ML19322D243
| ML19322D243 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8002100085 | |
| Download: ML19322D243 (64) | |
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UNITED STATES y ', ') # (f
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October 26, 1979 COMMISSION DETERMINATION REGARDING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT OF:
Transcript of Briefing on Proposed Enforcement Action Re TMI October 23,1979 Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.108(c), the Commission has determined that the subject transcript should be released to the public.
ef..a e
/ Samuel k
Secretary of e Commission 1
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NUCLE AR REGUL ATO RY COMMISSION i.
lN THE MATTER OF:
CLOSED MEETING BRIEFING ON PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT ACTION RE TMI
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Place - Washington, D. C.
Date. Tuesday, 23 October 1979 Pagesi - 174 r.i. pen.:
(202)347 3700 ACE -FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
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OffiaalReponers 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY
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CR7897 112 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g.
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
CLOSED MEETING 4
I 5
BRIEFING ON PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT ACTION RE TMI 6
7 Room 1116 1717 H Street, N. W.
8 Washington, D.
C.
9 Tuesday, 23 October 1979 10 The Commission met in Closed Session, pursuant to 11 adjournment, at 3:45 p.m.
12 BEFORE:
13 DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman
(
14 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 15 RICHARD T.
KENNEDY, Commissioner 16 PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner 17 JOHN F. AHEARNE, Commissioner 18 PRESENT:
19 Messrs. Bickwit, Chilk, Denton, Engelhardt, Malsch, t
20 Moseley, Snyder, and Stello.
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22 i
l 23 24
- Aw. sed Rgorws. lm.
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113 1
PROCEEDINGS jyjri l
(.7897 D E l-2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We meet to continue the discussion 3
on enforcement matters in connection with the Three Mile Island 4
Unit 2 accident.
I believe I'm correct in assuming that as a 5
continuation of yesterday's meeting, I need not ask for short 6
notice or closure votes?
7 MR. BICKWIT:
Yes.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I guess it would be useful, however, 9
for me to note for the record, as I expect I would have been 10 well-advised to note before yesterday's discussion, that in --
11 the Commissioners in discussing the points here in connection 12 both in general on the enforcement matters, the possible forms
(
13 it could take, and on particular aspects of particular 14 non-compliance items -- you have heard we have made various 15 comments for and against and in connection with; and I would 16 simply want to note and make clear that these are by way of 17 inevitably and properly, I think, of the Commissioner's initial 18 or preliminary views connected with deciding what the enforce-19 ment action that should go forward ought to be, that ultimately 20 the Commission may in turn be expected to confirm or review the 21 results of a proceeding on these enforcement actions; and I 22 would just emphasize for myself -- and I am sure for all of 23 my colleagues -- that the Commissioner's decisions at that time 24 will be based on the record compiled in the proceeding on Aces serd Roporters, Inc.
25 whatever enforcement action is taken here, and that whatever isi i
l 114 jari2 1
said now is not final and a prejudged final opinion on the 2
merits of these issues.
3 With that caveat, which it seemed appropriate for 4
me to make since my comments may have been among the strenger 5
in some aspects at the last meeting, let us go on.
6 We asked Vic Stello to go and consult his records 7
and see what further proposals we might discuss with regard 8
to enforcement.
9 Vic?
10 MR, STELLO:
Let me start with what I think is the 11 most substantive change.
You all should have had a draft that 12 we did last night.
It incorporates a number of the comments
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13 that were made at yesterday's meetire to make clear that the 14 action we are now taking does not preclude any further action 15 on the part of individuals or the Licensee based on what we 16 find as time goes on.
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Is this the one with 10231220 in 18 the upper --
19 MR. STELLO:
That's correct.
I think the language 20 that's in here reflects the various comments that were made 21 modifying the letter.
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Would you note where it is, Vic?
23 MR. STELLO:
ON page 4, the --
24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's see.
There's additional
- Aceverd Reconen, Inc.
25 language on page 2.
1
W 115 jeri 1
MR. STELLO:
The next to the last paragraph refers 2
to the fact that further action would be forthcoming.
The 3
paragraph, the second paragraph on page 4, starting "The 4
influence of the NRC" -- identifies other investigations.
There 5
were other editorial changes.
I want to speak to one that I 01 6
think is very substantive.
7 8
9 l
10 11 12 l
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13 14 15 l
16 17 18 19 20 21 i
22 l
23 24 Ace-.,er:0 Reporters, Inc.
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i I
W iv7.'02 01 116 sbnvu
,1 I indicated yesterday I would go back and look 2
very hard at what were the more significant saf e ty issues in 3
here and look at whe ther or not we had applied ways in which 4
we normally would the civil pe nal tie s, taking into account u
the activi ty, o
I guess I was struck by one that ala stand ou t.
7 That's the action rela ted to whe ther or not they should have 6
c lo sed the block valve downstream of the power-operated v
relief valve; and if they had done so, that the accident 10 they hao would not have occurred.
11 To me that clearly is a very, very significant 12 action.
he loosed very hard at that in the way we applied 13 the civil penalty.
I was able to persuade myself that a 14 rea sonable case could be to apply the f ull civil penal ty, 15 that is 35000 for each day tha t t ha t situation existed.
Io Tha t procedurc was in efrect and they did not take that 17 action.
Io As a result of tha t one specific action, the total lv cost of the civil penalty increased f rom yesterday's total 20 of $32,000 to sl55,000.
21 The reason it increa sed tha t amount was because 22 again you have the S25,000 a day maximum that you a pply in
^[
23 any three-day interval.
24 I have a number of other al terna tives for each of 2b t he 12 items.
I will get to those if I can last.
There
497'02 02 117 sbnUU i
were a number of questions raised yesterday that we 2
indicated we woula do our best to try to ge t answers.
I 3
tnink tney were very important.
If I could, I will just go 4
through what these questions were and the answers.
5 One question that I thought was very important was c
whether or not the NRC had approved any of the actions that 7
finally led up to a proposeo civil penalty f or tnat action.
You asked that of us and you asked it or Harold and Dick o
V Volimer.
The general answer is there are none.
10 MR. UENTON:
That's right.
Il MR. SfELLO:
I think I speak for Harold, too.
12 CHAIRd.AN HENDRIE:
At least that we are aware of 13 to the best you can determine.
I suppose re turns --
14 MR. STELLO:
There was one point, for example, i
15 that I think neens to be cited as an example.
We clearly lo wan ted da ta on the primary coolant s.mple.
We were asked to 17 get such information.
A re sul t o f taking that sample did lo re sul t in some overexposures.
We were asked -- we clearly Iv don't feel tha t the resul t of the overexposure was a result 20 of asking.
They needed che information as well as us.
