ML19322D454
| ML19322D454 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane, Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1980 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322D455 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002130018 | |
| Download: ML19322D454 (7) | |
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3AM 181980 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Ahearne 7,3, tusm,
THRU:
Lee V. Gossick, Executive Director for Operations PDM: -
Harold R.- Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
B&W ANALYSES OF THE SEPTENBER 24, 1977 ACCIDENT AT DAVIS-BESSE This is in response to question number 4 (of fcur questions) identified in your nemorandum of July 19, 1979 to Lee V. Gossick. Question numbers 1
1 thru 3 were addressed in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (ISE) nerorandun to you dated August 6,1979.
In that memorandum, IfE noted that the Office of' Nuclear Reactor Regulation would be asked to respond to question number 4 Ycur July 19, 1979 memorandum referred to two newspaper articles which indicated that internal Sabccck & Wilcox (021) analyses of the September 24, 1977 transient at Davis-Besse uncovered information which, if transmitted to operators of B&W plants in a timely fashion, might have prevented or i
significantly reduced the consequences of the accident at Three "fle Island, l
hit 2.
Question number 4 of your July 19, 1979 memorandum is repeated below:
In the staff's judgement, if the information uncovered in these analyses had been available to the NRC and/or Metropolitan Edison j
in a tinuly fashion, to what extent would the consequences of the TPI accident have been mitigated or avoided?
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As we are sure you appreciate, our response to this question is, of necessity, a highly subjective one. Therefore, we are unable to state with any degree of certainty what events would ar,2ually have taken place and how effective they might have been if these analyses had been available to us prior to the TMI-2 accident. However, we will attempt to provide a qualified answer to the question.
All things considered, I believe that if we had received information as expli-cit as that contained in the February 9,1978 internal S&W memorandum from Bert Dunn to Jim Taylor, we would have taken action which may have prevented or mitigated the TMI accident. I think that we would have informed licensees i
of the problem and required that procedures caution against early termination of HPCI.
Contact:
8002180 0 W
s Commissioner Ahearne -
There are two important aspects to the question, however, which significantly bear on the answer:
The manner in which the information was brought to our attention o
The time interval between the date the information was brought to o
our attention, and the date of the TMI-2 accident The first of these is important because it would have affected the degree to which the information would have been analyzed by this office. For example, if the information had been provided to the SRC staff (NRR or IE) by S*W pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, or a utility pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55e, or other reporting requirements, it would have led to a high priority effort on our part to assess its generic implications. On the other hand, if the information had become available to us without endorsement by either B&W or i
a utility, our assessment of its generic implications would have proceeded, but on a much lower priority.
The other aspect, i.e., timing, is also very important. It has to do with j
the time it takes for as to assess the significance of information of this type as well as the time it takes to implement the results of our assessment.
Considering each of these aspects, it is our opinion that the period of time (about one year) between the date of the B&W engineer's memoranda and the date i
of the TMI-2 accident would have been sufficient for us to have effected actions at B&W plants such that, to a large extent, the TMI-2 accident consequences could have been avoided. More specifically, we believe that these actions would have resulted in the TMI-2 operators being better aware of the behavior of that olant, as well as the requisite recovery procedures, during a loss of feedwater event with a consequential failure of the power-operated reifef valve. However, j
we would note that there is some uncertainty associated with this answer consid-
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ering the staff's lack of emphasis on procedutes prior to the TMI-2 accident.
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We would also point out that there were other errors that occurred during the accident, such as locking out the auxiliary feedwater system and failure to close th'e PORY block valve. In our view, we would not have taken acticn in these areas as a result of the disclosure to the NRC of the B&W engineer's memoranda since the information contained in these memoranda was not directly related to these errors.
1 Chairman Ahearne The timing aspect is difficult to deal with. Receipt of cicar information from any source, as much as a year before the accident, would probably have been suff-iciert time for us to react. Receipt of clear information from BaW or a licensee with much less than one year lead time also should have been sufficient. At sorte lead time interval, longer for an "outside" source than from BaW or a licensee, we probably would have not reacted soon enough.
I am confident, however, that clear information frem any source would now be acted upon promptly.
o Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: Comissioner Gilinsky Ccmissioner Kentiedy Comissioner Hendrie Comissicner Bradford L. V. Gossick
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Chairman Ahearne H Denton Rdg SIsrael Central F1 EDO Rdg WFKane, SB THRU:
Lee V. Gossick, Executive Director for Operations FP.CM:
Harold R. Centon, Directer Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
B&W ANALYSES OF THE SEPTEMBER 24, 1977 ACCIDENT AT DAVIS-BESSE Inis is in response to question number 4 (of four questions) identified in ycur cercorancum of July 19, 1979 to Lee V. Gossick. Cuesticn numbers 1 thru 3 were addressed in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (ISE) i.:cr..orar:dum to you dated August 6,1979.
