ML19327A075
| ML19327A075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1980 |
| From: | Howard J BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| 80-147, IEB-80-17, NUDOCS 8008010129 | |
| Download: ML19327A075 (3) | |
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M BOSTON ED150 N COMPANY 800 GOYLSTON STRErr BOSTON. MASSACHUSETTS 02199 J. EDWARD HOWARD
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8e.dCL.AA July 21, 1980 BECo. Ltr. #80-147 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Office of Inpsection and Enforcement Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA.
19406 License No. DPR-35 Docket No. 50-293 Response (II) to IE Bulletin #80-17
Dear Sir:
This letter provides you with Boston Edison Company's response to Items 4A-E, 5, 6A-C, and 7 of IE Bulletin #80-17 " Failure of 76 of 185 Control Rods to Fully Insert During a Scram at a BWR".
Item 4 Within 10 days, complete a review of emergency operating procedures by the licensee and the NSSS vendor to assure that, for scram, operator actions include:
a) Place the reactor mode switch in a position other than RUN.
b) Detarmine whether either of the two conditions below exist:
(1) Five (5) or more adjacent rods not inserted below the 06 position.
(2)
Thirty (30) or more ro'ds not inserted below the 06 position.
c)
If either condition 4.b. (1) or 4.b. (2) exists :
(1) Trip ' the recirculation pumps.
(2)
Insert' rods manually.
If rods cannot be inserted manually, alternately reset the RPS and scram the reactor until all rods are fully inserted.
(3) Vent the scram air header.
(4) Manually open or bvpass the scram instrument volume drain and vent valves, if possible.
d)
If, at any time, either condition 4.b.(1) or 4.b. (2) exists and either RPV 8 0 0 8 010ldl9
' NCYDN E3CXN. COMPANY Mr. Boyce H. Grier July 21, 1980 Page 2
- water level cannot be maintained or suppression pool water temperature cannot be maintained'below the suppression pool water temperature scram limit, initiate _the SLCS.
e) Review the Browns Ferry occurrence with all licensed operators and train them in the procedures to reccgnize and mitigate the event. Verify that preliminary training of operators is complated with 10 days of the date
-of this Bulletin and that full training is completed within 30 days of the date of this Bulletin.
Response
A-D.A review of emergency operating procedures and revisions as determined necessary to include the actions recommended above has been completed.
E. Preliminary training of the Brown's Ferry occurrence has been conducted and full training will be completed by August 3, 1980.
Item 5 Review and develop surveillance procedures such that scram discharge volume is monitored daily for residue water for 6 days and, if results are acceptable the interval may be extended to 7 days.
Response
Surveillance procedures have been established and implemented with acceptable results.
Item 6 In order to mitigate the consequences of an ATWS event, enhanced operability of HPCI, RCIC, SLCS, RPT/RHR/ pool cooling and main steam bypass is essential.
Accordingly, the following actions are requested:
a) Prompt notification (within_24 hours) of any of the above systems when it is less than fully operable and when it is restored to service.
Operability of both pumps in the SLCS is required for full operability.
Surveillance tests and preventive maintenance less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> need not be reported.
b) Operate all the available suppression pool cooling whenever the suppression pool exceeds the normal operating temperature limit.
c) Perform a.50.59 review to increase SLCS flow to the maximum consistent with safety (2 pumps, unless unsafe).
d..
CD3 TON EICON COMPANY Mr. Boyce H. Grier July 21, 1980 Page 3
Response
A&B. Operations personnel have been instructed to notify the NRC (within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) when any of the above systems is less than fully operable and upon its return to service. Our current operating procedures already require the operation of all available suppression pool cooling should the suppression pool exceed the normal operating temperature limit.
C. Boston Edison Company has initiated a 50.59 review to determine if simultaneous operation of both installed SLCS pumps would reduce safety margins as previously analyzed. General Electric Company has identified generic safety concerns which will be reviewed and included in our 50.59 evaluation. We anticipate completion of this review shortly and will include the results with our report on the scram testing conducted in accordance with Item #2 of the bulletin.
Item 7 For plants without ATWS related RPT, perform an analysis of the net safety of derating such char, in the event of an ATWS, calculated peak pressures do not exceed the service Level "C" limit (as/1500 psig) by taking into consideration the heat removal capability of safety valves, isolation condenser, bypass to the main condenser and other available heat removal systems.
Response
Not applicable.
Pilgrim already has ATWS related RPT.
Should you have any questions or concerns relative to this letter, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Very truly yours, Qp
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Commonwealth of Massachusetts) d County of Suffolk
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Then personally appeared before me J. Edward Howard, who, being duly sworn, did state that he is Vice President - Nuclear of Boston Edison Company, the
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applicant herein, and that he is duly authorized to execute and file the sub-mittal contained herein in the name and on behalf of Boston Edison Company and that the statements in said submittal are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
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My Commission expires:,/. >// ( / /J /k'
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Uotary Public cc: Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement