ML19329C707
| ML19329C707 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse, Perry  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1974 |
| From: | Goldberg R, Hjelmfelt D CLEVELAND, OH, GOLDBERG, FIELDMAN & HJELMFELT |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002180200 | |
| Download: ML19329C707 (21) | |
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- ,a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
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The Toledo Edison Company and
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The Cleveland Electric Illuminating )
Company
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Docket Nos... W 4 (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
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50-440A Station, Unit 1)
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50-441A
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The Cleveland Electric Illuminating )
Company, et al.
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(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
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Units 1 and 2)
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i OBJECTIONS OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND TO BOARD'S ORDER ON OBJECTIONS TO 4
INTERROGATORIES AND DOCUMENT REQUFcTS Pursuant to Section 2.751a(d) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, the City of Cleveland (Cleveland) objects to the portions of the Board's Order on Objections to Interrogatories and Document Requests specified herein.
l By raising specific objections to a portion of that Order now, Cleveland j
does not waive its right to raise its objections to these and other portions 1
of the Board's Order at an appropriate time.
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j Cleveland objects to certain of the Board's rulings with respect to I
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company's (CEI) Objections to Cleve-land's Request for the Production of Documents, Objections of Applicants g 3, t-
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other than CEI to Cleveland's Request for the Production of Documents, and Cleveland's Objections to Interrogatories and Request for Documents served on the City by Applicants.
I A.
CEI's Objections to Cle > 1and's Prooosed Discovery Document Request 16(d). In paragraph B. 5 of its Order the Board sustained CEI's objection to producing certain documents pertaining to legislation and constitutional revision affecting the ability of electric utilities to own, finance, and construct facilities and to sell electricity. The Board held that the requested documents were not relevant because under the doctrine of Parker
- v. B rown 317 US 341, (1942), legislative judgments with respect to legisla-i t
tive structure may not be considered as antitrust violations even though they have an effect upon commerce.
Absent any Parker v. B rown problem the requested documents are relevant under even the most restricted view of the scope of this proceeding as being an inquiry into structure and dominance. No examination of struc-ture and dominance can be complete without an examination of the ability of other electric utilities which are actual or potential competitors of Applicants to own, finance and construct facilities and to sell electricity.
This is particularly true in light of the Board's determination in Prehearing Conference Order #2 "not to limit discovery to the subject of dominance only. "
Cleveland does not believe that Parker is applicable. Parker involved an attack on a California marketing program instituted pursuant to a California 8
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! i statute intended to substitute centralized marketing plans for cornpetition between growers and to maintain prices. A producer and packer of raisins challenged the validity of the program as violating the Sherman Act and the Commerce Clause and as inconsistent with and superseded by the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.
The Supreme Court considered each o' he arguments separately.
With respect to the claim that the California prorate program violated the Sherman Act, the Court assumed that there would be such a violation if the program were organized and effected solely by means of contract, combina-tion, or conspiracy of private persons. The Court at p* 1 e 350-351 held that the program:
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... derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and was not intended to operate or become effec-tive without that command. We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents i
from activities directed by its 1
'slatu r e.
The Court also noted that the Sherman Act makes no mention of states as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by the state. Here, we are not concerned with any action by the state or directed by the state. The documents requested per-tain to activities by CEI. In this regard it is important to consider the Court's warning at page 351:
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True, a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by author-izing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful...
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i As Cleveland pointed out in its Statement in Clarification filed pur-i suant to the Board's Order Requesting Clarification docketed June 28, 1974, 1
dominance alone may net be sufficient to constitute a situation inconsistent I
with the antitrust laws, but dominance may be monopoly power which together i
j with the purpose or intent to monopolize constitutes an evil at which the i
j Sherman Act is aimed. Schine Chain Theaters. In c.
- v. United States, 334 j
US 110, 92 L. ed 1245 (1948).
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Documents showing that Applicants attempted to procure the passage i
i of legislation or constitutional revision which would limit or restrain the f
ability of actual or potential competitors to own, finance and construct facilities and to sell electricity would be evidence of an intent to monopolize.
i CF. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F. 2d 416 (CA2,
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1945), United States v. Griffitt, 334 US 100, 92 L. ed 1236. For such purposes, tb.: evidence would be admissible even if it would not itself be the basis for I
an action. The Supreme Court stated in United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 331 US 657 (1965) at 670-671 n. 3.
