ML19323G289
| ML19323G289 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1980 |
| From: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Kirshen A METROPOLITAN AREA PLANNING AGENCY, OMAHA, NE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006020095 | |
| Download: ML19323G289 (2) | |
Text
W 23 19a0 DISTRIBUTIO?l:
w/inc.-Docket File OR3!4 Rdg Dross NRC PDR NRR Rdg RMattson LJR DEisenhut PKreutzer ETE o TNovak IE-3 NSIC RReid OELD w/ir:PErickson AEOD Docket No. 50-285 HDenton Gray File ECase Yellow Ticket File w/inc.
HBerkow/WRussell MGroff(NRR3885)
DMuller Etine Mr. Alan H. Kirshen cNypell-t/ MSS Associate Professor of Law and Chairman, Natural Resources Committee 7000 West Center Road, Suite 200 Omaha, Nebraska 68106
Dear Mr. Kirshen:
Thank you for your letters of March 13, 1980 to tir. Lobel and Mr. Erickson We agree with you, that public meetings, such as the January 16, of the NRC.
1980 meeting in Omaha, can result in a very useful interchange between local citizens, the NRC and a utility on significant issues involving nuclear power plants.
I wish to thank you and your comittee, also, for your efforts in establishing the January 16th meeting in Omaha.
Your petition for rule making to require informal public meetings / hearings for NRC licensing actions has been published in the Federal Register and is under active consideration by NRC.
Our experience in the January 16, 1980 meeting in Omaha does support the establishment of more frequent public meet-ings near reactor sites.
You also suggested a safeguards procedure to bring a reactor to cold shutdown and block any restart until an NRC " key" (mechanical / electronic) was used.
We have reviewed your suggestion, but our preliminary assessment is that any system which would autcmatically bring a reactor to cold shutdown ar. could not be bypassed would not be desirable since shutting down a nuclear power plant requires the judgment of a competent well-trained operator to assure that the equipment is performing as it should.
If, for some reason, a piece of equipment is not available, only an operator could best put into operation the alternate piece of equipoent to assure that cold shutdown of the reactor will be reached in a safe manner.
Also, even after a reactor is shutdown much The block equipment must remain in operation to continue to cool the core.
on reactor restart would, therefore, not prevent damage to the core if the heat removal systems were prevented from operating properly.
The only threat that is used to develop scenarios for power reactor sabotage is that which is outlined in 10 CFR 73.la(1). Specifically, this threat was developed to provide protection with high assurance against successful indus-trial sabotage by both of the following:
(1) A determined violent external assault, attack.by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons with the following attributes, assistance and equipment:
(i) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (ii) inside assistance which may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in a passive role (e.g., provide information) an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and comunications, participate in violent attack), or both, (iii) l l
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P Mr. Alan H. Kirrhen suitable weapons, up to and including hand-hela automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, (iv) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or otherwise destroying the reactor integrity, and (2) An internal threat of an insider including an employee (in any position).
Protection against threats which exceed the above design basis threat are
' principally the responsibility of government protective forces and agencies (local, State and Federal).
Sincerely, Original signed by Robert W. Reid Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Licensing
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Protection against threats which exceed the above design basis threat are principally the responsibility of government protective forces and agencies (local, State and Federal).
Sincerely, Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch f4 Division of Licensing w.
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