ML19326D723
| ML19326D723 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000273, Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1980 |
| From: | Bradford P NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19326D721 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007030213 | |
| Download: ML19326D723 (2) | |
Text
_ _
' ?'.
'.4
'o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
h
', [5 W ASHINGTON. D.C. 20555
%, -...../
OrricE OF THs May 14, 1980 COMMISSIONER MEMO TO: William J. Dircks Acting Executive Director for Ope inns i
FROM:
Peter A. Bradford Can you explain the reference to a 1972 Westinghouse warning that is contained in these remarks by Dr. Pigford in a talk that he gave in Tennessee at the end of the last year?
Attachment:
As stated c'::
Chairman Ahearne Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Kennedy Commissioner Hendrie Samuel J. Chilk i
I I
Rec'd Off. ED0' o
4.u.ed.e %,
r n... a.a.t TOC 70$ OA/.5
c me-d49wWN}- em M%m. x.e TMs...w.mmQ.,,,;.:+ w w ?.$
.p+ W G ;i?& :ppy.7,v; r~
SMT
, 2 $ iC'*T ~ &_. -.
5 t ?? Q GMY W.mos.wdW.2..W) &L.4y:
v,.~,:;.;.q..=.. a.mc. O{&UYM,.W"%: m.+ v,.
..g.. :
.c.a..
5 f' 2 =c w. n a - %.c.. w% 'L M G %s p: % %. m ~
' MWVQ A
ISM.6:,.5.s ? -
w v.
i;. 7.r.~ m n,i. m..~ w.=.r~.:y. %..v. a, y..
m.~~ 1. ~;:- m - s.~ a...~.n. 2. w.,
~
n-u a
. ~ -.- e -
ur.nt m nu;e %::,Y.Qg,
...,g. ?f... aQP[r*W'bWhi@ *W :.. -
f,.... ;;, % '7.,s. %.-
. m
?.;; n:. y y w rr y ;.;,.,7.<n.n, w M.-
' - v.
g 4 y. '.,.
7:.K. M:~;~7nf p*V *C QW% -~~ - % Gd..x.%. hiA
- h.
f f,
~ " * -ll2,+~m. - 4. -
g.v:f A,7.'~p U [s; [6.i'. #
- T
.9.W. a. g. # q.c f n.
- f4g.,,.
,%lfs A.,$4*y%.g%,.Y.e:'DW-!GI.u ;g
' k,."
q.
.e.g..,.a;;.,...:. }
Setting the Stage Session I
"['e g: 3 c.
Mb.NbN.v.6h.u. 7tb,c.%N h, 1
p:4.
1 m...
khh,.,:. 3. Y 1(;. : _
..w Q
j core damage. The significance of that event apparently
~
fi-6M4:.h,k.-$hb'gMf.W.'1'.q%/J. j was not recognized by NRC, although one individual I
in NRC did try to get it considered. It was recognized p;< M.
l, ad.,.w
, j
. c": ?.pyv..y,p.. r,...
by someone in Babcock and Wilcox, but it did not get
>m.,-w.Mr.c W;>... w.,;;.f. -. !
through the organization. It fell through the cracks.
x y?.R 7WYs:f@.%: i That really bothered our commission. Problems like this x
are one of the main sources of overgenecalizations about
{N.;~,'Nyr,p.h 9., ' ;m.w =N.i }. " attitudes" in the industry.
- 0. M..'2' 8 0 V 9 :
The Rasmussen reports was an advance indicator 6
- -a.f,,%g e. c
- .,.J..A:u. ev,;v: > 2, that was not pursued by.the industry or by NRC. The
+,. s A. ~ ;n.
.,e
' p M.{y. M E' C ] g sfrw4%;-AM $.
1975 report concluded that small breaks had not been gj. Q ; r t,f-r i. &.
^r
' 2,,
assessed adequately m. terms of their importance to m
wwr I)!?,..v Wri[,q x
~ q'?
safa
.. ~
......e y:p :-
'INW,PdvD 1!
The Bezaau incident five years ago in Switzerland t.
showed a similar problem there. In 1972 Westinghouse "Eh b M., q. r a h U d N M -
had also foreseen tlus confusing situation of rising
.m
.w
~
- s. g*A. y,
'-' 7. %. '. NIP > :s *E'.
9 pressurizer level following a small break in the pressur-3 ar,
'P' yb M $:u@ @.'; M,yf g; :i izer. They no*"ied NRC in a very thorough report.
S M f Q" @iff ; M b e + %,".~,. p w
(, y Apparently, NRC did not recognize the sigmficance of
>m..:t this re.=rt. In fact, NRC in its own investigations since T6.w M
p.
D'$kh5hM.rgfM!.
the accident apparently hr.s not uncovered the Westing-house warning. This was very disappointing to us. I have
%O3.2SifN.Mh,g also learned that Westinghouse did indeed notify some Q.t:E W V. M ;Y;.q;gpx.p.
of its clients, and the operators apparently were then lM~rMi~b w.,u:h.1]N'%, p f:f,)[j D.... ? ' 7.' w' R. M.... m f-WF W W:.VY).:p,"
properly trained.
u-
' h.WNbe M
W L L The failure to follow-up on these advance indicators m M.
Qp%g.
is the thing our commission focused on most clearly.
i p$5%,$k-@.Y ---,h,,a : dg.
Until we have a system that can treat all of these warn-h
.m.
I ings as potential accidents, we have a faulty system.
&@@.M,Mlianw.M' '
That is what our commission wanted to correct, but I 6K*~$.W P@:gg.
- 9
@giii believe we were not sufficiently explicit.
G. t l Mr dhh igh,
We should have identified specifically what is wrcng d
b M IN.N Mf M J h.ME so that errors could be corrected. There were indeed some equipment problems. The specific signal that h[I5. Mf!/g(4tQif.)k b,* N E triggers containment isolation apparently had not been
[LbtM r/;
treated carefully. Iodine filters were in bad condition.
- t. @ U M E TEU r* Z l M i g j The letdown and vent system was leaky and, frankly,it
%.w. n..,,.g}h..Q.wg?*dwe.
t 1
w
- ?t*wr%b 6 eactor Se'ety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S.
AfWitniSS*r$ % ^
R
,.#f/,Y,
Commercial ch. clear Power Plants, wASW1400 (Springfield. Virginia.
?QgyM:::.ar 4.g'y-
'y
- [p #.*
j National Tedaical Information Service) october 1975 n.. u{
as.4
,s,4. Mg mu.
,m M mms'IJ8tv y.4 ;tetQ.
39
,Wcm.T -? ':%w:t.;c gv.u:... h.gg[
.r
& & e n.:.*, w.nty,, %.
w -. w-.. m.-. m $ n%gn.4_ pm. eu'*ygg.g.
~
n mmw e.