I It would of course still be within the province
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of the trial judge to admit this evidence, if he l
deemed it probative and not unduly prejudicial, under the ' established judicial rule of evidence that testimony of prior or subsequent trans-actions, which for some reason are barred from forming the basis for a suit, may never-l theless be introduced if it tends reasonably to show the purpose and character of the particular transactions under scrutiny. '
4 Pa rke r v.
Brown may insulate from the antitrust laws activities done l
pursuant to valid state legislative command. It does not insulate from the J
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antitrust laws the activities of Applicant which were not done at the direction i
of state legislative command and which are intended to preserve o r extend i
monopoly power.
Document Request 16(f). The Board sustained CEI's objection to producing documents relating to elections in any municipality operating a distribution I
system on the grounds that Cleveland has failed to demonstrate relevance.
Document Request 16(d) seeks evidence of CEI's intent to maintain or extend monopoly power through attempts to influence the legislation which would enable municipalities and others to engage in the electric utility business. Document Request 16(f) seeks similar evidence on a different level, i. e., attempts to influence the municipalities' activ. ties pursuant to state constitutional o r legislative authorization. Its relevance lies in the fact that to a large degree activities of a municipality in purchasing, con-structing, enlarging, repairing or franchising an electric system to operate within the municipality must be submitted to a vote of the residents. Attempts by CEI to influence the vote against creation or enlargement of a municipal electric utility which would compete with CEI would be evidence of an intent i
i to maintain o r extend its monopoly. Moreover, if such municipal systems i
I existed in CEI's operating area, a municipal electric pool fo r coordinated operations and development might be possible.
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Document Request 16(g). The Board overruled CEI's objection to producing documents relating to litigation in opposition to the construction of competing 1
T generation or transmission facilities but limited the required response to d
. litigation initiated by CEI. Cleveland submits that equally relevant is liti-gation initiated by others in which CEI may not be a party of record but has a community of interest and aids and encourages a party of record or is the inspiration behind the litigation.
Document Request 18(a). The Board sustained CEI's objection to producing correspondence with EEI or any committee thereof and the National Associ-ation of Electric Companies and any electric utility relating to system con-s t ru ctio n, financing, ownership, operation of electric generation, transmis-sion or distribution facilities by municipal and/o r cooperative electric utilitie s, including acquisitions of electric utilities by CEI, or cornpetition between such utilities and CEI fo r lack of relevance. The requested docu-ments may evidence opposition by CEI to the creation or continued existence of competing electric utilities which would challenge CEI's monopoly power.
Thus they would be evidence of an intent to preserve or extend monopoly power. Fu rth e r, such documents as the EEI Prime Mover Committee Report are relevant to show the types of business relationships among the utilities which the industry itself believes are necessary or desirable.
Document Request 21(c). The Board sustain:d CEI's objection to turning over documents relating to the formation of National Electric Reliability Council, ECAR, and N APSIC and their activities in setting reliability stan-dards and simila r standards to gove rn the relationships among electric utilities on the basis of relevance and burden. Standards set by these organizations have wide acceptance in the electric utility industry. When Cleveland went to the FPC in an attempt to fo rce CEI to interconnect and
_7 sell emergency power to Cleveland, CEI argued without objection from the FPC staff that Cleveland would be required to comply with ECAR standards.
One means by which CEI can preserve and maintain its monopoly position is by joining with other electric utilities to establish industry standards designed to prevent smaller electric utilities from full participation in interconnection and coordinated operations and development. In an antitrust inquiry wnich the Board has framed largely in terms of structure, any activities of CEI designed to preserve its dominance are extremely relevant.
Document Request 23. In paragraph B.16 of its Order the Board sustained CEI's objection to Document Request 23 except that discovery is permitted as to CAPCO and ECAR documents on the basis of relevancy. One of the relevant product markets fo r antitrust analysis in this proceeding is the regional power exchange market. The regional power exchange market includes power transactions for short term surplus sales, economy energy, maintenance energy, and seasonal diversity power exchange. Oppo rtunity to engage in such transactions results in lower power costs to the partici-pants. The regicnal power exchange market clearly is not limited to the CAPCO companies but includes all such opportunities which are available o r potentially available to electric utilities operating in the CAPCO area.
The documents requested go directly to the structure and activities of CEI in the regional power exchange market. No logical basis exists fo r limiting the regional power market to CAPCO and ECAR.
