ML19326E141
| ML19326E141 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/23/1980 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19326E138 | List: |
| References | |
| CLI-80-21, NUDOCS 8007280084 | |
| Download: ML19326E141 (25) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI1N COMMISSIONERS:
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John F. Ahea rne, Chairman Victor Gilinsky
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Richard T. Kennedy
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,w Peter A. Bradford Q--
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In the Matter of
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PETITION FOR EMERGENCY
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AND REMEDIAL ACTION
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
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The Union of Concerned Scientists (U CS) initiated this matter on November 4, 1977 by filing with the Commission a " Petition for
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Emergency and Remedial Relief."
The petition soi*-5t action in two areas:
fire protection for electrical cables, and environmental qualification of electrical components.
Af ter an extended pecied of review by the NRC staf f, and havin'g received numerous submissions f rom the staf f and UCS in addition to public comments, the Commission issued a Memorandum and Order on April 13, 1978.1/
Although tne c ergency relief sought by UCS2/ was not granted, the Commission o(iered its staff to take several actions related to petitioner's recuast.
UCS filed a petition for reconsideration on May 2, 1973.
By order de.ed June 27, 1978 the Commission determined as a ma tter of disecetien to consider this petition, and requested the NRC staf f to provide its l_,/ 7 NRC 400.
2/ Tha petition asked the Commission to immediately shut down all on rsting plants, and to halt construction of new plants.
oDO M h0-O h
i views on all issues raised by the UCS 1. dependent of the Commission's April 13 decision.
In addition to its overall evaluation of the potition, the staff was asked to respond to spec'fic questions which reflected the Commission's view of the discrete issues reised by the petition.
Certain items of immediate saf ety interest were reported to the Commission on July 6, the remaiador of the staf f analysis was provided to the Commission on August 31 with additional clarification provided on September 19, 1978.1#
Additional Commission questions directed to the staf f on October 6, December 5 and December 12, 1978 were responded to in a staff memorandum dated October 26, 1978 and in staf f pape rs SECY-79-112 (Febru 2ry 12, 1979) and SECY-79-112A (March : 1, 1979).
On March 7g 1979, 1CS filed a Motion for Expedited Decision Makinq, and requested a meeting with the Commission.
This motion restated the UCS orguments previously presented.
On March 21, UCS submitted a letter conce rning fire protection at nuclea r plants, repeating previous UCS contentions, and making reference to the November 1977 UCS Petition.
In response to Commission questions, the staff submitted further information on August 24, it 9.
On November 5, 1979 Urs submitted a letter again requesting Commission action.
3/ Nineteen public comments on the petition for reconsideration were received in response to the June 27 order.
.The comments represented views from private citizens, public interest groups, and the nuclear industry, and ranged from strong support for the April 13 decision to strong support for the UCS position.
The staff reviewed these comments, and reached the conclusion that no new safety information was provided which might call into doubt the conclusions reached in our April 13 decision.
As a result of the actions taken in today's order, che Commission concurs with the staf f conclusions.
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l 3-l We reaf firm the decision made on April 13, 1978 regarding the possible shutdown of operating reactors.
We believe that current Commission requirements in the fire protection and environmental qualification areas and those actions we order today provide reasonable kssurance that the public health and safety is being adequately protected during the time necessary f or co rrective action.
However, in reviewing the Petition for Reconsideration, we came across several areas of concern.
In this decision on reconsideration, we will discuss these areas of concern as well as relevant new developments and those contentions made by UCS which we think warrant comment.
All other issues and contentions were adequately dealt with in our original decision
.a and the staf f responses to the Petition for Reconsideration.
As we stated in our April 13th decision, UCS has highlighted an
" area of tegulatory review which heretofore had not bean acequately Lddressed.'
This continues to be our view:
UCS has made an important contribution to our regulatory eff orts in the area of fire protection and environmental qualification for electrical equipment.
The staff also is to be commended.
It has responded well to the concerns raised in this proceeding by instituting.a systematic re-evaluation of environmental qualification under specific guidelines and committing itself to a fire protection testing program.
While these efforts are probably not due solely to this proceeding, they do reflect a sensitivity to the problems raised here.
D
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. Environmental Qualification Issues As we stated in our original order, fundamental to NRC regulation of nuclear power reactors is the principle that safety systems must pe rf orm their intended f unctions in spite o f th e environment which may result from postulated accidents.
Confirmation that these systems will remain functional under postulated accident conditions constitutes environmental qualifi-cation.
The current legal requirements for qualification are found in General Design Criteria 1 and 4 of Appendix A, Part 50; Criterion III of Appendix B, Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.55a (h).1/
These are general requirements restating the principle that licensees should have qualified equipment.
The NRC has used a variety of methods "to see that thes e gene ral legal requirements are met for electrical safety equipment.
For the oldest plants, qualification.was based on the f act that the electrical components were of high industrial quality.
For the newer plants af ter 1971, qualification was judged on the basis o f I EEE-3 23-19 71.
However, no Regulatory Guide was ever issued adopting the 1971 IEEE-323 standard although some of the plants referenced IEEE-323-1971 in their licensing submissions to the Commission.E' For the newest plants whose Saf ety Evaluation 4/This standard applies only to plants which received their CP 's a f te r J a nua ry 1, 19 71.
5/Tvelve of the 70 plants licensed to operate make specific
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reference to IEEE-323-1971.
o
. Reports were issued after July 1, 1974, the Commission has
.t issued Reg. Guide 1.89 which in most respects adopted the most I
recent IEEE Standard 323-1974.
Currently, the Commission has underway a program to reevaluate the qualification of safety-related electrical equipment in all
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operating reactors.
As part of this program, more definitive criteria for environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment have beer. developed by the staff.
The Division of' Operating Reactors' ' Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Clas5 IE Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors" (DOR Guidelines) were completed in November 1979.
The Guidelines are intended as a screening device to catch those pieces of equipment which might have qualification problems, in addition, for reactors under licensing review, the -
staff has issued NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qralification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment."
The staff irtends to evaluate the qualification of all electrical safety equipment in operating plants pursuant to the Guidelines.
If problems arise, the intent is to resolve the problem using NURSG-0588 as a guide for the staff's judgment.
Against th is background, the Commission has been requested by USS to reexamine the 1971 IEEE-323 standard and order that all opert-ing plants be upgraded to meet the 1974 IEEE-323 standard.
The staff, UCS and the licensees have commented upon this issue in their.Tumerous submissions to us.
Based upon our examination of
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6-those submissions, it is clear to us that the 1971 standard by itself cannot serve as the standard against which qualification is to be judged.
A full description of this 1971 standard and its comparison to the 1974 standard is contained in the August 24, 1979 staff submittal.
Briefly, the standard does not specify the accident conditions which the electrical equipment must meet.
There are no specific requirements to maintain document files and no specific requirements concerning margin, aging and other j
needed equipment specifications.
It is, in fact, a document which briefly and broadly describes how to qualify any equipment, electrical or otherwise.
The DCR Guidelines and NUREG-0588 substantially improve upon the 1971 standard and should provide greater assurance that equipment is adequately qualified.
In its August 24, 1979
.o submission, the staf f stated that it intended by the Guidelines to provide a level of confidence essentially equivalent to that which would be achieved from the application of IEEE 323-1974.
The Commission endorses the staf f's actions to use the DOR Guidelines to review operating plants and NUREG-0588 to review plants under licensing review as well as those pieces of equipment l
in operating plants which do not meet the DOR Guidelines.
Furthermore, pursuant to Section 161(b) of the Atomic Energy Act an'd based 1
upon the record in this proceeding, the Commission is ordering today that these two documents form the requirements which licensees and applicants must meet in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (G DC ) -45/ which relate to environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment.
I 6/ These standards obviously do not supplant the IEEE ancillary standards which deal with the qualification of specific pieces of equipment.
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. Licensees of operating reactors are to comply with these requirements so that the applicable equipment in all operating plants shall meet the DOR Guidelines or NUREG-0588.
Non-compliance can be the i
basis for appropriate enforcement action after the implementation j
deadlines ordered below.
In order to leave no room for doubt on this is sue, the staff is to prepare additional technical specifications
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f or all operating plants which codify the documentation requirement paragraph of the Guidelines (paragraph 8.0).
After approval by the Commission, these new technical specifications will be added to each license.
The Guidelines leave open the (aestion of what standard will be applied to replacement parts in operating plants.
Unless
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there are sound reasons to the contrary, the 1974 standard in NUREG-0588 will apply.
The Guidelines and NUREG-0588 apply progressively less s.;rict standards to the alder plants.
The justification for this position was not articulated at the time the older plants were grandfathered from the provisions of Reg. Guide 1.89.
There was some discussion of this issue in the staff's August 24 submittal.
We believe tha t this problem is best resolved by a rulemaking on environmental qualification of saf ety-grade electrical equipment.
If tre staff proposed rule does not require plants to be upgraded to a single uniform standard along the lines of the 1974 requirements in NUkEG-0588, then its justification for that position will me articulated in depth and will be subject to comment in the proceeding.
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As ordered above, the Guidelines and NUREG-0588 will state i
the requirements of GDC-4 until the rulemaking has been completed.
For this interim period, the licensee and the public should be cble to examine the basis for the staff's judgment concerning qualification.
Accordingly, a written record of the staff's qualification judgment should be kept.
We stated in our April 13, 1978 order that the NRC is dopendent upon all of its licensees for accurate and timely information.
We expressed concern that some of the licensees' initial responses:
" indicate a lack on their part of detailed knowledge of the quality of installed plant equipment.
Licensees must have o*
this detailed understanding of their own plants in order to meet their obligations for public safety by ensuring a sound basis for making assessments of plants safety."
The history of the qualification issue since our April 13, 1978 l
order indicates that some licenses have' ignored the responsibility we emphasized in our original order.
As set forth in our April 13 order, our office of Inspection and Enforcement had in late 1977 and early 1978 sent several Bulletins to licensees alerting them to qualification problems of specified electrical equipment.
On May 31, 1978 our Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement sent a circular to licensees bringing to their attention our April 13 order and reminding them that:
"(Y]ou should examine installed safety-related electrical equipment, and ensure appropriate documentation of its qualification to function under postulated accident co ndi t ions. "
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, Despite this explicit direction, IEE found that the licensee rereviews and resolutions of qualification problem areas were not receiving the attention they warranted.
Therefore, on February 8, 1979 I&E sent Bulletin 79-01 which required essentially the same things as the, prior Circular, except that the licensees were required to respond in writing.
In view of our original order and the subsequent circular and bulletin, some of the responses to Bulletin 79-01 indicate a disregard for the environmental qualifi:ation problem.
Despite the specific directions in Bulletin 79-01, some licensees did not meet the time deadlines imposed and did not j
provide the information required.
ihe responses showed that some licensees, more than a year after our April 13 order, had ungealified
.o equipment in their plants.
Others did not have the documer'ation required to show qualification.
Still others, if they possessed 1
l the documentation, did not include it in the response to the NRC, contra ry Lo the B'ulletin requirements.
The staff must not tolerate the type of licensee response received in response to the qualification bulletins and circulars.
It has the power to order licensees to comply with bulletins and circulars and that power should be exercised in cases like this.
The staff has sent out a new bulletin,Bulletin 79-013, requesting not only the same information asBulletin 79-01, but additional information as well.
It has initially reviewed some some of the responses to this Bulletin.
In addition, it has unde rsay an inspection program at various plants to check environ-mental qualification.
The results show that after two years from our initial decision in this matter, environmental qualification
- 10 remains a serious problem.
Almost none of the equipment so far examined meets all aspects of the DOR guidelines which in;1ude the areas which any qualification judgment must address.y 8,/
Deviations from the guidelines include such things as an inadequate test sequence where not all of the service conditions were addressed, incomplete documentation of tests performed, no consideration given to aging and the fact that the component installed in the plant is not identical to the component tested because of differences in model, size and materials.
Thsse deficiencies do not necessarily mean that the equipment is unqualified.
However, they are cause for concern and require further case-by-case evaluations since the 1
deviations involve areas which any, environmental qualification judgment must address.
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Commissioner Bradford notes that the situation is worse than this decision ackscwledges.
As the staff indicated in an April 15, 1980 briefing, "I guess when one makes the statement that we haven't found any equipment that meets all the guidelines, it's cler.: that we've found ati least some equignent that just about every piece of the guidelines isn't met on."
(unofficial transcript)
The particular equipment referred to has since been replaced or the licensee has provided adequate justification for continued operation.
8/
Commissioners Kennedy and Hendrie note that the staff has indicated (memo frem W. Dircks to Cmmissioner Hendrie dated
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May 23, 1980) that, in each case where equipment so far exarined by the staff has been identified as not being in compliance with provisions of the DOR Guidelines, either the equipment has been replaced or justification has been provided for continued plant operation while outstanding concerns are being resolved.
The staff has further indicated that they have not identified any safety-related electrical equipment to date, other than that which has been required to be replaced or where adequate justification has been provided for continued operation, which will not perform its intended safety function during the time period in which it is required to function.
In connection with its review of 79-01B, the staff has i
found instances where equipment has not been installed according I
to its environmental qualification design.
Thus, even though the environmental qualification documentation may be in order, the actual equipment in place might not be environmentally qualified.
Licensees must check their own equipment in place to make sure this problem doec arise in their plants.
Staff will devise a system for checking this area.
Based on problems like these and the history of previous respenses to commission issuances on this subject, it is obvious to us that the nuclear industry is not devoting the resources necessary to solve the environmental qualification problem.
.a The staff has obtained frem some licensees information vital to qualification judgments which, because of its proprietary nature, 1s not being shared with other licensees so that costly, unnecessary ratesting is required and environmental qualification judgments are delayed.
Such delays may affect safety as related decisions about equipment replacement are delayed.
Accordingly, we are directing the staff to review environmental qualification information in its possession to determine how much of the information may be released to licensees to aid them in making safety judgments.
This review should be ecmpleted within 45 days and the results forwarded to the Commission.
We are also directing the staff to premptly pursue the possibility of the establishment, by the nuclear industry, of a Nuclear Qualified Equipment Clearinghcuse.
This Clearinghouse
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- would have as its objective the sharing by all parties of environmental qualification information.
The Commission considers the staff's review of the 79-013 Bulletin responses to be of high priority, and the staff is requested to keep the Consnission and the public apprised of any further findings of inecmplete environmental qualification of safety-related electrical squipment, along with corrective actions taken or planned.
The staff is requested to provide bimonthly reports of progess on this review.
The staff is directed to complete its review of environmental qualification, including the publication of Safety Evaluation Reports by February 1, 1981.
By no later than June 30, 1982 all safety-related electrical equipment in all operating plants shall be
..s qualified to the DOR Guidelines or NUREG-0588.
These deadlines, however, do not excuse a licensee from the obligation to modify or replace inadequate equipment promptly.
During its review, the staff will be faced with many situations where qualification documents is poor or where the existing documentation raises questiens about the ability of the equipment to perform its intended function in accident conditions.
In such cases, the staff will make a technical judgment regarding continued operation.
In its petitien, UCS requested that the Ccemission provide an opportunity for hearing once the staff had determined that the equipment was qualified to the standard it had requested.
We
13 believe there is no reason for the Commission now to order that such an opportunity be provided.
If an interested person reviews the staff's written jude'
.c on qualification and desires a hearing on the issue, that persu.2 may petition the commission pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR 2.206.
One other problem area related to the environmental qualification issue has arisen in our review of the Petition for Reconsideration.
This area concerns the delay associated with deciding upon an NF environmental qualification testing program.
In a separate memorandum sent today, wd have asked the staff to address this area promptly.
We wish to clarify one point in cur April 13, 1978 decision where we stated that:
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...because the Sandia tests on environmental qualifications were inconclusive, the Commission is directing that this testing be repeated on qualified cennectors with the resules reperted to the Commission and made avaliable to the public.
These connectors, qualified in accordance with IIII-323 (1974),
should include a representative sample of those commercially available and in use in nuclear power reactor safety systems._9./
The intent here was to obtain information not provided by the unsuccessful Sandia tests.
However, in a staff memorandum of May 4, 1978, it was noted that no electrical connectors currently in use in operating reactors have been required to meet the 1974 version of IIII-323.
Connectors qualified to the 1974 version are being required for plants under construction, but apparently 9/
7 NRC 426 k
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no such connectors are now commercially availablo.
As a result, the staff outlined in its May 4 memorandum a two-phase program to:
(1) test commercially availabis :ennectors qualified to IZZZ-323 (1971), and (2) test connectors qualified to the 1974 version when they become available.
The Commission endorses the 1
staff's approach, which will produce results in the near term directly applicable to currently operating plants, and at a later time, will generate information applicable to ecmponents in future plants.
