th Cir. 1959);
Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, 232 F.2d 190, 192 (9 th Cir. 1956); Hall v United States, 109 F.2d 976, 984 (10th'Cir. 1940).
Without. identification of the pur-poses of the alleged conspiracy, Applicants cannot ascertain which of the alleged acts may have been committed'in fur-therance thereof.
United States v Nixon, 94 S.
Ct. 3090, 3104 (1974);~ United States v Rodricuez, 509 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1975);
Steiner v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Coro., 232 F.2d 190, 192 (9th Cir. 1956); Hoffman v Halden, 263 F.2d 230, 295 (9th Cir.
1959); Neff v World Publishina Co.,
349 F.2d 235, 257 ( Stl1 Cir.
1965).
Perhaps most important, without a designation of the specific acts of each Applicant which are to be relied upon to establish its complicity, the individual Applicants will be hamstrung in their efforts to counter a charge of partici-pation in the conspiracy.
Such a precarious condition runs sharply centrary to the universally accepted proposition that There must be alleged certain acts of each of the alleged con-spirators which would connect him or it'with the conspiracy * *
- Each of'the defendants, therefore, has a right to know what he or it is alleged to have done which made him or it a part of the conspiracy....
. _ _ _ ~ _ _.. -
-m-
o
[
. ' Vermilion' Foam Products v General Electric, 386.F. Supp.-
1255, 259 (E.D. Mich. 1974),
quoting United States v.
North Coast Transportation Co.,
7 F.
R.
D.
491, 493 (W.D. Wash.
l 1974).
See United States v Aercquip Corp., 284 F. Supp.'ll4, 117
_ (E.D. Mich. 1968).
4.
Adherence to this principle is imperative hero' f
- Mere interdependence does not convert kncwingly parallel behavior into aEconspiracy.
See Northern' California Phar-
- maceutical-Ass'n v United States, 306 F.2dJ370, 388-89 (9th Cir.), certiorari denied, 371-U.S. 862 (1962); Bocosian v i
Gulf Oi,l' Corocration, 393 F.
Supp. 1046, 1052 (E. D. Pa. 1975).
If the Depa ment, the Staff and the City are to prevail on-any sort.of censpiracy theory, it must neccccarily be through E
uca of circametantial evidence.
Applicants cuspect that the allegations.of predatory retail 7and wholesale practices which have been charged against each Applicant individually will be'seiced upon as that circumstantial evidence.
In consid-
~
. ering what evidentiary guidelines are appropriate in such circumstancec, this Board would do well to heed-the counsel
'of the. district court in oversecs Motors, Inc. v Import Motors
. Limited,EInc., 375 F.
Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd,
- 519 F.2d'119 (6th Cir.1975) that where as here a i-Case is' based entirely on:such circumstantial evidence, the court must be especially vigilant
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.m a a to insure-that liberal modes of proof do not become the pretext for unfounded speculation.-
375 F. Supp. at 531.
5.
This admonition parallels that of Mr.' Justice Jackson, concurring in Krulewitch v United States, 336 U.S.
440 (1949), whcse sensitivity to the plight of those whose unenvicble_ task it was to refute charges of conspiracy was articulated in terms strikingly apposite here:
When the trial starts, the accused feels the full impact oflthe con-spiracy strategy.
Strictly, the prosecution should first establish prima facie the conspiracy and identify the conspirators, after which evidence of acts and declara-tions of each in the course of its execution are admissible against all.
But the order of proof of so sprawling a charge is difficult for a judge to control.
As a prac-tical matter, the accused often is confronted with a' hodgepodge of acts and statements.by others which he may never have authorized er_in-tended or even known about, but which help to persuade the jury of the' existence of the conspiracy itself.
In other words, a con-
-spiracy is often proved by evidence that is aamissible only ucon assumation that consciracy existed. '336 U.S.
at 453 (empnasis adccc).
.Moreover, this solicitude was not confined to the criminal
, cefendant:
"[t]he interchangeable use of conspiracy doctrine in_ civil ^as well as penal proceedings opens it to the danger, absent:in.the1 case of many crimes, that a court having in l
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m mind only the civil-sanctions will approve lax practices which later are Lnported into criminal proceeding."
Id.
at 451-52.
'6.. Guarding against the danger identified by
'Mr. Justice Jackson in Krulewitch.and mindful.of the settled principle that acts and statements of one alleged co-ecnspiratcr cannot be imputed to another until the e::istence of a con-spiracy, and each alleged confederate's participation therein, is established, this Board should at the outset articulate firm precedural rules regarding the introduction of docu-menta.ry and testimonial evidenco.
