ML19326D989
| ML19326D989 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1980 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8007250347 | |
| Download: ML19326D989 (80) | |
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COMMISSION MEETING C
13 the.httar Of.:
DISCUSSION ON INDIAN POINT PUBLIC MEETING
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DATE:.
July 17, 1980 pAgz3 1-72 g;
Washington, D.
C.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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3 DISCUSSION OF INDIAN PGINT 4
PUBLIC MEETING 5
6 i
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7
Room 1130 l
1717 H Street, N.
W.
8 Washington, D. C.
9 Thursday, July 17, 1980 1
10 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 P.m.
j TEFORE:
12 JOHN F.
AHEARNE, Chairman of the Commission 13
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VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner i
1 14 JOSEPH M.
HENDRIE, Commissioner 15 PETER A.
BRADFORD, Commissioner 16 STAFF PRESENTS-17 LEONARD SICKWIT, General counsel 18 M.
MALSCH 19 E.
HANRAHAN 20 21 22 23
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z-4 DISCLuMIR l'
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This is an unoffic-'.21 ::anscript of a =eeting of :he Uni:ed States Nuclear Regulatory Cc ission held on July 17, 1980 in the Cc= mission's offices a: 1717 H Street, N.
W., Washington, D. C.
The =aating was open to public attendance and observa 1en.
This transcript has not been reviewed, corree:ed, or edi:ed, and ic =ay contain inaccuracies.
The transcripn'is intended solely for general infor=ational purposes.
As provided by 10 C7R 9. :03, it is not part of de for=al or infor-21 record of decisi4 of the natters discussed.
Expressions of opd don in this transcript da not necessarily reflect final datar:1=ations or beliefs.
No pleading er other paper nay be filed with de Cw ission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed :o any state =en: or argu=ent contained herein, excepn as the Cc-4ssion =ay authorize.
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4 4
2 1
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The next order of business is 2 the meeting to continue discussion on Indian Point.
3 General Counsel has proposed an agenda for us to 4 talk through the meeting.
I gather that we have a request 5 cc postpone putting out the Order until we are set both on 6 the Licensing Board and the Order.
7 General Counsel, does that cause any problem with 8 respect to our legal situation that we are in?
9
- 33. BICKWITs No, it does not cause any problems.
.10 Tha. Commission may not choose to do it, but it does not 11 cause any legal problems.
12 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
It is acceptable to me.
13 C3MMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I guess, since my vote is
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1<4 that they remain in operation, and the delay does not change 15 their being in operation, there isn't from my standpoint a 16 real eff ect out there that comes about by going with the 17 order, or not going with the order at this time.
18 It did seem to me that, while I recognized the 19 desirability of as rapid an elucidation as possible of the 20 framework of the proceedings tha t are yet to come, useful 21 for the Cosnission to go ahead and take the interim st+; of 22 the notice of commen ts, and the draf t order that CGC and 0??
23 prepared.
i 24 I guess my preference would have been to go ahead 25 with the orier, even though I recognize that the desirable 4
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3 I thing, clearly, is to have as much of the road ahead mapped 2 as the Co= mission has set her itself to map at tFis time,
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3 but I would have preferred to go with tha statement of the 4 Commission's decision on interim operation, as we might
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5 adjust it and modify it at this time.
6 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
As I said, I will go along with 7 Peter on that.
8 I think that it will also serve, hopefully, to get 9 all of us concentrated on getting the whole thing out.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yes.
11 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The one thing that I certainly 12 agree with Peter is that it v6uld help to have everything in 13 one place.
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14 Commissioner Hendrie did raise an issue in his 15 comments tha t I would like to ask about.
Does anyone know 16 whether the report of the Task Force is being put out as a 17 NUREG document?
18 MR. HANRAHAN:
Not to my knowledge.
19 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Peter, do you have any problem 20 if that is done?
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
No, not at all.
22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Could you get that out?
23 MR. HANRAHAN:
Yes, sir.
s, 24 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I noticed the last time General 25 Counsel ef f ectively shifted that.
Eut it would be very
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1 useful to have that as a NUREG.
2 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
When you do it, take a look
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3 at what I have raccomended as a titling chan;e in one of the 4 sections of the tables V and VIII.
5 Nowhere in the report, unless you know what we 6 mean when we say risk, does one understand clearly that as 7 reported there it is a product of probability and a 9 consequence for a specific sequence, and then the sum of all 9 such products over the sequences to get the expected annual 10 consequence on a probability weighted basis.
11 Either my words, or the equivalent by the experts, 12 would serve that purpose.
13 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Would you see that that is
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1<4 clarified.
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Joe, you are just 16 suggesting changing the table titles as you have shown.
17 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Yes, or equivalent words.
18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You are raising an issue of, is 19 the title clear.
20 COMMISSIONER H ENDRIE:
That is right.
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Tha t is all right.
The 22 only thing that would have given me pause is if what was 23 being suggested was that the Task Force should go back and f
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24 rework any substantial piece.
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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
No.
Ihe Iask Force has ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 done its work, and has made its report.
I don't propose to 2 tinker with the results.
I have no problems with the 3 language.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
All right.
S COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Although it does not become 6 an immediate issue since the two of you have decided to 7 postpone the publication of an order immediately.
I will 8 have to go and see if I can line Vic up.
9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Even if you can 10 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
He seems to be out of 11 order, and I can only get half way there anyway.
12 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That is right.
13 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I would also raise the 14 question, to publish an order like this, and there is an 15 underlying document which is referred to, and which is 16 obviously of considerable interest to anyone who reads the 17 order.
If you incorporate the Task Force Report, in the 18 order, what are you up against?
19 Do you have to publish the whole thing in the 20 Federal Register, which on occasion could be rather more 21 than the editors of the Federal Register would like to see, 22 I expect.
23 MR. BICKWIT:
Nonetheless, it could be done.
24 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
'h. a t I was looking for was 25 a brief accounting of the results of the Task Force Re: ort ALCERSON PEPORTING COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WASHINGTON D.C. 20024 (202)554-2345 s
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1 in the order, necessarily brief.
I would not propose to 2 attempt to rewrite in full measure the Task Force discussion
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3 for the order's purposes.
.ievertheless, I think that it 4 would be helpful for people to see for themselves that 5 discussion and the full range of results in there.
6 I wonder what the best way, then, is to attach 7 pretty closely to the order the Task Force Report.
This 8 would come up down the line, and when there was a larger 9 order, of which this present draft or something er ivalent 10 would be a section, I presume, make a NUREG report, 11 reference it, and that way you don't have to publish it in 12 the Federal R egister, but send copies to people or make then 13 available, put it in the PDR, and so on, while you put the 14 copies with it.
15 MR. BICK'4IT :
Then you have to decide the extent 16 to which yoc wish to embrace every statement in that 17 document, whereas, obviously, you do embrace every statement 18 in your order.
19 C35MI55I3NER HENDRIE:
Yes, except that I don't 20 think that it is particularly a problem.
The report is 21 already referenced, although not as a fo rmal report, or bv l
22 number, and anybody who wanted it would have to call you up 1
23 and say,
"'4 h a t is this Task Force Report tha t the Commission 24 ref erred to in its order?"
Then you would have to tell 25 them, and they would get a copy.
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400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTCN, D.C. 20024 (202)554 2345
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1 I think that it might be handier if it had a 2 report number, snd was thereby more referencible through 3 standard referral services, and so on.
But I don't think 4 that it means that the Commission thereby adopts as its own 5 every word in the Task Force Report.
6
- 53. BICKWIT:
It would just be another question 7 for the Consission.
8 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I suggest that we move to the 9 second ites.
10 HR. BICKWIT:
The second item on our proposed 11 agenda was the question of reconsideration as propo. sed by 12 the licensees of the four-pconged approach that the 13 Commissioner has taken.
Before moving on to the other items
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14 on the agenia, logically it ssems that this is the next item 15 to consider.
16 The licensees are essentially arguing that there 17 is a denial of due process he're.
Since in their view there 18 is compliance with the regulations, they don't know what 19 precise standard they are being told to adhere te.
I may 20 not do justice to the precise langua;e of their comments, 21 but what comes through is that they believe they are being 22 singled out unjustly.
23 Our reconmendation is that the C = mission is on a N
24 perf ectly def ensible course here, and that the prsvious 25 decisions of the Commission are sound ones.
I see no denial ALDEHSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W.. WASHINGTON. O.C. 20024 '202)554 2345
8 1 of due process since there is a rational basis for going 2 forward in this way.
3 What the Commission essentially decided, as I 4 understand it, was that it made more sense to go forward 5 with an adjucation related to this specific plant now, 6 rather than waiting for an informal proceeding to determine 7 across requirements f or a11 plants.
The length of time that 8 would be taken before you had a decision on Indian Point 9 would be considerably reduced by the Commission's course of 10 action if you were to, first, have your informal proceedine 11 to develop across the board requirements, and fo11cving with 12 an adjudication.
13 You are talking about a decision quite far out
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14 into the future, whereas you can reach a decision cooner, 15 admitted on less solid ground, if you move forward with the
'E adjudication now and go forward with the informal proceeding 17 a t the same time.
18 C3MMISSIONER HEND3II:
By the informa1 proceeding, 19 you mean the generic proceeding.
20 MR. BICKWIT:
That is right.
21 C3MMISSI3NER HENDRIE:
To keep
=y simple mind ar 22 ease with the nomenclature used in describing the 23 f our-pronged approach, could you refer to tne generic
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24 proceeding, when you mean th e general one?
25 Ma SICKWIT:
Hight.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WASH!i4GTON O.C. 20024 (202)554 2345
9 1
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
We are culminating the informal 2 proceeding.
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3 MR. BICKWIT That is true.
4 C3MMISSIONER HENDRIE:
We are engaged in it today.
5 CHAIR 3AN AHEARNE:
In the summary of comments that 6 you provided, you pointed out that one of the issue they 7 raised is to require the Indian Point licensee to litigate 8 the acceptah$lity of their units, when the standard that 9 they must meet has yet to be articulated.
This would be a 10 violtion of due process and equal protection.
11 Do you believe that we must articulate the 12 standard in order to have the Board go forward?
13 MR. BICKWII:
I don't think so.
I think what you
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14 are talking about here is an investigation.
You happen to 15 be conducting that investigation in an unusual fornat, the 16 format of an adjudicatory proceeding.
17 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
On that, I can quote you.
18 MR. BICKWIT:
Yes, you can. quote me on that.
19 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The entire proceeding is an 20 unsual format for in invattigation.
21 MR. BICKWIT:
It certainly is, even by Nuclest E Regulatory Commission s,tandards.
23 When you come to a conclusion on what to do, if
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24 what you propose to do is to take action which would stand 25 the license, or revoke the license, or change the rights of i
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400 VIRGINIA AVE S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202)554-2345 o
o 10 1 the licensee in any way, you will then have to provide 2 hearing rights.
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3 We have been through this befora.
There is the 4 possibility of another adjudication.
At that time, when you 5 make a decision, you will certainly have to articulate the 6 basis for that decision.
But at this point, what you are 7 doing is essentially performing an investiga tio.
It is my 8 view that the licensees needn't participate in that 9 investigation.
10 Hy assumption is that they would want to.
Eut 11 they have the right not to, and their own rights will not be 12 damaged if they choose not to.
13 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You are saying that they could,
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14 then, say, "Since'you have not set up the standard we are to 15 prove that we meet, we don't have to pa rticipa te. "
16
- 53. BICKWIT:
They certainly could say that.
17 C335ISSIONER BRADFORD:
Supposing that one of the 18 points in contention were that one of the two plants did not 19 neet the particular regulation, supposing that some parties 20 said that they did, and others said that they didn't, you 21 are saying that the applicant could, if it chose, not 22 participate in that question?
l 23 dR. BICKWIT:
The applicant certainly cculd not to l
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24 participa te.
I 25 0355ISSIONER BRADF3EDs The licensee, rather.
If l
1 I
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400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 1202)554-2345 j
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1 they did not participate.
2 MR. BICKWIT:
They would not be prejudiced if they 3 didn't.
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
If we found that the 5 regulation was, in fact
.t o t met, and issued an order for 6 either a modification, or a shutdown, or what-have-you, they 7 could, then, request a second adjudication?
8 MR. BICKWIT:
That is correct.
9 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
They could well be 10 shutdown during that second adjudication.
11 MR. BICKWIT:
They might, yes, and that is why it 12 is in their interest to take part in this proceeding.
13 C3MMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I see.
So what you are
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14 really saying is that they could conceivably be shut down if l
15 they did not participate, and they might then have the right 16 to a second adjudicatory hearing.
17 MR. BICEWIT There is no doubt that they would 18 have that right.
19 COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD:
But during that second 20 hearing, they might well be shutdown.
21 MR. BICKWIT:
That is right.
22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
They would not be in default 23 f o r no t having pa rticipa ted in the li tiga tion.
24 COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD:
But as a practical matter, 25 the result that they would have achieved would be about the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202)554-2345
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12 I same as if they were in default.
2 CHAIRMAN AHEABNE:
If they were shutdown.
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3 MR. BICKWIT:
If there were an interim shutdown.
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Or if they were ordered to 5 make a modificaton -- No, because they would not be making 6 the modification.
7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
They might be subject to 8 discovery under the discovery rules.
Conceivably they could 9 he producing documents, maybe having witnesses appearing 10 under subpoena.
11 MR. BICKWIT:
Also, even if this were a straight 12 statutory adjudication, the way the law is structured, the 13 Commission needn't decide a standard in advance of that I
14 adjudiation.
There is a statutory standard, and it is 15 envisioned under the statute that even if there is 16 compliance with the regulations and the standards previously I'7 se t o u t by the Commission, the Commission may want to take 18 action against a given licensee when it is conceived that 19 the statutory standard is not being net.
20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
What is the distinctica tha t 21 You are drawing between the standard and the criteria?
22 MR. BICKWIT:
I as not drawing any distinction.
23 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So what you are sayinc is, in 24 this set of two question we asked in this informal
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25 proceeding, in your vied we are not asking what do you think ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGIN!A AVE, S.W., WASHINGTCN, D.C. 20024 (202)554-2345
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13 I we should, but you are saying that we need not.
It is not 2 necessary for us to answer the second question.
3 MR. BICKWITs That is right.
Legally, you need 4 for not for two reasons.
One, what you are doing here is an 5 investigation.
It'is not a formal adjudication as required 6 by statute.
7 Secondly, even if it were a formal adjudication 8 required by statute, there is no requirement for you to set 9 up a standard in advance of that adjudication in order to 10 ultimately decide _ what your. adjudicatory action ought to 11 be.
12 C3MMISSI3NER GILINSKY:
In one of the orders that 13 we put out, we committed ourselves to loing just that.
14 HR. SICKWITs I think you did.
You did commit 15 yourselves to that, but it was acknowledged that what you 16 were putting out was by way of interim judgment, and you I'7 were putting that out for comment.
As I remember some of i
18 the discussion at this table, it was understood that you 19 migh t not be able to develop the criteria.
20 I am saying that if you cannot develop a 21 criterion, you can proceed in a perfectly legally defensible 22 manner.
That is not to say that you should not develop th?m.
23 CHAIREAN AREARNE:
We did not commit to doing it.
24 We committed to try to do it.
We solicited the views of 25 interested members of the public on this question.
We ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (2021554-2345
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14 1 recognized that in both of these questions, guidance is I'
2 desirable.
3 We agreed that it would be good if we could, but 4 it does not commit us to doing it, if it is impossible.
5 MR. BICKWIT:
Certainly one of the issues you want 6 to take up is the next item on the agenda, what criteria can 7 you develop.
I think the Commission is well advised to try, 8 but again I do not believe that it is legally required to do O so.
10 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I think what you are saying is 11 that the reconsidera tion that they are proposing is based 12 upon their belief that it violates due process and etual 13 protection for us to go ahead in this proceeding as we have i
14 laid it out.
You do not believe it does.
15 ME. BICKWIT:
No, I don't.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What is the proceeding 17 a b o u t, then?
18 MR. SICKWIT:
The proceeding is about what to do 19 on review of the denial of 2206 relief, and whether any 20 additional anforcement action is called for.
21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
In the order that we gave out, 22 we had six questions.
We said that, subject to modification 23 a s a result of this as well as others, the Board will 24 address six of these questions.
25 If I could at least get over this first hurdle.
ALCERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON. O.C. 20024 (202)554 2345 e
15 1 Does anyone disagree with Len's conclusion that we need not 2 accept the reconsideration request?
3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I do not disagree with 4 Len.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
This is the request of the 6 licensee?
7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Can I think about that?
9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You are not sure?
1 10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I am not prepared to say.
11 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE4 I think thet I 'will think 12 some, too.
13 We discussed this subject a while ago.
The tarust 14 clearly was ' to move ahead with the investigation into the 15 Indian Point matter in the context of an adjudicatory 16 proceeding, so that there would be that object utich Peter 17 has often sought here and not often got.
That
.s, a record 18 developed in a more formal proceeding.
19 We are also going to charge ahead with a generic 20 proceeding on the general question of high population 21 density sites, and measures, conditions, and so on, that we 22 migh t now think appropriate for them.
23 As time goes along, it seems to me that there is a 24 point to scratching one's head again, and thinking how far 25 ahead with tha specific adjudication one wants to get of the ALCERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON. O.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
16 1 across the board of high population density sites.
2 I expect in the most order.y of all worlds, if 3 there were not impressing time reasons in particular cases, 7
4 and so on, you would prefer to try to treat the general 5 subject, and then come within the context of conclusions 6 drawn there to specific rases.
I think that that would be 7 desirable here, but in the f ramework of the way we have come 8 here to this matter, it may turn out not to be possible.
I 9 would like to hold.
10 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I join Peter.
I think that we 11 have now a formal commitment to go ahead.
I see no way we U cannot do taat.
13 C3MMISSIONER GILINSKY-let me explain myself a
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14 little bit here.
15 I come at it a little bit like Joe I think that 16 we ought to go. forward with the proceeding.
.here are a l'7 number of reasons for this.
Indian Point does stand out in 18 terms of population surrounding the site, and so on.
Eut 19 the proceeding needs to be ateut something.
We have to be 20 pretty clear as to what it is that is being c.<a:ined in that 21 proceeding.
22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
We have a fairly detailed list 23 of questions, which sany of you worked very hard *' develoo
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24 which we have said specifically that the Board will 25 examine.
As Len has just finished explaining, this is an ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE S.W., WASHINGTON. 0.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
17 1 investigation.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY It seems to me that it har 3 got to be more than an investigation.
I think that we have e
4 got to be clear on the criteria that will be applied to 5 decide whether or not this plant should operate, and under 6 Jhat conditions if it does.
O th e rwi se, I expect that we 7 will have a meandering investigation that will reach a 8 predetermined conclusion, but will sort of wander s11 over 9 the place until everybody is worn out, and not a great deal 10 will have been achieved.
11 Ihat is why I thought from the outset that we 12 ought to get straight what it is.
Not only what general 13 questions will be investigated, but what is the test that is 14 going to be applied there.
Then one caa ask, are the 15 measures proposed by NR?. suffirient to meet that test.
16 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
In fact, you say not be 17 disagreeing with Joe.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Except that I'think he 19 wants to wait and lump these things altogether.
20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But that may be the,only say to 21 g e t that set of criteria e st ab li sh e d.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I am more optimistic that j
23 we will come up with a criteria, at least an interia
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24 crit eria, or a 'eparate criteria, and a separa'.e criteria 25 t h a t would apply to this case.
I thin.s that it is different r
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, !NC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WA6HINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
18 1 from other cases.
2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
If I read you correctly, what 3
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you are saying is that you do not disagree with going ahead 4 with the hearing, but want to see, in order to go ahead with 5 the hearing, a set of criteria established by which the 6 final Commission judgment would be made.
7 C3MMISSIONER GILINSKYs Yes.
8 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
In the absence of that, you 9 would not go ahead with the hearing.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
If you put it that way.
I 11 would like to see one coming before the other.
I think that 12 this is the way to' proceed.
I think that we are committed 13 to going forward with a hearing, and I would like to see us 14 do that, and fulfill that commitment But, I ar afriid tha t 15 if we let the criteria go, or say ttat it will be developed 16 alon g the way, this hearing vill just go on, and the
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17 crit eria --
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE
'4c u ld that also, then, m'ean that you don't believe that these questions are si;nificant 20 in the absence of the criteria?
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think that they are 22 significant and important.
But the criteria would give 23 focus to the hearing.
It means that people know what they i.
24 are af ter.
25 I must add that I have no t looked at the six ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20024 (202)554-2345
19 I questions.
2 MR. BICKWIT Mr. Chairman, I might suggest that 3 clearly at this point there is not a majority for
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4 reconsidering the approach you are taking.
You might move 5 down the list on the agenda.
6 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Let's just move to the 7 criteria, and that is the' next item.
8 MR. BICKWIY:
If at the conclusion of our attempt 9 to develop this proceeding, if at that time there is not a 10 majority f or reporting the order, we will know about it.
11 CHAIR 3AN AHEARNE:
Let me ask, before you move to 12 the criteria, another question whic? in a way relates to 15 this reconsideration.
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1-4 I notire the suggestion in your set of comments 15 'h a t an IS would be required.
16 MR. BICKWIT:
Yes, we do not believe that any I.S.
17 is required at this stage.
There is nothinc in the case law 18 CO regulations, or the NRC regulations that suggest that an 19 impact statement is required for an enforcement action.
20 CHAIBMAN AHEARNE:
All rignt.
21 I guess, the other items as f ar as procedural are 22 what you end up at the end.
For example, the guestion 23 raised by the New York State Energy Office regarding who has
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24 the burden r2 proof.
25 3R. SICKWIT:
Ihat is right.
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CHAIS AN AHEARNE:
All right, what thoughts do you 2 have on the criteria?
3
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It seems to me that we 4 originally got into this by way of examining NRR's new 5 requirements for the plant.
The basic question, it seems to 6 me, are they good enough, and good enough compared to what.
7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
One the ways, as you recall, 8 what NRR had proposed was an examination from the standpoint 9 of what the relative level of safety was thought to be, and 10 there were some changes that might be used to bring it up to 11 what they thought it had been.
12 The Task Force's approach was a comparison of the 13 consequences of that plant with respect to other, which in a
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l'4 sense is a normative approach.
As you had pointed out when 15 we put out this order, the question was one that you wanted, 16 you f elt that it was unnecessary to raise, can you establich 17 some sort of criteria that would enable you to judge whether 18 or no t these plants should be allowed to operate.
19 That carried with it the concept that it would be 20 other than the standard by which plants had been judged in 21 the past.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
'J e migh t have had some 23 dif f erent criteria compliance witn large populations around.
, 24 CHAIndAN AHEARNE:
Specifically Indian Point.
25 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
Yes.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Because it was Comnissioner 2 Hend rie 's proposal that that was a generic question, the 3
g population density.
Your counter was that, perhaps true, 4 but Indian Point should be addressed directly.
So we have a 5 request in the informal proceeding, do people have coTments 6 on that particular question, by what criteria should the 7 acceptability of the risk posed by those facilities be 8 determined.
We agreed that it would be desirable to give 9 the Board guidance on that.
10 My review of the comments did not lead to any 11 great insight on establishing those criteria.
12 C3MMISSIONER GILINSKYa Has OPE done anything on 13 that subject?
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1-4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Len, did you?
15 MR. BICKWIT:
Yes, we have some suggestions.
16 C3MMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Do you?
17 MR. BICKWIT Yes.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I would be interssted in 19 hearing them.
I an afraid that otherwise we will have a 20 long proceeding.
I suppose we will learn a bunch of 21 interesting things.
22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
If I could bother you for a 23 minute, let me for those in the audience who may have 24 f or;otten them read the questions that were that we asked, 25 because there are some things that hopefully would.
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22 1
What is the current status and acceptability of 2 State and local emergency planning within a 10-mile radius 3
t of the site, and to the extent that it is relevant to risk 4 posed to plants beyond the 10-mile radius.
It is a question 5 of what is the status of State and local emergency plans.
6 The second is, what improvements in the level of
.7 energency plan can be expected in the future, and on what 8 time schedule.
This is a very specific question.
9 What improvements in the level of safety will 10 result from measuras required or referenced in the 11 Director's Order to the licensees.
The Task Force made an 12 initial review of that for purposes of addressing the 13 interim operation question, but the-Board was asked as a
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l'4 direct question.
15 Then it mentioned that a contention by a party 16 that one or more specific safety measures, in addition to l'7 those identified or referenced by the Director, should be 18 required as a condition of operating the f acility or 19 f acilities, would be within the scope of the inquiry.
20 What risk probability and consequences may be 21 posed by serious arcidents at Indian Point II and III, 22 including accidents not considered in the plants' design 23 b a si s, pending and after any improvements described in the
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24 previous two questions.
25 Based on the foregoing, how do the risks posed by ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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23 1 Indian Point units II and III compare with the range of 2 risks posed by other nuclear power plants licensed to 3 operate by the Commission.
4 We went to comment parenthetically that the Board 5 should limit its inquiry to generic examination of the range 6 of risks, and not go into any site specific examination, 7 other than for Indian Point.
8 Then, finally, what would be the energy, 9 environmental, economic or other consequences of a shutdown 10 of Indian Point unit II and/or enit III.
11 I am not trying to say that that solves the 12 criteria question.
You are absolutely right, it does not 13 address the criteria question.
It still leaves open to the 144 Commission the judgment after all those questions are 15 d e te rmined.
But it do 3s have the character, as Len 16 described, of an investigation.
There are s number of r
17 detailed factual issues addressed.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
They are important 19 questions, and they are the ones that we want to address.
20 There is no question about that.
21 CH AIRM AN AHEABNE:
Len, you said that you had some 22 sugg estiors.
73 MR. BICKWIT Yes.
In reviewine the cornents, we 24 did.not see references to quantitative standards, and we are i
25 pessimistic about the Commission being able to develop ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 quan titative standards in the immedia te future, which I 2 assame is the time period that is relevant with respect to 3 what the Commission contemplates regarding this proceeding.
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4 We, therefore, were forced to fall back on an 5 attempt to formulate some kind of quan11tative criteria, and 6 we saw various references to these in the comments.