It 21 was their obligation to go about getting it to the best of 22 their ability to ge t i t and prevent overexposure i f t ha t 23 were po ssible.
24 With that caveat or that exemption as a general 25 note, to the ex tent we we re a sking f or information --
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-8v7?d2 03 118 sbnbo I
COMMISSIONER KEl.NEDY Would we have had reason to
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2-assume if they pursued that request.that there was a high 3
probability there would be overexposures in ge tting that?
4 MR. STELLO:
I think the utility actually started 5
to oraw the sample -- once they did that, it would be hard o
presseo to notice how difficult it would be.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
There was at least that 6
po ssibili ty?
v MR. STELLO:
You knew you were dealing with highly 10 radioac tive ma terial.
I1 COMMISSIONER KEI4NEDY:
Or could be?
12 MR. SIELLO:
Could be.
No one, I don't think, is 13 suprised.
14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The second question. is was
(
IS there some way in which they coula have -- some 16 significant way, suostantial way, that they could have 17 mitigated the off ense?
Io MR. S f E LLO :
I will speak for myself.
I have lv looked very hard at t ha t question and taken the view that I 20 would not be able to cite them for the overexposures that 21 were obtained because I'm not sure that if they had tried to 22 do better, it would still have been eliminated.
There are 23 prac tices a ssocia ted wi th it.
That's one of the reasons 24 that a number of these issues are lumped together at the 25 sita-specific areas.
4
~uY7,02 04 119 sbnUU i
I do not believe that we can say had they done
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2 things a little bit be tter that they-could have completely 3
eliminatea the overexposures.
I might ask others here to
-4 comment, especially those that might have a different view.
5 I don't want someone to have a diff erent view, but o
if you ao?
7 (No response. )
6 (Laughter.)
v MR. STELLO:
We have explored i t.
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
?ould you put down your club 11 when you asked that question?
12 MR. BICKWIT:
I don't think he needs it.
13 MR. STELLO:
I never use a club.
14 (Laugnter.)
Another area that we were asked to lo look into --
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEdi On tha t one, is there a lo specific -- do I remember a specific citation in the HP 19 area?
20 MR. STELLO:
Yes. There is item number 2 which has 21 A through H which relate to general issues.
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I just wondered if there was a 23 specific citation.
24 MR. SfELLO:
Yes, there is.
F was overexposed, 25 and G; but they are pu t in there -- again, I am making it l
l
.ov7_.02 05 120 sbndd I
clear tnat my view was leaving them in there was for the
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2 purpose of general information; and again, I say I have a 3
_hard time deciding tha t tha t specific issue, if it stood --
4 if one argued to take this issue out and cite them for b
that overex posure, I in good conscience could not do that.
6 I don't think it is appropria te.
I will be coming back to 7
t ha t.
That's one of the reasons I will be using this.
6 It is cited because it is illustrative of what I v
think is the problems of the health physics situation at the 10 pla n t.
.11 The introduc tory language to this, it was 12 constructed to try to recognize the need to make this 13 balance.
14 CHAIRAAN HENDRIE:
If trare are not more
(
lo questions, let's move on.
Io MR. STELLO:
When was the NRC informed of the 10 17 to 40 rem per hour calculations try to reconstruct that, lo We went back ana asked people up a t region i to 19 look at wha t they had, fhey started to record conversations 20 about 9:15 or so in the morning.
On the record, there is a 21 conversation that related to a survey made at Goldsboro 22 which indicated they weren't being able to pick up 23 any thing, - and they did make ref erence to a calculation or a 24 prediction of a dose at that point, but didn't indica te the 25 n umbe rs.
l 1
~897.02 06 121 sbnUU i
COMMISSIONED AHEARNE:
They said they made a
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2 calculation but didn't 3
MR. STELLO:
They didn't.
Just indicated there 4
wa s a -- i t sounded -- and I can't recall the exact words.
5 I think it was an estimate, o
MR. MOSELEY:
That's my recollection that it was 7
said that they had taken surveys in the Goldsboro area and u
it didn't confirm that higher estima tes existed.
That was 9
the substance of it.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The surveys had reported il back at that time?
12 MR. SIELLO:
Yes.
We asked the inspectors that i
13 were in the region, in the office at that times and he was 14 unable to recall whether it was or wasn't mentioned.
He
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IS thinks it could have been that someone mentioned 10 r per lo hour.
I never recall 40 r per hour.
17 The about the best we were able to do in le looking back at the calculation.
It is going to be --
IV ContMISSIONER AHEARNE:
As far as from the initial 20 contact which was around seven up until that time, you are 21 saying it did not ta per?
l j
m' MR. SfE LLO :
Those conversations were not taped.
23 We had to rely on memory.
Tnat's what we asked them to do 24 was go back and talk to those inspectors.
l 25 COMMISSIONED AHEARtlE That memory is a little l
e
'897 02 07 122 sbnuu i
fuzzy?
Abou t wha t they might have heard?
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2 MR. SfELLO:
Yes.
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Why do we then refer to the 4
10 to 40 from here?
We don't have any record of the 40.
5 MR. SfELLO:
The licensee did a calculation, as I 6
recall, that said it projected up to 40 r per hour.
That 7
was a calculation.
Am I correct?
That's the reason.
8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Okay.
Y MR. MUSELEY:
That was later revised, I think, 10 rather informally to a 10 r per hour.
As far as I can 11 recall, that was sort of a top of the head juogment s that 12 the number calculation was wrong and the number should have 13 been more like 10.
I don't recall ther; being an actual 14 calculation.
(
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is it correct then from lo what you have said -- the way this reads is that -- down 17 here in the bottom of pager 11, that dose rates of this 16 magnitude were no t immediately reported to the NRC?
Wha t I ly gather f rom what you have said was we aren't sure whether 20 do se ra te s of this magnitude were reported to the NRC?
21 MR. SfELLO:
We have no evidence that they were 22 reported.
23 COMMISSIONED AHEARNE:
What you pointed out is 24 that time period, which would be at issue, we weren't 25 repor ting; ano the people recollec t a dose rate, they are L
's
'8v7,02 00 123 son 00 I
not sure what it is or whether they heard it, but we are
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2 making a flat statement that they didn't report it.
3 MR. MOSELEY:
There were notes maae of these 4
discussions earlier.
There was nothing in those notes.
We 5
are not stric tly de pendent on memory f or that time pe riod.
6 Maybe we misled you earlier.
There are notes.
7 CO 4MISSI0 DER AHEARNE:
I guess I'm still -- i t is o
not as positive -- it's a more positive statement than I ge t 9
from you.
10 MR. STELLO:
I think I see your point.
In light 11 of what wt leard, it is a t best going to be f uzzy.
