ML19323G944
| ML19323G944 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001308 |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1980 |
| From: | Goodhope A Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | Quigley E, Rorem R, Storey K AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006090304 | |
| Download: ML19323G944 (25) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
.Mk NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD C
USHM hi UN 5 $60.
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Andrew C. Goodhope, Chatrrran a
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Dr. Linda W. Little Dr. Forrest J. Remick
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A In the Matter of
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
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Docket No. 70-1308 OLA
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(Spent Fuel Pool)
(GE Morris Operation Spent Fuel
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Storage Facility)
)
ORDER RULING ON CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES (June 4,1980)
On August 13,.1979, the board issued an order allowing the State of Illinois (State), by its Attorney General, leave to intervene in this proceeding. This order also permitted intervention by four individuals, Bridget Little Rorem, Ralph Rorem, Jr., Keith Storey, and Everett Quigley.
These individuals are all nearby residents of the Mor :s facility and are now conveniently known as "Rorem, et al."
Thereafter the intervenors were asked to amend their contentions to give more specificity and a prehearing conference was held on February 29, 1980 at Morris, Illinois to discuss the contentions as they then stood.
The intervenors were then given additional time to re-amend their conten-
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j tions and the Applicant, General Electric (GE), and th'e Staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (Staff) filed responses to such contentions.
l The Board has considered all the contentions and responses thereto and anters this order establishing the contentions to be heard in this proceeding.
Y i='%R D
Lb kD A)M6 O a gese 8006090fOy
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The parties are hereby given ten (10) days from receipt of this order to ask the board for any reconsideration they wish.
l As will be seen, some of the Illinois and Rorem, et al. contentions have been ambined for convenience in proceeding. Also for the sake of clarity, brevity and specificity additional changes have been made to several contentions by removing statements of basis from the proposed contention.
Other contentions are rejected for the reasons set forth herein.
The board in this ruling has been guided by a recent Appeal Board deci-sion, namely, Houston Lighting and Power Company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generat-ing Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590,11 NRC (April 22, 1980).
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State Contention 1 and Rorem, et al. Contention 1 (Partial)
State Contention l' as oroposed:
The amended Consolidated Safety Analysis Report (hereinafter "CSAR")
prepared by the Applicant does not provide reasonable assurance, as required by 42 U.S.C. I 2232(a) and 10 C.F.R. Parts 30, 40, and 70 that'the continued operation of the Morris facili,ty will not endanger the health and safety of the public due to accidental release of radioactivity.
The retraction of the risk analysis of the Rasmussen Report, WASH 1400, and the acknowledgement by the Nuclear Regulatory Connission Staff that I/
Class 9 accidents are indeed a posibility indicate that accurate accident i
l
- / See Statement of Mattson, NRC, TMI Task Force In The Matter of Public Service Company of New Jersey (Salem Nuclear Plant Spent Fuel Pool Expansion)
ASLB-Docket No.
(sic)."
l
.. analyses are necessitated for nuclear facilities of all types. Without further adequate risk analysis the public cannot be assured that continued storage of spent fuel at Morris will not be hazardous to the public health and welfare.
The CSAR does not adequately describe and analyze the risk of all credible accidents and the consequences thereof including:
(a) The effects on the Morris facility of a Class 9 accident at the adjacent Dresden Nuclear Reactor; (b) The consequences of simultaneous accidental radioactive releases from the Dresden Nuclear Reactor and the Morris Spent Fuel Storage Facility; (c) The risks and consequences of the release of radioactive elements in excess of Part 20 regulations as a result of any of the fol'
, accidental occurrences at the Morris facility; a tornado-related incident, including the consequences of an accident caused by a tornado impelled missile; a loss of coolant accident, alone and in conjunction with an accident which has caused a rift in the building structure; earthquake related accidents; and sabotage related accidents not analyzed in NEDM-20682.
Rorem et al. Contention 1 as proposed (Partial):
Intervenors contend that under the present license held by General Electric, no account is taken of the possibility of an accident to the storage pools which might result in large releases of radioactive gases.
Intervenors further contend that such an accident is possible, due to earthquake, tornado, fire, flooding, acts of sabotage, acts of war, human error, or massive electrical power failure.
. State Contention 1 and Rorem, et al. Contention 1 (Partial) as accepted by the Board and redesignated as Contention 1.
Contention 1 The Consolidated Safety Analysis Report (CSAR) does not adequately describe the following:
(a) The consequences of simultaneous accidental radioactive releases from the Dresden Nuclear Power Station and the Morris Spent Fuel Storage Facility; (State)
(b) The risks and consequences of the release of radioactive elements in excess of Part 20 regulations as a result of any of the following accidental occurrences at the Morris facility:
(i) the consequences of an accident caused by a tornado impelled mi-sile; (ii) a loss of coolant accident, along and in conjunction witt an accident wnich has caused a rift in the building structure; (iii) earthquake related accidents; (iv) sabotage related accidents not aralyzed in NEDM-20682; (v) fire; (vi) flooding; (vii) acts of war; (viii) human error; (ix) massive electrical power failure (State and Rorem, et al).
The contention as accepted by the Board does not materially change the sub-stance of the contentions as proposed by the intervenors, er:ept that Class
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9 accidents are beyond the scope of this proceeding, particularly a Class 9 accident at another reactor (Dresden Nuclear Power Station) even though adja-cent to the Morris facility. PublicServiceCo.ofOklahoma,etal.(Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-587,11 NRC (March 28, 1980), and CLI-80-8,11 NRC (March 21,1980).
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. II State Contention 2 and Rorem, et al. Contention 2 State Contention 2 as orocosed:
The CSAR does not provide adequate assessment of credible risks of sabotage related events and the consequences thereof.
The " Sabotage Analysis for Fuel Storage at Morris", NECM-20682, November 1,1974, is limited in that it does not prove statistically the " unlikeliness" of sabotage events nor has it been updated to accom-modate advances in the technology of explosives which could make sabotage a more likely event.
Rorem, et al. Contention 2 as proposed:
Intervenors contend that the General Electric Morris Operation 'is not secure from acts of sabotage, and that its current sabotage plan does not meet 10 C.F.R. 73.
State Contention 2 and Rorem, et al. Contention 2, as accepted by the Board and redesignated as Contention 2.
Contention 2 The Physical Security Plan does not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 73. Further, the CSAR does not provide an adequate assess-ment of credible ricks of sabotage related events inasmuch that the advances in the technology of explosives, which could make sabotage a more probable event, have not been adequately addressed (State and Rorem,etal.)
The contention as accepted by the Board does not materially change the substance of the contentions as proposed, but does lini-the centention to 1
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whether Applicant has complied with 10 C.F.R. part 73 as well as considered advances in explosive technology.
III State Contention 3
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State Contention 3 as orocosed:
The CSAR underestimates or does not state fully the projected effects on the health of personnel, their families and the public from exposure to radiation:
4 (a) The CSAR does not state total whole body exposure to occupa-tional personnel for the expected life of the Morris facility; (b) The CSAR does not project expected genetic effects on personne1 or to the general population caused by such whole body exposures; (c) The CSAR includes only irradiated fuel and contaminated basin water as radiation sources. Other tanks and pipes should be included.
(See G.E. " Status of Existing Licensing" 2/21/79, Exceptions to Compliance With Regulatory Guide 3.44 5 7.2 " Radiation Sources".);
(d) The CSAR does not account for additional radiation exposure to occupation personnel during testing or experimentation with fuel disassembly, dry storage or compaction, all of which are projected for the near future at Morris; (e) The CSAR does not address the absence of effective effluent monitoring".
- i. There are no devices to measure flows of air.
ii.
There is no routine procedure to measure Kr 85 (See G.E.
" Status of Existing Licensing" 2/21/79, iten 16.)
