ML19326A999
| ML19326A999 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse, Perry  |
| Issue date: | 02/07/1977 |
| From: | Hauser D CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003050931 | |
| Download: ML19326A999 (22) | |
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February 7, 1977 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of
)
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THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY and
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
)
Docket Nv. 50-346A COMPANY
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(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,
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Unit 1)
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
)
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Docket Nos. 50-440A (Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
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50-441A Units 1 and 2)
)
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THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.
)
(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,
)
Docket Nos. 50-500A Units 2 and 3)
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50-501A THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE INITIAL DECISION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. $2 762 of the Commission's Rules of Practice, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating i
Company ("CEI") hereby takes the following exceptions to the Initial Decision of January 6,1977, rendered by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Board") conducting antitrust review in the above-captioned proceeding:
1.
The Board erroneously ignored orders of the i
Federal Power Commission and' failed to recognize their force and effect.
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2.
The Board erroneously denied the " Dismissal Motion of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company with Respect to the Allegations Fully Litigated Before and Finally Decided by.the FPC" (oral order at Tr. 11751).
3 The Board appears to have erroneously con-cluded that CEI's policy of complying with the terms of applicable FPC orders is somehow illegal or immoral (pp.
72, 74).
4.
The Board erroneously ignored evidence that Cleveland has consistently violated the orders of the FPC.
5 The Board erroneously ignored evidence that Cleveland has consistently violated its contractual obliga-tions with CEI.
6.
The Board erroneously concluded that retail power transactions are a relevant product market for purposes of this proceeding (pp. 47, 51-53).
7 The Board erroneously assumed that Applicants' objection to retail power transactions as a relevant product market was based, inter alia, on a contention that retail sales cannot meet the standards necessary to define either a relevant geographic market or product market (p. 51).
8.
The Board erroneously concluded that there is a nexus between retail power transactions and the activities under the nuclear licenses (pp. 51-53).
9 With respect to the retail power transaction market the-Board erroneously concluded that the CCCT is the relevant geographic market (pp. 54-56).
10.
In the alternative, and again with respect to the retail power transaction market, the Board erroneously concluded that the CEI service territory is a relevant geo-graphic market (p. 56).
'll.
The Board erroneously failed to conclude, assuming that retail power transactions are a relevant pro-duct market, that within the CEI service territory there are separate "open" and " closed" retail markets that must be defined.
12.
The Board erroneously failed to find, and therefore erroneously failed to apprise the reviewer of fact, whether CEI had monopoly power in any relevant market or possessed a degree of market power sufficient to suggest a dangerous probability that it would acquire monopoly power in any relevant market.
13 The Board erroneously found, if it did so find, that competition between CEI and Cleveland has been conducted unfairly by CEI or in furtherance of an attempt by CEI to monopolize retail power transactions (p. 53).
14.
The Board erroneously concluded that a CEI company objective to acquire Cleveland, if such objective existed, and if the. Board did so conclude, is inconsistent with the antitrust laws (p. 57).
15.
The Board erroneously found that the alleged CEI company objective to acquire Cleveland is evidenced by l
studies prepared by CEI (p. 57).,
16.
The Board erroneously failed to find that the studies prepared by CEI were in re'sponse to activity and develop-ments external to CEI and to bona fide requests by people outside of CEI for information (p. 57).
17 The Board erroneously failed to find that since 1965 Cleveland has made studies concerning acquisition of CEI (p. 57).
18.
The Board erroneously saw fit to comment that since the close of the record in this proceeding CEI has made a proposal to Cleveland for acquisition of the municipal system, notwithstanding its own acknowledgment that such pro-posal was wholly irrelevant to this proceeding (p. 57).
19 The Board erroneously concluded that a CEI company objective to acquire Painesville, if such objective existed, and if the Board did so conclude, is inconsistent with the antitrust laws (p. 58).
20.
The Board erroneously failed to conclude that, if Cleveland offered lower rates than CEI, it did so as a result of subsidization, in part through tax dollars from CEI, which itself is a form of unfair competition (p. 58).
21.
The Board erroneously failed to conclude that to counter CEI's advantage in quality of service, Cleveland not only provided " promotional considerations," but also subsidized rates and tied electric service to other municipal service, which are forms of cutthroat competition (p. 59).,
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i 22.