Was it 12 or wasn't it reported?
I suspec t that if the licensee does 13 make an argument that he thinks i t was not, he can o f f e r --
14 I am sure it will be memory, someone having had the I
15 conversations then I think that tha t's the a ppropriate time lo to raise tha t issue.
17 I think tha t the enrust of item number 12 was to lo collect these three issues into one and say was the 19 reporting of significant information done as well as it 20 should nave been.
21 There's a feeling at least that while it could 22 have been be tuer, we'll need to have his side of the story, 23 and that's, af ter all, wha t we are doing.
We are suggesting 4
24 this is where we are coming out, that we have yet to hear 25 what his views might be; and if they are views such as you l
l
dv7,02 OY 124 sbnUU i
are suggesting might come to light, there's no reason ' why wa 2
car t decide it then.
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3 ColhIISSIOtJER AHEARNE:
I am not suggesting that 4
they might come to light, I am just raising the question.
5 6
7 6
v 10 j
11 3
12 13 14 f
15 to 17 lo Iv 20 21 22 23
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24 25 i
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dv7,03 01 125 bwuo
'l MR. SfELLO:
Yes.
On this one I-think maybe we 2
should soften tne language.
I'll do that.
g' 3
COMMISS10dEH AHEARNE:
Since I raised tha t, you 4
mention in item 123 -- did you give any more thought to S
possible action against individuals?
o MR. STELLO:
I've given it thought but not as a 7
part of this particular activity.
Some reports that I have seen and heard about recently have raised some questions in o
v my mind beyond those that I had yesterday as to whether some 10 of the interviews we have had with people have provided us 11 with the same information that was provided in later 12 interviews based on the questions.
I really can't answer 13 that.
14 It is being looked at.
16 CD'4MISSIONEd AHEARHE:
Is it -- is there some lo alluding to that in the cover le tter?
17 COMMISSIOJER GILINSKY:
Let's see.
That deals 13 with events subsequent to the accident?
19 COMt4ISSIONER AHEARNE:
No.
20 Co.4MISSIONER GILINSKY:
In other words, I 21 understood Vic to say tha t he was concerned that 22,
sta tement made to I&E didn't jibe witn what had been -- the 23 same individuals said later?
24 MR. SfELLO:
That's correct.
26 Cat.i4 ISS IONEH GI LIdSKY :
I t's tne tru thf ulne ss i
126 ov7 03 02 bwou 1
of those statements as opposed to their actions during the
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2 period of the accident?
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY :
I thought it was both.
4 MR. S fE LLO :
It really is both.
Without getting 5
into specifics, cepending on how it comes out as to what he o
told us, and what he told others who may have been in the 7
plant and how f ar up in the corporation that was understood, o
which we will now have to understand and pursue, might mean 9
t hat other individuals may be involved, what they did or 10 didn't know.
Il COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask yous wha t 12 action can you take against individuals?
13 MR. STELLO:
If the individual is licensed, we can 14 revoke the license or fine him.
(
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
If it's not a licensed 16 indivicual?
17 MR. SfELLO:
If it's not, I don't gnow there is Id anything we can do.
IV MR. MOScLEY:
Unless there is a Part 21.
20 MR. SfELLO:
That doesn't apply.
21 COMMISSIOviER KENNEUf Exce pt insofar as ou can 22 a sse ss the licensee for responsibility f or their employees' 23 actions.
24 MR. S fE LLO:
Inat's the licansee.
29 COMM I SS I0tlEr. AH EARN E.*
I was specifically a
I
ids ?,03 03 127 bwud I
addre ssing the indiviaual.
( -
2 MR. STELLO:
To answer your question -- I have too 3
many questions -- on page 4, the last paragraph, we did 4
indicate in here there might be action on individuals.
The S
second to last paragra ph.
"Further enforcement action - "
o against the company or individuals.
7 CHAIRMAtt HENDRIE:
Don't you mean for this time d
period?
I've exhausted the merits of the issue and am now v
quibbling.
10 MR. STELLO:
Yes, it's for.
11 CHAIRl4AN HEtIDRI E:
Editorial trivia.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You worry about that part.
13 I'll worry abouc the rest.
14 So that's what you would view as potentially lb covering that?
Io I ask General Counsel and also Tom, your 17 interpretations are there's no provision in our laws, our lo regulations that would enable us to take any civil penalty 19 against an individual; i s tha t co rrect ?
20 MR. BICKWIT:
Tha t's no t licensed.
21 MR. EdGELHARDT:
That's not licensed.
If it's an 22 indiviaual who -- if an individual is not licensed, then we 23 won't have any way of reaching them, except through the 24 licensee itself.
25 MR. BICKWII:
Agreed.
e ov7,03 04 128 bwuu I
fou might refer to the Department of
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2 Justice under various criminal codes.
3 MR. Ei1GELHAR0ft We are talking about civil.
4 COMMISS10i4ER AHEARNE:
Specifically on the civil 6
penal ty.
The
's no way we have of reaching that 0
indivicual?
7
. I gather that even if it's a licensed operator, 6
can we exact a civil penalty on a licensed operator?
y MR. E;1GELHARuT:
Ye s, you can.
10 MR. BICKWIT:
You can.
Il MR. EilGELHARDT:
If they are licensees of the NRC, 12 Ne have the whole panoply of actions.
13 C0!.iMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Another advantage of 14 requiring licensed operators.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
This may have been asked, lo but can the company pay that fine?
Is there any way to stop 17 it f rom paying that fine?
Io Ed. EuGELHARUT:
I guess there is nothing in the tv regulations that says the company cannot pay tha t fine.
In 20 o ther worcs, there is noching to preclude that 21 ha ppening.
?lhether they do or not is a ma ttter of company 22 policy.
The re is nothing in our regulations that con trol's 23 it.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Of course, you can control 25 the operating license, let the company do that.
I l
O o97,03 06 129 owbu 1
In otner words, Vic was trying to point out if you 2
penalize the operator, the company might step in and pay the 3
penalty.
If you lift the operator's license --
4 COMMISSI0 DER KENNEDY:
Oh, I thought you said b
opera ting license.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I just dian't know what 7
the situation was.
o MR. STELLO:
The next question was, were any of v
the items that are in the citation previously identified 10 through irispection reports or activities?
11 h'e had them go back and review the inspection 12 }
reports.
We cannot find any specific ref erence to something 13 {
having been previously identified or known to be inadequate' 14 in a specific manner.
However, the reports which cover the 15 period f rom 1977 through '78, they do contain discussions of lo being dissa ti sfied wi th procedures.
However, they do not 17 reflect the specific procedures or the specific aspect of a 18 specific procedure that is befog requested.
So you really 19 can't get a direc t answer to each of these.
They normally 20 don't have details to allow you to get down into that 21 problera.
That is especially when you are going through the 22 preoperating.
23 The next question was whe ther there were any 24 'I inspections in progress on the dates at which the auxiliary 26 wa ter valve s had problems.
That was January 3 J,
F l
0
'ov7 03 00 bwbu I
February 26, ana March 20.
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2 On January 3, there were no inspectors on the 3
site; on February 26, there was an inspector on the site who (}
4 was performing inspections on Unit I, not Uni t 2.
S On March 26, there was an inspection that was o
principally looking at the ref ueling outage for Unit No.
I, 7
and he did some record review on unit 2, but didn't do a y
u walk through the pl an t.
Y Did any of the previous inspections identify the 10 fact that tail pipe temperatures were above the procedural 11 limi t?
Based on the review, the answer is no.
12 Did the inspectors review and a pprove the 13 auxiliary f eedwater surveillance procedure?
We did find out 14 that hera again there was an inspection in December of 15 1978.
The inspector observed the surveillance testing for lo the period through July to early December.
He also reviewed 17 the procedure, but the report does not indicate that he 16 identified any problems with the procedure.
I would have to 19 conclude that he didn't recognize that that procedure had a 20 deficiency in it.
21 C04MISSIOi4ER AHEARdE Would you then also 22 concluce that tha t would be in terpre ted as his approving the 23 procedure?
24 MR. STELLO:
I don't think so.
I think tha t wha t 25 they do is look at them; and if they find deficiencies, get l
897.03 07 131 bwuu 1
the deficiencies corrected, but the kind of review and the
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2 knowledge and the time it would take to really go through 3
them and do them, get approval I don't believe they would 4
not normally do this during inspections.
5 If they do find some thing tha t is a problem, they o
clearly f ocus on that and get it corrected.
7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Does the licensee see it a
that way?
The guy goes through the procedure, looks at it, V
hands it back and doe sn't indicate deficiencies.
Wha t is 10 the licensee going to think he just did?
11 MR. MOSELEY:
If I may answer that, beause I am sure Vic may want to havae his own answer, in my experience
/
12 t
13 we have -- we always tell the licensee that our review of 14 procedures is specifically not to approve the procedure, but g
it t,/f IS rather to test for the ef fec tiven'ess with which they review 16 it.
17 So I would say f rom my vantage poin t tha t 16 licensees do not believe tha t the reviews we do are for the 19 purpose of approval.
20 MR. STELLO:
I guess I agree.
the licensee would 21 be in error to think that tha t constituted approval, since 22 if he wanted to change the procedure then, I think he would 23 have to then, if he f elt that way, come back and ask for our 24 review ano approval of the change.
That's clearly not --
25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Which he does not do?
t 1
~dV7.03 06 132 bwDO
'l MR. STELLO:
Right.
If he does think it
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2 constitutes approval, he would have the obligation of 3
saying, "Now, I want to change it.
Here, approve my 4
change."
o MR. SiiYDER:
Aren't these also one of just o
thousands of procedures that you pick someone at random on 7
an audit basis?
6 MR. STELLO:
They are clearly --
Y MR. SNYDER:
How about all the others?
We are not 10 in that position, are we?
11 MR. STELLO:
We are going to be emphasizing a lot
';?
12 more in the future, do a lot more procedure review for the 13 im por tan t safety systems.
14 MR. SNYUER:
At the time?
15 MR. STELLO:
At the pre sent time the answer is --
Io COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Boy, are we going to have a 17 a lot of problems.
16 MR. STELLO:
I know we are.
I think wi th the lv resident program, if we pick out the important systems and 20 take a good hard look a t how that should be done, we ought 21 to be able to identify problems such as we saw here.
22 23 24 25
I CR7897 133
- 4 rip 1 DD 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Isn't there some hope
(
2 through the unit inspector programs, I think, probably more 3
than the resident?
Because the resident is a little more 4
broadly focused.
It's going to be tough to do; and I wouldn't 5
be surprised if -- to the extent that you can settle down on a 6
particular model, of which there are a number, and if it 7
happens to be one, for instance, that we run a number of 8
our residents through a simulator program on, and the pro-9 cedures that are used in each one of those run-throughs, 10 each one of those quick course for our people, I wouldn't 11 be surprised but that those get a tolerable shake-down, 12 because I must say that training crowd of simulators is 13 pretty darn sharp.
14 Just to be faced with a mass of those things in the 15 plant, to try to go through them --
16 MR. STELLO:
That's not what I am advocating.
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I know.
Furthermore, it's 18 off the subject.
We have already had a pretty vigorous 19 afternoon here.
20 MR. STELLO:
One more number I tried to deal with 21 as we were groping around yesterday to try to find out 22 how to articulate the clearly upper bound number.
What is 23 the maximum theoretical dollar civil penalty that could be l
l 24 imposed?
And let me tell you what I didn't try to do:
I l Ace ad Roponen, Inc.
25 looked up when was the plant licensed.
It was February 8, 1978.
l
134 r
rlp 2 DD 1
So if I assumed that there was something that went. wrong
(-
2 every month from the time it was licensed until March 30 --
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Not a Dad assumption.
4 MR. STELLO:
-- that assumption, the maximum 5
dollar fine, $350,000.
That's assuming a $25,000 fine every 6
month, in that time period.
So you can;t get a number bigger 7
than that number.
At least I don't see of any way.
8 MR. ENGELHARDT:
That's right.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
A certain principle of 10 spanking children whether they need it or not on the principle 11 that they may have done things you don't know about.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Just make a uniform $25,000 13 levy and after two years if we haven't found anything, we can 14 give part of it back.
15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
However, I would have to note 16 that I think that is in many quarters discredited.
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Vic, I notice that on your 18 discussion on the electromatic relief valve and not closing 19 the black valve you don' t have any comments that you have in 20 a few other places about why that is significant.
Is there a 21 particular reason for that?
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I thought that was one page 2.
23 MR. STELLO:
Unless it didn't come through.
24 Page 2, I told you I modified that paragraph to make Ace dr"J Reporte,s, Inc.
25
' clear that the concern here is this could have prevented i
rip 3 DD 1
an accident and it does add up -- and I don't want to say it's
(
2 the most important issue, but it clearly is among the itaportant 3
issues.
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
No.
I see.
I just 5
contrasted the bottom, item number 1 where you have the 6
violation attributed to an accident.
You pick it up in the 7
letter.
8 MR. STELLO:
I emphasize it in the letter to make 9
the point.
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
On that valve, if the block 11 valve had been closed, I think they'd have pumped the safety --
12 the low set safety, wouldn't they?
13 MR. STELLO:
Yes, I would think they would have.
7 14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
With the auxiliaries off, the 15 rise in the temperature, the expansion, I assume it would 16 have gone up out the safety.
Would that have at least had 17 a different ending?
18 MR. STELLO:
No.
Now,you would have to assume 19 that the safety failed, too.
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Oh, yes.
21 MR. STELLO:
I don't have any evidence to say 22 the safety would have failed.
I assume the safety would 23 have worked.
24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think the likelihood of the nw neoonwi, inc.
25 safety resetting is probably better than that -- than Peter's I
136 rip 4 DD 1
favorite relief valve.
(
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Who manufactured it?
3 MR. STELLO:
What I said is that the valve 4
failed.
If the block valve had closed, it wouldn't have 5
been given an opportunity to fail.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I just think you would have 7
gone ahead and lifted the saefty and then been --
8 MR. S TELLO :
Everything would have been all right.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
On the other hand, it would 10 at least have been a different sequence.
The chances that it 11 would have resulted in a severe accident are probably --
12 MR. STELLO:
The reason I made the statement I made, 13 that valve we know failed.
If that valve had had its block
(
14 valve closed, failure would not have affected the accident.
15 I have no reason to believe that the safeties would have 16 failed.
That's why I made the statement.
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You had no more than roughly 18 a 1 percent reason to believe that the safety --
19 MR. STELLO:
Excuse me.
There is always a chance.
20 That is true.
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Then at least you'd have started 22 with a cold tailpipe.
Maybe the operators would har 23 MR. STELLO:
Been more successful.
The recorders --
24 there is another thought.
If they also had the high tailpipe na wO Reponm, Inc.
25 temperatures, I think -- someone help me -- I think they were
~.
137 rip 5 DD 1
also requried to put thermocouples on the tailpipes and 2
the safety valves on a trend recorder.
Even if one of those 3
should have maloperated, they would have had the temperatures 4
on the trens recorders and been able to see it.
5 Is that not right?
6 VOICE:
That's correct.
7 MR. MOSELEY:
That is correct.
8 MR. STELLO:
The procedure required them to put 9
those termocouples on the trend recorder.:
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Because they don't have 11 valve indication on the safety?
12 MR. STELLO:
They don't also have a way to isolate
/
13 it.
\\
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
15 MR. STELLO:
Well --
16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
At any rate, clearly a different 17 kettle of fish?
18 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
19 If you would like, I could go through each of the items 20 again as to --
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Is it necessary?
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I don't think so.
23 I have another question, though, of a general character.
24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
Ace
,eral Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Vic, I recognize that your l
1
138 rip 6 DD 1
group has now gone through and thoroughly reviewed as far
(
2 as the I&E' approach is concerned; but there are a number of 3
other people reviewing the behavior of the licensee as well 4
as our own behavior, but the behavior of the licensee.
5 In particular, obviously Kemeny's group is doing this.
6 Can you give me an explantion of why it is more 7
appropriate to take the action now as opposed to waiting 8
until February, given -- at least let me make an assumption 9
and disagree with the assumption.
10 The assumption would be that a large civil penalty 11 against the licensee now is not going to have any greater 12 effect upon the licensee than a large civil penalty upon the 13 licensee in February?
14 MR. STELLO:
The thought that I had when I addressed 15 this the last time was the need to get on with the action, 16 we have sharpened up the thinking of what went on.
I think 17 it's time to bring this into focus.
We could probably do it 18 other ways than issuing the civil penalty, but the thought that 19 I had in my mind is, well, we might find something from the 20 Kemeny Commission, it's possible, that will affect our think-21 ing, and we will have to pursue it.
22 It's possible that when Ragone is finished, it may come 23 out.
24 The Hart group, Senator Hart's group, I think won't be l
Am sw agonm. ine.
8 25 finished until June.
It's possible something may come out of i
i 139 rip 7 DD 1
it.
I just see the potential for a delay in making this 2
decision that just seems longer than it need be.
3 I don't feel the least but constrained; and if I do I
4 learn something more, I can take further action as needed.
5 Either way.
I don't know if we could give someone 6
a civil penalty back if they paid it and found that we were 7
not really justified.
8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Sure.
9 MR. STELLO:
I suspect we could if that were 10 appropriate.
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We would just have to reopen.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
My real concern is c~
13 trying to think through -- that is we -- I am now looking 14 more at it on our side than on your side of the table.
We l
15 went through a fairly lengthy period of trying to get started 16 on a broad scale investigation and finally got it going, 17 the Ragone effort, which is now committed to coming in 18 rather around the end of the year.
19 I was trying to think through what is it that required, 20 that makes it important to go out now in this enforcement 21 action prior to receiving that; and that's what I would 22 like to know.
Ther is one other thought that came to my i
23 mind.
I think we have pretty much signaled to the country 24 that this was something that we would be doing in about 60
- Am..
,esQ Reporters, Iric.
25 days after issuing the report.
I use the flip side --
i
140 rip 8 DD 1
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That was the purpose of 2
launching the study that led to new reg 0600 in the first 3
place.
4 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
That was its purpose.
I 5
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Since you interjected 6
that, if you recall at that time we were under the assumption 7
we were going to get started on the other thing.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes, but they are directed 9
to different purposes, principally improving of the agency.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
As has been recently obvious 11 in recent stories in the newspapers, they're still continuing 12 to come out with alleged information about what actually was co' 4 13 happening with respect to the licensee's personnel at the time.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Ace nos neporters, Inc.
25
141 jGri 1 I
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It's a good question.
I have been
{'DD5
- 7897 2
trying to decide for myself, John, whether we ought to be going 3
forward now with this or to, in effect, hold it and have the 4
lbgovin results in hand and the Presidential Commission and then 5
go with it.
6 About all I concluded from that is that there isn't 7
any good answer.
We are going to collectively have to choose 8
which form we are going to be impaled on.
9 If we don't move, people are going to point a finger 10 and say, look, there, they can't do anything again; they sit there and mutter to themselves.
12 If we do go ahead, we are going to hear there goes l'
13 the NRC going ahead with their own inquiry and letting Met Ed Id off with a little pat on the wrist.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I suspect, Joe, there's a 16 different part to that; and also there is the strong potential 17 that there is the NRC trying to quickly run ahead and say that 18 they have now identified who the culprits are and it's right over there, it's Met Ed, they are the culprits.
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Just so.
21 About all I can conclude is that --
22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That only presumes that people 23 are out looking for culprits.
There are those who believe 24 people are out looking for facts.
I am one of those.
w se nonm. inc.
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's why I think it might be i
142 scri 2 1
be better to wait.
C 2
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
My impression is there are more 3
culprit lookers.
4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I think you are right.
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
That may be a cynical view.