The 7 kinds of things we saw were, do benefits exceed cost of the 8 actions do costs exceed u..e cost of replacement solutions; 9 that kind of thing.
10 In looking at these, and in attempting to think 11 through the problem as best we could analytically, we came 12 up with this as perhaps a jumping off point.
So this will 13 give you some idas about the level of specificity we think I
1-4 the Commission can attain in the immediate future, and it 15 may not be satisfactory to the Commission.
.N o n a t hele ss, we 16 pu t it forward.
17 The criteria we would suggest are.
18 Is this situation significantly riskier than the 19 typical plant that is now operating.
If you deternine that 20it is significantly riskier, is the level of risk 21 unacceptable.
22 What we mean by that, I think, every health and 23 safety regulator has some concept of certain conditions 24 which he or she would regard as so unraf e that that would 1
25 make the decision for the regulator without regard to i
l I
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25 I compensating costs, compensating factors that would be 2 incurred if the action based on health and safety were 3 taken.
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4 I think probably most regulators have in mind that 5 there are certain risks where the assessment of those risk:
6 is not so severe as to preclude consideration of the costs 7 associated with taking the regulatory action.
It has always 8 been extremely dif'ficult, from the standpoint of regulatory 9 philosophy, to characterire where that line shoud be drawn.
10 But I think that it has to be understood that there would be 11 some risks that you would regard as so serious that 12 non-safety f actors ought not to be considered when you 13 address those risks, and some where they should.
I
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14 It is a judgment that ultimately would have to be 15 made by the Commission, but it is all included in the notion 16 of acceptable risks.
So, to repeat, it would be two pronged 17 test.
One, is the situation rignificantly riskier than the 18 typical plant; and, if so, is the level of risk unacceptable.
19 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE.
Two questions.
20 First, it sounds 1
.t e the second is an individual 21 judgment decision.
I think that all contentious decisions 22 tend to be that way, anyway.
But that sound like explicitly Z3 saying it is an iniividual judgment derision.
24 If that would be the case, how does that provide much 25 guidance to the Board, unless you are saying that you like ALDERSON REPORTING CCMPANY, INC.
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26 1 first the Board to make that judgment decision, and then th e 2 Consission would.
3
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dR. BICKWIT That is one of the questions that 4 you have to take up in the procedural section of this 5 meeting.
Do you want a recommendation on that question from 6 the Board.
I guess my inclination is that it would be 7 usef ul, recognizing that it is your decision ultimately tc 8 make.
9 Nonetheless, you sre right, there is very little f
10 guidance provided to the Board on that question, and you may 11 want to keep that entirely to yourselves.
12 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I guess the difficulty I would 13 have with relying on the Board's judgment in that sense,
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14 this type of a judgment decision is an aggression, and the 15 more specific one can make the criteria that we are trying 16 to get to, I think the more specific you can make then, the 17 more comf ortable I am in askin; the Board to make a
.j I
18 recommendation.
19 The second question I had was with respect to your 20 initial statement.
It seemed to me you would thereby 21-automatically have made a conclusion on one of the issues 22 that has bean raisad, I think, by many of the commentors 23 certainlyfrom the beginninc of the Indian Pcint questien and i.
24 that is, tha separation of probability and consequence.
25 If you address risk at the end of that factorino, 4m ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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1 you have already taken the position, haven't you, that very 2 large consequencesby themselves ought to rise --
3
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MR. BICKWIT:
No.
You are asking the question, is 4 it significantly riskier than the typical plant.
You can 5 reach a yes to that.
6 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Are you defining risk?
7 MR. BICKWIT:
No.
8 You can reach a yes answer to that by a number of 9 routes.
One is to say that 10 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I was assuming that you were 11 defining risk as the probability times the' consequences.
12 MR. BICKWIT*
I am using it that way.
13 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Many of the people who comnent 14 would argue that the question of celative risk is 15 irrelevant.
Their argument is that when the potential 16 consequence is so large, even though when you evaluate 17 through some sort of analytic framework the risk because the 18 l
probability is very low their argument would be that is I
19 irrelevant if the consequence is high enough.
20 MR. BICKWIT:
That certainly is a subset of that.
21 The Commission could got more specific by attempting to 22 provide guidance.
23 In answer to your question, I had not focused on 24 that.
The Commission can focus on it sad decide that it 25wants to assion a higher level to the consequences and ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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,s--
I l probabolity, or that it doesn't.
2 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Isn't the toute proposition 3 that we seek here, and the sort of criterion that we either
(
l 4 should use directly or derive whatever criteria we set from, 5 somewhat along the following lines:
6 The proposition ought to be that the risk of 7 injury or death to a resident in the neighborhood of Indian 8 should not be beyond the range of such risA to individuals 9 that live near other plants.
10 (Laughter.)
11 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That is the way to go.
12 03MMISSIONER HENDRIE:
The arguments that are made 13 about Indian Po.nc, the population density is such that
(
14 individuals that live in that neighborhood don't have the 15 same opportunity to get out.
16 The., are other arguments made tha t because ther=
1 1'7 are large numbers of people that may be involved that you~
18 ou g h t to do things that involve large numbers of people.
I 19 aust say that I am unable to accept a proposition which says 20 that a poten tial large consequence is unacceptable, however 21 low its probabilities may be, because it is large.
If one 22 adopts that general principle fo r society 's opera tion, I am 23 sorry, most of us are going to have to starve because this 24 society will not work.
C0gxIssI3NERGIlhSSKY:
Wait a minute.
25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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29 1
We limit exposures to indivifuals, but we also are 2 cor e vened with the totals.
3 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
That is true, but we don't 4 take the attitude that be.cause a plant's total population 5 exposure for a year, workers plus general population, may 6 run four or Elve hundred manres yea r in and year out that 7 the larger consequence makes the thing unacceptable.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs I think that we do things 9 to reduce both of those numbers.
10 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE To reduce, yes.
But the 11 arguments that are made in some of these comments are that 12 anything that has a possible consequence the death of 13 several thousand people is an unacceptable societal activity i
14 no matter how small the chance 'that that may occur is.
15 All I am saying is, if you adopt that as a general 16 principle for the operation of society, you cannot operate 17 society because we operate, whether we realize it or not, 18 intuitively and in many ways on a sort of risk aversion 19 basis in which we try to drive down more obvicus risks come 20 place where we are willing to live vita them.
21 So I cannot buy the argument that a potentially 22 large consequence, no matter how unlikely, is a reason to 23 write the whole thing off.
I just can't buy that.
24 Setting th a t aside for myself, then, what I look 25 and say ist The base problem ic, is th e risk of injury or 8
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I death to an Indian Point locale resident substantially in 2 excess of the risks for people who live around other sites.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Or to the group around 4 Indian Point.
It seems to me that this is what this is 5 about.
To what extent should we take into account the 6 second number.
7 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE That,is certainly a 8 question.
9 I think for myself, over the years, this is one of 10 these things where at various times I halc argued various 11 sides of the question, whether one is intr.asirally 12 protecting individuals, or is protecting society.
'a'e h a v e 13 elements of our requirement that are directed both ways.
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14 There is no question about that.
15 I am inclined to think that for me the Indian i
16 Point one is primarily the first.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
The individuals?
j 18 COEMISSIONER HINDRIE.
Yes.
The question, if the 19 individual around Indian Point, by virtue of it bein; Indian 20 P o i. n t, at substantially greater personal risk than for other 21 plants.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKIs Then we are basically 23 talking about an evacuation plan.
24 C3hMISSIONER HENDRIEs And the range of plant 25 measures that contribute to what the probability of various ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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3j I accident sequences is, and how those would go, and whole 2 array of it.
3
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I will agree that you may very well want to add to 4 the question of individual risk, the range of risks that 5 individuals who live around various plants.
You might want 6 to add to that question a sort of societal impact criteria, 7 which would be entirely, then, on a population exposure 8 basis.
That would require some careful consideration.
9 I am not, for myself, inclined to give very great 10 weight to things like a tenth of a millirem to each of four 11 billion people.
I am sorry, a tenth of a millirem is for 12 the purposes of people who have to live in the late decades 13 of the Twentieth Century a zero effect.
The fact that you 14 multiply it by four billion people is still for me a zero 15 effect in terms of regulatory policy.
16 So if you want to take a societal criteria, a 1'7 population exposure criteria in addition to the individual 18 risk one, I would not argue that it is an unreasonable thing 19 to do, or an appropriate one to do, or an inconsistent one 20 to do, in view of the present practice, and the traditional 21 practice.
22 But I would suggest that it needs to be framed 23 with a little care, and that as one integrates cut, out in 24 distance and to lower and lower doses, you have to put a 25 cut-off on the integral.
It is going to have to be in the ALOERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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32 I range of the annual background, or something like that.
2 Otherwise, you are going to be in the position of going out 3 hundreds, and even thousands of miles, and integrate 4 enormous numbers of people, and enormously small doses, and 5 that just does not get to th e point.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You can't be doing that 7 because that would be the same, presumably, for all the 8 plants, more or less.
In fact, I think that this is what 9 Bob Borners was saying, when you get to large distances they 10 are all about the same.
11 Now you are getting into the details of whether 12 there ought to be a cut-off, and so on.
13 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
As I say, if you wanted to 14 argue that there ought to be the dual criteria, I sure could 15 not say that was not a sensible proposition.
I think for 16 myself I would be inclined on the specific Indian Point 17 matter to sort of come straight on it on t.he basis of 18 individual risk.
19 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
What woulf you use as the 20 criterion ?
Let's take individual risk, what criterion vould 21 you use?
Where would your threshold be set for acceptable 22 and unacceptable?
23 C3MMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I would make it a 24 comparison against the run of si te s, and I would.?ake it on 25 the sort of risk assessment basis that we had the Issk Force ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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33 1 do.
They came back to us within a few weeks with.come 2 results which admitted had to be done in a hurry, and which 3 have of course built into them the fact that these 4 techniques are not enormously precise.
So you have to 5 respect the fact that there are wide area bands.
6 Nevertheless, I think for comparative purposes, in 7 particular, the'y are rather usef ul, even taking into account 8 the imprecision of the results.
9 I think the adjudication would allow the 10 presentation of evidence of this kind, in rather more 11 detail, and rather more carefully calculated, from parties 12 outside the staff.
There could be argument about that sort 13 of evidence, cross-examination, and so on, and the 14 development of a record on it, testing of the witnesses, 15 whatever.
16 Follow all of those good things that Peter 17 occasionally points out to us can flo w f rom this process.
s 18 '4h a t you would have, then, is sets of answers to some of the 19 six questions f ramed in the same sorts of risk assessment 20 terms as some of the Task Force results, but presumably as a 21 result of -- I am sure you would get submissionc from the 22 applicant and his consultants, and the staff and their 23 consultants, other parties and their consultants. You would 24 have a wider and better developed record to look at in that 25 r e g a rd.
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C3MMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is something that you want 2 to respond to?
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
No.
The question of the 4 criteria was really generated by you.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think that we ought to 6 put our heads together, and think about this question.
7 I think the thing that singles out this site is 8 that there are a lot of people around it.
O therwise, it 9 would be like most other reactors.
Ther'e is, fire'c of all, 10 the question of to what extent does this large population 11 affect individual risk, by way of constricting possibilities
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12 for getting out of there if you have to.
13 It seems to se that the larger question is, to 14 what exten't does this Commission want to include a criterion 15 that deals with the overall effect on the population in the 16 event of an accident.
We ought to have at least some rough 17 notion of where we stand on this, and to express that 'b'efore 18 we launch on a hearin; of this sort.
Otherwise, we are 19 going to make a lot of consultants rich, or more prosperous.
20 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
It sounds like a laudible 21 f ull employment objective.
22 (Laughter.)
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I don't :::uch will ever 24 ch a n ge.
25 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
It would depend on how ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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35 I carefully focused those question are, I think Peter would 2 have pointed out in o th er cases..
3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I will even do it here.
g 4
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
'I seem to remember the same 5 conversation in several meetings sceceding this.
6 MR. BICK'4IT :
I am afraid it was substantially 7 before the order went out.
8 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
I just looked at that.
9 In several meetings preceding the development of 10 the order.
It is a fundamental question, to what extent do 11 we consider societal risk as opposed to individual risk, and 12 w h at are the relative weights that we give to each.
13 I tend to come down much closer to your position, 1-4 I think, than yours, Joe, because really we would not be 15 looking 16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Not to this extent.
17 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
It raises some interesting 18 questions.
19 Consider the following propositien, er sequence.
20 Suppose you say, okay, there is a populated site, and what 21 we are concerned about, either mostly or at least half of 22 wh a t we are concerned about is the societal impact.
Ihere 23 are a lot of people around this site, so this plant has to 24 have two containments, or three reactor vessels, or I don't s
25 know.
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I If you do that, then the population exposure --
2 beyond the design basis accident sequences are below a 3 criterion that we have set.
4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
5 COMMISSIONER HENDRIEs Now we go over here to a 6 place that has a relatively low population, and you find, 7 Gee, we only need one containment, or one reactor vessel for 8 the same sort of calibrating calculation of why you are 9 again below the population exposure guideline.
10 Now comes an individual who lives in the low 11 population site.
He says, "You have not protected me as 12 much as my brother-in-law Smith up at the other site.
