ML19323A158
| ML19323A158 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1980 |
| From: | Conner E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323A157 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004170318 | |
| Download: ML19323A158 (5) | |
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'"JCLEl-R REGULATCRY CC:. *.USS!ON
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': arch 31,1950 Dccksts Ncs. 50-317 and 50-318 LICENSEE:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E)
FACILITY: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP), Units Nos. I and 2 SU? JECT:
SU'F.ARY OF MEETING HELD ON FEBRUARY 21, 1930, TO DISCUSS THE LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) CONTINGENCY PLAN LCCATIO": Ccamission's Offices, Bethesda, Maryland Introduccion 3. 's-tsrs da ted Septenber 11, 1978, ". arch 30, 1979, ard December 31, 3
! ! 7.0, 535E provided A;;sndix I, "LN3 Contingency Plan", to their Site E s';sncy ?lan Irpieranting Prccedures, Additi nal Informati n requested t
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- ter of Jan ary 30, 1979, and A;pendix H " LNG Contingency Plan",
- ' ?.s ravised Site E..srgency Plan, rsspectively.
The r. sed fer a LNG C:rtir.gsncy Plan develc;ed frcr our rsview of the potential risk to C N:? asscciated with LNG ship traffic in the Cove Poin:/Calvert Cliffs arsa of the Chesapeake 3ay as docutanted in cur June 13, 1973 Safety E.a:uaticn.
':s recuested the meeting to discuss the staff review of BG&E's current L.3
- n-i gancy Plan. A list of the attendses is given in At achment 1.
T s Iss-in; aganda is shc'.;n in Atta:h snt 2.
5.- ary Aftsr c;ening remarks by -he NRC (Conner) and a brief history of the LNG cuestions by the licensee (01 son), a discussion along the lines of the agenda began.
1.
'tr. Olsen said SGLE was not continuing to search for LNG vapor cloud deteccien develecrant since the 1978 review. Mr. Pasedag discussed the Attachment 3 le:ttr on methane detection using lasars. The staff 5sifeves it is just a matter of time before an acceptable methcd of L.'i3 cloud detection is developed and made cornercially available.
2.
r. Olsen report 5d that the aute:2:icly actuated emergency radio teni-cr (as described in their letter of Maren 30,1979) had nce been i stalled.
He said the he werkad up the design last yea,r and. turned
- i. in o their purenasing department. Abcut.a =cnth age, ne disccversi St nc unit had been Scught. He said that the emergency radio cni :e
.;:uid ts in placs by May 1, 1980. The staff pointed out that this..as unsstisfactcry.
". Olsen is tc ;ec back to us en this sub!ect.
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..e briefly discussed why the con rol rec is and is not a desirable 1:ca-icn to store breathing apparatus.
The staff is concerned because
- ' e centrol roce dose following a LCCA generic review has not teen completed. Mr. Olson pointed out'that the control room area is the caly lccation with a recirculating ventilation system. The staff a; reed that this assembly point is acceptable.
4 Mr. Olson questioned why the nine parts of Question 4 are important if the Ll G accident probability is acceptable..The staff explained that the purpose of contingency plans is to have advanced planning prepared and approved for all possible accidents no matter how low the probability of occurrence. We discussed the follcwing shortccmings of the present Li'G Contingency Plan proposed by EG&E.
a.
The basis for action statments (e.g., when to disable the diesel generators) shculd be provided in the plan or in an appendix to the plan. This will help the public understand the plan.
' b.
S;ecific criteria shculd be given fer each required action (e.g.,
a reactor trip is required if a Ll:G spill of size X occurs and the wind at speed Y is bicwing in directien Z.)
Special attention to the metheds of core cooling and the availability c.
of necessary p:wer supplies, both AC and DC, must be clear in the plan.
d.
When ' addressing specific protective actions covered by other plant
_ operating:or e ergenby' procedures, positive reference to-the pro-cedure to be used shculd be ade.
- :1. sic, e s aff poir.ted out that, since E3T.E has mcVed the Ll;G Contingency Plan f :- A;;endix I of their Site Emergency Plan Implementation Procedures to A ;er.fix H of the December 31, 1979 Site Energency Plan, we plan to complete t.e p'.an review concurrent with the Emergency Planning review new in process.
M. Gison said he would work toward tUiis~ goal with us.
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E. L. Ccnner, Project Manager-Operating Reactors 3 ranch i4 Olvision of Operating Reactors A tn5:ents:
'i3: cf A tendees 2.
"ee-ing Agenda 3.
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LNG CONTINGENCY PLAN REVIEW WITH BG&E LIST OF ATTENDEES February 21, 1980 NRC
_BG&_E Monte Conner, ORB #4, DOR Richard C. L. Olson-George W. Knighton, EEB,1.9R Walt Pasedag, EEB, DOR Millard Wohl, EEB, 00R Norman A. Eisenberg, 050, TPSt.
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MEETING AGE'NOA f
CALVERT CLIFFS LNG CONTINGENCY PLAN REVIEN 1.
Discuss your continuing efforts in the area of LNG vapor cloud detection technology.
2.
Describe your experience with the monitoring of broadcast communication links with the Coast Guard. Discuss the status of progrcss of letters of agreement bat.seen the Coast Guard and Cove Point with respect to notifying the plant of any difficulty with LNG spills / handling.
3.
State why the control room is an acceptable place to assemble and store breathing apparatus.
State the number of people to be processed, the number of airpacks on hand, and the time required to complete this protective measure.
4 Assume an LNG vapor cloud on-site.
a.
Provide estimates of the duration of the plant's immersion in the cloud, and corralate those estimates with the proposed emerger.cy actions.
b.
Discuss the basis for inhibiting the diesel generators f om starting.
c.
Describe the means of and time requirements for inhibiting the diesels from starting d.
Discuss the means of purging the diesel rooms of vaporized LNG
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after the cloud disperses.
e.
Discuss means of protection of the battery room from LNG vapor hazards.
f.
Discuss the available power s:;rces after the batteries are exhausted (including system / component sequencing).
g.
In light of the possible non-availability of the diesel generators, explain the reason for the two hour duration availability of the O.C. battery power supply, and state why this is considered to be adequate.
I h.
Discuss the impact on the switchyard of detonation / deflagration of the LNG cloud,
- i. Discuss the need for and availability of alternative access ways to the site if a cloud detonation / deflagration were to occur.
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