6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
No, it's the realistic one.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
My conclusion out of all this is 8
if I am going to be damned if I do and damned if I don't, my 9
inclination is to go ahead with it.
It's right.
The investiga-10 tion has been done.
The Staff has chewed.
We have viewed, 11 argued, come back.
12 I would be inclined to see what the results -- what
(
13 our collective view is; I would be inclined to go ahead.
14 There are clearly good arguments you can make both ways.
15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
One argument for going ahead --
16 I recognize arguments on both sides as well, one argument for 17 going ahead is that at least it's consistent with our oft-l 18 stated o'bjective of moving the assessment of penalties up closer 19 to the event.
20 We had' historically waited for long periods and thus 21 the event and it's signficance had paled by the time when 22 suddenly the penalty comes along and nobody even recalls the 23 event.
24 That's not likely to happen here.
w s e n.pon m,inc.
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It's not likely.
t
143 jori 3 1
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Wait a moment.
Just a minute.
2 Events tend to pale in people's significance.
While 3
it may be a dramatic and terrible one in your view right now, 4
I bet you that there are in the 200 million people in this 5
country a very, very much larger percentage today who would 6
say TMI, let's see, what was that about than there were even 7
two months ago.
It's going to be that way, the longer time 8
goes on.
It is not going to be the greatest historical event 9
of all time, except in our minds.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Not in mine.
There are a few 11 others that were of more significance historically.
12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I think so.
But I suggest 13 t
that there are going to be a lot of them.that will come along I4 in ther interim.
15 I am not arguing for this point of view.
I am just 16 saying it is an argument that I think one can make and weight 17 in the equation.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I agree.
I think we have the 19 responsibility for investigating these sorts of situations.
20 I am of the view of taking enforcement action.
For us to 21 wait I think would be to raise questions about the respons-22 ibilities of that office.
Certainly in waiting it -- the 23 advantages of waiting are that we may learn more, obviously.
24 I would say we ought to act now in the face of waat we have Am wW Reorwrs, lm.
25 come up with.
I
4 144 jeri 4 l'
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I agree with that on balance.
C-2 I think the sooner rather than later concept is the better 3
course to take.
That is the proper course.
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I think it's a very difficult i 5
question.
As long as the matter is so phrased that we can take 6
various actions, we can go ahead now.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I would prefer to wait.
I 8
just feel there are too many unanswered questions.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I guess we will -- the record 10 will duly note your view, John.
I think the rest of us are 11 more inclined to move ahead.
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
It could become pretty
(~~
13 important if we split two to two on the matter of how John 14 voted.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I intend to continue voting 16 the rest of the year.
17 Having now accepted the Commission action...
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We are going to lose a commissioner 19 pretty quick.
20 I think we have settled 'cne of the questions I was 21 going to ask you, namely should we think about postooning 22 until other investigation reports are in or go ahead now; and 23 by now I mean in the near term; and I think the weight it 24 toward going ahead.
Aw. aeral Reporters, Inc.
25 Can I --
I
145 jori 5 1
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I would only add, however, 2
as I suggested yesterday after having advised the Kemeny group 3
of our intention to do so, I'm not suggesting that we are 4
hereby seeking their advice in the matter, simply advising them 5
what we are doing, so they don't read it in the Washington Post 6
or some other equally reputable paper.
7 VOICE:
We have held later than they have, sir.
8 VOICE:
I notice that.
I am suggesting if we have a 9
leak on that, I rather it come from them than us.
I would 10 rather we read it as a leak than they.
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Can I do a quick sampling of the 12 feeling --
(
13 COMMISSICNER AHEARNE:
Before you get to that, I 14 appreciate the rapid turr.around in answering my questions.
I 15 do find the dollar amour.t here more satisfying.
16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
More satisfying?
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
More satisfying.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Gee, you got to $700,000 there 19 before that limit turned up.
20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Are you sure the word is 21 satisfactory.
I am just trying to get the nuance of the feel-22 ing here.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Can I ask what the general 24 inclination is with regard to the current -- Dick's revised A=_
.ww n oorwri. w.
25 package?
l t
146 jori 6 I
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Do you want to take it piece 2
by piece?
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, I am going to run out of a 4
Commissioner in ten minutes.
I was trying to see whether it 5
might go in larger chunks I guess is what I was searching for.
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I tell 'fou the difficulty 7
I have with it, even as recast.
As I said yesterday, the one 8
item in it that I find the most troublesome is the withholding 9
of the thermocouple information, and perhaps the other two items 10
' that are in that same category.
Il The new package in a sense exacerbates that 12 difficulty; that is it seems to me the 4000 bond for those 13 infractions which might have had drastic implications for the Id public health and safety have been a very short time, 15 represents the greatest disproportion between the penalty we 16 are talking about imposing and the gravity of the action we 17 are citing.
18 By jacking a different item up to $620,000, we are 19 saying that that item is $150,000 more serious than the one 20 that seems to me to be the most serious.
In a way, I think it 21 represents one of the concerns.
You showed there would be an 22 imbalance by doing your numbers again yesterday.
23 That leaves me about where I was at the end of 24 yesterday.
I would come down in favor of I think revocation Ace ser'J Reporters, Inc.
25 based specifically on that one item or set of items and would I
147
' jori7 1
go back to a civil penalty package.
I haven't really had a 2
chance to sit down and study this, but it seems to me the big cnd 5 3
difference is clearly in that jump up to $620,000.
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 I
11 i
12 13 14 15 16 17 I
18 19 i
20 i
I
.21 i
22 i
23 24
!Aa ne neponm, inc.
25 i
148
.o97 Oo 01 ltD0 i
CL '.JI SSIOilEtt AHEARtiE Could I comment on that?
2 At least as f ar as I can see, the action that they are
{
3 citing f or the much larger penalty, though, is one which had 4
it not been there, had tha t violation no t o ccurra d, the b
accident would not have occurred.
o If that's clear in the sense that's a clear 7
violation, their action tha t they followed the procedure and c
this accident would not have occurred, the Three -- not Y
relating information, tha t is the area I am uneasy about, 10 not knowing all of the f acts.
11 You have one case, the relay of a dose ra te 12 calculation.
I know of the dif ficul ty -- we have heard 13 about the dif ficulties the licensee had in contacting the 14 IJhC during that period of time.
15 That wa s al so w ha t led to a lot of hectic action lo going on at that time.
I am very uneasy about saying, aha, 17 there's a clear violation.
16 The second one whic h is tha t hydrogen spike, I 19 think that's going to be if ever resolved, it would be an 20 interesting resolutioni but there is certainly a lot of 21 debate about who would have known what, when and how much 22 did liRC employees in that area know.