I 13 van t to assure you that I am as good and deserving a person
(
1-4 as he is, and I want the same level of protection for myself 15 and my f amily."
16 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE But I think that we then turn 1:7 to the FY-80 authorization bill which I recall explicitly 18 recognizes the abilty to have different criteria in 19 different regions.
20 COMMISSIONER HENDRIEs I don't doubt our authority 21 under the law.
I just want to know what I am going to tell 22 this guy.
You knoa, he is not fond of his brother-in-law, 23 you understand, and I am going to have a lot of trouble f
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24 convincing him that he is not worth as much.
25 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE Not only authority, but ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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37 I Congressional direction.
2 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I am sorry, I don't think 3 so.
(
4 If you went up and attempted to explain to th e 5 committees writing that legislation the result you suqqest 6 here is what they had in mind, I don't think they would buy 7 that.
8 CH~ AIRMAN AHEARNE:
I am not sure about that.
I 9 thought they would.
10 COMMISSIONER HENDRIEs It is kind of a head 11 scratcher.
12 So then we say, "It turned out that the plant at 13 the high population site was able to put in two containnents 14 and three vessels, and they still made electririty at a rate 15 that was reasonable for their area.
'J h y don't we go ahead 16 and do it every place."
Then it switches the other way, and 17 you can argue 5.t the other way.
18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I recognize the problem on that.
19 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I guess between the t w o',
my 20 inclination would be either to stick with the individual 21 risk, or if you want to include a societal risk, a 22 population exposuca sort of criteria, that the population 23 ex po su re criteria not be the real cutting edge.
I think the 24 real cuttin; edge on safety really ought to be the s
25 individual risk.
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1 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
This is just off the top 2 of my head.
I am not sure where this com'es out.
But 3 suppose that it was not people, but it was animals, and you 7
4 were running a great farm.
5 C3MMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I am about to lean forward 6 into early phrases of the Declaration of Independence here.
7 I can feel it already.
8 COMMISSI3NER GILINSKY:
I am going to bring the 9 morality of it out.
10 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
All right.
Let's suppose 11 that it is a turkey farm.
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes, with one reactor at 13 one end, and another reactor at the other end, and a small
(
14 number of turkeys at near one reactor, but a large number of 15 turkeys at neat the other reactor.
It seems to me that you 16 would worry about losing a large number of birds.
17 03MMISSIONER HEhDRIE:
I think that you would 18 calibrate those two machines on a straight forward basis of 19 the worth of a turkey, and ten turkeys are worth more than 20 one turkey.
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
'Jo uld n ' t you ray that one 22 has the same rights as ten turkeys?
23 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
No.
24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
You are leaning more 25 toward his position.
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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39 1
(,j COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
But I am not sure that I am 2 able to make the t:ansition from turkeys to people.
3 MR. 3ICKWITs What about a grain versus a beach?
g
~s 4
C0"3ISSIONER GILINSKYa If you get it away froa 5 the Declaration of Independence, and the rights of 6 individuals and so on, it seems perfectly natural to protect 7 the larger population.
8 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I have great difficult stepping 9 away from those.
10 C3MMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I think there are i
11 societies, in f act, that are operating at the present time 12 in which that would be consistent with their tradition.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
If there aren't any people 14 thede at all. If you are just talking about things?
15 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
If there are only things, j
16 there are not health and safety factors.
I'7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The difficulty we are going t'o 18 have is translating this general philosophy.
I would 19 probably agree with Joe that you want to put out some.
20 minimum threshold that the plant must be able to provide 21 this level of protection to each individual.
No individual 22 should at greater risk than this.
But then you go on to 23 m o re than that.
24 Wnat I as saying is, here is the level of risk f
5 beyond which you would find unacceptable for an individual
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ao I no matter how sparsely populated the area was.
But then y 2 would go beyond that to address this question of the 3 societal risk.
7 4
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It seems to me that it has 5 got to be some combination of the two.
6 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Sure.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
We have to think about 8 wnat that combination is.
9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I am not sure that we are any 10 fcrther.
I think that we could take some transcripts of 11 several months ago, and we are at the same stage.
The 12 difficulty is translating it into something that you could 13 really give to a Board, and give guidance to them.
L 144 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You just put yoursel'f in 15 the position of having received a record, maybe a 16 recommendation but certain a record from the Board some 17 months or years f rom now that would cause you to act one way i
18 or another.
19 If we could set out in some dramatic way that 20 wo uld --
21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I think that that was the 22 intent of these sets of questions, to focus on what are the 23 key issues, and if there is some dramatic way in which 24 Indian Point stands out, then the decision is probably very 25 straight forward.
It is in the case where it does not ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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41 1 really stand out that starkly.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
If it does not stand out 3 that starkly, then we will treat it like every other plant.
7 4
CH AIRM AN AHEA RNE:
But then you get back to the 5 point that I was trying to raise with Len.
We really at 6 some are going to have to address as a Commission, do we or 7 do we not accept the argument that if the population density 8 is high enough, that you put aside the question of risk, but 9 bring in the probability, or take essentially a probability 10 of one, and leok at the consequences.
Many of the 11 commentors believe that this is what we should do.
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
'I mean, if you are looking 13 a t risk to the community, you are alre.dy including the
~
14 numbers.
15 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I as assuming that whenever you 16 talk about risk, you have some probability involved.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes.
18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Many of the commentors argue 19 that you can take probability one when you talk about a very 20 large population area, and only look at consequences.
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think that it depends a 22 lo t on how much confidence you have in these probability 23 numbers.
If you don't have any confidence in the numbers, 24 then you can look at it th a t way.
If you have some 25 confidence in the numbers, I would think that you could use ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 42 1 them.
2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Peter, do you have any thoughts?
3 C3MMISSIONER BRADFORD:
At this stage, I think 4 what we are basically going to ha ve to do is ask the Eoard 5 to develop data on bounding questions, or else it is going 6 to take us a very long time to sit down -- in fact, I don't 7 think that it can be done -- and articulate the findings 8 that we would expect to emerge from all this data that would 9 trigger a Boa rd action.
10 I must say that the only way I can conceive of 11 this going from here is th a t we would articulate the areas 12 in which we would want the Board to receive evidence, plus 13 the best we could with the standard that we expect them to 14 apply.
But in the end it would be us and coi the Board that 15 is applying the standard.
16 I think that the questions of adequacy of I'7 emergency response now and in the future, obviously, nave to 18 be asked, and, in fact, putting the Task Force Eeport up for 19 grabs in the context of a probability and consequenca 20 question of the type of a couple tha t were in the draft that 21 v e n t out.
I think they can be sharpened a little, but there 22 is going to have to be a question in that area as well.
23 I think, also, since the proceeding really ficwc, 24 a t least initially, from a petition and a denial, that to 25 the extent that questions of conformance with our
)
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f3 1 regulations were included in the original petition, one of 2 the issues that should be before the Board is whether both 3 these units do in fact comply with the regulations.
That is
/
4 an issue aside from the probabilities.
5 I think that it is important that whatever we are 6 doing here, we are no t substituting risk assessment for the 7 regulations as a standard for licensing and for continued 8 operations.
~
9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
On that one, how would you, 10 then, consider if we received a petition for any plant, does 11 it subscribe to our regulations?
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
In the normal course of 13 events, it would be a petition and a Director'c decision,
(-
1-4 presumably a denial.
In all likelihood we would not, then, 15 institute a proceeding of this sort.
16 It is because for reasons having to do with the 17 guestions opened up by population density coupled with a 18 so rt of rough reassessment of the concept of credible 19 accident that we are going f urther f orwa rd h ere.
But it 20 seems to me that you can't get very far away frca --
21 You can't get in a position whert yo u would be 22 prepared to say, regardless of the state of compliance with 23 the regulations, as long as our risk assessment study shows 24 that they saem to come out roughly aqu11 with other plants, s
25 it is all right not to be in c mpliance.
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44 1
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The converse, though, is that 2 if one concludes that they are completely in compliance that 3 does not close the hearing.
The reason we are in open 4 hearing is --
5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That is right.
6 I would iak'e it one of the questions.
But you are 7 quite right, if the answer is that those units are in 8 complete compliance --
9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The real issue is that we are 10 taking a different look at reactors in accidents, and these 11 are in the highest population density areas.
That is the 12 reason.
13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
As one tries to compile a
(
14 list -- my list is not very different from the list we put 15 ou t originally -- I would add the question of regulations.
16 I think that the individual questions can be sharpened.
l'7 think that the adequacy of whatever proposed staff measures 4
la are actually going to be implemented at the site shquid be 19 part of the proceeding.
20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
'4here do you come out on this 21 question of explicit criteria?
22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
As I said at the 23 beginning, I cannot at the moment say, beyond compliance 24 with the regulations and the desire to have the best q
25 evidence we can pet before us on probability, consequences, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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45
(_
and risk, which obviously includes whether or not the l
2 emergency planning would work --
3 I cannot answer Victor's question of what set of 4 numbers would it take to tell me that the plant should be 5 shut down, or substantially modified, or only operated for 6 part of the year.
7 I am not adverse to spendfag some time trying to 8 -- I am not adverse to spending another week or 10 days 9 trying to figure cat whether we can state that standard, but 10 I sure can't do it now.
11
- C3MMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
Presumably, you will have 12 to spend that time down at the other end.
13 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
About the only advantage in
(
1<4 going shead without the criteria is while the hearing goes 15 forward you are probably creating a somewhat broader record 16 than would be the in the case if you were able to enunciate 17 a t least an initial set of criteria that you intended to 18 u s e.
19 It is going to go on, and God kncvs how long it is 20 going to take to close the record on th e th i n g.
You will 21 have had that additional time to thrash around.
I dare say
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22 that there will be a lot of other things to occupy our 23 attention.
I doubt that we will spend that whole time
(
24 concentra ting on the judgment criteria here.
Eut at least 25 it would be down the line.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I think we ought to try, over 2 the next week, to see whether we can sharpen some of the 3 questions that we would like, or add additional ones, to see 7
4 if we perhaps can incorporate some sense of criteria.
5 But I think that we ought to go ahead with getting 6 the Board started, because I don't think we will focus it 7 sharply enough to drastically reduce the amount of effort 8 that the Board is going to have to go through.
I would gess 9 that that in the end whoever is here is going to have to 10 make a subjective judgment based upon that record.
11 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE I have looked at the 12 questions about five times in recent days.
I keep going 13 back and saying, there must be a better set of questions to 14 develop the points, and I have not done much better.-
15 The, questions, with a little tuning on them, I 16 dare say I will make a try and see how it fits.
They are 17 n o t a bad set of questions to develop the so rt of' 18 information I foresee as being at the root of th's issue.
19 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I know that Peter has some 20 modifications that he would like to make.
21 Would you in the next three or four days be able 22 to provide comments on those questions?
23 I would like to see if v'e can't aim at at least i
24 sharing some alternate forms, or additional questions by the 25 middle of next week, and see if by the end of next week we ALDERSON REPORTING CCMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WASHINGTON, O C. 20024 (202)554 2345 9.
47 s+-
1 could get to the point where we could resume this issue.
I take it, Mr. Chairman, you are not
(
3 making a judgment on whether you are going to have criteria 4 formulated prior to the Board process.
5 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE My own conclusion is, I think 6 about the best we vill be able to do is to point that in the 7 examination of the risk, it is both societal risk and 8 individual risk that have to be examined.
I doubt that we 9 will be able to do much more.
10 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I would not foreclose 11 anything at this point.
12 03MMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I would not completely 13 give up on the proposition of at least trying to have some
(
1-4 tentative criterion or criteria.
I cannot imagine that it 15 can be locked in place before the hearing goes forward, but 16 it is conceivable.
17 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
There are a whole rance of 18 criteria you can set, starting at the linit, and one way to 19 test things is to go to the extremes.
You could make a 20 criteria statement which is so general that it is both 21 unobjectionable and useless.
My theory would be that we 22 will find tnese units safe enough.
It is unobjectionable, 23 but it is not in the least helpful, and I would not care to 24 enunciate it for fear of being run out of to wn on a rail.
25 But es you come down and get more explicit, it j
i 1
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I seems to me that it is not out of the question to find.a
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2 point where you are able to enunciate something, which is 3 still not going to be so quantitative that it is as much 4 help as one would reall y like it to be, but nevertheless 5 indicates a sort of a direction a'nd general thrust of the 6 way in which, at least at the present, we are thinking.
7 To the extent that th a t would be helpful to the 8 Board, and the majority thought it useful, I think that it 9 is possible.
10 CHAIBMAN AHEARNE:
If we can coma up with 11 something along that line.
What I would like to do is to 12 nove forward over the next week, and if we can come up with 13 something excellent.
M COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
In the midst of this yen to 15 ge t things done, in the midst of the dead summer, and the 16 budget review upon us.
I'7 fou see, Peter, that business before the 30th was 18 no t unseemly rush for the reason you thought.
It was just 19 his natural inclination of things.
20 C3MMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Somehow it is mere 21 congenial now.
Maybe the numbers are different.
22 (Laughter.)
23 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I know you want te get to the t.
24 procedural issue, but I could hold for a minute on that, !
25 would like to get.this affirmation session which we put on ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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49 I hold.
