ML19329B657
| ML19329B657 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1977 |
| From: | Cardile F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Burke W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002050767 | |
| Download: ML19329B657 (2) | |
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Docket No. 50-346 Q
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MD ORANDUM FOR:
File No. 50-346 v
FROM:
F. Cardile, Effluent Treatment Systems Branch, DSE L. BurEEEflober, Applications Section, Effluent 1HRU:
CTitrle'atment Systems Branch, DSE
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-RESSE, UNIT No. 1, WASTE GAS SYSTEM HYDFOGFN "0 NIT 0 DING On October 21, 1976, in a seco fron J. Collins, L'11cf, ETS3, to J. Stol:,
Chief, LWR Branch No.1, we indicated that the Davis-Besse, Unit No.1, design was unacceptablo since it did not provide redundant instrumentation for hydrogen control. On November 15, 1976, in a meno fron L. Roc, Toledo Edison Co., to J. Stolz, Davis-Besse co=nitted to provide a second oxygen monitor which would alarm locally and in the control room at the set points of 2% and 4% by volu=e of oxygen. This conitor is to be added
')y June 1977. This information was incorporated in Revision 23 of the Davis-Besse, Unit No. 1 FSAR. Theso monitors were to be located on the inlet header to the waste gas surge tank. This inict header contains inputs from the reactor coolant drain tank, sanple returns and the de-gasifier.
This solution was not acceptable for two reasons:
(1) There was no way to detect possible ec pressor suction air inleakage since the cenpressor is downstrean of the oxygen monitors, and (2) Bere was no way to detect potentially exnlosive nixtures in the line fron the cover gas syst s to the unste gas tanks since this line was not ronitored at all. These problen areas were pointed out in discussions with C. Doceck of Tolado Edi:.on Co.
In these discussions ho indicated that the compressor controls work in such a way to shut off the conpressor on low suction pressure.
This would prevent inleakage of air into the conpressor suction. On this basis, we conclude that the probability of air inleaka.;c into the compressor suction is small.
In Revision 26 to the Davis-3 esse, Unit No. 1 FSAR, Davis-Besse provided a revised system design to provide for the redundant oxygen : monitoring of the cover gas line. Based on this comitment, the problem area identified in (2) above has been acceptably resolved.
Based on these discussions are the comitments of Revision 23 and 26 of the FSAR, we conclude that the Davis-Besse, Unit No. 1, gaseous radwaste
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File No. 50-346 system has the capability to handle potentially explosive mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen,.and, therefore, is acceptable.
....:t ei ned t7:
Frank Cardile Effluent Treatment Systems Branch Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis cc:
J. Collins DISTRIBlTTION:
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