23 As f ar as going on to the thermocouples, that's 24 why I really now focus back on the question of an individual 25 and possible penalties against an individuals and I have a l
4
av7.0c 02-149 ituu I
li ttle dif ficulty --
2 COMi4ISSIONER GILINSKY:
Don't you see the utility 3
responsible for the accident?
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARHE:
But, Vic, as I tried to say 5
yesteraay, in thinking through the revocation cycle -- and I o
hate, I gue ss, satisfied myself that the issue of would we 7
be able to have suf ficient leverage on them -- I am e
satisfieu we would, so I think I am satisfied from that 9
point of view.
10 The question is, it seems to me, there are two 11 reasons one would do that.
One either doe s i t because you 12 have concluded that they are not fit to operate a plant, or 13 you do it as a penalty.
14 What kinds of penalties?
Well, there are two
(
15 penal ties a ssocia ted.
I gather this is, one, a question 16 that there may be a very substantial financial penalty that 17 they would have to pay to refile for a license.
16 My experience leads me to believe that's no t lv really, (a), much of a penalty, because that can go into the 20 rate system, that is more normal operating expenses; and it 21 certainly would seem to be a warping of the rules of the 22 Congress that we work under, as to here is what you are 23 supposed to do.
24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I don't understand that.
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Congress has said here are
@97.06 03 150 ltou l~
the penalties you lay out.
I don't recall -- I don't think
(
2 there's any thing that would say one of the penalties is you 3
have to pay an application fee in the sense of a penalty.
4 Then the other side of it would be a penalty that 5
in our list of possible penalties the worst we can do is hit 6
them with our procedures, the y ha ve to go through the 7
procedures.
8 That's bad governmen t.
I'm having real difficulty v
seeing it as a consistent with a penalty, so I move back to 10 the o ther side They are not fit to operate.
Il COMMISSIGHER BRADFORD:
Wai t a minute --
12 COl.iMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Could I just finish my 13 point?
14 If the conclusion is they ar not fit to operate,
(
15 tnen I think a much more serious question is on fMI-I and to that's the license we ought to revoke.
That's the issue.
17 Tnere's real doubt whether TMI-2 will ever lo o pera te.
Certainly there's no doubt it's not going to 19 operate for several years.
20 TMI-l is an operable pl an t.
We are going through 21 this process on whether it should be able to operate.
So if 22 we have grave doubt about someone, one of those plant's 23 ability to operate, the management, can they do it, i t ought 24 to oe TMI-l tha t we ought to revoke?
2S COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Are you making that l
l t
I
\\
o97.0o 04 151 l tbu i
pro posal?
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I hope not, since we have 3
an ongoing proceeding.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I am trying to understand b
the suggestion.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Tha t's why I have had 7
dif ficulty seeing the logic of going through the revoca tion 8
on this enforcement ac tion.
Y COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I think you are right in 10 saying that it's more in the category of saying that they 11 are not fit to operates that is, there are certain driving 12 viola tions that would cost you your license automatically, 13 even if you commit them during an accident s you find 14 yourself in the hospital and you can't drive a car again for is mon ths anyway.
Revocation simply follows.
16 What I am saying is I would revoke based upon what 17 is here.
I am snying that based on the showing that we have lo had so f ar f rom the staff, the posture I would think that is IV the rignt thing to go into the hearing with is that 20 revocation is in order.
As a consequence of the withholding 21 of this information.
22 As facts come out during the hearings that 23 indicate that as to one or another of those three i tems, the 24 understanding as presented to us in this letter and by the 25 staf f in the briefin9s are somehow different or shaded or i
697.06 05 152 Ituu i
modified, then the conclusion of the hearings should be l(~
2 diff erent, also.
3 As f ar as saying what the right position is to 4
have based on the f acts under this, I come down on the side 5
that I would not want these people operating a plant again.
o As to TMI-1, I might wind up there again on the 7
other hand saying, (a), there are changes that could be made 8
in the management struc ture.
(B), the mere fact that the v
hearing in that case will permit that i ssue to be thoroughly 10 aired with regard to fMI-1, the picture might be different 11 it both plants were still operating.
12 I don't kr.ow what I feel.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
There will certainly be --
14 if the licensee ever proposes to opera te TMI-2, and whatever I
15 struc ture, organization, what that is at that time, there 16 certainly will oe a hearing on it.
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
My point has le ss to do 16 with TMI-2 as such than I think that as this is laid out 19 here ought to result in revoca tion and that that ought to 20 be -- even if this were to happen again, even if the 21 licensee --
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Where I would end up -- and 23 tha t's why I say I have a lot of questions and pref er no t to 24 go aheaa at this time.
25 Af ter I reviewed what Rogovin has come up with and l
l
'dv7.0o 06 153 itbd I
gone through that, and I were to conclude as you have L
2 concludeo that the licensee should not operate the plant, I 3
would take ac tion against him.
4 That's the one that I think is really the issue.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask yous Su ppose a o
utility has half a dozen or dozen plants and something were 7
to occur that raises grave questions about the management, b
do you f eel bound to pull all the licenses?
Y COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
If something occurs that 10 raises grave questions about the management, I certainly 11 f eel obligated to take careful review of their management.
12 My point is tha t if the issue is that it is so 13 grave an action that a license should be pulle d, i t a ppears 14 to me that focused specifically on Met Ed, narrowed down to 15 TMI, there is one plant where the issue of it operating is lo really an issue.
17 That's the main one.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Are you pro posing -- if 19 you are, we can discuss that?
Are you proposing that we 20 also close the other one?
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Wha t I am saying is of the 22 two licenses I would be prepared to pull, it would be TMI-1, 23 COMMISSI0tfER KENNEDY:
We ought to restrain 24 ourselves to the dirhicsion of TMI-l ?
20 MR. BICKWIT:
No.
There is no problem with tha t.
$v7,00 07 154 ItDJ l
You are deciding -- you are discussing an additional 2
enforcement action with respect to TMI-1.
You are permitted
{
3 to do tha t.
4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Let me just say that tha t 5
is r.ot my sensing of the conversation.
It has had to do o
with some of the very issues that, as I understand it, we 7
have specifically asked the board to consider.
u MR. BICKWIT:
That is true.
I don't -- I don't 9
dispu te --
10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I am suggesting we have to 11 be careful.
12
- R. BICKWIT
I don't dispute that.
I am saying 13 that there need not be much :are exercised here, because 14 what you are coing is deciding whether to go forward with IS additional enforcement actions; and there are cases that lo suggest that you ought not to be precluded f rom dealing with 17 those kinds of questions, because of the pendency of ongoing 16 proceeoings.
Iv COMMISSIONER KENNEDY :
Okay.
All right.
20 MR. BICKNIT:
You would be hamstrung as a 21 Commission if tha t were not the case.
