ML19329B613
| ML19329B613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1977 |
| From: | Thompson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Boyd R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002050730 | |
| Download: ML19329B613 (11) | |
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Docket :io. 50-346 v
3 0 10ItANDUlf F02: Roger S. Boyd, Director Division of Project
- tanagemen t, Office of !!uclear Reactor Regulation F"@!:
Dudley Thompson, Acting leirector, Division of Field Operations, Office of Inspection and Enforcenent E'JF CT:
TOLEDO EDIScil C0 tam', D WIS-3ESSZ I, ILOCFJ:T !;0. 50-346
'4e have been inferred by our Region III Office, based on the resulta of their inspection resulta, that construction and preoperational testing of the subject facility have been compl:ted in substantial agraenent with docketed coenitnenta and regulator'/ requirenents, vita the exceptions listed in the enclosures. The Office of Inspection and 2nforcement has no further items unich wuld preclude issuance of an operating license to per.mit f acility operation up to its full desi;rn rating (or alternate operating limitationa as appropriate).
It is reconcended that the oocrating license be conditioned with the inforuation contained in the enclosures.
'Je have reviewed the licensee'n preparations for implementation of the Quality Assurance Pro;; ram for Operations, and have fcund that they meet the requirements of 13 CFIt 50, Appendix D, na specified in the licenace's quality Assurance Progran (Chapter 17 of the ISAiO. cich was reviewed by the Offico of ;;uclear Reactor Regul:1 tion.
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.1 Dudley Thompson, Acting Director Division of Field Operations Office of Inspection and Enforectant See page 2 for enclosure and diatribution list 8002050730
Contact:
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F. '.iarnick, IE f
49-27261
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w APR 7 1977 ko,,er S. Soyd Enclosurca:
Items to be conpleted before fuel loading S.
Items to be completed before execeding 200*F C.
Itenu to be completed before exceeding, 230*F D.
Items to be completed before itot standby oO9 E.
Items to be coupleted before g
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Items to be coupleted before power operation
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ENCLOSURE A Items to bs completed before fuel loading: 3 1.
Preoperational Test Completion As of March 24, 1977, the status of 94 Preop tests identified as being required for fuel loading is as follows:
a.
Thirty-seven tests have been completed and approved.
b.
Thirty-two tests have been completed and are la the review chain.
c.
Twenty-five tests are either in progress or yet to be started.
A select number of these require revisu by the inspectors subsequent to the licensee's review.
2.
Diesel Generator Sequencer - SFAS Wiring Modifications to controls necessary to prevent interruption of sequencing when the SFAS is manually initiated have been installed but remain to be tested.
3.
Diesel Cenerator Panel __ Temperatures Hodifications and testing have been completed to direct the Diesel Generators units discharge camparature away from the panels.
Licensee is awaiting cer-tification from vendor that high panel temperatures did not damage electrical relays.
4.
Diesel Generator Sequencer Out-of-Phase This item is awaiting an engineering study to determine the potential for the sequencers getting out-of-phase and the resulting consequences of the out-of-phase condition.
5.
Safety Related Listing of System and Components The licensee is to develop a list of safety related activities including cem-ponents, systems, and operations which fall under the cognizance of the Toledo Edison Quality Assurance Program. This inforsation is to be included in con-trolled documents priar co fuel loading.
- 6. " Power Ascension Test Review Of the 5 test procedures required to be completed prior to fuel loading, two have been complaced, two are in progress. and one has been cancelled. The latter cancelled test ie the Loose Parts Monitor. The resolution of this cancelled test has ' nema. forwarded to IE:HQ for action on March 17, 1977.
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Inclosure A March 29, 1977 7.
System Modifiention Review 3
The licensee has comeitted to review all proposed and completed systems re-visions to ansess whether or not system retesting is required. Approximately 220 of the 370 field changes and startup revision notices have been completed.
The review indicated to date that 15 of the revisions would require system ratest, six of which will require retest prior to fuel loading.
8.
Penetration 29_ Resolution Manual normally opened bypass valves have been installed around the contain-ment isolation valves for the Decay Heat succion line thus requiring a dif-farent containment boundary for penetration #29.
This item will require NRR review.
9.
Infrared Detectors The FSAR states that infrared detectors will be installed in areas such as the emergency diesel generator rooms. The licensee has installed smoke detectors instead. This discrepancy must be resolved by the licensee.
- 10. Instrument Ground Crid System During preop testing it was determined that the acceptance criteria could not be attained due er ground currents between the instrument and station ground systems. The licensee's testing technique was not sufficiently pre-cise enough to define the problem. The licensee has obtained more precise testing equipment and is currently rerunning the test.
