ML19329C755
| ML19329C755 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1975 |
| From: | Engle L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002190873 | |
| Download: ML19329C755 (9) | |
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d ISPLIC.W : Tclab Ediscr. Capmy (~E)
FTCIIJTY: Davis Desse, Unit 1 (DD-1)
St.M'ARY T ::IE SIT '/ISIT ':0 ':1I OWIS B ITI: CCT13. IO3 STF'ICU, CTI"' 1
- CC staff fmn tM Cffico of !Alclear I'ecctcr 7s;ulation crrrhictM a sito visit to the Dxtic besrc !.'uclear Pcrer Statien, Unit 1 (DD-1) en 0:tcher 15 anl 1G,1973. Also present wre ::'r staff frcn tM Office of Ire ction mi Diforcic.L (Regicn 3),, ard the Toledo rdincn Ccrpany (TTn9 an1 the Ecchtel Ccrporation had representatives avminhle for the site visit ard ensuiry discussions.
'n attenlar:ce list is attact.el.
':he rurpose of the tm day visit ma to ca:pp1<rtnt cur present revicv ci the Fir.a1 c.1fe j.'.ralysis Pc;rrt (FCA'.) in tM areas of Elcetrical Centrei an! Instnrtntation Systers.
n adlition, tSo facility design as installel at the site ms ctcorvs1 for 3IS relatal itcu.
Arms ir_,getd by tM :E staff ircit:id the cent:rl rean, cable rtms and cabic.,prm:i y; areas, c.dtchgear recrs, Latt..:7 ins'n11ations, diecel gena:aters, instrun,-nt pipirg, transforcrs, cwitchyards, reactr hui.blinJ, tudine bd W n, stem li:rs and the recirealatica mtcr s',rstes. Nso inspected wre the levast :nre of Pct-leg pinini, the OII notcrwted isolati:n valves, the mtcrtight HIS p:rp rocr:s,
- 2I an! 1:PI pipiru vonts, location of 24" rcr;.al gate valve en the 2.1.7' (Dti 79), III-to-:.?I mi IPI-to-l'PI c: recover valves ard the IIIS :..T..
.b a result of the abcve inspe.cticrs, the fclle day discussions were held an3 2cre n1ta11 JTrea r_nt with the it-C staff and 7.XL ms chtained, it is so notal below.
1.
The EC staff stated t'ut a violaticn of GCC 17 ms ncmi in the switchyard. ':he 2 offsite pcwr circuits wre rot physimily inlepon!cnt, i.e., they hxl a acrren support structure. T Co inlicatal their intewLaticn of Gtc 17 allcwx! a cctronality within the boun11 ries of the r,;itd rt ni statal this itcn muld be apicaled.
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NOV. 0 5 1975 tbte: Subsa;uent to the site visit, the lac staff investigated past interpretations of GDC-17 for other facilities and concluded the DB-1 switchyard was not in violation of GDC-17. TECD was so notified by telephone on October 17, 1975.
2.
The cable installation in the control rocm and in the adjacent electrical equipnent area wcs less than 50% ccrplete. !b fi.M evaluation could be made in this area, and another site visit may be necessary for this purpose.
3.
The diesel generator (DG) electrical installation was not acr:plete.
Mcwever, the DG's are in separate and independent Class I roms and no apparent violation of separaticn requirements was noted.
It is intendal to further verify that applicable requirements regarding DG controls are met during a subsequent detailed drawing review.
4.
It was cbserved that the electrical design included scme mechanically interlocked breakers (or switches) trat can energize a cxrporant or bus frtm either of two redundant pcwer scurces. In these cases, TEco stated that the si:gle failure criterion is met by administrative 1y opening the circuit not in use at its other teminal. The staff requested that the applicant identify all such administrative 1y controlled circuit opening devices in the FSAR by cxr:ponent nirber and location.
5.
The applicant -Med the folicwing cable color code infczmation:
Inst. Channel ESF CPannel 1.
Green 2.
Orange
? 1.
Green 3.
Lt. Blue-y2.
Orange 4.
Raroon -
Non Essential Cables run in Essential Faceways (none presently installed)
(1.
Faceway) Non Essential Channel A - Dark Blue (2. Raceway) Non Essential Channel B - Tan (3. Raceway) Non Essential Channel C - Silver Fleck Ibn Essential cable not run in essential raceways are not color coded. The staff concluded that this was acceptable and requested tra above information be documented in the FSAR.
NOV. O t 1975 l i 6.