In that nercrandua, ICE noted that the Cffice of Nuclear Reacter Regulation would be askcd to respond to question nun ber 4 Your July 19,1979.remoranaum referred to two newspaper articles which ir.cicated that internal Babcock & Wilcox (caw) analyses of the September 24, 1977 transient at Davis-Besse uncovered information which, if transmitted to cperators of B&W plants in a tirely fashicn, raight have prevented cr significantly recuced the consequences of the accident at Three Pile Island, Unit 2.
O estion number 4 of your July 19, 1979 raemorandum is repeated celow:
In the staff's Judgement, if the information uncovered in these analyses had been available to the NRC and/or Metropolitan Edison in a timely fashion, to what extent would the consequences of the TMI accident have been mitigated or avoided?
As we are sure you appreciate, our response to this question is, of necessity, a highly subjective one. Therefore, we are unable to state with any degree of certainty what events would actually have taken place and how effective they might have been if these analyses had been available to us prior to the TMI-2 accident. Howver, we will attempt to provide a qualified answer to the question.
We believe there are two important aspects to the question which significantly bear on the answer:
o The inanner in which the information was brought to our attention The time interval between the date the information was brought to o
cur attention, and the date of the TMI-2 accident cruv e, v.
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The first of these is important because it would have affected the Jegree to which the information would have been analyzed by this office. For example r if the information had been provided to us by B&W pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, or Petropolitan Edison pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55c, it would have led to a high priority effort on our part to assess its generic implications. On the other hand, if the infomation had becorne available to us without endersenent by either B&W or a utility, our assessment of its generic implications would hue proceeoed, but on a much lover priority.
The other aspect, i.e., timing, is also very important.
It has to de with the time it takes for us to assess the significance of information of this type as 5. ell as the time it takes to effect the results of our assescrent.
Considering each of these aspects, it is our opinion that the period of time (about one year) between the date of the B&W engineer's memoranda and the date of the THI-2 accident would have been sufficient for us to have effected actions at 249 plants such that, to a large extent, the TMI-2 accident consecuences ccule have ceen avoided. Fore specifically, we believe that these actions w uld have resulted in the TPI-2 operators being better aware of the behavior of that plant, as well as the recuisite recovery procedures, during a loss of feedwater i
event v.ith a consequential failure of the power < operated relief valve. However,
he roul': note that there is sece uncertainty associated with this answer consic-ering the staff's lack of emphasis on procedures pricr to the TMI-2 accident.
We n.oule also point out that there were other errors which centributed to the accicent, such as locking cut the auxiliary feeovater system and the inadequacy af the containnent isolation scheme. In our Vfew, we would not have taken action in these arus as a result of the disclosure to the NRC cf the EaW engineer's
..e cranca since the information centained in these nemoranda was not directly related tc these errors.
This answer assuces that the informaticn had been provided to us with the endorse-r.;ent of either EaW or a utility. For the case in which the information had been brought to our attention without the endorsement of either B&W or the utility, we believe the pace of our assessment would not have been sufficient to prevent or suostantially mitigate the consequences of the TMI-2 accident.
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If any additional information or clarification is desired, I or a member of my staff will,be pleased to meet with you to discuss this matter further.
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Kennedy Comissioner Hendrie Comissioner Bradford C(?
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g The first of these is important because it would have affehted the degree t.o which the information would have been analyzed by this office. For example, if the infomation had been provided to us by 88W pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, or Metropolitan Edison pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55e, it would have led to a high priority effort on our part to assess its generic implications. On the other hand, if the information had become available to us without endorsement by either B&W or a utility, our assessment of its generic implications would have proceeded, but on a much lower priority.
The other aspect, i.e., timirg, is also very important.
It has to do with 1
the time it takes for us to assess the significance of infomation of this type as well as the time it takes to effectihe results of our assessment.
~~
Considering each of'~these aspects, it is our opinion that the period of time (about one year) between the date of the B&W engineer's memoranda and the date of the TMI-2 accident would have been sufficient for us to have effected actions at BSU plants such that, to a large extent, the TMI-2 accident conse-quences could have been avoided. 'dore specifically, we believe that these actions would have resulted in the TMT-2 operators being better aware of the behavior of that plant, as well as the requisite recovery procedures, during a loss of feedwater event with a consequential failure of the power-cperated relief valve. awe would point out that there were other errors which contributed to the accident, such as locking out the auxiliary feedwater system and the inadeq'uacy of the containment isolation scheme.
In our view, we would not have taken action in these areas as a result of the disclosure to the NRC of the SW engineer's memoranda since the information contained in these memo-randa was not directly related to these errors.