- 11. Preoperational Test Deferral The licensee has submitted a request for partial relief on twenty-five preoperational tests required to be completed prior to fuc1 loading in accordance with Chapter 14 of the FSAR.
NRR is currently reviewing the request.
The licenses is still committed to review and approve the sections of these tests not contained in the relief request.
- 12. Flow Splitter Resolution of representative particulate sampling characteristics of vent stack sampler (i.e.. isokinetic flow at snlitter) and orientation of charcoal filter assembly.
This work is in progress (March 17) and is scheduled for completion by fuel loading.
- 13. Completion of other Preoperational Tests Completion of preoperational test procedures - radiation protection. radwaste, radiation monitors, ventilation (see FSAR Table 14-lf - except as specified in the licensee's relief requests dated February 22, 1977 and March 2,1977.
None of these procedures had been completed as of March 4, 1977.
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Enclosure A March 29, 1977 14.
Control Rod Drive Systemt 7
The licensee's rod drop test does not conform to Regulatory Cuide 1.68 with respect to rod trip time testing. The licensee has been informed of NRR's position and is evaluating further action.
- 15. NSS Heat Balance The licensee's test procedure calls for adjusting flow instrumentation read-ings if the mismatch between reactor and turbine power exceeds one percent.
The licensee is reviewing this method to determine if there is a conflict with Technical Specifications calibration requirements.
- 16. Records and Document Control The licensee's corrective actions relative to records and document control inadequacies identified in Inspection Report 50-346/76-06 remain to be reviewed. This item is scheduled for review during the week of April 4, 1977.
- 17. Physical Protection Reinspection of physical protection items noted during the inspection on August 4-6, 1976, were conducted during tiarch 15-18. 1977. The following outstanding items must be resolved or completed before the licensee's phy-sical protection plan can be considered operational:
All security type alarms identified in the security plan must be a.
installed, functional and tested.
b.
All openings to vital areas must be secured with formidable barriers and where applicable, with adequate locking devices.
The security plan must be revised to specifically identify all Vital c.
Area doors.
d.
All security training required by the security plan must be cumpleted and adequately documented.
e.
A Clear area must be maintained on each side of the protected arna
,erimeter fence.
p f.
The locking devices for vital area portals must be changed upon turn-over of vital areas from Construction to Operations.
3 All Physical Protection related communications equipment must be installed, functional and tested.
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e Enclosure A March 29, 1977
- 18. Emorgency Planning 3
The inspection requirements in this subject eres partaining to offsite Agencies, Facilities, Equipment, Procedures. Tests, and Drills have been completed. The following outstanding items are being resolved with the licensec, and this activity is not expected to impact adversely on the IE reccmciendation for issuance of the 0.L.
Itans to be completed prior to fuel loading.
a.
(1) A recently received letter of agreement shall be entered into Appendix C of the Emergency Plan and a list detailing the letters of agreement updated.
(2) Periodic testing proceduras for supplied breathing air and those communications not related to security shall be developed and imple-mented.
(3) The station public address testing shall be completed in order to determine the adequacy of the quantity and quality of the system coverage in order to assure that personnel are made aware of emer-gency conditions.
(This item may be modified dependent upon NRR action on the licensee's relief request of February 22, 1977.)
(4) Documentation of the completion of general orientation training for all station personnel, contractor personnel, and consultant support groups stationed on the site shall be available for review.
(5) Changes in Administrceive Procedures, Emergency Procedures, and Health Physics Procedures discussed with a licensee representative during a previous inspection, shall be made.
(6) Clarification of the response to a firo alarm and/or the use of an additional emergency classification for local emergencies, where limited response is required, shall be made in the emergency plan and the FSAR. Retraining of personnel for the required response shall be performed.
19.
valve Yoke Failure This item was reviewed with B&W during the past week.
Based on this inspec-tion it was determined that supplemental information would have to be provided i
to substantiate the seismic qualifications of the valve assemblies.
Inspection of the stem replace =ent and seismic support installation remains to be com-t plated.
20.
Larne and Ses11 Pipe Hangers and Anchors As of March 25, 1977, approximately 200 hangers and anchors remain to be i
inspected and accepted prior to fuel load for safety related systems.
The acceptability of the exceptions, if any, must be reviewed.
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Enclosure A March 29, 1977
- 21. Electrical - Firebarriers and Separation Between Redundant Class _lE and Non Class-1E Circuits Criteria for fire barriers and separation between redundant Class IE and non class 1E circuits within enclosures and between cable trays, wireways has been accepted by NRR and this matter is currently being examined.
Final inspection by IE staff is awaiting the completion of the work.
Criteria for separation of metal conduits containing class 1E cables is still being reviewed by NRR.
This item is to be accepted by NRR and the work completed by the licensee before final review can be completed by regional i
staff.
