ML19329B669

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Reviews Recommendation for Reporting Generator Load Sequencer Inoperability at Facility.Not Reportable as AO Since Public Health & Safety Protection Not Significantly Reduced.Item Rated as Seriously Considered for Reporting
ML19329B669
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 08/09/1978
From: Hartfield R
NRC OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND PROGRAM ANALYSIS (MPA)
To: Jordan E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
NUDOCS 8002050777
Download: ML19329B669 (3)


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Y HEMORAf4DUM FOR:

E. L. Jordan Executive Officer for Operations Support Office of Inspection a Enforcement FROM:

R. A. Hartfield, Chief Licensee Operations Evaluation Branch Division of Technical Support, "PA

SUBJECT:

POSSIBLE AB;10FRAL OCCURREtiCE AT DAVIS BESSE Upon receipt of the necessary supplemental information, we have cocpleted our review of your recorrendatien for reporting the inoperability of the diesel generator load sequencers at Cavis Besse. We conclude that it is not reportable as an abnomal occurrence as it did not involve a major reduction in the degree of protection for public health and safety for the following reasons:

(1) tio unscheduled incident or event involving complete loss of power to the systems occurred, that is both cn-site and off-sito power were not lost simultanecusly. Surveillance testing identified the deficiency as intended.

Previously, the loss of both on-site and off-site power at Millstone Unit 2 was reported as an abnomal occurrence and apoears to be the appropriate threshold for reporting (see A0 llo. 76-9 infiUREG-0090-5).

(2) Postulating an accident, assuming no additional failures, does not lead to consequences exceeding Part 100, as off-site power was available to power the energency systecs.

(3) Per Toledo Edison's supplemental report and RES review of that infomation, the defect did not significantly effect

'overall risk.'

llowever, the report identifies a defect and non-compliance with basic design criteria which requires prompt correction to ensure system performance for intended design purposes. And actions are warranted to identify how the quality assurance and testing programs can be revised to prevent recurrence, or lead to earlier identification of this type of problem.

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e AUG s 1918 In addition, several recent LERs have contained information on similar type problems at other facilities (the Haddam Neck [ Connecticut Yankee] potential diesel overload condition, and Hatch 2 preoperational testing)of their diesels identifying deficiencies in the Unit 1 diesel systems. The licensees' reporting of these itens indicates that though the system of checks and balances is working, some improvements can be made to ensure that the design analysis and initial testing programs, either preoperational testing or testing subsequent to design modifications, more thoroughly define performance and test the systems. We reconnend that you consider issuing a bulletin or circular informing operating reactor licensees of this recent experience (including all three items) and have them review their testing programs on the emergency power systems, particularly those conducted after any system modification, and their system designs, to ensure that similar problems do not exist.

If a bulletin or circular is not issued, we could report the Cavis Lesse, Hatch and Haddam Ecck experience in ' Current Events - Power Reactors.'

It appears we should decide with you which action, if any, is most appropriate and make sure that duplication is avoided. Since 3RR night also want some input into the decision, we propose a meeting early next week to decide what needs to be done. Perhaps, the Standard Review Plan and IE inspection efforts need to be reviewed to see if they can be improved to assist in earlier problem identification and resolution in these areas.

He will include this item as an Enclosure 3, Itecs Sericusly Considered for Reporting, in our third quarter report submittal to the Cocuission.

Your reconnendation for reporting initiated actions as noted above, and, though the infomation was determined not to be reportable as an abnormal occurrence, it highlighted safety-related concerns, an important element of the program.

Distribution Central Files MPA Reading L0EB Readino R. A. Hartfield, Chief Licensee Operations Evaluation Branch Division of Technical Support Office of Management & Program Analysis cc: see next page MPA:LhIEk MPA:L0 ebb

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