ML19322D891
| ML19322D891 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1979 |
| From: | Daniels A AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322D888 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003100018 | |
| Download: ML19322D891 (6) | |
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DARTMOUTH COLLEGE HANOVER
- NEW HAMPSHIRE THE PRESIDENT 1
December 7, 1979 Mr. Albert G. Daniels P.O. Box 415 Winnsboro, S.C.
29180
Dear Mr. Daniels:
We did speak to improvements of instruments in the control room on pages 72-73 of our report. We had specifically considered recommending a water-level indicator in the reactor vessel and decided that this might be unreliable.
While I am not an expert on this subject, as I understand it, in tiie horrendously complex mixture of water and steam that is likely to exist in the reactor vessel during an accident, with very complex flow patterns once the core is disturbed, the water level indicator could be misleading.
We opted instead for a recommendation for " instruments that can provide measurement of the full range of temperatures within a reactor vessel under normal and abnormal conditions".
Knowledge of the totally abnormally high temperatures that existed in the reactor vessel during the accident should have been the single clearest indicator for the need to pour in large quantities of water.
Personally, I believe that no small number of additions to their control panel will help.
It has to be reorganized and modernized.
For emergencies one needs to take advantage of (fairly inexpensive) information technology that would clearly display the most important indicators and would suppress the hundreds of alarms that go off during the emergency which are relatively unimportant.
Sincerely yours, John G. Kemeny l
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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February 14, 1980 c,.
j Mr. Albert G. Daniels P. O. Rox 415 Winnsboro, SC 29180
Dear Mr. Daniels:
On December 11, 1979 you sent letters to Chairman Ahearne and Mr. Denton requesting comments on two other letters, a Deceder 7,1979 letter from Dr. John Kemeny to you, and a December 11, 1979 letter from you to Dr.
Kemeny.
Since you and I have already exchanged correspondence regarding reactor vessel level measurements, Chairman Ahearne and Mr. Denton asked that I respond to your letters to them.
Dr. Kemeny's letter to you states that his Comission considered recommend-ing a water level indicator and decided that this might be unreliable, noting that very complex steam and water flow patterns could make the in-dicator unreliable.
Your response to Dr. Kemeny points out that there were periods of minimum agitation in the TMI reactor vessel when a level gauge would have given reasonably correct and crucial infonnation to the operators, and that corrective action could have been taken.
Dr. Kemeny is correct in being concerned that complex flow patterns and agitation could give mislead-ing indications.
You are correct in believing that a well-designed system for level detection could provide crucial information.
As my letter to you on December 18, 1979 indicated, the NRC staff has established a requirement that instrumentation be added to nuclear power plants to provide an indication of reactor vessel level.
The efforts I outlined in that letter are proceeding, and we remain steadfast in our resolve to reach the objective of having reactor vessel water level indica-tion. We agree with you on the importance of this infonnation.
We also see the merits of instruments which can provide measurement of a full range of temperatures, noted by Dr. Kemeny, and have required that these be installed on nuclear power plants.
Dr. Kemeny briefly mentioned his opinions on control panel reorganization and the display of the most important indicators. The NRC has underway a task to evaluate control room designs from a human factors viewpoint, and another task to display the most critical parameters for the operators, as suggested by Dr. Kemeny. We expect reactor vessel water level indication to be among those parameters.
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Mr. Albert G. Daniels February 14, 1980 Your letter to Dr. Kemeny also suggests that some consideration be given to weighing the reactor vessel as a means of detecting water losses.
Since you so kindly sent me copies of correspondence between yourself and the Babcock and Wilcox Company, I see that this does not need to be addressed further.
I appreciate your intense interest and comprehensive study of this matter.
If the above response to your requests is not adequate, please let me know.
Sincerely, t
Q Richard P. Denise, Acting Assistant Director for Reactor Safety Division of Systems Safety i
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j$l%,,'g OfMED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
WASHING TON, D. C. 20555 j
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February 14, 1980 9
l Mr. Albert G. Daniels P. O. Box 415 Winnsboro, SC 29180
Dear Mr. Daniels:
On December 11, 1979 you sent letters to Chairman Ahearne and Mr. Denton requesting comments on two other letters, a December 7,1979 letter from Dr. John Kemeny to you, and a December 11, 1979 letter from you to Dr.
Kemeny.
Since you and I have already exchanged correspondence regarding reactor vessel level measurements, Chairman Ahearne and Mr. Denton asked that I respond to your letters to them.
Dr. Kemeny's letter to you states that his Commission considered recommend-ing a water level indicator and decided that this might be unreliable, noting that very complex steam and water flow patterns could make the in-dicator unreliable.
Your response to Dr. Kemeny points out that there were periods of minimum agitation in the TMI reactor vessel when a level gauge would have given reasonably correct and crucial information to the operators, and that corrective action could have been taken.
Dr. Kemeny is correct in being concerned that complex flow patterns and agitation could give mislead-ing indications.
You are correct in believing that a well-designed system for level detection could provide crucial information.
As my letter to you on December 18, 1979 indicated, the NRC staff has established a requirement that instrumentation be added to nuclear power plants to provide an indication of reactor vessel level.
The efforts I outlined in that letter are proceeding, and we remain steadfast in our resolve to reach the objective of having reactor vessel water level indica-tion.
We agree with you on the importance of this infonnation.
We also see the merits of instruments which can provide measurement of a full range of temperatures, noted by Dr. Kemeny, and have required that these be installed on nuclear power plants.
Dr. Kemeny briefly mentioned his opinions on control panel reorganization and the display of the most important indicators.
The NRC has underway a task to evaluate control room designs from a human factors viewpoint, and another task to display the most critical parameters for the operators, as suggested by Dr. Kemeny.
We expect reactor vessel water level indication to be among those parameters.
a Mr. Albert G. Daniels February 14, 1980 Your letter to Dr. Kemeny also suggests that some consideration be given to weighing the reactor vessel as a means of detecting water losses.
Since you so kindly sent me copies of correspondence between yourself and the Babcock and Wilcox Company, I see that this does not need to be addressed further.
I appreciate your intense interest and comprehensive study of this matter.
If the above response to your requests is not adequate, please let me knew.
Sincerely, Richard P. Denise, Acting Assistant Director for Reactor Safety Division of Systems Safety
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