During an inspection on March 23-25, 1977, it was determined that the licenr ee did not test fire barriers in accordance with ASTM E-119, which j
are rspresentative of the installation at the Davis-Eesse site. This item i
is being transmitted to IE:HQ for resolution.
- 22. Mixing of Protective and Control circuits within RPS & SFAS Cabinets (Internal Cabinee Wiring in Conflict with IEEE 279)
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Test results must be reviewed and accepted by NRR prior to fuct load relative to mixing of protective and control circuits within RPS and engineered safe-guard cabinets. NRR is concerned that grouncing, shorting, application of
,high voltage and/or electromagnetic and radio frequency noise may degrade the class IE system. We understand that NRR will impose the appropriate MODE restrictions regarding the resolution of this item.
- 23. Reactor Vessel Internals The licensee is currently making repairs in accordance with the March 10, 1977 NRR meeting.
The licensee's current completion date for the repairs is April 1, 1977.
- 24. Diesel Generator Sequencer - Anti Pump 1
" Modifications to insure that the sequencer is available whenever a loss of offsite power occurs..."
Final report pursuant to 50.55(e) has been received.
Item remains to be reviewed by regional staf f.
- 25. Ccw Surge Tank Instrument Interchanges This change is stated to be coaplete by the licensee. The item must be reviewed by IE III.
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6-March 29, 1977 Inclosure A
- 26. Removed Valves 3
Thirteen small vsives were removed from safety related systems because of internal leakage.
Applicable code which governs the hydrostatic pressure for ratesting the systems is in question pending responso from the auch-orized inspector.
27.
_otor Control center _ Electrical Stabs M
The licensee has identified a problem with slignment of the MCC electrical stabs. This item will be reviewed during the next inspection.
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i Itaes to be completed prior to Mode 5 (Excepding 200'F) 1.
Surveillance Tests The licensee has 38 surveillance procedures out of a total of 141 remaining to be completed and approved.
Surveillance procedures with an interval greater than quarterly must be developed in a timely fashion to permit their adequate review prior to implementation.
2.
Electrical Reinspection - System Interaction The Engineering Inspection Reports document a number of conditions adverse to
" system interaction considerations".
This relates to a failuro of a non safety related systen which could adversely interact with and lead to the failure of a safety related system.
The licensee has deter:sined that none of these EIRs impact on fuel loading.
Further review is required to detcrmine by what mode the remainder of the approximately 274 items must be completed.
Enclosure C Items to be completed prior to Mode 4 (Prior to exceeding 2S0 F) 0 1.
High Pressure Injection Pump Modification The licensee must provide documentation to establiah that the modification work for the pumps is in accordance with the SAR and the specification require-ments.
In addition, the licensee must demonstrate by cesi:ing that the modifi-cation solves the pump bearing temperature problem.
2.
HVAC System Mequate corrective action relative to deficiencies in HVAC welding was not provided. Reinspection and rework is in progress.
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In addition, the licensee has yet to provide documentation that the damper l
motor operators are seismic qualified.
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Enclosure D -
Items required to be completed to Mode 3 (Ept Standby)
~ None identified.
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Enclosure E items required to be completed prior to Mode 2- (Criticality) 1.
Communications Six additional speakers shall be installed in containment pursusut to an issued Startup Field Report.
2.
Core Flood Tank 3
The licensee's evaluation of the pressurization of the core flood tank using nitrogen fc. the condition where there is a large vapor space needs to be reviewed to determine if the subsequent temperature reduction could cause the temper 4 cure-pressure limitation for the tank to be exceeded.
3.
Waterproof Trench Cover The licensee has committed to provide a periodic test procedure to assure periodic retesting of the leak tightness of the water proof trench cover installed over DH 11 and DH 12 in the containment.
Enclosure F e
,. Items to be completed prior to Mode 1 (Power Operation) 1.
Emergency Planning a.
A permanent supplied air cascade charging system shall be installed.
b.
An isolation emergency plan impismenting procedure to cope wit' weather conditions which require personnel to remain at the station for un-i
" determined perieds shall be developed. This procedure shall alsu address provisions for transportation of emergency personnel to the station when' needed during these periods.
c.
Pursuant to a telephone conversation with a licensee representativo"on February 23, 1977, it is out understanding that the following topic will be studied for incorporation into the Emergency P3sn Implementing Proce-dures. These topics relate to those stess where there is a high degree of inaccessibility:
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Enclosure F 2-March 29, 1977 (1) Ryacuation of personnel to nipimize exposure to a hazard.
g.)
Personnel accountability to assist the person in charge of emergency response actions to account fue missing persons.
(3) Reentry into previously evacuated areas for the purposes of saving lives, search and rescue of missing and injured persons.
Safety equipment to be worn depending on areas or conditions shall be addressed.
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