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_ i Document Request 25. In paragraph B.17 of its Order the Board sustained CEI's objection to providing documents relating to the formation of a holding company on the grounds of relevance. Formation of a holding company by members of the CAPCO Group could reduce the already minimal access to 4
alternate bulk power supplies that now exist. Documents showing CEI's reaction to the proposed holding company could provide evidence of its intent to prevent Cleveland from obtaining bulk power supply to alternatives.
1 Document Request 37(f). In paragraph B. 28 of its Order the Board sustained l
CEI's objection to furnishing reliability data with respect to generation on grounds of relevance but directed CEI to supply a summary analysis of trans-i mission reliability. Generation reliability is equally as relevant to system reliability as is transmission reliability and CEI should be required to supply simila r summary data vith re spect to generation reliability.
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Document Request 51. Ia paragraph B. 37 of its Order the Board sustained j
in part CEI's objection to producing documents relevant to Yankee-Dixie on a
grounds of relevance. The Board did direct CEI to produce documents in i
f the limited area of planning, policy and study documents. Since Yankee-1 Dixie is a potential competitor of GFI, any activities of CEI directed at b
defeating or delaying the construction of Yankee-Dixie facilities is evidence of an attempt to maintain or increase the monopoly power of CEI. Limiting t
discovery to planning, policy and study documents may prevent Cleveland from discovering documents, for example, correspondence, evidencing i
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9 CEI's opposition to Yankee-Dixie. Significantly, CEI has not argued that the search for Yankee-Dixie materials would be unduly burdensome.
Document Requests 56-62.
In paragraph B.40 of its Order, the Board sus-tained CEI's objections to producing documents relating to advertising on the grounds of relevancy. One issue in this proceeding is whether CEI has 1
acted to preserve or extend its dominant, monopoly position in the generation and transmission of electricity. One means by which CEI could act to preserve its monopoly is to cut off its competitor, Cleveland, from retail ma rkets. Without sifficient retail markets, Cleveland cannot insta111a rge, economic generating units. It is bad enough that Cleveland must operate its system in isolation. But CEI has through advertising and through promotional practices sought to insure that Cleveland remains a small, isolated system, thereby reducing any threat that Cleveland may pose to CEI's monopoly.
Document Request 70. In paragraph B.41 of its Order the Board sustained i
CEI's objection to this discovery on the grounds that Cleveland had not a
shown good cause for discovery prior to September 1, 1965. The Board obviously overlooked the concluding clause of the request which requests "any other documents pertaining to efforts by the Company, its directors or officers to influence the budget for the City's electric system since I
January 1, 1960." Since Cleveland's request calls also for documents dated after the Board's cut-off date; the Bcard's rationale does not apply i
to the entire document request.
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Cleveland asserts that it has indeed shown good cause for extending this inquiry ba-k to 1960. The specific event referred to in the discovery relates directly to the ability of Cleveland to construct transmission lines and install generating capacity. In a case in which the Board has framed the issues largely in terms of structure and CEI's dominance, activities of CEI directly aimed at preserving its monopoly of transmission and generation is relevant and not remote. It bears directly on the anticom-petitive situation presently existing.
t Document Reouest 72. In paragraph B.41 of its Order the Board relies on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to sustain in part CEI's objection to producing i
documents relating to Cleveland's Bond Ordinance. The Noerr-Pennington line of cases does not purport to deal with or limit discovery. Rather it holds that the right of acces s to the political process insulates from anti-l trust liability the use of that access standing alone. It does not preclude the use of evidence of political activities to show intent or to show the
" purpose and character of the particular transactions under scrutiny,"
United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, supra. Moreover, activities legal by themselves may be a part of a course of conduct which is illegal. The Board has itself recognized the relevance of evidence relating to attempts to defeat the financing of the City's system. In the Farley case, the Board permitted discovery over similar Noerr-Pennington objections. (Alabama Pvwer Company, AEC Docket Nos. 50-348A, 50-364A, Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Motion to Compel Production, docketed November 1, I
i 1973) j i
Document Request 74. In paragraph B.42 of its Order the Board su'.tained, in part, CEI's objection to Document Request 74 without stating the basis for l
its action. Cleveland believes the Board to be in error for the reasons given j
with respect to Document Request 72.
Document Request 76. In paragraph B.43 of its Order the Board sustained CEI's objection to discovery pertaining to CEI's opposition to Cleveland's 1938 Bond issue on the grounds of remoteness. This is, of course, relevant to structure in that the funds were to be used for enlargement and improve-ment of the City's electric system. Since the structure which exists today is the result of incremental additions to each of the existing systems it is relevant.