2 (Recess.)
3 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
All right, len.
(
4 MR. BICKWITs On the procedural 'ssues, we listed 5 a couple that emerged from the commants.
6 The first was whether you want to have a Board 7 that is indapendent of the Commission, and its licensing 8 panels.
That was not the original intention of the 9 Commission, and I don't see any particular reason why it 10 should be 'the present intention.
But that was put forward, 11 and we recommend against it.
12 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
What did people have in 13 mind ?
(
14 MR. BICKWITs Bringing in expertise not associated 15 with the Commission.
I think that the theory was that the 16 Commission had certain limitations this area, and that a 17 hearing -.
18 COMMISSIONIR HENDRIE:
I fought for this ager.cy's 19 budget for too many years not to do things like that.
! a.?.
20 against it.
21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I would go with that.
22 C3MMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Our own licensinc boards.
23 COMMISSIONER 3RACFORD:
I think that that is all 24 righ t.
i 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Let me explore that a little 2 bit, particularly with regard to the probabilistic 3 assessment group and research who did for the. Commission the
(
4 paper.
They and in fact OPE and in some sense OGC were the 5 producers of this report.
In fact, I imagine the NUREO 6 document that goes out will identify OPE and OGC.
7 Now, to what extent will you people be parties in 8 the proceeding?
9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Not at all I would trust.
10 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
How about research?
11 MR. BICKWIT:
You could go either way on that 12 question.
You could simply make this document and the 13 research staff subject to discovery or you could have
(
14 research come in on its own' or ycu could reach a coordinated 15 staf f position.
You have to recognire you a re not in a 16 typical adjudicatory situation.
17 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
No, I know.
What I a:
18 trying to look f orward downstream to at some point in i
19 helping us to evaluate all this record, we are going to have 20 to turn to some expert staff for assistance.
21 MR. BICKWIT:
Yes.
22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I woul:. like to be able to turn 23 to the probabilistic assessment pvople for assistance.
24 MR. BICKWIT:
Yes.
25 CHAIR 3AN AHEARNE:
Now, is it possible te have ALDERSON REPCRTING COMPANY, INC.
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5i I then serve as expert witnesses and not be a party and still 2 be *.vailabla then?
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3 MR. BICKWIT:
You are concerned about separation 4 of functions?
5 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE.
Yes.
6 MR. BICKWIT:
In this particular adjudication 7 there is no statutory prohibition on ',eparation of 9 functions.
There is no prohibition in our rules with 9 respect to separation of functions.
10 COMNISSI3NER GILINSKY:
Why is that?
11 MB. BICKWIT:
Because 'our rules relate to 12 adjudications'that are initiated by orders to show cause and 13 notice of hearings in the normal context in which those
(
14 words are used.
We are not initiating an enforcement action 15 in this particular proceeding.
You are conducting an 16 investigation which may lead to an enforcement action.
17 Moreover, the statutory requirements and I woul:1 18 say the constitutional require:::ents relate to adjudications 19 which are required by statute to be on the record.
There is 20 no requiremont for this particular proreeding to be on the 21 record.
There are therefore no statutory requirements 22 applicable to this procee:iing.
23
,COM!iISSIONER HENDRIE:
When you say "this i
24 proreeding," you mean the adjudication?
25 ER. BICKWIT:
That is right.
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C3MMISSIONER HENDRIE:
The ex parte rules don't 2 apply?
g.
3' MR. BICKWIIs The ex parte rules do not.
That is 4 right.
you can decide to apply them.
5 C3MMISSIONER HENDRIE:
No, I don't think I would 6 want to do that.
7 (Laughter.)
8 HR. BICKWITs I didn't think you would want to do 9 that.
You are f ree to, however.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
When you talk about staff 11 positions, or I suppose anybody else's position, there is 12 nothing here about adequacy of the level of safety.
The 13 question is really related to estimates of the risk,
('
I 14 estimates of possibilities of improving saf e ty and so on.
15 At one point on the emergency plans there is something like 16 acce ptability.
17 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE I guess embedded t'h o u g h,
18 latent, is talk about Director Denton 's determination to 19 hear the things that have to be done.
That I guess would ha 20 the NRR's position, yes, that would have to be done.
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Sut there is nothing in 22 these questions about a need to do anything.
23 MR. BICKWITs In a footnote on page u of the order i
24 it says "A contention by a party that one or more specific 25 saf ety measures, in addition to those identified or ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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t 53 1 referenced by the Director, should be required as a 2 condition of operating the facility."
The facilities would 3
,r be within the scope of the inquiry.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think that is when we 5 thought that the fundamental question was going to be 6 whether the requirements imposed by the Director met some 7 standard, set by the Commission.
Then there is a possibility 8 that further safety measures might be required, and that 9 would also be within the scope of the proceeding.
10 But if you strip away the question of whether 11 these new requirements imposed by NRR, indeed, have to be 12 - im p o s ed to neet some standard, then I think the whole 13 proceeding has a different character.
It is an
(
14 investigation, and I wonder whether this is the right 15 format.
I guess I hope we_will come up with some criteria.
16 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I guess since I viewed it a s: an 17 investigation from the beginning I think it is consistent.
I come back to the notion that the 19 proceeding uakes sense even in the absence of criteria.
20 C3MMISSI3NER HENDRIE:
Does the nature of the 21 proceeding with regard to these discussions about 22 separations of f unction change in any way if we were, for Z3 instance, able to igree upon and enunciate at least some 24 general criteria that we intended at least at this time to 25 use down the line in judging results?
4 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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MR. BICKWITs No.
2 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
It would continue to be an 3 investigation in which one is developing information on the 4 basis of that c '. ord.
In effect, on the basis of that 5 record we are going to review the Director's decision to 6 deny the 2206 petition, I think.
7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNEs Yes.
I recall for all of us 8 that Len had made this point fairly clear way back when we 9 were talking about the development of this, that this would 10 not be the final adjudication.
If we reached a conclusion 11 on shutdown or major change to the facility, then the 12 licensee would have the opportunity for an adjudicatory 13 hearing on that issue.
(
14 COMMISSIONER GILINKSY So this is an informal 15 adjudicatory hearing.
16 (Laughter.)
17 COMMISSIONER HENDIRE:
No, no.
You have to stick 18 to the nomenclature in the four pronged approach otherwise I 19 roll over and be:ome unconscious.
20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Sort of like a written hearing; 21 another version.
22 (Laughter.)
23 MR. BICKWIT:
The point sim ply is from a legal 24 stan dpoint it can be as formal or informal as you want it to 25 b e.
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CHAIBXAN AHEARNE:
But you are saying'it would 2 cause no problem for research to be a witness at this 3
7 hearing talking about their paper, f or example, and still 4 then at the end of the hearing when the record comes to us 5 for us to ask for their assistance in interpreting sone of 6 the things.
7 MR. BICKWIT There would be ne problem whatever.
8 CHAIREAN AHEARNE:
Good.
9 HR. SICKWIT Nor would there be any problem with 10 seeking the advice of other parties to the proceeding.
11 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
By "other parties" are you 12 saying research would be a party if they were an expert 13 witness?
{\\
14 gg,'3ICKWIT:
I didn't' conceive of tnem as being a 15 party.
16 C3MMI55IONER HENDRIE:
Well, they would be part of 1'7 tha sta'ff who are i party, yes.
18 2R. BICKWIT:
But I am saying with recrect to any 19 p a rt y t o th e proceeding there would be no inappropriateness 20 in seeking the advice of that party.
It is a ceparate 21 question of whether research should be a party.
I don't 22 really see that that gets you anything out of it.
23 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I remember we were fairly 24 explicit in the development of the task force to have 25 research as a separate group because they in essence were ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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56 1 taking a look at what where NRR would come out.
So it 2 really was a separation.
3 C3MMISSIONER HENDRIE But even though there isn't 4 a separation of functions problem here or requirement, I 5 would assume that your office and Ed's office are now, 6 except for assistance to the Commission, are out of it.
7
.MR. BICKWIT That would be the normal way of 8 doing business, and that is s better way of doing it.
9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I would think you are not 10 going to participate in the Indian Point hearing except 11 insofar as you advise us on motions and so on that may come 12 here and eventual digestion of the record.
13 MR. BICKWIT:
I think we have the gist.
14 CHAIRMAN AREARNEs There is one other issue on' 15 proceedings that was raised by the New York State Ener;y 16 oggiee,
l'7 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Before we go away from this 18 one could I just comment.
I don't know whether it is usual, 19 unusual or would be considered breach of legal etiquette or 20 something, but the fact that tnis proceeding has this 21 dif f eren t caaracter and that we do not perceive that the 22 ex parte rules, the separation of functions rules, apply 23 here, it seems to me that there would be so:e useful point 24 in at least footnoting in whatever order we produced that 25 that is our belief and that we propose to operate en that ALDERSON REPCRTING COMPANY, INC.
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57 1 basis just to make it clear to anybody who doisn't agree 2 with that that they could start ar;uing early so we don't 3 clear down the line a year from now and then have people 4 running around screaming we have violated the ex parte rules 5 and why didn't we say something before.
6 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Or at least raising the point 7 that they had not appreciated that that was the approach we 8 were taking.
9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
It is kind of out of the 10 ordinary fer a situation in which we do have a hearing board 11 and it is following the more formal procedures of the 12 adjudicatory hearing.
13 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
In fact, the hearing board
(
1<4 migh t be interested to know this.
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
No one wants to arrive at 16 it without some care.
For example, I am not sure that these 17 rules shouldn 't apply to the hearing board.
If they don't 18 presumably have the need we might have to have access to the 19 probabilistics analysis people f or other reasons.
20 COMMISSIONER HEND2IE:
Yes.
j 21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Chat is really my concern is to 22 make sure that we have the access.
1
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23 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I don't disagree with your 24 poin t, Joe, but I don't think the note should simply say 25 that ex parte rules don't apply.
i ALDERSCN REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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58 I
1 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE.
That is my crude shorthand 2 for what.is probably a number of contorted sentences which
,r' 3 will satisfy all the legal scholars.
4 MR. BICKWIT:
Tentatively we vill take the view of 5 the Commission as boing the ex parte and separation of 6 functions rule should not apply with respect to the 7 Commission but would apply with respect to the board.
8 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Yes, I think I would agree on 9 that.
10 Now, can we move on?
11 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Yes, sir, please.
12 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The issue raised by,tne New 13 York State Energy Office on where is the burden of proof.
(
14 da. BICKWIT:
Again, no statutory requirements are 15 applicable and the rules are not appli:able either.
We see 16 no reason why the normal practice of putting the burden of 1'7 going forward with the evidence on the staff'should be 18 ch anged.
19 With respect to the ultimate burden of persuasion, 20 there really is no clear Commission practice on that 21 question at least with respect to OL licensees.
'Je would 22 suspest that it is most appropriately placed on the licensee 23 in t ha t the licensee knows the most and therefore is bect
(
24 able to sustain that burden.
25 Secondly, as a matter of requiatory philosophy, we ALDERSON REPORTING COMFANY, INC.
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59 1 think it is appropriate for a health and safety regulatory 2 agency to give the benefit of the doubt to the safety 3
(
position when the economic position of the licensee and the 4 safety position come in conflict.
They don't always, but 5 they often do.
6 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I guess that is pretty good 7 when you are applying for a license, either an CP or an OL.
8 Once you have satisfied your requirements and have a valid 9 license and believe that you have lived up to all of the 10 terms and conditions of the license and all of the 11 regulations and rules of the agency which has licensed you, 12 do you really think you ought to live perpetually in the 13 position of having to prove against all allegations?, That
(
l'4 is, at,that point doesn't the burden shift over to people 15 who want to argue that you aren't conforming?
16 MR. BICKWIT:
That is a perfectly defensible 17 position.
I come out the other way.
It is simply is a 18 matter of regulatory philosophy.
The Commission is free to 19 go either way.
s 20 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE4 Excuse me.
Ia running 21 strong here, but I will shut up in a minute, John.
- Second, 22 is i t so clear that what we are running here is a burden of 23 proof sort of position?
Ihat is, parties are going to give 24 their evidence.
They are going to be examined on it.
The 25 record thereby formed will be digested as best it can be by ALDERSON REPCRTING COMPANY. INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W. WASMNGTON. 0.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
60 1 a board and some preliminary recommendations will made to us 2 and we will then get the record in the summary and the g-3 preliminary recommendations and we will have to examine it 4 and think carefully about it and see how we come out.
5 I am not quite sure vnen you are doing an 6 investigation of this kind to develop a record of this kind 7 that the burden of proof question is so significant.
8 MR. BICKWITs Well, it really depends on the kinds 9 of questions you put.
If they are the kinds of questions 10 that might be put to another board is an order to show cause 11 of typical adjudication, such as have the regulations been 12 complied with, then in my view it doesn't make a lot of 13 sense to assion the burden one way in one of these k
14 circumstances and one way in another of these 15 circumstances.
It would be best if you had an idea if the 16 same board would come out the same way based on the same I'7 burden of proof.
18 So I think you ought to recognize that there will 19 3e some issues in which there will be a very close 20 resemblance to the normal adjudicatory framework, and it 21 seeis to me that you ought to assign the burden in the way 22 that you would assign it if you had a normal adjudicatory 23 f ram ewo rk.