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The first phase of this test program is already underway and l
electrical connectors, in accordazice with existing TVA specifications, have been successfully tested.
These connectors were manufactured specifically for the test.
The manufacturer ~$ d the utility which assembled the connectors under I&E supervision were aware that these specific connectors were to be tested.
These tests, while useful, do not fulfill the April 13, 1978 requirement that connectors be tested which are "in use in nuclear power reactor safety systems."
The Commission requires that connectors be tested which are not specifically manufactured for test purposes.
This might be accomplished by testing spares at existing plants.
In this order we have not attempted to apply the lessons of Three Mile Island to environmental qualification.
This* issue is addressed in the NRC Action Pi e under review by the Commission.
Fire Protection Issues An item raised by UCS in its petition for reconsideration
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(Attar-h==nt D, p.3 0) not diccussed in our previous Memorandum and Order was that other tests conducted at the Sandia Laboratories showed that at least some of the so-called fire retardant coatings burn."
The fire retardant coatings in use in nuclear plants have been shown in the Sandia tests to be effectively only in reducing the fire propagation rate in cable assemblies, and there is no considerable variation among those coatings tested in the degree of protection provided.
Nevertheless, the results of these tests do show that, for the tested configuration, exposure-initiated fires do not propagate between trays of coated cables.
Such coatings, by themselves, do not provide complete protection against fires.
As we htated in our previous decision:
"The Commission endorses the staff's position that no one level of defense-in-depth can be made invulnerable.
Strengthening one of the levels can compensate in seme measure for reduced safety margins in the others." 10f It is our conclusion that the staff has treated these results correctly in reviewing nuclear plant fire protection capabilities, by not considering these coatings alone to be satisfactory protection against fires.
On September 15, 1978, a fire protection test was performed for NRC at the Underwriters Labcratory (UL).11/
This test, as ona of a series of cable system fire tests, was a generic test of vertical cable trays with fire protection features generally
' Of 7 NRC 421 ll/
Details of this test have previously been reported in staff memoranda of September 29, October 26, and November 2, all of which were provided to the petitioner and were placed in the Public Document Rocm.
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P applicable to those used or proposed for use in nuclear plants.
The specific combinaticas of protective features and configurations were not representative of any particular plants.
The purpose of the test was to investigate the effectiveness of ceramic fiber blankets as fire barriers on vertical cable runs, and *w test fire detection and extinguishing systems.
The ignition source was a spill of flammable liquid which had access to each tray barrier at the floor.
The test was observed by NRC staff and consultants. Although fire detectors did alarm promptly, the sprinkler system, which l
was installed in a manner not representative of any plant system,12,/
l was not actuated.
Two cables, contained in adjacent cable trays l
l represen*4ng redundant safety divisions, were damaged.
The apparent l
reascus for this damage were:
(a) the sprinklers did not accurte, and (b) the fire was not excluded fr=m the cable trays by the blanket barriers.
The Occmission concurs with the staff's conclusion that although al damage occurred,13,/
the test did not demonstrate that i
caly mi acceptable protection is afforded by the particular configuration tested.
Of concern is the sta.ff's conclusion that there are plants which have configurations which are even more prene to damage.
12/
The sprinkler heads were arranged in groups of three.
The test requ:.rements called fer actuation of all three heads pric:
to manual (not autcmatic) initiation of the flow water frem another sprinkler.
In plant installations of sprinkler systems, actuation of any one head would automatically allcw for ficw of water through that sprinkler head.
13/
only two cables of a total of over 500 involved in the test were functionally destroyed.
However, the staff states i-has taken measures for these plants.
Licensees have been inform +d of the results of this test through a circular from the office of Inspection and Enforcement (II Circular 78-18, November 6, 1978).
Appropriate licensing boards have also been notified.
These two tests must be viewed in conjunction with one other development since cr-April 13th decision. When we made l
our original decision, the staff had stated in their December 15, 1977 submission that there were certain locations in scme operating plants in which an uri ticated fire could affect redundant systems.
On July 8, 1978, after our decision, the staff on the basis of further reviews concluded that each plant contains a few fire areas where a postulated u= mitigated fire m.i.y affect both divisions
.o of redundant safety systa=s.
The staff has required additional fire protection in these areas, including alternate shutdown systems.