The Board erroneously found that CEI's "com-petitive edge of greater reliability" stemmed simply from the benefits of coordinated operation and development (p. 59).
23 The Board erroneously failed to find that CEI's
" competitive edge of greater reliability" also stemmed from the benefits of efficient and honest management (p. 59).
24.
The Board erroneously found that access by Cleveland to power supply sources outside its own system or disposition of excess capacity was possible only through the use of CEI's transmission system (pp. 60, 76, 80, 83).
25 The Board erroneously found, if it did so find, that Cleveland has now or has had in the past excess generating capacity available for disposition (p. 60).
26.
The Board erroneously found that Cleveland could not feasibly interconnect with any utility other than CEI and that CEI was aware of such alleged " fact" (p. 60).
27 The Board erroneously found that CEI had a
" larger motivation" in its early 1960's offers to inter-connect with Cleveland (pp. 60-61).
28.
The Board erroneously failed to find that CEI, as the largest taxpayer in the City of Cleveland, had a legitimate concern in the tax-subsidy granted the electrical operations of Cleveland (pp. 60-61).
29 The Board erroneously found that CEI attempted to "fix" the rates charged by Cleveland for electric service (p. 61).
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30.
The Board erroneously concluded that an' attempt to "fix" rates, if such an attempt existed, constitutes a per se violation of the antitrust laws (p. 61).
31.
The Board erroneously concluded that an offer to interconnect electric systems on the condition that Cleveland equalize its rates with the rates charged by CEI is a per se violation of the antitrust laws (p. 61).
32.
The Board erroneously found that CEI did not modify the terms of its offer to interconnect with Cleveland (pp. 63, 64, 65, 66).
33 The Board erroneously concluded that an attempt by CEI to forestall the expansion of Cleveland's electric generating plant, if such attempt existed, was a form of
" destructive competition" (p. 62).
34.
The Board erroneously failed to conclude that CEI's unsuccessful attempts to forestall expansion of the Cleveland electric generating plant, if such attempts existed, were in the public interest and in the interest of both the customers of CEI and Cleveland (p. 62).
35 The Board erroneously found that CEI's 1962 offer to interconnect with Cleveland constituted a means toward the' elimination of Cleveland as a competitor (p. 62).
36.
The Board erroneously failed to conclude that the construction of,an interconnection between Cleveland, Painesville and Orrv111e was not in the public interest (p. 62).._
37.
The Board erroneously failed to find that CEI's offer to interconnect with Cleveland in 1963, which offer was not accepted, could not have been the reason why Cleveland did not construct an interconnection with Painesville and Orrv111e (p. 62).
38.
The Board erroneously found that CEI's 1963 offer to interconnect with Cleveland was anticompetitive in purpose and intent (pp. 62-63).
39 The Board erroneously failed to conclude that there is no relationship (i.e., nexus) between CEI's offers to interconnect with Cleveland and the activities under the nuclear licenses.
40.
The Board erroneously assumed that the asser-tions in Mayor Locher's letter of February 17, 1965 (DJ 297) were true in fact and that they represented the true senti-ments of Cleveland (p. 63).
41.
The Board erroneously found that, in 1969 or at any other time, Cleveland wanted to achieve the full bene-fits of coordinated operation and development (p. 64).
42.
The Board erroneously found that CEI wanted to sell power to Cleveland at greater than traditional industry prices (p. 65).
43 The Board erroneously found that it was CEI's
" private" intention to avoid a permanent parallel interconnec-tien_(pp. 67-68).
44.
The Board erroneously found that CEI delayed in reaching a mutual agreement on an intertie with Cleveland (p. 69).
S 45 The Board erroneously found that prior to a meeting in 1971 with Mr. Hinchee of Cleveland "no real engineering investigation" had been undertaken by CEI on a permanent interconnection (p. 69).
46.
The Board erroneously found that only as of July 8, 1971 did CEI agree to begin a study of a permanent synchronous interconnection (p. 70).
47.
The Board erroneously found that, in 1971 or at any other time, CEI sought to maximize Cleveland's economic burden (p. 70).
48.
The Board erroneously failed to find that the reason for installation of a 69 kv nonsynchronous tie was the delay on the part of Cleveland in agreeing to and con-structing a permanent synchronous interconnection (p. 70).
49 The Board erroneously found that CEI refused to supply Cleveland anything other than emergency power (p. 70).
50.
