ML19323C003
| ML19323C003 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/19/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Sniezek J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323B970 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-80-217 NUDOCS 8005140506 | |
| Download: ML19323C003 (4) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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631 PARK AVENUE O
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 FC i 3 ID MEMORANDUM FOR:
James H. Sniezek, Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Inspection FROM:
Boyce H. Grier, Director, Region I
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED BULLETIN Region I recommends t. hat the attached bulletin be issued to fuel facility.
licensees who may receive shipments of plutonium.
m Yli. W w Boyce H. Grier irector en t
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f UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.
20555 February
, 1980 l
IE Bulletin 80-UNLOADING PLUT0NIUM OXIDE FROM SHIPPING CONTAINERS AND PACKAGING SHIPPED PLUT0NIUM i
Description of Circumstances:
There were two reported accidents in 1979 which occurred while packages con-taining " plutonium oxide" were being removed from shipping containers.
Both accidents demonstrated the need for the use of suitable equipment and proce-dures while unloading packages' of " plutonium oxide" from shipping containers.
The report for one of the accidents points out a need for repackaging the plutonium oxide which has been shipped, especially that shipped in an FL-10-1 shipping container.
i On March 13, 1979, a plutonium oxide storage can ruptured as it was being removed from a shipping container, and airborne' plutonium contamination was spread within a storage facility at Hanford, Washington.
Three persons received minor clothing contamination.
No significant internal depositions occurred.
On October 25, 1979, plutonium oxide storage cans ruptured as they were being removed from the inner canister of a shipping container, and airborne plutonium contamination was spread at the Savannah River Plant in South Carolina.
Five persons assimilated plutonium in their lungs from this accident.
The amounts were all well below permissible limits.
The sources of the pressurized gases causing the rupture of the cans and the contamination were different in the two accidents.
In the March 13 accident
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it appears that heat buildup in the insula'ted 5791 shipping container c'aused the vaporization of moisture present in the material and/or the formation of N02 and 02 from the thermal decomposition of residual Pu02 (NO )2 left in the 3
material by incomplete calcination of the plutonium nitrate during processing.
a In the October 25, 1979 accident, it appears that helium gas used during the l
1eak checking of the seal of the pressure vessel of the shipping container entered the inner canister of the shipping container through weld defects and
. pressurized the entire contents of'the inner canister.
When the end of the inner canister was removed, the inner canister vented rapidly, the cans holding the plutonium oxide did not, thus causing a differential pressure across the t
cans and plastic bags holdin'g the plutonium oxide.
In both accidents the shipping containers performed their function in that the packaged material was transported safely within the barriers provided by the i
containers.
However, the shipping containers contributed to both accidents.
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IE Bulletin No. 80-2 The packages of material removed from the shipping containers were not in the same condition as the packages placed inside the shipping containers.
The in-vestigators of both accidents recognized this, and among their recommendations, they recommended that containers be opened under strictly controlled conditions to provide adequate radiological protection to personnel.
This protection was recommended to be provided by ventilated enclosures, such as gloveboxes.
The investigation report for the October 25 accident pointed out a serious consideration for packages of plutonium oxide which have been packaged in an FL-10-1 shipping container.
A shipping container is assumed to contain four cans, and each can contains 800 grams of Pu02 with a heat generation rate of x
6.75 watts per can.
The total heat loading of 27 watts is within the certificate of compliance limit of 30 watts.
The calculated equilibrium temperature distribution within the FL-10-1 shipping container was as follows:
CALCULATED TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTION WITHIN FL-10-1 SHIPPING CONTAINERS Location Temperature (*C)
Pu0 Centerline 231 2
Paint Can Surface (Containing Pu0 )
223 2
Food Can Surface (Containing Pu0 )
148 2
Spacer Food Can Surface (Empty) 117 Inner Surface of Foam 68
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Outer Surface of Drum 27 Ambient 25 This report also points out that plastic bags are routinely used in the packaging of plutonium oxide as containment barriers.
Often these bags are made of polyvinyl chloride (PVC).
This report points out further that PVC is reported to degrade at temperatures greater than 100*C with release of hcl and an accompanying darkening in color.
Consequently, if a package.of Pu02 depends on plastic, PVC in particular, as a containment barrier, and the package was held in an FL-10-1 shipping container for a period of time, the integrity of the package for containment of the plutenium oxide is highly suspect.
If
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storage of such cans of plut' onium oxide is required, the plastic bags initially i
used can not be considered to be containment barriers and other suitable barriers must be provided.
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IE Bulletin No. 80-3 Action to be Taken by Licensees:
All licensees' receiving, unloading, handling and' storing Pu02 from' shipping containers, especially the FL-10-1 shipping containers, must take the following ac' tion to provide adequate radiological protection for personnel.
- 1.,
Determine if plastic containment barriers of Pu02 packages may have been degraded at the elevated temperatures encountered in the shipping con-tainer.
If so, repackage the Pu02 to provide the necessary containment barriers to allow safe handling and storage of the Pu0.
2 2.
Provide adequate procedures to provide for tha safe removal of Pu0 from 2
packages transported in shipping containers.
3.
Provide adequate equipment for the safe removal of Pu02 from packages transported in shipping containers.
4.
Items 1 and 2 should be accomplished prior to the receipt and unloading of any packages of Pu02 at your facilities.
Report in writing within 45 days your plan of action and schedule with regard to item 3.
Reports are to be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy should be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment, Division of Fuel Facilities and Materials Safety Inspection, Washington, D. C. 20555.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
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