In light of these farts, the staff's fire protection testing program is particular3y i=portant.
We are concerned that the staff has still not ccmpleted plans and initiated
- sts which replicate typical fire proterdion neasures being proposed for operating plants.
The most recent status of the fire protection research prcgram was reported to the Commissien in the staff's submission of August 24, 1979 and memo of September 26, 1979.
The pri=ary emphasis of the program is currently being placed en integrated ecnfirmatory tests of selected portions of fire protection systa=s which replicate those proposed in four d.fferent reacter plants.
The' purpose of
these tests will be to confirm the adegaacy of current designs j
and NRC staff licensing criteria.
The Commission views this testing program as a priority itA and regaests that the configurations which are of greatest concern should be first tested.
The Commission regaests that a gfinite schedule be established as seca as possible which provides that testing commence without delay.
Any slippages in the schedule must be approved by the Commission. Bimenthly reports should be made on I
the progress of this program.
1
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The staff has completed Safety Analysis Reports concerning l
fire protection for all operating reactors.
The mcdifications j
recommended by the staff are not being implemented smoo*J11y.
Of utmost concern is the fact that some licensees, four and one-half
..w years after the Bromas Ferry fire, are resisting the modificatiens found necessary by the staff.
Because of these facts, the Ccmmission approved on April 23, 1980 1/
a proposed rule concerning fire protection. This proposed 1
rule and its Appendix R have been developed to establish the M nimum acceptable fire protection regairements necessarf to resolve these contested areas of concern ';r nuclear power plants operating prior to January 1, 1979.E/
Other fire protection M/
This rule is scheduled for publication in the Federal Register on May 29, 1980.
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Cc=missioner Kennedv and Hendrie agreed with the fire protection
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safety previsions of the proposed Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50, but disagreed with the implementation schedule proposed by the Ccmmission.
A statement of Commissioners Kennedy and Hendrie's separate views in this regard is attached.
_ 19 -
criteria that have been used by the staff during its plant-specific fire protection program reviews are contained in Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1.
The combination of the guidance contained in Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 and the requirements set forth in this proposed rule define the essential elements for an acceptable fire protection program at nuclear power plants docketed for Construction Permit prior to July 1, 1976, for demonstration of compliance with General Design Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
Similar acceptable guidance is provided in BTP 9.5-1 for nuclear power plants dockated for Construction Per-nit af ter July 1,1976.
All modifications (except for alternate and dedicated shutdown i
capability) would be required to be implemented by November 1, 1980 unless, for good cause shown the Commiscion approves an extension,.
Since the issues involved are well-known and have been under discussion for several years, the Ccmmission anticipates approving few, if any, extensions.
No plant would be allowed to continue operating after November 1, 1980 or beyond an extended date approved by the j
Commission, unless all modifications (except for alternate or dedicated shutdown capability) have been implemented.
The Commission recognires that, in a few instances, approval has previously been c;iven to particular licensees to extend the implementation dates for some modifications beyond November 1, 1980.
The Commission will review these extensions on a case-by-case basis to deter ine whether continued approval or some revision of the extension is appropriate.
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For alternate or dedicated shutdown capability, the purposed rule specifies implementation dates which depend en which kind of capability is to be implemented and whether the plant is under review in the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP'..
(Plants under I
review in the SEP include Palisades, Dresden 1 and 2, Oyster Creek, Millstone 1, Ginna, Haddam Neck, San Onofra 1, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, and Yankee Rowe.)
For non-SEP plants, the proposed implementation dates are April 1, 1981 for alternate shutdown capability and Decacher 1, 1981 for dedicated shutdown capability.
I Licensees who have committed to earlier implementa*. ion dates will be expected to meet dose commitments. For SEP plants, the proposed implementation dates are December 1, 1981 for alternate shutdown capability and October 1,1982 for dedicated shutdown capability.
j
.o Licensees will be required to submit plans and schedules to meet I
these implementation deadlines by August 1, 1980 (non-SEP plants) and November 1, 1980 (SEP plants).
The Commission may revise the implementation deadlines for SEP plants to earlier dates following completion by the NRC staff of its review of the status of fire protection at those plants.
The staff review is expected to be completed in August 1980.