This answer assumes that the information had been provided to us with the endorsement of either B&W or a utility. For the case in which the information had been brought to our attention without the endorsement of either S&W or the utility, we believe the pace of our assessment would not have been sufficient to prevent or substantially mitigate the consequences of the THI-2 accident.
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If any additional infonnation or clarification is desired, I or a menter of my staff will be pleased to meet with you to discuss this matter further.
Harold R. Denton, Director cc: Chairman Hendrie
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7/19/79 ACTION:
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SUBJECT:
Memo for Chairman Ahearne fm Denton thru Gossick re B&W ANALYSES OF THE SPETE SEPTEMBER 24, 1977 ACCIDENT AT DAt S-BESSE
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v MEM3RANDUM FOR:
Commissioner Ahearne (signed) T. A. Rehm THRU:
Lee V. Gossick, Executive Director for Operations FROM:
Victor Stello, Jr., Director,' Office of Inspecticn and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
B&W ANALYSES OF THE SEPTEMBER 24, 1977 ACCIDENT AT DAVIS-BESSE IE initiated.ar, investigation on July 19, 1979 upon learning of the testimony before the Presidential Commission by B&W employees, described in your July 19 mem randum to Mr. Gossick.
We anticipate approaching the investigation in the following manner:
(1)
IE will examine the question of B&W's handling of this information
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in light of their responsibilities under 10 CFR 21 Particular attention will be fc:ussed upon whether either the m acrandum in question or the substance of the information was pro'. ided to NRC in any fashion.
(2)
If our investigation establishes that such information was made available to NRC prior to March 28, 1979, we may ask OIA to look into the handling of the information within NRC.
This procedure is being followed during the Michelson investigation.
(3) We will ask flRR to respond to your question (4) regarding the significance of these analyses vis a vis the TMI accident when the full facts of the matter are clear.
We have held initiation of interviews in abeyance until we have had the 1
opportunity to evaluate both the testimony at issue as well as any formal
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rebuttal or amplification by more senior B&W officials.
Upon completion of l
I CONTACT:
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cirr investigation which will ~ receive priority attention, we will forward all of the information that we develop.
We will also provide you with copies of the documents that you requested as we cbtain them ourselves.
h Victor Stello, Jr.
Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement cc:
Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Gilinsky,
Commissioner Kennedy Cc:missioner Bradford SECY OPE OGC
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OESCRIPTION O terTER OMEMO O REPORT O OTHER P-PECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS
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B&W analyses of the 9/24/77 accident at Davis Besse & the TMI accident - req respon: e to questions c cys of the B&W memoranda and g.
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C LA SSIFICATIONl NUM1ER OF PAGES CATEGORY SOSTAL REGISTRY NO.
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NRC FORM 232 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS DO NOT RE?.fCVE THIS COPY PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROC.v C-M-5.+
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' Lee V. Gossick, EDO :
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John Ahearne dk
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SUBJECT:
E&W AttALYSES OF. THE SEPTEMSER 24, 1977 ACCIDENT AT DAVIS-BESSE The two attached newspaper items, which appeared this morning, indicate, that internal B&W analyses of the September 24, 1977 ac:ident at Davis-Sesse ur. overed information which, if transmitted to operators of E&W power reactors in a timely fashion, might have prevented or significantly recuced the con-sequences of the TMI accident.
These newspaper items raise many questions, am:ng which are the following:
1.
5'ere the memoranda referred to, or.the information in them, made available by B&W to the NRC prior to the TMI accicent? If so, when?
What action did the staff take as a result?
- 2. 71f not, dies this failure to transmit the results of these analyses constitute a violation of 10 CFR Part 21?
3.
If the at:swer to Question 1 is no, did the !.9C staff learn of tne analyses betseen March 28, 1979 and today?
If so, has tne staff eviewed the analyses and what are the results of those revins?
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In the staff's judgment, if the infomation uncovered in these analyses h d been available to'the HRC and/or Metropolitan Edisca in a timely f ashion, to what extent would the consequences of the TMI accicen-have a
baen mitigated or avoided?
l I would appreciate receiving the answersi to these ouestions as soon as gcssible.
If the staff has r.ot yet obtained the me:0randa and analyses or completed its review of them, please provide preliminary ans-ers now and
. cre ccraplete answers as soon as the staff reviews can be ccmpleted.
In addition, I would like to receive copies cf the S&W memoranda and analyses and the s sff reviews of them.
Chairman Fendrie Comissioner Gilinsky i
Comissioner Kennedy
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y 8
fev THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7-23-79 I
Mr. Gossick:
kL46 Please provide Commissioner Gilinsky with the same information l
requested in Commissioner Ahearne's i
Memo of July 19 (attached).
Y #f, 6,
Sylvia Elizonco Admfdistrative Aide to Cmr Gilinsky Attachment i
Rec'd Off ~~'-
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