24 CHAIRM AN AHEARNE:
Let me ask -- may I?
25 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE I as wrung out.
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CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
I haven' t reached a conclusion 2 on the first issue that Joe raised, but let's just go down 3 these questions, for example.
r 4
What is the current status of state and local 5 emergency planning?
6 MB. BICKWIT:
I said it depends en the question 7 that you put.
8 CHAIBMAN AHEARNE:
Well, I think I am going to go 9 down all of them and I think I am going to reach a different 10 conclusione What is the current status and acceptablity of 11 state and local emergency planning?
First, current s ta tus,
12'that is an explotation, but I don't think the licensee is 13 the person best able to describe that.
I think that was
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I4 really what the New York State Energy Office was taising.
15 That is really state and local officials.
They are best 16 able to describe the status of the state and local planning.
17 COMMISSIONER 3RADFORDs But I thins for cur 18 purposes since we certainly can't compel them to assume the 19 burden of proof ---
20 CHAIRMAN AMERANEs Well, but status isn't proving 21 something.
Status is describing.
22 03MMISSIONER 3RADFORD:
Right, but ul tima tely what 23 burden of proof means is tha t if the Commiasion finds itself 24 in substantial doubt about a proposition essen tial to the 25 resu lt, the party that had the burfen of resclving that ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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62 1 doubt is the party against whom the doubt will be assessed.
2 Now, what that does with regard to that particular 3 question, I am not sure, but ona thing it doesn't do is let
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4 you assess it against :he emergency planning officials of 5 the State of New York unless they are themselves a party to 6 the proceeding.
7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
If this role of the board is to 8 be useful certainly to me, and if this record is going to be 9 at all useful, it has to be established on the basis of 10 questioning people who know the most about something.
Il COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That is certainly right.
12 CHAIRMAN AHERNE:
The state and local officials, 13 and not the licensees, are the ones who know about state and k
1-4 local emergency planning.
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That is right, and there 16 is no question but what one wants to be able to have them in 17 the proceeding, but when you say that somebody has the 18 burden of proof with regard to this type of issue that is 19 another question.
20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, see, I am sure that the 21 phrase " burden of proof" really gets to what my concern is.
22 What my concern is is who is it that the board should t?
23 looking to provide the answers to something.
I think on the 24 status of state and local emergency planning it would b5 the 25 state and local officials.
Then tnere is the uestion of ALOERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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63 1 acceptability.
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Or FEMA, John?
3 e
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, that is what I was just 4 getting to, FEMA, and I think that our question No. 1 is 5 oriented really towards a combination of government 6 of ficials.
Some are FEMA and some are state and local.
7 COMMISSIONER BRADEORD.
You see, at some point as we get this whole emergency planning rule in place and have 8
9 a formal certification process it won't look too different 10 from other issues in our regulatory process.
The burden of 11 proving it in effect will be with the NRC staff who will 12 have certified to the adequac:t of the emergency plans.
So 13 it is a problem that is much more tro':.blesome in this 14 context than it will be in the licenting context.
15 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But, you see, as I went down 16 through No. 1 I couldn't see the licensee being the percon j
17 on whom that applied.
I view the question from the New York 18 State Energy Offic,e at least somewhat as to what extent do 19 we intend to pla:e reliance upon state officials, and I felt 20 that we ought to try to be a little more explicit in 21 whatever direction we go to the board.
22 Let me continue.
What improvements in the level 23 of emergency planning can be expected in the what schedule?
24 Again, that is really no t a licensee issue.
25 What improvements in the level of safety will ALDERSON REPORTING CCMPANY, INC.
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64 I result from measures required in the Director's order?
That 2 really seemed to be NRC staff.
They have claimed tha t this 3 is going to bring up some level of safety.
I understood, at 4 least from some of the comments that the licensee had been 5 making in the past, they didn't think those steps were 6 necessary.
So it would be odd to me to turn to the people 7 who have already said we don 't really think that is much of 8 in improvement and to say, all right now prove it is an 9 improvement.
It is the NRC staff who is claiming it is an 10 improvement.
11 What risk may be posed by serious accidents?
That 12 I could see the licensee being the one on the hook on that 13 o n e.
14 How do the risks posed by Indian Point units 2 and 15 3 compare with tha range of risks provad by other nuclear 16 power plants?
That really seemed to me again much more NRC 17 staf f and then questioned by people who disa;ree wi th that.
18 As far as tae lead on that when you compare it across the 19 spectrum to other plants it seemed to be much scre an N.C 20 staf f position.
21 C3%XISSIDNER BRADFORD.
'J e ll, I wouldn't have much 22 dif ficulty on that one assuning that we can articulate a 23 criterion, which may be a big assumption.
Assuming that 24 some criterion exists at the beginning of the proceedinc 25 with regard to risk relative to other plants, if in fact ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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65 1 that is to be an issue in the proceeding at all, well it 2 certainly is all right to have part of that burden rest with 3
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the staff.
It is not inapprcpriate to have it rest with the 4 licensee as well.
I mean, if we were to start as a 5 criterion the risk from this plant should be no greater than 6 the risk from nuclear plants taken as a whole.
7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Sure, but I would think it 8 would be the NBC staff who would probably be recuired to say 9what is the risk from nuclear plants as a whole and then the 10 licensee would be the one who would say their plant is no 11 greater risk than that.
In the current framework we are 12 sort of working our way into that kind of a comparison.
It 13 is our staff who are the experts on whatever the risks are 14 across this board.
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
There are other people who 16 could make those studies.
It is probably true that Con. Ed.
I'7 itself does not necessarily have anybody in-house who can do 18 it, but it certainly is within their capability to find 19 some body.
20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I hadn ' t fully appreciated the 21 significance of it, and burden of proof doesn't mean th a t 22 much to me.
As a term, it is a tern of art.
But it 23 certainly was clear in going through our questions that it i
24 w a s n ' t immediately obvious to whom the board should be 25 turning as the lead on resolvin; this question.
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MR. SICKWITs Well, I think you would answer the 2 question differently depending on which question you are 3 talking about.
4 The threshold ques tio n then is do you want to have 5 a different burden of proof with respect to each question 6 and that seems to be to be cumbersome.
7 CHAIRMAii AHEARNE:
I am not sure I would phrase 8 burden of proof as cumbersome.
9 03MISSIONER HENDRIE:
Help me with the term of art.
10 MR. BICKWIT Sure.
11 COMMISSIONER HENDRII:
It hasn't seemed to me that 12 as you use burden of proof in the legal context that that 13 necessarily means who is the expert and presents the
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14 evidence.
It has a connotation about it that one party or 15 the other is expected to carry forward the argument and the 16 second party can be expected to attack it rather than the 17 second party carrying the argument.
18 MR. BICKWIT:
There are two kinds of burdens.
One 19 is the burden of going forward with evidence.
Ihat means 20 that party sust sustain what is called a prima facie care; 21 1.e.,
if there is no answer, judgment for that party.
22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD4 Or against it.
23 MR. BICKWIT Right.
24 Then there is also the question of if he sustains 25 that prima. facie case the burden will then switch tc another j
A6DERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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67 I party because the judgment will be for that person, for that 2 party if you sustained it and nobody else comes in.
If 3
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somebody else comes in and argues against that prima facie 4 case, it is a different question who has the ultimate burden 5 of persuasion when the two parties square off against each 6 other once the prima f acie case has been established.
7 As Peter mentioned, it is the question of what you 8 are talking about.
When we are talking about ultimate 9 burden of persuasion, it is who bears the ri'sk of 10 nonpersuasion, and this will be a very unusual situation.
11 In the situation where the adjudicator is simply undecided, 12 the person who beats the risk of nonpersuasion loses on that 13 point.
That is what it means to have the ultimate burden of i
1<4 persuasion.
15 CHAIRHAN AHEARNE:
Depending on the point of view, 16 there are ;wo groups who bear the burden c-nonpersuasion.
I'7 The licensees who want the plant up have t.. e risk of having 18 it shut down.
The people who want it shut down have the 19 risk of allowing it to be kept up.
So I don't know how it 20 comes out then.
21 MR. BICKWICs If the issue is should the plant be l
22 kept up, and that is the issue on which your hypothe tics.1 is 23 based, and the adjudicator is in total equipoise, has no i
24 idea on the basis of the evidence whether the plant sh:uld 25 be kept up or shut down, then he asks who has the burden of ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 persuasion and he decides the case against that person.
2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So that either group would have 3 the risk of nonpersuasion?
4 wBa BICKWIT:
No, only one group.
If they are 5 arguing against each other only one group can have the risk 6 of nonpersuasion, i.e.,
the burden of persuasion.
7 (Laughter.)
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Len, your point about this 9 proceeding is that the Commission can allocate the burdens 10 as it sees fit?
11 MB. BICKWIT:
It can, yes.
I think the Chair =an's 12 point is a good one that on different tatters you might want 13 to assign it to different people based on some theory that
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14 the burden of persuasion should be on the person who knows 15 the most about the issue.
I just that is a very cumbersome 16 way of proceeding.
17 CHAIBMAN AHEARNE:
It is an investigatory 18 proceeding.
19 MR. BICKWIT:
Yes, it is.
I don't know what that 20 means.
21 (Laughter.)
22 I mean I don't know what that cesns in this 23 context.
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24 CH AIRMAN AHEARNE:
Can you find out that 25 inf ormation?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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MR. BICKWIT Yes.
2 CHAI2 MAN *HEARNE; I want the board to focus its 3 attention on those who know the most about it and try to get 4 information.
5 HR. BICKWIT Yes, and I am certain that the Board 6 will do that.
It is a question of when that person 7 disagrees with another party in the proceeding what does the 8 board decide.
9 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let me suggest that once 10 we have in f act agreed on a list of questions and/or 11 criteria it will be a lot' easier to cut down that list.
12 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
13 MR BICKWIT:
I think that is rignt.
[
14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Then just decide as a 15 matter of f airness and efficiency who would want to have 16 both.
17 CHAIRMAN AEEARNE:
But it is an issue that perhaps 18 unlike in a usual case we may have to explicitly address it.
19 MR. 3ICKWIT:
I think you should explicitly 20 address it.
21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
All right.
Len, is there any 22 other?
23 MR. BICKWIT:
Yes, there are two other procedural i
24 issues.
25 One is do you want the board to recermend on all ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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70 I questions and reach decisions on all questions or simply 2 certify a record up on those questions for the Commission to 3 make the decision?
4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
For me I think it will depend 5 on the questions.
6 MR. BICKWIT:
On the questions, yes.
7 The final issue is ---
8 CH AIRMAN AHEARNE:
Wait, that is just for ne.
9 3R. BICKWIT:
That is true, it is just for you.
10 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
For myself I will at least 11 want a summary from the board of what th ey perceive as the 12 really central points in the record pertaining to each 13 question as an assistance in digesting the record.
I am
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14 inclined to think that I would find some recommended 15 findings or results helpful, but, you know, I am by no means 16 desperate and willing to fight to the last ditch for that 17 proposition.
18
- 58. BICKWIT Let me just point out one thing.
19 There are really three levels of questions here that you 20 would hsve tc make this decision for:
one is wha t signt be 21 called the basic questions, what we have generally been 22 callirg the board questions; two, the question of are the 23 criteria met, assuming you have criteria; and, three, what i.,
24 should be done.
You may come up with different answers with 2b respect to what kind of input you want from the teard tn ALCERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 each of those levels.
2 J0MMISSIONER BRADFORD:
It is a process of inertia 3 that leads ne to say by all means let's have
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4 recommendations, just because I can't see how they will ever 5 be heard, unless there is some contention to the effect that 6 it takes away time the board might be putting into things 7 they would do better.
Off the top of my head my feeling is 8 that af ter they have'been through the proceeding they ma y 9 have a perspective on the raw data that we would not and I 10 just can't see that anything is lost by having the benefit 11 of their analysis even if we rejected it entirely.
12 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
From myself I will still wait 13 to see the questions because I think if we get a set of
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14 suf f icie n tly loose questions then I think a lot of time can 15 be lost as the board tries to figure out what we might have 16 seant and tries to reach recommendations on them.
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I agree with that, which 18 is all the more reason to avoid the loose questions.
19 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Yes.
20 All right, Len, yo u are last.
21 MR. BICK'4IT:
Ihen the final issue, which I think 22 will have to be def erred, is tae relationshi; of this 23 proceeding to the generic proceeding.
In thinking about it, 24 what we have in mind is that the generic proceeding can 25 develop something much more specific and perhaps ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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l quantitative in terms of criteria than can be developed 2 here.
Mr. Hendrie has raised the possibility that thinos 3 may get tangled up.
I am not particularly concerned about 4 it because I think you are really going to be dealing with 5 different questions.
They a re the same kinds of questions 6 but you are going to be on a different level of 7 specificity.
I am hopeful that some kind of numerical 8 criteria can be developed.
I am not hopeful that they can 9 be developed in this proceeding.
10 CH AIRMAN AHEARNE -
Not hearing any other comments, 11 I think we will.try to get together again on this at the end 12 of next week.