Inasmuch as CEI has admitted that it dominates generation and transmission in its service area, it is to be anticipated that CEI will assert as one defense that its dominance is simply the result of its own good business management and efficient operation. The documents requested could produce i
evidence to rebut that defense.
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Document Requests 83. 84. 86, 87. 88. In paragraph B.44 of its Order the Board sustained CEI's objection to the above discovery of political activities of CEI including activities relating to the appointment of the Director of Public Utilities and the Executive Commissioner of Light and Power of the i
City. The Board did not give the reasons for its holding but presumably the i
Board relied on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The Noerr case clearly created an exception to the doctrine for activites which interfere with l
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. business relationships of a party. This would be particularly applicable to the situation in which the political activities pertain to the business o
activities of the City acting in its proprietary capacity. The case of Whitten
- v. Paddock Pool, 424 F. 2d 25 (CA 1, 1970) is especially relevant to the request for documents i elating to the appointment of officers in the City's utilities system. In Whitten v.
Paddock the Court held that in dealing with the governmental unit acting in its proprietary capacity a party is subject to the same limitations as in its dealings with private parties. In the Farley case the Board permitted discovery over similiar Noerr-Pennington objections
( Alabama Powe r Company, Docket Nos. 5 0- 34 8 A, 50-364 A, Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Motion To Compel Production, docketed November 1, 1973).
i Document Request 77.
In paragraph B.47 of its Order the Board sustained CEI's objection, in part, because the request for documents relating to the City of Cleveland's Electric Light System First Mortgage Revenue Bonds is broad. This request goes to the heart of Cleveland's ability to finance its sys tem.
The Board did not find it irrelevant. The request is not a broad, sweeping reque st but narrowed to a particular part of the City's financing.
Document Request 78. In paragraph B.46 of its Order the Board sustained CEI's objection since the document request refers to a pending civil action in the Federal District Court, the records of which are available to the City.
It is precisely the. documents in this case which a re not of record that the City wants to discove r, i.e.,
is CEI assisting or encouraging Mr. Nolan in
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! i his civil action against the City. Discovery should be allowed for the same I
reasons that the Bcard allowed Discovery Request 75.
Document Request 113. In paragraph B. 51 of its Order the Board sustained i
CEI's objection to producing daily diaries and appointment calendars. The l
City hereby narrows its request, to seek only those pages which reflect j
appointments or meetings with bond counsel for the city, the trustee of Cleveland's First Mortgage Revenue Bond Indenture or counsel fo r the trustee, or with any bankers in Cleveland for the purpose of discussing the ability of the City to finance its electric system.
1 B.
Objections of Applicants - Toledo Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power Comoany. Ohio Edison Comoany, and Duquesne Light Company - to City's Proposed Discovery Document Request 2(d). See discussion with regard to Document Request 16(d) in Part A, above.
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-A Document Request 4(c). In paragraph C. 59 of its Order the Board sustained Applicants' objection on the grounds tb leveland failed to demonstrate the 1
4 relevance of the requested material..11 of the Applicants in this proceeding 4
I have stipulated that they dominate transmission and generation in their respective service areas. Among other things, Cleveland will argue that 1
in fact Applicants monopolize transmission and generation and have acted to perpetuate and enlarge their monopoly thus creating a situation inconsistent l
with the antitrust laws. In light of the Board's formulation of the issues in controversy to relate primarily to structure, it is important that Cleveland be permitted to inquire into matters relating to the growth and perpetuation j
of that structure.
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Document Request 5.
In paragraph C. 60 of its Order the Board sustained in part Applicants' objection. See Cleveland's discussion with respect to Document Request 18(a) in Part A, above.
Document Request 7(c). In paragraph C. 60 of its Orde r the Board sustained in part Applicants' objection. See discussion with respect to Document Request 21(c) in Part A, above.
Document Request 8.
In paragraph C. 62 of its Order the Board sustained l
Applicants' objection. See discussion with respect to Document Request 25
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in Part A, above.
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Document Request 13. In paragraph C. 67 of its Order the Board sustained in part Applicants' objection. See discussion with respect to Document Request 23 in Part A, above.
Document Request 14(e). In paragraph C. 71 of its Order the Board sustained in part Applicants' objection. See discussion with respect to Document Request 37(f) in Part A, above.