The Board erroneously found that CEI's asser-tion that Cleveland could have used the 11 kv load transfer service to enable it to correct its operating deficiencies and generating problems was not correct (pp. 70, 75).
51.
The Board erroneously found from an operational point of view that no outage need have occurred in the operation of the 11 kv load transfer service (p. 71).
- 52. - The Board erroneously found that CEI imposed operating problems, unnecessary restrictions, and administra-tive delays before Cleveland could utilize the transfer system _(p. 71)..
53 The Board erroneously found that CEI's load transfer procedures were arbitrary, cumbersome, and not in keeping with modern engineering practices (p. 72).
54.
The Board erroneously failed to find that in most cases the 11 kv switching operation in fact was accom-plished with only a three to five second, or less, service interruption (p. 72).
55 The Board erroneously found that when CEI lacked sufficient generation to supply power to Cleveland it did not attempt to secure other bulk power supplies or offer to transport power to Cleveland from other bulk power sources (p. 73).
56.
The Board erroneously found that the require-ment that a " block of load" be transferred at one time, if such requirement existed, was onerous, particularly since the Board did not find that such a requirement was unreason-able 'p. 73).
57.
The Board erroneously found that the 69 kv interconnection was constructed to operate synchronously (p. 74).
58.
The Board erroneously concluded, if it did so conclude, that operation of the 69 kv interconnection non-synchronously, as ordered by the FPC, was inconsistent with t'he antitrust laws (p. 74).
59 The Board erroneously found that administra-tive delays by CEI in energizing the 69 kv interconnection were worse than the alleged delays encountered with the 11 kv system (p. 74).
60.
The Board erroneously found that the Cleveland electric system experienced brownouts, blackouts, or voltage reductions while awaiting CEI approval of a request for power over the 69 kv interconnection (p. 74).
61.
The Board erroneously concluded that the 1972 street lighting contract with Cleveland was a tie-in sale (p. 75).
62.
The Board erroneously concluded that Cleveland was forced to take power over the 11 kv load transfer points and the 69 kv interconnection on conditions that prevented the municipal system from performing necessary maintenance on its generating units (pp. 70, 75).
63 The Board erroneously failed to find that Cleveland could have received maintenance power over the 11 kv load transfer points and the 69 kv interconnection had it desired to maintain its generating equipment (pp. 70, 75).
64.
The Board erroneously failed to find that historically Cleveland has had no maintenance policy and has, in fact, maintained its equipment at a level below that normally considered acceptable in the industry (pp. 70, 75).
65.
The Board erroneously failed to find that Cleveland's inability to maintain its generating equipment resulted from its own mismanagement (pp. 70, 75-76).
66.
The Board erroneously concluded that CEI's motivation and conduct in operating the 11 kv load transfer points and the 69 kv interconnection was anticompetitive (p. 76).
'N 67.
The Board erroneously failed to conclude that there is no relations Ap (i.e., nexus) between CEI's opera-tion of the 11 kv load transfer points or the 69 kv inter-connection and the activities under the nuclear licenses.
68.
The Board erroneously failed to find that any delay in reaching agreement on a permanent interconnection was attributable to Cleveland (p. 76).
69 The Board erroneously found that the permanent interconnection agreement establishes a reserve obligation for the Cleveland electric system (p. 76).
70.
The Board erroneously concluded that the reserve margin it found to exist in the permanent interconnection agreement placed an " unusual and unjustified burden" on Cleveland (p. 76).
71.
The Board erroneously failed to find that the firm power service schedule attached to the permanent inter-connection agreement (App. 271) provides Cleveland with the benefits of coordinated operation and development (p. 76).
72.
The Board erroneously failed to find that CEI has offered to Cleveland service schedules in addition to the already negotiated firm power and emergency schedules which, if accepted, would provide Cleveland with further benefits (p. 76).
73 The Board erroneously failed to conclude that there is no relationship (i.e., nexus) between the permanent interconnection between CEI and Cleveland and the activities under the nuclear licenses.
74.
The Board erroneously found that for the Cleveland electric system to remain viable it was essential that CEI wheel power over its transmission system to Cleveland (pp. 76, 83).
75 The Board erroneously found that in 1973 American Municipal-Power-Ohio (" AMP-0") obtained a commiument from the Power Authority of the State of New York ("PASNY") for 22.7 mw of hydroelectric power which had been allocated to the State of Ohio (p. 77).