. State Contention 3 as accepted by the Board:
Contention 3 The CSAR underestimates or does not state fully the projected i
effects on the health of personnel, and their families from occupational exposure to radiation inasmuch as:
(a) The CSAR does not state total whole body exposure to cccupa-tional personnel for the proposed licensed life of the Morris facility; (b) The CSAR does not project expected genetic effects en personnel or to the general population caused by such whole body occupational exposure; (c) The CSAR includes only irradiated fuel and contaminated basin water as radiation sources. Other tanks and pipes should be included as sources of occupational exposures.
(d) The CSAR does not account for additional radiation exposure to occupational personnel from all anticipated activities at the facility (f.e., fuel disassembly, dry storage or compaction all of which are projected for the near future at Morris.)
(e) The CSAR does not address the absence of effective radiation monitoring of the air within the facility resulting from:
(i) No devices to measure radioactive materials in the air.
(ii) No routine procedure to measure Kr 85.
The contention as accepted by the Board does not materially change the substance of the contention as proposed, except the contention is limited to occupational exposure as agreed to by counsel for the State.
(Tr. 76).
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IV State Contention 4 State Contention 4 as proposed:
The CSAR is incomplete in that it does not discuss prospective plans (in 1980) for testing of fuel, reconfiguration of storage, experi-mentation of storage modes, and other innovative techniques which General Electric has planned in cooperation with other private corpora-tions and Government agencies.
t This contention is rejected as being vague and beyond the scope of this proceeding which is limited to renewal of an existing license to conduct present activities.
Later the Board poses Board Question 1 to the Applicant and Staff which covers this subject to the extent it could be material to this proceeding.
V State Contention 5 State Contenticn 5 as proposed:
The decommissioning and emergency plans subnitted by the Applicant as part of its application cannot be adequately judged at this time.
With the assistance of'the NRC Staff, the Applicant has attempted to
. l adapt its CSAR to the proposed 10 C.F.R., Part 72 which they presume will eventually regulate Away from Reactor storage. However, as the regulation has not yet been adopted by the Comission it is new impos-sible to judge whether the decomissioning and emergency plans will be adequate to conform to the finally approved regulation. The NRC Staff f
is well aware that the Decomissioning plan presented by Applicant in the CSAR may demand revision.
See letter of March 1, 1979 to D. M.
Dawson,fianager, Licensing & Transportation, Nuclear Energy Programs 1
Division, General Electric Co. from Leland C. Rouse, Acting Chief Fuel Reprocessing and Recycle Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle and Material 3
Safety, NRC, wherein the Decomissioning plan for Morris is referred to l
and it is stated:
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It should be pointed out that new decomission-ing criteria for nuclear facilities are now being developed. When issued, these criteria may require revision of the plan.
Until the final promulgation of Part 72 the Decomissioning Plan must be considered inadequate.
This contention is rejected. As has been frequently pointed out, this proceeding involves an application to renew an existing license to continue present activities.
10 C.F.R. Part 72 is a proposed rule, covering Storage i
of Spent Fuel in an Independent Spent Fucl St:::g: In:t:11:tica (42 c d. P.:g.
c 46390). Whether the Morris facility will ultimately comply with a proposed regulation is not material to this proceeding. The contention merely states that if Part 72 becomes effective, GE's decomissioning plan may need revision.
This presents no issue capable of litigation in this proceeding.
State i
l 1
i.
- 10 proposed Contention 6 and State proposed Contention 7 as accepted by the Board will fully explore the question of decommissioning and emergency plans.
VI State Contention 6 State Contention 6 as proposed:
The Decommissioning Plan proposed in the CSAR is inadequate for the following reasons:
(a) There is insufficient determination of ultimate decantami-nation and decommissioning costs. Costs have not been adjusted for inflation for the projected time of decontamination. CSAR pp. A7-13 A7-14. Without an accurate cost assessment GE cannot make a valid ~
commitment to meeting decommissioning costs.