13 (Whereupon, at 14 : 10 p.m., the meeting, conclu:ied. )
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
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24 25 1
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's NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.*d14ISSION rhis is to certify that the attached proceedings before the
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COMMISSION MEETING in the :: tatter of:
DISCUSSION ON INDIAN POINT - PUBLIC MEETING Date of Proceeding:
July 17, 1980 Docket flumb er :
Place of Proceeding:
Washington, D.
C.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Coccission.,
Patricia A. Minson Official Reporter (Typed) i
. x u,
es id /s s 7
? //b s,
r-r.
Official Reporter (Signature) e l
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f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1-This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the
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COMMISSION MEETING in the matter of:
DISCUSSION OF INDIAN POINT - PUBLIC MEETING
- Date of Proceeding:
July 17, 1980 Docket !! umber:
Place of Proceeding:
Washington, D.
C.
were held as herein appeers, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Commission.,
Mary C. Simons Official Reporter (Typed) p, e
.r.?]on,- ifl A,ss w,
Official Reporter (Signature)
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,p5g UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a /U'~
Rb.
Commissioners:
i Jont, F. Ahearne, Chaiman Victor Gilinsky Joseph M. Hendrie Peter A. Bradford CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK Unit No. 2) (Indian Point.
Docket Nos. 50-247 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 50-286 0F NEW YORK (Indian Point.
Uni t No. 3)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER A.
BACKGROUND
- i On May 30,1980, the Commission issued an order establishing a four-pronged approach for resolving the issues raised by the Union of Concerned Scientists' petition regarding the Indian Point nuclear facilities, and by the decision of the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), granting in part and denying in part that petition.
The order announced the Commission's intention to hold a discretionary adjudication for the resolution of safety issues con-cerning the plants; initiated an informal proceeding for the purpose of defining The Commission has received a motion from the Union of Concerned Scientists, dated June 23, 1980, requesting the disqualification of Commissioner Hendrie from participation in this matter.
In its Diablo Canyon decision (In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric,11 NRC 411 (1980)), the Commis-sion stated that requests for the disqualification of a Commissioner would not be entertained by the Commission as a whole, but would be referred to the Commissioner whose disqualification was requested.
By memorandum of April 23,1980, Commissioner Hendrie has denied the request for his disqualification.
e z
I the questions to be answered in that adjudication, as well as the criteria to be applied; announced the Commission's plan to address the generic question of the 3
operation of nuclear reactors in areas of high population density through a generic proceeding, to be decided at a later date; and directed the Commission's General Counsel and Director, Office of Policy Evaluation, to establish a Task Force to ' address the question of the status of the reactors during the pendency
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of the planned adjudication.
The Task Force has now presented its report to the Commission.
On the basis of its findings, we conclude that the risks posed by the operation of the Indian Point facilities during the pendency of the adjudi-cation are not such as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of an interim shutdown in that period.
1 B.
THE TASK FORCE ON INTERIM OPERATION
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The Task Force was asked to examine the following specific questions:
1.
A description of the Indian Point site demography as compared to other U.S. reactor sites.
2.
A comparison of reactor accident risks (spectrum of probabilities and consequences for health impacts and property damage) at the Indian Point site to reactor accident risks at other sites.
.3.
The effects of potential public energency response systems (evacuation, sheltering, etc.) on reactor accident risks at Indian Point.
The area studied should be large enough to include New York City. This evaluation 1
j e
e
3 should include an assessment of the effects of uncertainties associated with successfully completing such actions.
i 4.
A comparison of the reliability or accident probabilities of the Indian Point 2 and 3 reactors to each other and to other reactor designs which have been analyzed. This should include consideration of the changes ordered by the Director, NRR; technical design comments received in response to the Commission's February 15 solicitation of ccmments; and the effects of partial reductions in power level.
5.
An assessment of the economic, social, and other "non-safety" effects of shutting down or reducing the output of either or both reactors.
The Commission directed that the Task Force develop the information necessary for a Commission decision on interim operation, consider the comments
' t!:at had been filed with the Commission in the matter of interim operation, and present that information to the Commission.
C.
TASK FORCE FINDINGS On June 12, the Task Force presented its report to the Commission, and on June 26, it briefed the Commission as to its findings in a public meeting.
The Task Force found the following with respect to the first four items of its charter:
1.
Site Democrachy i
With New York City within less than 50 miles to the south, the Indian Point site has the highest or one of the highest surrounding population l
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4 densities of all U.S. nuclear power plant sites, as shewn by the various populat' ion density criteria examined by the Task Force. The data for tatal population levels out to 10, 30, and 50 miles show Indian Point figures as highest for the U.S.
Total estimated populations to these distances are approximately 218,000, 3g8,000, and 17 million' respectively, as compared with corresponding median population i[v'els for all U.S. power
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reactors of 24,000, 334,000, and 1 million.
When considering reactor accident risk, the population in a given direction, (i.e., in one 22-1/2 degree sector), is often more significant than population density averaged over all directions.
Here too, Indian Point ranks among the highest:
eighth with respect to the highest-population sector at 10 miles, and highest at 30 and 50 miles.
2.
Comoarison df Accident Risks Accident risk, in the sense of the product of accident probabilities and consequences, is partly a function of population density and distribution around the plant.
In addition, it is a function of design and operational characteristics of the reactor plant, local meteorology, and ceasures --
such as sheltering or evacuation -- which could be taken to reduce the effect of a reactor accident on the public.
The Task Force compared Indian Point risks with those of other reactor sites and designs, dis-tinguishing among effects of population densities and of design and other factors.
a.
Site Ascects l
To discern the risk effects of site considerations alone, the Task-(
l Force calculated risk measures for various sites for a " benchmark"
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5 reactor, whose design remained constant regardless of site.
(The Surry pressurized water reactor was used as the benchmark design,
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but with a power level increased to 3025 thermal megawatts, the rating of Indian Point 3.) Six sites were analyzed for this comparison.
Four -- Indian Point, Zion, Limerick, and Fermi -- represent sites o~f relatively high population.
One, Palisades, represents what the Task Force believed is a site with typical or average population distribution.
The last, Diablo Canyon, represents a remote site, that is, one with relatively low population density.
The comparison was made in terms of four principal risk measures:
early fatalities, ~early (radiation) illnesses, latent cancer fatal-ities, and public property damage costs.
For each of these measures, the Task Force considered both accident consequences and, using the benchmark reactor, the probability of their being exceeded.
In teg. ration 4
of consequences of accidents for all probabilities represents the I
overall risk.
4 Risk estimates of this sort necessarily involve wide uncertainties, as the Task Force enphasized.
The large uncertainties in absolute values of risk estimates generally introduce wide uncertainty bands in comparisons.
Subject to those uncertainties, and subject to the assumed conditions, including unshielded exposure during the entire radioactive cloud passage, the Task Force found that Indian Point risks attributable to site (i.e., surrounding population) factors alone compared ~ with risks of other sites as follows:
- ...L 6
(1)
Early fatalities:
Indian Point risks are essentially the same as those of the other sites with dense local population.
The less densely popu- }
1ated sites showed progressively much lower risk levels.
Early fatalities are dominated by tiie-population within 10 miles of ti1e plant, so the large population of New York City is not a factor here.
At very low probabilities, up to thousands to tens of thousands can occur, according to the estimates.
(2) Early illness from radiation:
4 These risks are dominated by the population within 50 miles.
Thus, New York City is important here.
Indian point risks were comparable to those of the other high-population sites. The Palisades and Diablo Canyon sites were not very different from
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each other but were found to be substantially lower than the others. At very low probabilities, up to hundreds of thousand::
of persons could suffer radiation illness, according to the estimates.
(3) Latent cancers (i.e., delayed cancers, occurring possibly a number of years after radiation exposure, which are statistically expected in excess of those that would '
otherwise have occurred):
These are dominated by the population within about a 200-n.ile radius of the plant.
Because of this, the individual site risk curves for latent cancers reflect the character of the region.
The latent cancer risk for these sites, and probably all other
.. ~. :
7 sites, is approximately the.same.
The number of latent cancer deaths projected is on the order of hundreds per year or thousands per accident for the lower probability events (on the order of 10~9 peryear).
(4) Property damage, excluding damage to the plant itself, was estimated as proportional to population density.
Accordingly, Indian Point was at or near the high end of property damage estimates, differing only moderately from the other high-density sites, but sharply higher than Palisades and, especially, Diablo Canyon.
Damage can reach up to tens of Lillions of dollars at very low probability levels for the high-density -- and even intermediate density -- sites, f
The worst of the accident consequences -- those that result in fatal doses or severe ground contamination -- would ensue only from certain accident scenarios entailing core meltdown and gross containment failure, coincident with particularly adverse weather conditions.
Expected consequences, i.e., consequences statistically expected, taking annual accident probabilities and magnitudes of consequences into account, compare as follows, as summarized in Table 5 of the Task Force report, which follows.
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TABLE 5
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' EXPECTED ANNUAL CONSE0!!ENCES'.(RISX) FP.CM 6 SITES WITH THE SURRY RE3ASELINED PWR C.ESIGN Probability of Ea rl y Early latent Property Consequence Oc 73;,)j ties Injuries Cancer /Yr*
Damace S=*
D Sits enee.ne ner vr Diablo Canyon 1.6x10-5 2.5x10-4 1.8x10-4 1290 Palisades *
'Z.9x10-4 1.2xk O-3 2.7x10i 2570 9.2x10-4 6.3 10'3 3.6x10-4 4755 Fenni Limerick 3.5x10-3 1.1 x10-2 4.7x10-4 6980 Zion 4.7x10-3 1.2x10-2
- 4.3x10-4 6030 Indian Point 6.1x10-3 1.5x10-2 5.4x10-4 9550
- Total Latent Cancers Would Be 30 Times Higher
+*5ased on 1974 Dollars NOTE:
THERE ARE LL.RGE UNCERTAINTIES WITH THE'/.3Pn.UTE VALUES.FRESEtiTED IN Tiil5 Tr.
E.
ASSUMPTIONS:
1.
SURRY DESIGN.
2.
I.P. UNIT 3. POWER LEVEL (3025 MWT).
3.
WITHIH 10 MILES - ENTIRE CLOUD EXPOSURE + 4 HOURS GROUND EXPOSURE 110 SHIELDING EEYOND 10 MILES - ENTIRE CLOUD EXPOSU?.E + 7 OAY GROUND EXPOSURE SHIELDliC EASED ON NORMAL ACTIVITY.
4.
WIND ROSE WEIGHTED 1970 CENSUS FO?ULATION DISTRIBUTION.
5.
IDENTICAL 91 WEATHER SEQUENCES FOR ALL SITES.
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Design Effects The Task Force performed an analysis to estimate the extent to which the impact of the relatively unfavorable site demographic character-istics on the relative risk at Indian Point would be nodified by design characteristics of the Indian Point plants.
The analytical approach was to ' consider accident sequences that, ba:ed on previous studies, could reasonably be viewed as dominating overall risk.
The sequences examined inc~1uded reactor-transient accidents and loss-of-coolant accidents.
The design-effects comparison was done by comparing I
what the risks of plants of the Indian Point and other designs would be were they all located at the Indian Point site and operated at the same power level.
The Task Force points out that large uncertainties surround the -
results -- uncertainties believed larger than those surrounding estimates for site-dependent differences alone.
Subject to those uncertainties, the Indian Point reactors were estimated to have a 1 in 100,000 annual probability of suffering severe core damage, as compared with probabilities some 3 to 20 times higher for six other representative U.S. pressurized-water and boiling-water reactors.
The risk of the Indian Point reactors appeared from the Task Force analysis to be even lower compared to the other reactors examined than the ratio of their estimated core' damage accident probabilities would suggest.
The changes completed and in progress at Indian Point
g as a result of the decision of the Director o'f Nuclear Reactor Regulation concerning the petition of the Union of Concerned Scientists produce a further risk reduction estimated by the Task
.)
Force at a factor of three.
The risks, in terms of statistically expected annual consequences for the Indian Point and three other plant designs,'were they all located at the Indian Point si'.e, would compare as follows, as sun:narized in Table 8 of the Task Force report, reproduced below.
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EXPECTED ANNUAL CONSEOUENCES (RISK) FROM 5 LWP. DESIGN 5 7 ~:'
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,AT 'lHE INDIAN POINT SITE
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a Prob. of Conse-Early quence Oc m Fatalities Early latent
- Property '
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Oesion rence ner vr.
Injuries Cancer /Yr*
Dama9e $**
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4 IP After Fix.
2.2x10
- 2. 7x10 1.6x10-5
)gg IP Be' fore Fix 6.3xib4
- 9. 5x10-4 4.4x10-5 700 Surrf Rebaselined 6.1x10-3 1.5x10-2 5.4x10-4' 9550 SequoyahI'ce:
2.7x10-3
- 2. 2x10-2 1.2x10-3
)4g00 Condinser Peach.Sottom SWR 1.7x10-2 3.1x10-2 1.1x10-3 13500 Rebaselined
- Total Latent Cancers Would Be 30 Times Higher
- Based on 1974 Dollars NOTE:
THERE ARE LARGE UNCERTAINTIES WITH THE ASSOLUTE VALUES PRESENTED IN THIS TABLE.
SSUMPTIONS:
1.