76.
The Board erroneously concluded that CEI was not legally justified in refusing to wheel PAGNY power (pp. 77-78).
77 The Board erroneously failed to conclude that there is no relationship (i.e., nexus) between CEI's refusal to wheel PASNY power and the activities under the nuclear licenses.
78.
The Board erroneously found that power was available to Cleveland from Buckeye Power, Inc., the City of Orrv111e, Ohio, and the City of Richmond, Indiana (pp. 78-79).
79 The Board erroneously found that CEI has not agreed to wheel to Cleveland power from Buckeye Power, Inc.,
Orrville, or Richmond (pp. 78-79).
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The Board erroneously found, at least inferen-tially, that Cleveland had made a tona fide request of CEI to wheel to it power from Buckeye Power, Inc., Orrv111e, or l
Richmond (pp. 78-79).
81.
The Board erroneously failed to conclude that there is no relationship (i.e., nexus) with respect to any request to wheel power from Buckeye Power, Inc., Orrv111e or Richmond and the activities under the nuclear licenses.
82.
The Board erroneously found that Cleveland could not construct transmission facilities to non-CEI sources of bulk power (pp. 79-80).
83 The Board erroneously found that commencing in March 1971 Cleveland requested participation in nuclear generation (p. 81).
84.
The Board erroneously found that Cleveland had-requested participation in nuclear generation, if by that finding is meant a bona fide request, as distinguished from a tactic in negotiations for electric service (p. 81).
85.
The Board erroneously failed to find that all requests by Cleveland for participation in nuclear generation were mere negotiating tactics, not intended to be taken seriously by CEI, the Council of the City of Cleveland, or this Commission (p. 81).
86.
The Board erroneously ignored evidence that Cleveland never has been, and is not now, capable of par-ticipating in nuclear generation (p. 81).
87 The Board erroneously concluded that the condi-tion that CEI have a "right of first refusal" on nuclear power surplus to Cleveland's needs was an anticompetitive condition (pp. 81-82).
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s 88.
The Board erroneously concluded that the condi-tion that Cleveland not sell power below cost was an anti-competitive condition (p. 81).
89 The Board erroneously failed to find that Cleveland was obligated, under its own mortgage indenture, not to sell' power below cost (p. 81).
90.
The Board erroneously found that the condi-tion that Cleveland not sell power below cost would give CEI control over Cleveland's rates and that CEI would be the one to determine what constituted " cost" (p. 81').
91.
The Board erroneously concluded that the condi-tion that Cleveland withdraw its petition for antitrust review was unreasonable and had the effect of maintaining a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws (p. 209).
92.
The Board erroneously failed to find that CEI did not insist on withdrawal of Cleveland's antitrust petition at any time after February 7, 1974 (p. 209).
93 The Board erroneously found that a memorandum by CEI's trial counsel, which on its face was prepared as a step in analysis of the other side's case in this proceeding, was evidence of CEI's direct awareness that denial of bulk power services has the inevitable result of reducing an entity's competitive viability (pp. 209-10).
94 The Board erroneously _ concluded that a statement by CEI's trial counsel of what he thinks the opposition might believe (right or wrong), is in any way supportive of a find-ing that the FPC is not in' a position to adjudicate al.d resolve l
Cleveland's complaints and charges relating to denial of l-bulk power services (pp. 209-10, 227-28).
95.
The Board erroneously found that Cleveland had proposed and CEI had rejected the " wheeling out" of power (p. 82).
96.
The Board erroneously found that no meaningful effer of access to nuclear generation has been made by CEI to Cleveland (p. 82).
97 The Board erroneously concluded that the present conditions to nuclear access are "an outrageous affront to the policies underlying the antitrust laws" (p. 83).
98.
The Board erroneously found that Painesville has markets and customers for excess capacity, and, for that matter, that Painesville has excess capacity (p. 84).
99 The Board erroneously found that CEI offered Painesville a territorial allocation agreement (pp. 84-85, 87).
100. The Board erroneously concluded that CEI offered an interconnection to Painesville on anticompetitive terms for the specific purpose of eliminating competition (pp. 86-87, 89).
101. The Board erroneously concluded that CEI mis-used its " dominance and monopoly power" to secure an anti-competitive and oppressive interconnection agreement with Painesville (p. 87).