(b) There is insufficient assurance that the Applicant will be financially capable to meet decontamination and decommissioning costs. Other than a general statement regarding GE's present relative solvency there is no verifiable financial statement to show GE can meet future costs as is required by 10 C.F.R. 5 70.22(a). A bond or other assurance of financial capability should be required to provide a guarantee that decontanination and decommissioning costs will be fully covered.
(c) There is no contingency plan to provide decommissionino of the Morris facility should an emergency, accide..t or other unfore-seen event necessitate immediate and permanent abandonment of the Morris site. CSAR 5 A.7.2.1.
. (d) There is no consideration of possible perpetual care and maintenance due to incomplete decontamination or decomissioning including:
(i)
Inability to dispose of LAW vault material (See GE
" Status of Licensing" par.19);
(ii) residual contamination of waste vaults or other stationary parts of the facility; (iii) gr und water contamination which would recuire maintenance to prevent leaching offsite; (iv) unavailability of offsite disposal facilities for dismantled facility and wastes.
" Note: Contention 6(d)(iv) does not address the issue of whether offsite disposal facilities will be or should be available when decomissioning occurs.
The intent behind Contentier.
6(d)(iv) is to litigate the issue of General Electric con-tingency planning if it is found to be the case that no offsite facilities are available when needed. See Trans-script of Prehearing Confercnce held February 29,1980, at 84-88."
State Contention 6 as accepted by the Board and Renumbered Contention 4:
Contention 4 The Decomission Plan proposed in the CSAR is inadequate for the following reasons:
(a) There is insufficient detennination of ultimate decontamination and decomissioning costs. Costs have not been adjusted for inflation for the projected time of decontamination. CSAR pp. A7-13, A7-14. With-out an accurate cost assessment GE cannot make a valid comitment to meet decomissioning costs.
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(b) There ic insufficient assurance that the Applicant will be financially capable to meet decontamination and deccomissioning costs.
Other than a general statement regarding GE's present relative solvency there is no verifiable financial statement to show GE can meet future costs as is required by 10 C.F.R. ! 70.22(a). A bcnd or other assurance of financial capability should be required to provide a guarantee that decontamination and decmanissioning costs will be fully covered.
(c) There is no contingency plan to provide decomnissioning of the Morris facility should an emergency, accident or other unforeseen event necessitate immediate and/or permanent abandomnent of the Morris site.
(d) There is no consideration of possible perpetual care and maintenance due to incomplete decontamination or decommissioning inclua1.mi (1)
Inability to dispose of LAW vault material; (ii) residual contamination of waste vaults or other stationary parts of the facility; (iii) ground water contanination which would require maintenance to prevent leaching offsite; (iv) unavailability of offsite low-level disposal facilities for the dismantled facility and wastes.
This contention is accepted without material change, except that subpara-graph (d)(iv) is limited to low level waste disposal facilities since high level waste including spent fuel disposal is presently subject to rulemaking (Tr. 84-85).
. VII State Contentinnl State Contention 7 as prooosed:
The Emergency Plan in the CSAR is inadequate in that:
(a) it does not specify which emergency procedures will be utilized to unload the spent fuel pool and to transport and/or store irradiated fuel in the event that an emergency should necessitate transfer of the spent fuel from the Morris spent fuel pool, (b) Figure 9-4 " Emergency Plan Rela-tionships for Morris Operation", NEDO-21326C, January 1979 supplement to the CSAR includes "amergency transportation of irradiated fuel" (sic) as a concept, but nowhere is this concept developed.
The CSAR should be supplemented to explain GE's plans for emergency transportation, and (c)
There is no reference to tests or other means by which it can be deter-mined that the existing emergency plans are adequate. Adequate test pro-grams of both comunications systems and procedures should be documented prior to licensing.
State Contention 7 as accepted by the Board and Renumbered 5:
Contention 5 The Emergency Plan in the CSAR is inadequate in that:
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(a) The Plan does not specify which emergency procedures will be utilized to unload the spant fuel pool and to transport and/or store irradiated fuel in the event that an emergency should necessitate transfer of the spent fuel from the Morris spent fuel pool.