Cable tray cross sections as obse:wxi for CB-1 are shown in the followirs r2 etch.
ghg g g" 14"cavders 04bl85 yo
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,; go,_,33.dio,1 s' O 00 cei,in me.y bo w tr.yIISD s
t a
d owly 4"sidm L.yf f 3,wa g, %
The staff indicatal that the cable tray design as irrlicated above w1s a gcod design.
7.
TE:o stated that the mininun seperation distance betwen redundant cable trays was 4 feet vertical and 18 inches horizontal (cottan to bottan). Less seperation m uld require installation of a barrier. The staff indicated the above provisiens were acceptable.
8.
Non essentid cable trays (Channels A, B, or C) are pennitted between redundant essential cable trays. The staff concluded that this was acceptable provided the folicwi m minimum seperations were maintained. Iess seperation would r @ e fire barriers as shown by dotted lines.
- i. I C%m A(B) 7
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_ y Cho,n 2,4 (1,3) h rI cha A@m
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TECo stated that the above criteria was acceptable to then.
9.
The applicant provided a draft of the separation criteria for cable routirn inside encicsures, (Centrol boards, instn: ment cabinets, distribution panels, meter control centers, etc). The followirq diagrams reflect the staff psitiens regardire cable bundlirg.
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N0s. 0 61975 4-U2 A
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(c0 twa e
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y CHI f
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CHA
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[k9 Areas e.ere cables c e buniled togetFar (with (g
t no seceration or barriers CQ.g l'
provided)
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m CH A
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unaccentable unless it can be dmenstrated by e
7y test that flane pm -
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pagaticn frcm one safety j
channel to a redundant k
safety channel will not occur for these cen-figurations.
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Acceptable provided 5
verification that cable f, }
p A(B) is not also bundled, V "'
routed, er fez:nsd with h
f any cable at another i
essential crarml.
1,2.,3,A O gge % Acceptable Wimn 12 inches or barrier
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$ edwnd emt CM 3g.
h0V. C 51975 1
. An acceptable h7rrier ray be a rigid er fler.ible metal corduit.
TECO statal that flame test data uculd be &:cmentai *w substantisto the acceptability of arrarga:rnts 9-c) an! 9-d) above.
- 10. TED was requested to justify their exceptions for perh& testing of the follcwiny values (Pcf. mu 7.3.2.6), W106, W106A, W107, W107A, or modify their design to provide periodic testi:rJ, i~.e., renthly. TECO stated that this iten-appears to'be an-cVer-1 sight arxi will be checked a:xi reported to staff...
- 11. T2D wus advised that valves DiIIA arxi DIII3, as presently desicnal, kere subject to 1:vxt/crtent closure ard did not justify the single failure criteria in tPs event of a pipe break in ene cf the t ro low pressure injection (I2I) locps. Sc staff irr1M, tad that the j
design of these valv=s be rnHrici to ccnfcm with tSa staff positicn for rurmity controlla2 elcetrically-crerated valves.
(Statal in P 7.1.1-1 of tre F.TG).
- 12. The staff identified rodunfnnt cables 2C010SL (crange) ard 4"D2m (marron) in cubicle 13 of 4160 V bas D1 as boirs h:: riled j
together. "IXD checked their inspecticn red (itm 2237 cn 3/2/75) ard fan 1 that this ini already been fourxi ard corredive action scPn!nic1. The 0--
c.iva action sculd 1/2 to erclose ene c&le in a fler.ible retal conduit. W.o staff fctrxl these ccrrective provisions accerc hle.
"ICb ctated tMt inferntien pertaini q to fire stc7s cal h7rriers, cable flawhility ard fire detection ard gotecticn syntan wuhl Ec fcrfmis; in resmnso to the sgcific rescst for iricrration Ta:Ir'.ittcd by A. Schercer of Z to L. ce of TECD on 0.117 22, 1975.
- 13. The cerara breakcrs and the cabliny fer the rod control systes tere rot yet installot
'o* evaluatien of ada;uacj for the ints::cr.nectienc of this ccuirrent ws ressible.
- 13. It was notal that cnly cne of tPc tw rtraire! runual scr rt writches (73 asrxrblics) tes ciservoi circuntal mierneath t.hc centrol console. C'Co statal tMt a rol=b.nt inicpendcnti/ wired ase(rbly mtid be providal as decrental in t'c FCla.
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NOV. 0 5 1975
- 16. It ms observol that r.mns for ranm1 initiation of systa s level incperablo status cr bypass iMbtien was ro t italled in tM control recrn. TDCo statal tMt this.:uld be pts idcd in acccrdance with docmentation in the FE/Jt.
- 17. The !hin Stoan Line Isolation ard F1:pture Centrol Systen Cabinets (including the 1.;.::r #
f Featwater Ccntrol Systan) wro not yet ir#al l M.