102. The Board erroneously failed to find that the alleged "special provision" of the CEI-Painesville inter-connection agreement is in conformity with the FPC's Mobile-
-Sierra rule and is a provision typical in the industry (p. 87)..
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103. The Board erroneously failed to find that the inclusion of emergency service and coordination of scheduled maintenance schedules in the CEI-Painesville interconnection agreement gives to Painesville the benefits of reserve sharing (p. 87).
104. The Board erroneously found that the CEI-Painesville interconnection agreement does not provide Paines-ville with any of the benefits of coordinated development (pp.
87-88).
105. The Board erroneously found that the mainten-ance power provision of the CEI-Painesville interconnection is a " serious burden" on Painesville (p. 88).
106. The Board erroneously found that CEI delayed construction of an interconnection with Painesville (p. 88).
107. The Board erroneously failed to conclude that there is no relationship (i.e., nexus) between the CEI-Painesville interconnection agreement and the activities under the nuclear licenses.
108. The Board erroneously concluded that a refusal by CEI to engage in general third-party wheeling for Paines-ville is inconsistent with the antitrust laws (pp. 88-89).
109. The Board erroneously failed to find that CEI has offered to wheel power to Painesville (pp. 88-89).
110. The Board erroneously failed to conclude'that there is no relationship (i.e., nexus) between wheeling power for Painesville and the activities under the nuclear licenses.
111. The Board erroneously found that Painesville was seriously interested, in 1973 or presently, in nuclear participation (p. 90).
112. The Board erroneously failed to find that, at the time of Mr. Pandy's testimony in these proceedings, it was up to Painesville to request further discussions on nuclear participation (p. 90).
113. The Board erroneously failed to find that CEI had sent Painesville a complete set of technical and economic information on nuclear participation to assist Painesville (p. 90).
114. The Board erroneously found that an agreement to recognize territorial boundaries between CEI and Ohio Edison has been in effect since as early as 1964 (pp. 118-120, 187).
115. The Board erroneously failed to conclude that there is no relationship (i.e., nexus) between an alleged CEI-Ohio Edison agreement on territorial boundaries and the activities under the nuclear licenses.
116. The Board erroneously found that CEI responded to certain demands of Cleveland out of a fear that there "might" otherwise be more " intensive scrutiny by the FPC,"
notwithstanding that the FPC has been continuously scrutiniz-ing the CEI-Cleveland relationship since 1971, which scrutiny has manifested itself in numerous orders of the FPC that were totally ignored by the Board (p. 231).
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117. The Board erroneously concluded that CEI un-lawfully combined and conspired with the other CAPCO com-panies to restrain competition in the CCCT area (pp. 187-215).
118. The Board erroneously concluded that CEI has engaged in mutually supporting actions with the other Appli-cants in-these proceedings having the effect of increasing the dominance of each Applicant within its own service terri-tory and that such actions may constitute monopolization, attempted monopolization, and a combination to monopolize (p. 15).
119. The Board erroneously found, if it did so find,'that CEI is chargeable with any alleged anticompetitive conduct engaged in by Toledo Edison in its dealings with other electric entities in the service area of Toledo Edison.
120. The Board erroneously found, if it did so find, that CEI is chargeable with any alleged anticompetitive conduct engaged in by Ohio Edison or Penn Power in their deal-ings with other electric entities in the service areas of Ohio Edison and Penn Power.
121. The Board erroneously found, if it did so find, that CEI is chargeable with any alleged anticompetitive c,or. duct engaged in by Duquesne in its dealings with other electric entities in the service area of Duquesne.
122. The Board erroneously exercised its responsi-bilities under Section 105(c)(6) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, by failing to fashion license conditions 18 -
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for attachment to the nuclear licenses of CEI that bear any relationship to the alleged activities of CEI found by the Board to be inconsistent with the antitrust laws (pp. 254-64).
Respectfully submitted, N/
DONALD H. HAUSER General Attorney for The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Dated:
February 7, 1977 i-l l l
M
^
o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of
)
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THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY and
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
)
Docket No. 50-346A COMPANY
)
(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
)
)
Docket Nos. 50-440A (Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
50-441A Units 1 and 2)
)
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THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.
)
(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,
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Docket Nos. 50-500A Units 2 and 3)
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50-501A CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing "The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company's Exceptions To The Initial Decision" were served upon each of the persons listed on the attached Service List, by hand delivering copies to those persons in the Washington, D.