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. (b) The CSAR should be supplemented to explain GE's plans for energency transportation of irradiated fuel.
(c) There is no reference to tests or other means by which it can be determined that the existing energency plans are adequate.
Adequate test programs of both communications systems and procedures should be documented prior to licensing.
VIII State Contention 8 and Rorem, et al. Contention 1 as Procosed (Partial):
State Contention 8 as proposed:
The discussion of emergency planning in the CSAR is inadequate in that there is no mention of an evacuation plan that would be put into effect should an accident occur at Morris or Dresden which required evacuation of occupational personnel and/or nearby residents. Although Appendix 3 of NEDE 21894 lists " Evacuation and Persor.nel Accountability" under " General Personnel Actions" there does not appear to be any specific evacuation procedure included in the " Radiological Bnergency Plan for Morris Operation" of June 1978 recently submitted to supplement the CSAR.
It has been proposed that nuclear facilities in highly populated
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areas may face shut down if adequate plans are not made to evacuate resi-dents in a 10-mile radius of the facility. Morris is located near Joliet, a city of 80,000 people, 50 miles south of Chicago.
The Applicant shculd be required to formulate an updated evacuation plan or include in the CSAR an emergency plan that would service Morris.
Rorem, et al. Contention 1 as orocosed:
Intervenors contend that under the present license held by General l
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. Electric, no account is taken of the possibility of an accident to the storage pools which might result in large releases of radioactive gases.
Intervenors further contend that.such an accident is possible due to earthquake, tornado, fire, flooding, acts of sabotage, acts of war, human error, or massive electrical power failure.
(See Contention 1)
Intervenors contend that before a renewal license is issued, the follow-ing conditions should be met:
A.
There should exist a comprehensive evacuation plan for the area, including the whole of two large metropolitan creas to the northeast (Joliet) and the southeast (Kankakee) of the facility.
These plans should include detailed information as to how hospitals, nursing homes, schools, and prisons are to be evacuated.
B.
Hospitals within a 50-100 mile range of the facility should be equipped to handle large numbers of people exposed to radiation or contaminated by radiation. At present there is no hospital or other facility within such a distance which could take proper care of more than several such people.
C.
Applicant should take responsibility, both financial and other-wise, for informing residents of the area that the possibility of such an accident does exist, and informing them of evacuation plans and/or measures to be taken in case of a radioactive accident either at the facility or during transport of spent fuel to or from the facility.
. D.
Applicant should take complete financial responsibility for fonnation of evacuation plans, for equipping hospitals and training personnel, and for maintenance of any equipment needed."
State Contention 8 and Rorem, et al. Contention 1 as acceoted by the Board and gnumbered State Contention 6:
Intervenors contend that before a renewal license is issued, the following conditions should be met:
(a) There should exist a comprehensive evacuation plan for the area, including the whole of two large metropolitan areas north-i east (Joliet) and the southeast (Kankakee) of the facility.
These plans should include detailed information as to how hospitals, nursing homes, schools, and prisons are to be evacueted.
(b) Hospitals within a 50-100 mile range of the facility should be equipped to handle large numbers of people exposed to radiation or contaminated by radiation.
(c) Applicant should take responsibility, both financial and
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otherwise, for informing residents of the area that the possibility of such an accident does exist, and infonning them of evacuation plans and/or measures to be taken in case of a radioactive accident either at the facility or during transport of spent fuel to or from the facility.
(d) Applicant should take complete financial responsibility for fonnation of evacuation plans, for equipping hospitals and training personnel, and for maintenance of any equipment needed.
(Rorea, et al.
and State)
, The substance of both State Contention 8 and Rores et al. Contention 1 (exclusive of the part considered above in part I of this decision) is accepted after substantial editing to remove argument and evidentiary basis.