INDIAN POINT SITE
~~
METEOROLOGY - 91 WEATHER SEQUENCES WIND ROSE WEIGHTED 1970 CENSUS POPULATION DISTRIBUTION UNIT 3 POWER LEVEL (3025 M'dT) 2.
WITHIN 10 MILES - ENTIRE CLOUD EX?OSURE + 4 HOURS GROUND EXPOSURE NO SHIELDING BEYOND 10 MILES - ENTIRE CLOUD EXPOSURE + 7 OAY GROUND EXPOSURE
- SHIELDING EASED ON NORMAL ACTIVITY O
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0 8
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Overview After separately examining the risk of the Indian Point site and of the Indian Point design, the Task Force summed up its findings as followsi
[T]he site is about an order of magnitude more risky than a typical site and the-design about as much less risky than a typical design. Theiu is much more certainty in our comparison of the relative site risks than there is in the comparison of the design risks.
It is reasonable to conclude that the two about cancel, that is, the over-all risk of the Indian Point reactor is about the same as a typical reactor on a typical site. We recognize that such a comparison makes no explicit compensation for the i
j Indian Point-risk entail 19g notably higher consequences even if at lower probability than is typical.
It is not unusual in risk aversion to demand lower risk as the potential consequences increase -- as the stakes get i
higher. Accordingly, one might argue that the probability should be more than a magnitude lower if the consequences can be a magnitude higher.
)
3.
Emeraency Plannino Considerations The Task Force analyzed the sensitivity of the Ind-ian Point risks to the effects of evacuation and she'ltering.
~
I The Task Force reported analyses which assumed that all persons who would be evacuated from the vicinity of the plant in an accident would suffer cloud exposure from the radionuclides released. As a result of this pessimistic assumption, the analyses presented showed little difference in public risk for the alternatives of different radii of evacuation, sheltering, or even no evacuation for one day after the accident.
Under
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the same assumption the Task Force analyses showed somewhat higher risk of early fatalities for the no evacuation alternative, and some reduction of the early illness risk for the sheltering and 50-mile evacuation I
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11 alternatives, but the calculated differences are small in relation to the uncertainties of the analysis. The Task Force did some further analyses which were reported to the Commission in the briefing at the June 26, 1980 open Commission meeting, which indicated that prompt notification and evacuation out to 10 miles could substantially reduce the early fatality '
risk.
4.
Soecial Desion and Ooerational Provisions a.
Difference Between Units 2 and 3 The Task Force found no risk significant differences between the Indian Point 2 and 3 designs.
It made this finding in its examina-tion of the two designs in relation to the seven accident sequence scenarios that it judged to dominate overall risk.
b.
Effects of Desien and Ooerational Chances The design and operational fixes'ccmpleted or imminent at Indian Point in~accordance with the decision of the Cirector of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in connection with the petition of the Union of Concerned Scientists reduce risk by a factor of three, in the Task Force's estimation.
c.
Effects of Power Level Reduction Reduction of power level would reduce risk primarily through two mechanisms:
(1) proportionate reduction in the longer-lived radioactive fission-product inventory, which would produce a less-than-proportionate decrease in ' accident consequences; and I
12 (2) reduction in accident probabilities thro ~ ugh lowered fuel' temperatures and reduced rate of decay heat after shutdown, both of which would improve the reactor core's tolerance for poor
)
cooling.
Though the Task Force performed no ~ detailed study, it concluded fran its consideration of these mechanisms thit it appeared reasonable to i
say that risk would be reduced in proportion to the reduction in power level.
D.
CONCLUSION ihe Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation acted on the petition to shut down these reactors on February 11, 1980, finding that the interim risk of their continued operation while the matter was being considered did not warrant 4
their shutdown.
Now the Task Force has conducted a separate evaluation of the
).
comparative risk of interim operation.
We have reviewed the report of the Task Force with great care.
It should be emphasized that our review has been directed not to the question which is the subject of the adjudicatory proceeding which will be initiated -- that is, the long-term acceptability of the Indian point Unit 2 and 3 facilities -- but rather to the issue of whether the twc plants should or should not be allowed to operate during the pendency of that adjudication.
Our conclusion is that the evidence now before us indicates that the risks posed by operation of the two plants is not so great, or so dissimilar to the risks posed by other facilities 3
licensed to operate by the Commission, as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of an interim shutdown or reduction in power level.
The gist of the Task Force
~'
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13 report is that although the Indian Point site is considerably less desirable than the average n'uclear powe.r plant site, in terms of the density of the sur-rounding population, special design features not found in the average nuclear power plant reduce the accident risk from Indian Point by a comparable factor.
We are conscious as well that operation of the two facilities, during this interim period, is subject to the various safety improvements ordered by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor. Regulation, in his February confirmatory o rder.
In so finding, we are not prejudging the outcome of the adjudicatory proceeding, but rather are addressing only the narrow question of whether interim relief is appropriate during the period in which the adjudicatien will be arriving at a decision, based on the evidence submitted to it.
In the event that the Licensing Board conducting the adjudication determines that new evidence warrants interim relief, it can at any time recommend that course of action to the Commission.
For the present, however, we find no basis in the record to support the extraordinary measure of an interim shutdown in advance of completion of the hearing and Ccmmission decision..
It should be emphasized that our decision is based on grounds of safety, and the actual risks posed by the plant.
Though we have sought out information as to the economic and other non-safety issues involved in the decision whether to shut down the two plants, those factors do not play a part in this decision today. We need not decide today the extent to which such factors may be taken into account, in circumstances in which safety considerations militate in favor of one course of action, while economic considerations argue for a contrary resul t.
34 The request for an interim shutdown of Indian Point Units 2 and 3 is therefore denied. By a subsequent Order, we shall prescribe the questions to be resolved in the adjudicatory proceeding, and the criteria to be applied.
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It is so ORDERED.
For the Comission SAMUEL J. CHILK Secretary of the Comission Dated at Washington, D.C.
this day of July,1980.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
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In the Matter of
)
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY
)
OF NEW YORK, INC. (Indian Point,
)
Docket Nos. 50-247 Unit No. 2)
)
50-286
)
POWER. AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF
)
YORK (Indian Point, Unit No. 3)
)
)
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COMMISSIONER HENDRIE The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) moves that the Commission disqualify Cc=missioner Hendrie from further participation in any deliberations or decisions by the Commission concerning UCS' Petition for Decommissioning of Indian Point Unit 1 and Suspensien of Operation of Units 2 &
3.
This Motion is based on the likelihood of actual prejudice and the inescapable appearance of prejudice and unfair treatment that stems from Commissioner Hendrie's previous extensive involvement in the consideration of the Indian f
Point reactors as a member of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) e
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2 Division of Technical Revie{ -
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UCS first requested Mr;..,7, DUPLICATE DOCUMENT
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Paragraph 69 of its Petit'. I i Entire document previously c,r, entered into system under.
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by the Director of Nuclear hd ANO O}(90\\O\\ O f I'> '
i orpagesi T
No.
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of February 11, 1980, and by the Commission in its request for comments on his Order, published on February 22, ~1980, at 45 FR 11969.
UCS raised the point again in its comments dated March 10, 1980.
)
Having received no response, UCS wrote the General
~
Counsel on April 15, l'980, asking'for a ruling on the disqualification issue before the Commission reached any '
decisions with respect to UCS' Petition.
Relying on a brief memorandum from 'the Geberal Counsel, Mr. Hendrie notified 1
the parties on April 23, 1980, that he would not remove himself from the case.
Commissioner Hendrie's refusal to recuse himself is ill-advised and contrary to settled law.
Since the inte-grity of its proceedings is at stake, the Commission ar a J
l whole must now rule on UCS' request that Mr. Hendrie be disqualified.
I.
Commissioner Hendrie's Previous Involvement in Consideration of the' Indian Point Reactors Commissioner Hendrie participated in the Commission's decisionmaking process concernir.g the Indian Point reactors in two separate and highly influential roles.
As a member of the ACRS, and later as Deputy Director for Technical t
Review, he addressed many of the issues raised by UCS' Petition, and recommended that the reactors. in question met all necessary requirements and posed no safety hazard at the i
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Indian Point site.
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APPENDIX 3 i
c ADVISORY CCMM1 i a c.t:. ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS UNIT!*D STATES ATCMIC ENERGY Coidid!S310N l
-wss>uncren.o.c. :aus SEP 2 3. 570
(
Honorable Glenn I, Seaborg Che ir- '
U. S. Acc=1c Energy Co.m ission-Washington, D. c.
20545
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Subject:
RIPOET ON b!DIAN POINT NUCIZ$ G5?E2A2CC UNIT EO. 2
Dear Dr.. Sesb6rg:
r
' At its 125th eeeting, Septa -her 17-19, 1970, the Advisory Cocmittee en Reactor Safeguards, co=pleted its review of the application-by Consoli-dated Edison Co pany'of New York,' Inc., for authorizatics to operata She Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit'No. 2.
This project had pre-vicusly been considered at the Co
'ttee's 95th, 98th,.122nd, and 124th ecctings, and at SubcMetae :caccings on August 23,1969. Earch.13, 1970, ' April 25,1970, May 28,1970, Tuly 25-29,1970, and. Septa-ker 15, 1970. Subce:=aittees also =et at the site on Decccher 28,1967 and May 11,,1970.
The C-
{ttee last reported on this project to you on August 16, 1966' During the review, the Cc=nittee had the benefit of discussions with represenectives of the Consolidatad Edison Cc=peny and their centractors and censultants, and with represcr.tatives of the AEC
,Ecgulatory Staff.
Tha C Jttee also had the beasfit of ths doc:::ents listed.
T~oe Indian Point site is located in Westchester County, New York, approx -
ir.acaly 24 miles north of the Neu York Ci:y li-its. Tec mini==n radius a
,of the exclucion araa for Uni No. 2 is 520 =cters and Peckskill, the nearact population center, is approni.ately en:-hulf nila frca the unit.
Also st.thic site cre Indica Point Unit 1, which is licensed for opera-tion s.: 615 IGt, and Unit 3, rh* '
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1se applicant has re-evaluated i
tha cvent of the priabla me.~.in DUPLICATE DOCUMENT I
=. ore recent infor= tion, and h-s entste f:: vital co..=cnents and i Entire document previously 1
/
entered into system under:
ij Unic !!o.1 cuperbastar building j)
Additional scis=ic reinforec=c D O Q (o O ) ') D q
ANO supsrhacrer : tack will ene.ble. t No. of pages:
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of 300-200 uph currcupending to 1..,.
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Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg SEP 2 31970 the reinforcement of the superheater building, which supports the stack, enables the stack to resist wind loads of c magnitude :nost likely to be s
)
experissced frem a tornado, the Co~ttece believes that removal of the top 80 ft. of the steck, to enable it to resist the me-h effects fro =
a tornado, may be deferred until. e convenient time during the next few yearo, but prior to the ec _ance=:ent of operation of Indian Point Unic No. 3.
The applicant has stated that truncation of the neack will hava no significant adverse effect, on the environt:ent,.
The Indian Point Unit No. 2 is the first of the large, four-loop Westing-house pressuri=ed water reactofs to go into operction, and the prop'osed Power level of 275S W e will be the inrgest of any power reactor licensed to date.
.The nuclear de ign of Indian Point Un' t No. 2 is sir ilar to i
that of H. B. Robinson with the e=ception that the initial fuel rods to be used in Indian Point Unit No. 2 vill not be prepressurised.
Part-length control rods will be used to shape the axial power distributica and to suppress axial xenon escillations. The reactor is desig=ed to have a zero or negative coderator coefficient of reactivity, and the applicant pla=s to parfom ecsts to verify that divergent r. #--" thal xenon oscillations cannot occur in this rccctor.
The Cc=ittee reco--ands thct the Regulatory. St:ff follow the =casure= ants cad analyses related to these
)
tests.
Unit 2 has a reinforced concrete containment uith an inter =al steel liner which is provided uith facilities for continuous pressurization of weld cad penetratics aress for leak detection, and a secl-t:ater syste= to back up piping isolation vnives.
In the unlii:ely event of an accident',' cooling cf the contain=ent is provided by bo:h a contaiu.:ent spray systen and en cir-racirculatica systen with fcn coolers. Sodiun hydroxide additive is used in the centain.. nt cprzy cycte= to rerwve cle=sneal iodine fren the
' post-c.ccident ccaccin=ent at=cephere. An i=preganted charcoal filtar is provided to renove organic iodine.
Major ch nges have be n ende in the design of the c= rge:cy : ora cooling system as originctly proper:d ce th-? tina of the construction ~ perzi.e re-vicu.
Four accu:aulators are prcvided te necenplich rcpid reficoding of the core in tie unlik:ly ever t of s large pipe brach, and redund nt pu:sps cre included to enintnin long-terzi core cooling.
ib applicant has analyzed the effier.cy of Chn ocargency core coolins syctc= and concludes that the synte= trill h::p the cro intact and the-p::k clad te=perature vell belee the paint uhers circalcy-unter renetin.: ::.ight hcVe an adverse
)
effect on cl:d ductility and, benec., en tha continu:d structural integrity of the fusi alcannt::.
Th: Co=itta: helieve that th2rc is ressenable assur..nce that the Indicn Foint Wir. No. 2 :=srecuey core cooling syste:1 will perform edequately r.
tbc pro.wr.cd pr:ce.- leni.
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