C. area, and by mailing copies, postage prepaid, to all others, all on j
this 7th day of February, 1977.
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE l
By:
dbA
-. md__
l Wm. BradfordNReynoldss I
l l
TNITED STAT::S OF. AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board e
In the Matter of
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THE TOLEDO EDISON' COMPANY and
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
)
Docket No. 50-346A COMPANY
)
(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
)
)
Docket Nos. 50-440A (Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
50-441A Units 1 and 2)
)
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THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.
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(Da',-is-Besse Nuclear Power Station,
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Docket Nos. 50-500A Units 2 and 3)
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50-501A SERVICE LIST Alan S.
Rosenthal, Esq.
Ivan W.
Smith, Esq.
Chairman, Atomic Safety and Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Licensing Appeal Board U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Washington, D.
C.
20555 John M.
Frysiak, Esq.
Jerpme E.
Sharfman, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board Washington, D.
C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C._20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Richard S.
Salzman, Esq.
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D. C.
20555 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission
. Docketing & Service Section Washington, D.
C.
20555 Office of the Secretary U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.
C.
20006 Appeal Board Panel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Joseph Rutberg, Esq.
Washington, D.
C.
20555 Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq.
Lessy, Jr., Esq.
Douglas.V. Rigler, Esc.
ECY.
Office of the Executive Chairman, Atomic Safety and Legal Director Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulator / Commission Foley, Lardner, Hollabauch and Jacobs Nashington, D.
C.
20:2s Chanin Building - Suite 206 815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20006 O
g fN.
.+ Joseph J.
Saunders, Esq.
Terence H. Benbow, Esq.
Antitrust' Division A. Edward Grashof, Esq.
D2partment nf Justice Steven A.
Berger, Esq.
Washington, D. C.
23530 Steven B. Peri, Esq.
Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam G Roberts Malvin G.
Berger, Esq.
40 Wall Street Jcnet R.
Urban, Esq.
New York, New York 10005 Antitrust Division P.
O. Box 7513 Thomas J. Munsch,.Esq.
Wnshington, D.
C.
20044 Gene.al Attorney Dur uesne Light Company RCuben Goldberg, Er.
435 Sixth Avenue David C. Hjelmfelt, Esq.
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
~ Michael D.
Oldak, Esq.
Goldberg, Fieldman & Hjelmfelt David McNeil Olds, Esq.
Suite 550 Reed Smith Shaw & McClay 1700 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Union Trust Building Washington, D. C.
20006 Box 2009 Pittsbprgh, P 15230 Vincent C.
Campanella, Esq.
Director of Law Lee A.
Rau, Esq.
Robert D.
Hart, Esq.
Joseph A.
Rieser,.Jr., Esq.
1st Ass' t Director of Law Reed' Smith Shaw & McClay City of Cleveland Suite 900 213 City Hall 1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.N.
Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Washington, D.
C.
200'36 Frank R. Clokey, Esq.
James R.
Edgerly, Esq.
Spacial Ass't Attorney General Secretary and General Counsel Room 219 Pennsylvania Power Company One East Washington Street Towne House Apartments Harrisburg, PA 17105 New Castle, PA 16103 Donald H.
Hauser, Esq.
~ John Lansdale, Esq.
Victor F. Greenslade, Jr.,
Esq.
Cox, Langford & Brown William J.
Kerner, Esq.
21 Dupont Circle, N.W..
The Cleveland Electric Washington, D.
C.
20036 Illuminating Company 55 Public Square Alan P.
Buchmann, Esq.
l ClGveland, Ohio 44101 Squire, Sanders & Dempsey 1800. Union Commerce Building j
Michael M.
Briley, Esq.
Clevela'nd, Ohio 44115 i
Paul M.
Smart, Esq.
Edward'A. Matto, Esq.
Fuller, Henry, Hodge & Snyder P.
O.
Box 2088 Richard M.
Firestone, Esq.
. Toledo, Ohio 43603 Karen H. Adkins, Esq.
Antitrust Section Russell J.
Spetrino, Esq.
30 E.
Broad Street, 15th Flcor Thomas.A. Kayuha, Esq.
Columbus, Ohio 43215 Ohio Edison Company Christocher R.
Schraff, Esc.
76 South Main Street Assistant Attorney General" Akron, Ohio 44308 Environmental Law Section 361 E.
Broad Street, 5th Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215