IX State Contention 9 State Contention 9 as orocosed:
The Applicant has failed to analyze the relevant safety and health issues from the perspective of long-term storage. Although the license application foresees a licensing period of 20 years, there is no assurance that fuel will 7t, of necessity, be left for a longer period at Morris.
prior to a finding of the Connission that storage at Morris beyond 20 years will be unnecessary because government facilities, other than Morris, will then be available for the existing fuel, the license application is incom _
plete without a long-term analysis.
This contention must be rejected since this matter is presently the subject of a generic rulemaking proceeding.
In instituting that proceeding, the Cannission stated:
"The Commission has decided, however, that during this proceeding the issues being considered in the under-taking should not be addressed in individual licensing proceedings.
These issues are most appropriately addressed in a generic proceeding of the. character here i
envisaged." 44 Fed. Reg. 61373.
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State Contention 10 State Contention 10 as oroposed:
The Design Earthquake data in the CSAR are insufficient to.eet
. proposed regulation 172.66. Morris is designed to 0.2g (sic) and the proposed regulation calls for a " peak horizontal ground acceleration of not greater than 0.259..."
The Applicant has not satisfied the proposed regulaticn by establish-ing the CSAR site specific "g value" by the procedures of 10 C.F.R. Part 100.
This contention must be rejected. The issue presented is bayond the scope of this proceeding. Tnis proceeding is governed by 10 C.F.R. Parts 30, 40 and 70.
Part 72 is a proposed rule and has no force or effect and cannot be considered in the proceeding.
XI State Contention 11 State Contention 11 as proposed:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has an obligation under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 42 U.S.C. 4332 (1969) to issue an environmental impact statement which will account for nomal opera-tion of the Morris facility and for the environmental impact of:
(a) emergency evacuation and its consequences;
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(b) decomissioning and/or residual contamination probabilities; (c) testing of fuel in the spent fuel pool; (d) dry storage of fuel in the canyon; (e) expansion of the spent fuel pool; (f) contraction of fuel assemblies for compact storage; (g) storage of waste products or tools from decontamination of the Dresden reactor;
.- (h) any other proposed activity, other than simple storage of spent fuel in water.
State Contention 11 as accepted by the Board and Renumbered as Contention 7:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has an obligaticn under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 42 U.S.C. 4332 (1969) to issue an environ-mental impact statement which will account for environrental impact of normal operation of the Morris' facility.
The Board believes that the Staff position on this contantion is sound.
The request that the environmental impact statement should be required can best be heard after evidence of potential environmental impacts are shown on the evidentiary record. The Board will defer hearing evidence on this con-tention until all the other evidence is substantially in the record.
Subpar. '
graphs a through h are either so vague or speculative as to present no litigable issue.
XII Rorem, et al. Contention 3 Rorem, et al. Contention 3 as proposed:
Intervenors contend that renewal of the license should take into account the close proximity of the Morris Operation to Dresden Nuclear Station, noting in particular that:
A.
Dresden Nuclear Station has a poor safety record; B.
There is a concentration of spent fuel in the area; if an accident at one storage pool causes it to go critical, the other site could easily be affected.
C.
The G.E. facility may be affected by the attemoted decon-tamination of Dresden Unit One.
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. This contention is rejected as lacking in specificity and basis to satisfy 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714.
The only apparent basis for the contention is that Dresden Nuclear Power Station is adjacent to the Morris facility and something might happen at Dresden that could somehow affect the Morris facility.
Everyone recognizes that the two facilities are adjacent but completely separate facilities.
See Applicant's CSAR, Chapter 3, Site Characteristics. No liti-gable issue is presented by Rorem, et al. Contention 3.
XIII Rorem, et al. Contention 4 Rorem et al. Contention 4 as proposed:
Intervenors contend that relicensing the facility, because of the possibility of an accident at the facility, or during transportation to it, would damage property values and the economic structure of the com-munity.
This contention is rejected.
It is vague and speculative.