The Department, the Staff.
and the City should be required to specify the particular Applicant against whom the evidence is sought to be admitted.
Such evidence-will then ccme in only against that Applica t subject to the right "later to move for the admission of said evidenceLao against all the [ Applicants] onca (the particc]
succeeded in establishing their allegations of conspiracy from independent evidence."
Rutledge v Electric Hose & Rub-1/
ber Co., 329 F. Supp. 1267, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1971).-
As in Rutledae,~it would be incumbent upon the party alleging con-
= 1/- We submit that the alternative procedure of admitting evidence.of individual acts as against all. Applicants subject to some: subsequent showing.of a conspiracy is an inadequate safeguard against the danger that conspiracy will be impermissibly
~ inferred on the basis of an amorphous totality of the evidence wi'thouf proper recognition of the failure of the other parties 1to show the complicity of all Applicants.
m-
s spiracy to establish its existence from independent evidence, rather than rely upon the possibility that, at the close of a protracted evidentiary hearing, a finding of conspiracy would be rendered based upon the " totality of evidence" 1-approach.
Thus, the factors of motive,2/ opportunity,3/ and consistency of overt actsS[ would have to be separately es-tablished and so identified to the Board to support a con-spiracy claim.
-7.
That this is the most sensible way to proceed here becemen obviouc when ene -?acurcs en the overriding pur-pose of this antitruct hearing.
This Board is being asked to impose conditions on permits and licences for these nuclear plants.
To the extent that the Department, the Staff and the City have a#vanced different cilegations against each Appli-cant, this Ecard would be remica to precced en the aucumption that a singla set of standcrd licensa condition: might be 2/
First National Bank of Arizona v Cities Service Co.,
391 U.S.
253, renearinc denied, 393 U.S.
901 (1968); Scranton Construction Co.,
Ine[ v Litton Inductries Leasinc Coro., 494 l'. 2 d ! < 3, 7ea (Sth Cir. 12,4), cart. acalca,
,A9 u.s.
_105 (1373);
Ovarcnsa Motorc, Inc. v Imrort Mcters, Ltd.,
375 7.
Gupp. 499, 534 (E.D. Mica. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1975).
3/ Overseas Motors, Inc. v Import Motors, Ltd., supra, at 5327 Stern v. Lucy Weco Hayes National Trainina School for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F.
Supp. 1003, 1012 (D.
D.C.
1974).
4/ Norfolk Monument Co. v Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, 394 U.S7 700 (1969); State of North Carolina v Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
Inc., 384 F.
Supp. 265, 284 (E.D.
N.C.
1974); overseas Motors, Inc.
v-Import Motors, Ltd.,,
suora, at 534-35.
es
. appropriate under any circumstances.
Each set of allegations should b,e viewed independently.
While Applicants do not believe that license conditions are appropriate for any of them, in the unlikely event that this Board should disagree as to some (or even all) Applicants, the proper procedure vould be to issue a separate set of license conditions tailored to whatever case is made out against each Applicant.
See Kansas Gas and Electric Ccmoan" and Kansas City Power and Licht Comoany (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), Docket I:o. 50-4S2.3 (cor.pt a 39 Fed. Reg. 442G9 vith 39 Fed. Reg. 44272).
Respectfully submitted, CIIJJ, PI.T'?? 'Z.?, POTT." n Tn0' L C';5 r\\ m
,n2 By:
It' I
? I;If 1 1_.
i F:m. crc.cford Reynoda Gerald Charnoff Counsel for Applicants Dated:
':overabar 25, 1975.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensinct Board In the Matter of
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THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY and
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
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Dockot No. 50-346A COMPA'iY
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(Davis-Desse Nuclear Power Station,
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Unit 1)
)
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
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Docket Mos. 50-440A (Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
50-441A Units 1 and 2)
)
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THE TOLEDO EDISON CO*1PANY, ET AL.
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(Davis-Eesse Nuclear Pcwer Station,
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Docket Nos. 50-500A i
Units 2 and 3)
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50-501A i
CERTIFICAT2 O? SEFVICC 1
I hereby. certify thab copies of the foregoinc; "Applicantc' St tement Of Procedural Matters To Be Ccn-cilered" varc sarved upon each of the perscae listed en
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the attached Service List, by hand delivering a copy to 3
thoso persons in-the Washington, D.C.
area and by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to all others, all on this 25th day of November, 197S.