Other Issues In its petitlen for reconsideration UCS states:
"CCS has ccmpleted a review of the underlying documents for some of the plants affected by the connector problem, and generally for the fire protection issue, entitled, " Chronology and Analysis of Staff Actions."
We believe that it contains information which was not specifically brought to your attention prior to the issuance of the Memorandum and Order."
. In its June 21, 1978 memorandum to the staff, the Commission asked if there were substantive matters in the UCS " Chronology" not specifically brought to the ccmmission's attentien by the staff prior to the issuance of the April 13, 1978 Memorandum and order.
l The staff in its response to the Commission on August 31, identified several mino: documents not specifically forwarded to the Ccamission.l6,,/
The staff stated that none of these documents contained information material to resolution of the matters in the petition.
We agree.
The petition for reconsideration contains the following argument regarding our mention of WASE-1400 in the April 13 decision. E "The Commission has, insofar as we can tell, relied on the probability analysis of WASE-1400 to conclude that another Browns Ferry-tfpe fire is so imprchable that the force of the regulations can be ' waived,' or temporarily de-emphasized or phased-in.
That is the
-16/
In its response to the Ccamission request, the staff noted items that were not specifically sent to the Commission:
1.
For Haddam Neck:
a maating repcrt dated January 19, 1978.
This meeting was, however, su=marized is a report to the Commission dated January 26, 1978.
2.
For Brcwns Ferry:
a draft supplemental test report to NRC frem Sandia, dated August 5, 1977.
3.
For Pilgrim 1:
documents relating to the construction permit and operating license reviews.
These items are part of the public docket for that plant.
_17/
7 NRC 422-424 I
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only apparent significance for the icng quotation from the Browns Ferry Review Group given at page 37 of the Memorandum and order.
This ccmmission announced on August 27, 1974 (39 Fed. Reg. 30964) that WASH-1400 would not be used as a basis for licensing decisions pending the most careful study of its potential use for decisionmaking.
The Commission has held to the position that WASH-1400 needs to go through thorough, systematic review before it can be useful in the regulatory context.
Yet, one can only read the words of your decision here as establishing 'through the back door' the startling new precedent that apparent violations of the regulations can be justified on the basis of RSS probability analysis."
1 (Petition at 13) 1 We concluded in the April 13 decision that the regulations, as expressed in the General Design Criteria and the single-failure criterion of Appendix A to 10 CTR Part 50, had been met with no
.iependenceonriskassessmentanakysisofWASE-1400.
7 NRC 427, 428.
WASE-1400 was referred to in the previous opinien only
.a as' background to the discussion of the Browns Ferry fire and subsequent events.
While the Browns Ferry Special Review Group did refer to the WASE-1400 calculation based en Browns Ferry,10./
it also cited steps taken by the NRC ' staff and the licensee after the fire to prevent such eve.sts in the future.
In spite of the WASH-1400 analysis conclusions that fires were not a dcminant centribution to everall risk, the Review Group raccmmended further actions, all of which were incorporated into the Coimnission's Fire Protection Action Plan.1?./
Chroughcut this proceeding petitioner has repeatedly cited to and relied upon the decisien of the Appeal Board in ALA3-138, M/
Cuoted at 7 NRC 423 19/
7 NRC 423-424.
e
=
. In the Matter of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Powe.r Cerroration (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), 6 AEC 520 (1973).
In particular petitioners calls upon the following langutge from that opinion:
"As a general rule, the Commission's regulations preclude challenge to applicable regulations in an individual licensing proceeding.
Th.is rule has frequently been applied in such proceedings to preclude challenges by interveners to Commission regulations.
Generally, then, an intervenor cannot validly argue on safety grounds that a reactor which meets applicable s*=n<*=_rds should not be licensed. By the same token, neither the applicant nor the staff should be permitted to challenge applicable regulations, either directly or indirectly.
Thus, those parties should not generally be permitted to seek or justify the licensing of a reac*wr which does not ccmply with applicable standards.
Nor can they avoid compliance by arguing that, although an applicable regulation is not met, the public health and
.a safety will still be protected.
For, once a regulation is adopted, the s*=nr*=-ds it embodies represent the Commission's definition of what is required to protect the public haalth and safety."
"In short, in order for a facility to be licensed to operate, the applicant must establish that the facility complies with all applicable regulations. If the facility does not ecmply, or if there has been no showing that it does comply, it may not be licensed."