In addition, a contention alleging economic harm absent an environmental relationship is not cognizable by a licensing board. Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418,1420-21 (1977).
XIV
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Rorem, et al. Contention 5 Rorem, et al. Contention 5 as proposed:
Intervenors contend that mere compliance with NRC standards in no way assures residents of the area that they will suffer no adverse effects from low-level radiation.
This contention is rejected since it is merely a challenge to the Cemis-sion's regulations as be'ng inadequate.
In addition, the Comission's 10 C.F.R.
d
. Part 20 radiation protection standards are presently the subject of rulemak-ing (45 Fed. Reg. 18023, March 1, 1980). Long Island Liohting Comoany (Shoreham), ALAB-99, 6 AEC 54 (1973) and ALAB-156, 6 AEC 831 (1973).
XV Rorem, et al. Contention 6 Rorem, et al. Contention 6 as proposed:
Intervenors contend that transport of spent fuel to the facility involves substantial risk of dispursal (sic) of radioactive materials due to accident or sabotage.
This contention is rejected since it lacks specificity and basis and, again, is a challenge to the Commission's regulations as being inadequate.
These regulations are at 10 C.F.R. Parts 71 and 73 as well as Department of Transportation regulations.
In addition, as the Staff points out, this whole area of regulation is the subject of a rulemaking proceeding (44 Fed. Reg. 34466, June 15,1979).
XVI Rorem, et al. Contention 7 Rorem, et al. Contention 7 as proposed:
Intervenors contend that a relicensing of the G. E. Morris Operation would facilitate a possible takeover of that operation by the federal government.
This contention is rejected. Again the scope of the proceeding before the board is whether the license of GE to operate the Morris facility should r
l be renewed.
Even if the Board should find that a takeover by the federal
. government might somehow occur at a later date, this would have nothing to do with whether the current license should be renewed at this time.
Board Question 1
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For clarity and information, the following Board Question 1 is posed to the Applicant and Staff:
Board Question 1:
(a) The Applicant is requested to identify the specific activities which the Applicant is requesting to continue or undertake within the proposed license renewal; j
(b) The Staff is requested to identify the activities that the Applicant would be permitted to continue or to undertake within the proposed license renewal;
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(c) Both Applicant and Staff are requested to specify the criteria that will be used to determine whether possible future activities can be performed under the license in effect at that time, in contrast to requiring a license amendment.
Attachment A is a listing of the contentions as accepted by the Board for convenience.
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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id (AndrewC.Goodhope Q
f Chairman Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 4th day of June, 1980
P Attachment A Contentions as Accepted by the Board Contention 1 The Consolidated Safety Analysis Report (CSAR) does not adequately describe the following:
(a)
The consequences of simultaneous accidental radioactive releases from the Dresden Nuclear Power Station and the Morris Spent Fuel Storage Facility; (State)
(b) The risks and consequences of the release of radicactive elements in excess of Part 20 regulations as a result of any of the follow-ing accidental occurrences at the Morris facility:
(i) the con-sequences of an accident caused by a tornado impelled missile; (ii) a loss of coolant accident, alone and in conjunction with an accident which has caused a rift in the building structure; (iii) earthquake related accidents; (iv) sabotage related accidents not analyzed in NEDM-20682; (v) fire; (vi) flooding; (vii) acts of war; (viii) human error; (ix) massive electrical power failure (State and Rorem, et al.).
Contention 2 The Physical Security Plan does not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 73.
Further, the CSAR does not provide an adequate assessment of credible risks of sabotage related events inasmuch that the advances in the technology of explosives, which could make sabotage a more probable event, have not been adequately addressed (State and Rorem, et al.).