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
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By:
i Wm. Bradfor,d Reynolds Counsel for Applicants i
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
' HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Defore the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board In the Matter of
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THE TOLEDO EDICOM COMPANY and
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THE CLE'/ELA:iD ELECTRIC ILLUMIHATING
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NRC Docket No. 50-346A COMPAUY
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(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,
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Unit 1)
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THE CLEVELA::D ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
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NRC Docket Nos. 50-440A (Perry "uclear Power Plant,
)
50-441A Units 1 and 2)
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,Lm n. u r 3
.e.u._, e n.,
C c. n. m. w.
Em nL.
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s (Davis-Bessa Nuclear Pcuer Station,
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HRC Docket Nos. 50-500A Units 2 and 3)
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50-501A SERVICE LIST Douglac V. Rigler, Etc.
Mr. Chase R.
Stephenc Coal nan, Atczic Safetr End Dockering & Service Secticn LacerninJ Scard U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commisdion Foley, Lardner, Holla':augh 1717 H Street, N.W.
and Jacob 3 Washington, D.
C.
20005 Chc.in Euilding - St.ite 205 615 Connecticut Avenue,, U. 'd.
Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq.
Uschinston, D.
C.
20000 Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esq.
Jack R. Goldberg, Esq.
Ivan W. Smith, Esq.
Office of the Executive Legal Direc cr Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ~ Commission Board Panel Washington, D.
C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatcry Commission Wr.a'.;ington, D.
C.
20555 Jeseph J.
Caundars, Esq.
Steven M.
Charno, Esq.
John A.
Frysiak, Esq.
Melvin G.
Eerger, Esq.
Atemic Safety and Licensing
/.nthony G. Aiuvalasit, Esq.
Board Panel Ruth Greenspan Bell, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Janet R. Urban, Esq.
Uashington, D. C.
20555 Antitrust Division Department of Justice Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.
C.
20530 Board Panel U.S. Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 1
n Reuben Goldberg, Esc.
Russell J. Spetrino, Esq.
David C. Hj elmfelt, Ecq.
Thomas A.
Eayuha, Esq.
Michael D. Oldak, Esq.
Ohio Edison Company Goldberg, Fieldman & Hj elmfelt 47 North Main Street 1700 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Akron, Ohio 44308 Washington, D. C. 20006 Terence H. Eenbow, Ecq.
Wallace E. Brand, Esq.
A. Edward Grachof, Esq.
Pearce & Brand Steven A. Berger, Esq.
Suite 1200 Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts 1000 Connecticu't Ave., N.W.
40 Wall Street Washingten, D. C.
20036 New York, New York 10005 Frank R. Clohey, Ecq.
Thomas J. Munach, Esq.
Special Assistant General Attorney Attorney General Duquesne Light Company Room 219 435 Sixth Avenue Tonne House Acart=snts Pittsburgh, PA 15219 1:arrisburg, ?A 17105 David Olds, Esq.
- r nrr.cm1 Eud.U21 William S. Lersch,.Ecq.
Dicceter o.' Public Utilitius need Smith Shaw i McCla" ClLy of Cleveland Un3cn Trust Eailding 1201 La%caidc Avenue Don 2009 Cleveland, Ohio 44110 Piutsburgh, PA 15230 Jares'E. Davis, Director Lee A. Rau, Ehq.
Ecbert D.
Hart: Ecq.
Joceph A. Riescr. Jr., Ecq.
1;apcat::'ent ci' La-Reed S:aith Sha t 5 McCla' 1201 La::enide Avnnu s Madicon Buildirg - T.7.
- 0" Cicveland; Ohio a 14 1155 15th Strcot, N.'.
Utchic.cton, L.
C.
20CC3 Donild H. Hauser, Eci.
Victor A.
Greenslada, Jr., Esq.
Edward A. Matto, Esq.
The Cleveland Electric Richard M. Firestone, Ecq.
Illuninating Company Earen H. Adkins, Esq.
55 Public Square Antitrust Section Cleveland, Ohio 44101 30 E. Broad Street, 15th Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215 J:Fn Lansde.13, Ecq.
Oc::, Lar.3fGrd & 3rc :n Chriatopher R.
Schraff, Ecq.
21 Dupon: Circle, 11. 4.
Assistant Attorney General Washinston, D.
C.
20036 Environmental Lau Section 361 E. Broad Street, 8th Floor Leslie Henry, Esq.
Columbus, Ohio 43215 Michael M. Eriley, Esq.
Roger P-Klee, Esq.
James R. Edgerly, Esq.
Fuller, Henry, Hodse & Snyder Secretary and General Counsel P. O. Box 2086 Penncylvania Power Cc=pany Toledo, Ohio 43603 One Eact Washington Scree:
New Castle, PA 16103
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