An evaluatien of the Mccuacy of this irs.silation ms tMrefere not possible.
- 13. Thc D11' drop lira connection to thecret leg us found acceptable at the lcwst part d tra lot leg pipizq.
- 19. The Dil matcr-qcratal isolation valves inside con +h.t wuld te unler mter in post-IDCA tut are enclosed in a mtertight ccrpartrent with a wtcrtight access hatch. :-%nual bypans valves will rot be located in this caqmtrent.
- 20. A mil abcut ten feet high with ro ceili:n ms observed in the mtertight im pump rocns. E'J1 penetrations wra rot uter-ti@.t ani the gr.ide in!ica'&the penetratices wro not yet ccT eto:1. Tccess is by stairs frcn top of rocras.
l Ioak detoction ma notal frca a level ala=n in a mall s:.:rp in tin p:=p roa:s.
'Xrs ccolers for teth tr.ir, are 1ccated in the :. cmc recn.
- 21. ?ipical IPI anl I:PI pipi q vc:PJ.rry provisiens wre rot rccessible in the ecnples obsernd. "he guide irdicate-1 that reach rods wre to be installcd.
- 22. The III:S p:rp casirn vct.ti:n provisiens mre fary! aceq.+2.ble.
".3. The locatien of the 24 irch gato 'talvo C?II 79) en t'.o MC ma obscrxd to be as close as practible to the F.C.
24.
If narr.:,'l. Iv~t for the LPI to !TI cren r/tr are accret4. "Y m through DB-1 appeal,-handwheels muld.have to be-1cwered or reach rcds irou. gated.
- 25. The LPI to LPI crossover valves are acceptable previaal this design is ac,.tyLcd by ZC after apio11 by "IT:o.
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yd' NCV. 0 51975
. 26. The mm single strp ms ebcerval to be too small to cc xiuct a full flew test (* 3500 gal). arp constructicn ms net complete, piping ms not cm. red, an1 the antia.ortex devices wre rot installcx1. Cofferirt gwaih414 ties for tretire prccueracienc1 testiny pmvinim.c for.%gulatcry Otir!n 1.79 are linital by the larger adjacent in-ccre guide t' des pit arrl the IIIS stry is charfcd by this pit. It es cheerval that although the initial few feet of su::tien pipirq frtn the strp are brirental, the pipi:v!
sicpos slightly q.wrd after s=p valves (So verifial l'r guido).
- 27. For the 'x:ren dilutien inctrtrc:Pation, the ficw rate roccbut frcr.1 tM control rocr15,ca not avnil'bic for all diluticn Tx.cs.
AvDilNhle trA"aturo revh'ntit is prcycsed to Irevhle cperatcr.
cf the presence of dilutien ficv.
TECO was nest cooperative in previdirs plant and angirecrits staff for the cbscrintiens arxl discussiera cerr:ncted a. t' tis si*a vicit.
ci,!ral Si;'.d h7 LErTc Ircn "ngle, Freject **anagcr Light i'ater Tcactors Erarch 2-3 Divisien of Mc or Lice:.sirc attacMenc Atterdr:ce IJst I
cc w/ attach tr.t:
Pr. In cl1 2. h Dcrald 1:. :duser, Esq.
Gerald Charreff, Esq.
Mslic :*.cnry, Isq.
P1:
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11/ 75 onvs,
Forms AEC.318 (Rev. 9-53) AICM 0240 W u. s. movem==a=v con = rime orrics: s ete.sas.ios
NOV. 0 51975 ATDONENT ATIE20Au LIST OCIGBER 15, 1975
'ICIEDO IDISQi CINPANY J.Brk G. Eicherauer i
M. CalcamtnJ o T. Mitchell J. Ienardson E. Ibvak A. 'Ibpar BEE"EL CCRPCPATIOT D. Bilowus J. Gonzales S. Saba E. Steudel NBC - SIAFF L. Engle F. Rosa J. Sutton j
F. Jablonski l
A. Szukiewicz
NOV. O S 1975 O
' ATDCHME2Tf ATIHEANCE LIST MLEDO DISCN CI24PRTI OCIDBER 16, 1975 ELEDO EISON CO@MiY J. Blank J. Buck G. Eicherauer M. micam ggio T. Mitchell J. Lerarlson E. Ncnak A. Topar E2 urn.L CERPCRATICN D. Distukes W. Maenan R. Jackson T. Quay A. Wikk D. Bilowus J. Gora. ales S. Saba E. Steudel NRC - STAFF G. Mazetis K. Parezeswki L. Engle F. Posa J. Sutton F. Jablonski A. Szukiewicz 1
i i
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