Contention 3 The CSAR underestimates or does not state fully the projected effects on the health of personnel, and their families from occupational exposure to radiation inasmuch as:
(a) The CSAR does not state total whole body exposure to occupational personnel for the proposed licensed life of the Morris facility; (b) The CSAR does not project expected genetic effects on personnel or to the ger.eral population caused by such whole body occupation exposures; (c) The CSAR includes only irradiated fuei and contaminated basin water as radiation sources. Other tanks and pipes should be included as sources of occupational exposures; (d) The CSAR does not account for additional radiation exposure to l
occupational personnel from all anticipated activities at the facility (i.e., fuel disassembly, dry storage or compaction all of which are projected for the near future at Morris);
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(e) The CSAR does not address the absence of effective radiation monitor-ing of the air within the facility resulting frcm:
(i) No devices to measure radioactive materials in the air; (ii) No routine procedure to measure Kr 85.
j Contention 4 The Decomissioning Plan proposed in the CSAR is inadequate for the following reasons:
(a) There is insufficient detemination of ultimate decontamination and decomissioning costs. Costs have not been adjusted for inflation for the projected time of decontamination. CSAR pp. A7-13, A7-14.
Without an accurate cost assessment GE cannot make a valid connit-ment to meet decomissioning costs; (b) There is insufficient assurani:e that the applicant will be finan-cially capable to meet decontamination and deconTaissioning costs.
Other than a general statement regarding GE's present relative solvency there is no verifiable financial statement to show GE can meet future costs as is required by 10 C.F.R. 5 70.22(a). A bond or cther assurance of fiaancial capability should be required to provide a guarantee that decontamination and decomissioning costs will be fully covered; (c) There is no contingency plan to provide deconsnissioning of the Morris facility should are energency, accident or other unforeseen event necessitate imediate and/or pemanent abandonment of the Morris site; (d) There is no consideration of pass % perpetual care and maintenance due to incomplete decontamination y acomissioning including:
(i)
Inability to dispose of LAW vault material; (ii) residual contamination of waste vaults or other stationary parts of the facility; (iii) ground water contamination which would require maintenance to prevent leaching offsite; (iv) unavailability of offsite low-level disposal facilities for the dismantled facility and wastes.
i contention 3 The Emergency Plan in the CSAR is inadequate in that:
(a) The plan does not specify which emergency procedures will be utilized to unload the spent fuel pool and to transport and/or store irradiated l
fuel in the event that an emergency should necessitate transfer of the spent fuel from the Morris spent fuel pool.
. (b) The CSAR should be supplemented to explain GE's plans for emer-gency transportation of irradiated fuel.
(c) There is no reference to tests or other means by which it can be detennined that the existing emergency plans are adequate.
Ade-quate test programs of both corr.unications systems and procedures should be documented prior to licensing.
Contention 6 Intervenors contend that before a renewal license is issued, the following conditions should be met:
(a) There should exist a comprehensive evacuation plan for the area, including the whole of two large metropolitan areas to the north-east (Joliet) and to the ' southeast (Kankakee) of the facility.
These plans should include detailed infomation as to how hospitals, nursing homes, schools, and prisons are to be evacuated; (b) Hospitals within a 50-100 mile range of the facility should be equipped to handle large numbers of people exposed to radiation or contaminated by radiation; (c) Applicant should take responsibility, both financial and otherwise, for informing residents of the area that the possibility of such an accident does exist, and infonning them of evacuation plans and/or measures to be taken in case of a radioactive accident either at the facility or during transport of spent fuel to or from the facility; (d) Applicant should take complete financial responsibility for fonnation of evacuation plans, for equipping hospitals and training personnel, and for maintenance of any equipment needed.
(Rorem,etal.and State).
Contention 7 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has an obligation under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 42 U.S.C. 4332 (1969) to issue an environmental impact statement which will account for environmental impact of normal operation of the Morris facility.
Board Ouestion 1 (a) The Applicant is requested +o identify the specific activities which the Applicant is requesting to continue or undertake within the proposed license renewal; (b) The Staff is requested to identify the activities that the Applicant would be permitted to continue or to undertake within the proposed license renewal; (c) Both Applicant and Staff are requested to specify the criteria that will be used to determine whether possible future activities can be perfomed under the license in effect at that time, in contrast to requiring a license amendment.