'%r,
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- 24 "It bears repe:ition that, under the principles we have set out above, it cannot be argued that, even though the reactor does not comply with the criteria, it should receive an unrestricted full-power, full-term license on the ground that there is reasonable assurance that it can operate without adversely affecting the public health and safety.
Such an argument might be factually supportable, but would l
constitute an indirect attack on the applicable
)
Commission r=Culations.
Again, the point to be made is a simple one:
reactors may not be licensed unless they comply with all applicable standards."nE#
We believe that the actions taker ;oday will ensure that the Commission's regulations concerning fire protection and onvironmental qualification are met.
If the staff finds to the contrary, it must, as we stated earlier, make a judgment 1
about the continued operation of the plant.
1 1
cur earlier decision made clear that the dsnial of emergency A relief f or fire protection was based primarily on the f act that the Sandia tests relied upon by petitioners provided "no new i
informativ.....beyond confirmation of.the current staff assumption for review of fire protection measures, i.e.,
that exposure fires may propagate beyond the minimum separation distances of Regulatory Guide 1. 7 5.... "11/
our specific response to petitioner's
" shut-down" request states in regard to fire protection:
...the Commission denies the requested relief...
because (1) in view of the additional improvement of fire saf ety made in operating power plants since the Browns Ferry fire, coupled wi:n the curren: Fire Protection Action Plan, these plants can centinue to operate without undue risk to the public health and safety.**e' 20/
6 AEC 528-529 21/
7 NRC 424.
_2_2/
7 NRC 428.
e.
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25 -
Our April 13 decision in no way permits reliance on probabilistic calculations to enter regulatory policy 'through the back door.*5CI Denial of emergency relief in this case is based upon our review of the fire protection program and the Sandia tests, and it is this review, and not probability analysis, which assures us that public health and saf ety is not at undue risk.
Having considered all the f acts and arguments before us in this matter, it remains our conclusion that the April 13, 1978 Memorandum and Order sad staf f actions resulting f rom it, together with the actions taken today, satisf actorily deal with all substantive issues raised by UCS.
Subject to the clarification and revisions set out above, we affirm our prior decision.
It is so ORDERED.
4 Fo e Commi ' !'on
~
f
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l an,.
l 54mbel J.Mik Secretary of thd Commission 4
Dated at Washington, D.C.
this 23rd day of May, 1980.
23 /
The Commission policy on the use of probabilistic risk assessment continues to be as articulated in our January 1979 policy state-ment.
See memorandum and attachments, Chilk to Gossick, January 13, 1979:
With respect to the component parts of the S tudy, the Commission expects the staff to make use of them as appropriate, that is, where the data base is adequate and analytical techniques permit.
Taking due account of the reservations expressed in the Review Group Report and in its presentation to the Commission, the Commission supports the extended use of probabilistic risk assess-ment in regulatory decisionmaking.
n SEPARA*E COMMENTS OF CCMMISSIONERS HENCRIE AND KENNEDY ON THE PROPOSED NEW REGULATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OPERATING PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1979 We agree with the fire safety provisiens of the proposed Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
However, we do not agree with the implementation schedule that the Comission proposes.
In its original presentation of this rule to the Commission, the staff. proposed a schedule which we believe is more reasonable.
In the absence of Three Mile Island and. the actions we have required, the short schedule the Comission proposes might be appropriate in view of the extended period during which a number of these fire safety provisions have been under discussion.
In the present situation, the Cemission has properly imposed a large number of Three Mile Island-related safety requirements on operating nuclear power plants.
We are concerned that the short implementation schedule proposed here for fire safety provisions, together with the large workload associated with the Three Mile Island requirements, may make it impossible for licensees to complete all of these measures in a carefully considered and thorough fashion.
Since all operating plants have implemented a ' number of improvements in their -
- ire safety postures, the remaining improvements to be required under the proposed rule do not seem to us so urgent as to require either shutting down of plants because of inability to complete these requirements, on the short schecule proposed or to make tnose improvements in a hasty fashion.
We note also that the proposed implementation schedule would require licensees to submit their plans for complying with this rule by August I, 1980.
Considering that the staff has said it will not be able to completa its plant-by-plant reviews to deter::ine specific requirements until July 1980, some licensees will simply not have any reasonable time to make an adequate plan.
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