ML19323E594
| ML19323E594 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07104960 |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1980 |
| From: | Macdonald C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Ross D ENERGY, DEPT. OF |
| References | |
| MS-E-201, NUDOCS 8005270024 | |
| Download: ML19323E594 (2) | |
Text
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UN!TED STATES
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MAY l 31980 FCTC:WHL 71-4960 U..S. Department of Energy ATTN:
Dr. Donald M. Ross MS-E-201 Washington, D. C.
20545 Gentlemen:
This refers to your letter dated April 10, 1975, as supplemented July 19, 1976 and October 31, 1979, requesting our review of the Model No. LLD-1 package.
In connection with our review of this package, we need the information identified in the enclosure to this letter.
Please advise us within thirty (30) days from the date of this letter when this information will be provided.
Sincerely, Charles E. MacDonald, Chief Transportation Certification Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NMSS
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl:
DOE, Albuquerque Operati ns Office ATTN:
Mr. Jack R. Roeder P.O. Box 5400 Albuquerque, NM 87115 t
i soos27043 M C
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY MODEL NO. LLD-1 PACKAGING Encl to ltr dtd: MAY 131980 Cri ti cali'y_
Based on your reports of the accident damage to the single package (bottom end drop, puncture and fire) it.is evident that the support frame and aluminum mesh undergo gross failure. The staff does not interpret the results of the bottom end drops, as reported in your letter dated October 31, 1979, as demonstrating the adequacy of the support frane to maintain the spacing assumed in your criticality analysis.
It is also noted that the fire test will melt away the aluminum mesh, thereby, permitting free travel of the secondary container, should it break away from the support structure.
It is the staff's conclusion that the package array configuration used in the criticality evaluation does not represent the most reactive credible configuration consistent with the damaged condition of the package. We will need a revised analysis for an array of packages in the most reactive credible configuration (an array of secondary containers free of the support frame) in order to determine criticality control requirements for fissile Classes II and III.
Structural Show that the containment system of the package is adequately designed against nonductile failure (i.e., brittle fracture) under the hypothetical accident 30-foot free drop test and the puncture test at low service temp-erature environments (-20 F). Acceptable materials would be austenitic stainless steel or other steel with its NDT substantially lower than -20 F (see material toughness requirements for ASME Class II vessels).
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