Document Request 26(b), 26f e), 26(d). In paragraph C. 79 of its Order the Board limited the required response to documents involving CAPCO members only. This request pertains to the availability of bulk power supply alter-natives and transrnission alternatives available to Cleveland and others in the wholesale and regional power exchange markets. There is no rationale justifying limiting a response to only items involving CAPCO members.
Other entities exist which, if they joined in construction of generation or transmission facilities with Applicants, could become potential bulk power suppliers of the City of Cleveland. The very reasons which make it relevant to obtain these documents when CAPCO members are involved make it i
l relevant to obtain the documents involving an Applicant and an electric 1
J utility not admitted to CAPCO.
Document Request 39. In paragraph C. 83 of its Order the Board sustained l
in part Applicants' objection. See discussion with respect to Document i
Request 51 in Part A, above.
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, C.
City's Objections to Applicants' Initial Interrogato ries and Request fo r documents Cleveland notes generally that in several of the paragraphs of part E of the Board's Order, the Board has sustained Cleveland's objections to interrogatories on the grounds that the City had represented that the same information would be provided in response to other interrogatories. That is in error. The material will be provided in response to document requests, 1'
not interrogato ries.
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Inte r ro gato rv 71. In paragraph E.113 of its Order the Board overruled I
Cleveland's objection to stating in detail how it plans to finance purchase of an interest in the Davis-Besse, Beaver Valley, and Perry units if one of the remedies ordered in this matter is access. Cleveland strenuously renews its objection on grounds of relevance and that the discovery goes to remedies. Applicants, who have repeatedly refused to make any conten-tions in this proceeding, have never contended that their refusal to permit I
Cleveland to coordinate development, coordinate operations or have access to wheeling or nuclear generation was predicated upon allegations that Cleveland could not finance its share of such activities. Unless and until access is offe ed to Cleveland on a reasonable basis, its ability to finance an ownership share is irrelevant. What is relevant is that Applicants' anticomlatitive activities have foreclosed the opportunity to Cleveland to 1
i have access to bulk power supply alternatives. A denial of access which forecloses to Cleveland the opportunity to consider bulk power supply l
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._ alternatives is no less anticompetitive because the City may find itself temporarily disabled from utilizing all of the alternatives. The existence of alternatives by itself alters the competitive situation.
Inte r rogato ry 82(c). In paragraph E.119 of the Board's Order, the Board overruled Cleveland's objection to identifying persons who have rendered services in connection with financing Cleveland's participation in CAPCO nuclear units. See the discussion with respect to Interrogatory 71 in Part C, above.
Inte rro gato ries 8 3 -94.
In paragraphs E.120 - E.131 of the Board's Order, the Board overruled Cleveland's objections. Cleveland's petition has been ruled upon and found sufficient to permit intervention. The Board has formulated the matters in controversy. Discovery going back of Cleveland's petition to intervene will do nothing to advance this case to conclusion.
Document Recuest 49(a), 49(b), 49(c). In paragraph E.135 of the Board's Order, the Board overruled Cleveland's objection. See discussion with respect to interrogatory 71 in Part C, above.
Document Request 50. In paragraph E.136 of the Board's Order, the Board overruled Cleveland's objection. See discussion with respect to interrogatory 71 in Part C, above.
i Document Recuests 59, 60, 61. 62, 63, 65, 66, 67. In paragraph E.138 i
of its order, the Board overruled Cleveland's objections. See discussion with respect to Interrogatories 83-94 in Part C, above.
_ Cleveland also objects to the establishment of September 1,
- 1965, as the earliest day for the production of documents. The situation incon-sistant with the antitrust laws is the result of activities of Applicants which in part pre-date the formation of CAPCO. Mo r eove r, there is no assurance that all of the documents pertaining to the formation of CA PCO will be included in the discovery period set by the Board.
Respectfully submitted, CITY OF CLEVELAND, OHIO
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w Reuben Goldberg David C. Hjelmfelt Its Attorneys Reuben Goldberg David C. Hjelmfelt 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
'Na shington, D. C.
20006 Telephone (202) 659-2333 Herbert R. Whiting Director of Law Robert D. Hart Assistant Director of Law City of Cleveland City Hall Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Telephone (216) 694-2717 October 21, 19'4 l
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Certificate of Service I hereby certify that service of the foregoing " Objections of the City of Cleveland to Board's Order on Objections to Interrogatories and Document Requests" has been made on the following parties listed on the attachment hereto, this 21st day of October, 1974, by depositing copies the reof in the United States mail, postage prepaid.
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Reuben Goldbi rg Attachment
m ATTACH *.ENT Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Jon T. B rown, Esq.
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Duncan, B rown, Weinberg & Palmer Washington, D. C.
20545 Suite 777 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
M r. Frank W. Karas, Chief Wa shington, D. C.
20006 Public Proceedings branch j
Office of the Secretary John C. Engle, President j
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission AMP-O, Inc.
Wa s hin gton, D. C.
20545 Municipal Building 20 High Street l
John B. Farmakides, Esq.
Hamilton, Ohio 45012 Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Melvin C. Berger, Esq.
U. S. Atomic Ene rg/ Commission Joseph J. Saunders, Esq.
Washington, D. C.
20545 Steven Charno, Esq.
Antitrust Division John H. B rebbia, Esq.
Department of Justice Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Post Office Box 7513 Alston, Miller & Gaines Washington, D. C.
20044 1776 K Street, N. W.
j Washington, D. C.
20006 William T. Clabault, Esq.
David A. Leckie, Esq.
j Douglas Rigler, Esq.
Department of Justice Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Post Office Box 7513 IIoilahaugh & Jacobs Washington, D. C.
20044 Suite 817, Barr Building 910 17th Sttcet, N. W.
Gerald Cha rnoff, Esq.
Washington, D. C.
20006 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 910 17th Street, N. W.
Benjamin II. Vo gle r, Esq.
Wa s hingto n, D. C.
20006 Jo s eph Rut.!;e rg, Esq.
Cffice of the General Counsel Frank R. Clokey, Esq.
Reyulation Special Assistant Atto c. ey General' U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Room 219 - Tcwnc Hor c Apartments j
Wa s hin gton, D. C.
20545 Harrisburg, Penasylania 17105 i
i Robert J. Verdisco, Esq.
Thomas J. Munsch, Jr., Esq.
i Roy P. Lessy, Jr.
General Atto rney j
Office of the General Counsel Duquesne Light Company
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R egula tion 435 Sixth Avenue j
U. S. A tomic Energy Commis sion Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
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Wa shington, D. C.
20545 David McNeil Olds, Esq.
Abraham Braitman, Esq.
John McN. C rame r, Esq.
l Office of Antitrust and Indemnity Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay U. S. A tomic Energy Commission 747 Union T rust Building Wa shin gton, D. C.
20545 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
Page 2
.1TTACHM ENT (Cantinued)
John R. White, Esq.
Leslie Henry, Esq.
Vice President and General Counsel Fulle r, Henry, Hodge & Snyder Ohio Edison Company 300 Madison Avenue 47 North Main Street Toledo, Ohic 43604 Ak ron, Ohio 44308 John Lar.sdale, J r., Esq.
Pennsylvania Power Company Cox, Langfo rd & B rown 1 East Washington Street 21 Dupont Circle, N. W.
New Castle, Pennsylvania 16103 Washington, D. C.
20036 Lee C. Howley, Esq.
Donald H. Hau se r, Esq.
Vice President and General Counsel Co rpo rate Solicitor The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating en Post Office Box 5000 Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Cleveland, Chio 44101 Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Richa rd S. Salzman, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals
'd.
U. S. Atomic Energy Coramission U. S. Atomic Ene rgy Commis sion Washington, D. C.
20545 Washington, D. C.
20545 Dr. John H. Buck William C. Pa rle r Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals m U. S. Atomic Energy Commission U. S. Atomic Ene rgy Commis sio t Wa shington, D. C.
20545 Wa s hingto n, D. C.
20545 i
i Dr. Lawrence K. Qua rles D r.
W.
Reed Jo'in 4on Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Appe als ".
U. S. Atomic Ene rgy Commis sion U. S. Atomic Ene rgy Commis sion Wa 4"in gton, D. C.
20545 Washington, D. C.
20545 Ds ht C. Pet tay, J r., Esq.
Debo rah Power Highsmith 3
A s.4 i > tant Atto rney Gene ral As sistant Atto rney Gene ral Chief, Antitru st Section Antit rust Section 30 East B road Street, 15th floo r 30 East Broad SL:
tt, 13th floo r 0
Co lu m bu s, Ohio 43215 Colu mbu s, Chio 43215
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