22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Fine.
F 23 I will eliminate the problem as far as I am 24 concerned.
I may wind up the only Commissioner able to 2S consider the problem later.
i l
GV7.Oo 08 155 ituu I
l4R. BICKWIT:
My advice is that that will not be
{~
2 the case.
3 4
5 o
7 6
Y
'T 10 Il 12 l3 14 IS lo 17 lu 19 20 21 22 23 24 2b
156 i
cr 7897 1
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
If you keep talking about it ftri1 uD 7 2
in the context in which you are talking about it, it will be.
3 (Commissioner Kennedy lef t the room at 4:50 p.m.)
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It is my understanding that 5
you said you thought revocation didn't amount to much?
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
No.
I said I can see 7
revocation being taken for one or two rounds, as a penalty --
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I don't understand your 9
comments on the penalty.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I said then there are two 11 kinds of penalties that are associated with it.
The first 12 is there is a financial penalty; and as I understand it, it's 13 a possibility of a very large fee that has to be paid once they 14 reapply for the license.
My point was I did not think that that 15 was consistent with the congressional statutes under which we 16 operate, that that license fee was supposed to be a penalty.
17 The second was the other kind of a penalty is that l
l 18 we make them comply with our procedures.
I think that is bad 19 government to use our procedures as a penalty.
One of the 20 reasons you take the action is for a penalty or they are not 21 fit to operate.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think it would be regarded 23 as a penalty quite apart from any monetary costs that are 24 involved here.
I think the licensee will regard it as such.
h sord Reporters, Inc.
25 I think the public will regard it as such.
I
157'
- jeri2 1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, at the moment I am trying
(
2 to focus on what I think it really is; and I think -- it's 3
either a penalty or it's because they are not fit to operate.
4 COliMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Suppose you regard it as a 5
penalty?
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Then it's one of two kinds:
7 a financial penalty or the penalty is they have to go through 8
our procedures.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It seems to me beyond that 10 there is an expression on the part of this Commission leading 11 to revocation of the license.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That gets me back to -- the
/
13 reason that's being exacted is that we must conclude they are 14 not fit to operate.
If I reach that conclusion, then I get 15 back to the fact it's TMI 1 I ought to be worried about.
16 COliMISSIONER GILINSKY:
They have taken actions which 17 we regard as being wrong and so wrong that punitive action is 18 required.
What are all those monetary penalties?
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's right.
These are 20 explicit penalties that the Congress has said we have the 21 authority to lay out.
My point is that as far as the revocatior 22 of license, as far as I can think through it, you do it for 23 one of two reasons.
The main reason -- and I end up that you 24 only do it for one reason.
They are not fit to operate the Aco..mW Reponen, Inc.
25 plant.
That's the reason you revoke the license.
If they are I
I
4 158 cicri 3 I
not fit to operate, I have much less -- I don't have many
(-
2 concerns, at least in the immediate future, about their opera-3 tion of TMI 2.
If they re not fit to operate, I am really 4
concerned about TMI 1.
5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
If TMI 1 were running right 6
now, so would I.
The fact is it's the ongoing procedure.
It 7
seems to me we don't have to take that action on TMI 1 at the 8
moment.
9 With TMI 2 it's quite right, the action is not of 10 great significance, just as in my earlier hypothetical about II the guy driving the car.
12 That is not of grave practical significance.
It
(
13 does seem to me in both cases what you have is a situation in Id which the pulling of' the license just speaks out clearly about 15 the facts, at least the way it emerges to me at the moment, I0 that it is simply something that ought to be done.
It may not 17 have great practical significance to this case, but establishing 18 that as a clear standard --
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
If I use then the car analogy, 20 I would think a n. ore analogous situation would be the 21 individual who drives recklessly and cracks up the car and goes 22 back to the garage and gets a second car.
The conclusion the 23 police take is that you may not drive that cracked-up car 24 because you are a reckless driver.
Am...serol Reporters, Inc.
25 CCOMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
If it's the same individual, t
L_
159 jcri 4 1
we can get to the same choice.
(
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
This is the same answer.
3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That's why I tried to use a 4
taxi company yesterday.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
The degree of commonality 6
is not entirely clear.
Had we not started this other proceeding 7
in which these questions would be reviewed, it would seen to 8
me the thing would appear in a different way e but we have, and 9
we will review those specific questions in the course of the 10 TMI 1 proceeding.
That should not, it seems to me, hodl it 11 back from acting in the case of TMI 2.
The alternative is to 12 say that when you don't notify the NRC -- and I agree here that 13 that whole list strikes me as the most significant item, the 14 worst wrong that was committed.
You get stuck with a fine of 15 a few thousand dollars.
16 In fact, it seems to me if you are willing to put in 17 the bank $300,000, you don't have to worry about NRC enforce-18 ment at all.
You just handle the whole year's worth.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That would be an interesting 20 argument to the PUC.
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Or you can made a deal or 22 something.
I think for this Commission to come out with X 23 thousand dollars in fines as a result of what took place at 24 Three Mile Isalnd would be regarded with some levity.
When we A.
e n ponm, Inc.
25 talk about things not being of practical significance, that is i
o
4 160
- cri 5 1
of practically no significance to a company.
It's the literal 2
drop in the bucket.
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Of course one of the main 4
reasons that the civil penalty amount is low is because of the 5
congressional restraint we have on us.
We are not 6
constrained -- we are not coming out with that proposed 7
peanity because I&E evaluated and concluded that that's the 8
right amount.
They read value within the constraints of the 9
laws that they have to operate under; that's the amount.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Sure.
Il COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I am not saying $60,000 is 12 very large.
13
-(
COMMISSIGNER GILINSKY:
We have to live within those 14 constraints.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's right.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But we have other means 17 available to us.
18 When we discussed the whole question of approaches 19 to enforcement earlier, we were discussing in fact the upping 20 of these limits.
It was said that the fines are sort of an 21 intermediate category.
On one side is a letter of reprimand, 22 trying to get to the attention of the company.
Then there are 23 fines.
If somebody is really serious, that's it; you ring 24 the place shut.
.ws neswan, Inc.
25 What we are saying is that this event falls in the l
i
161
- ori 6 1
intermediate category.
Suppose the reactor were not
. {-
2 inoperable?
Would the situation call for telling them not to 3
operate or would it call for revoking the license?
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
As a matter of fact, one of 5
the points I tried to make was that I want to be clear on 6
what the licensee did do in that period.
Both you and Peter 7
have stressed the really crucial factor was the lack of 8
relaying information.
I think in this report the fuzziest 9
part we have at the moment is the relaying of information.
cnd 7 10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That's a separate matter.
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Am mW Mewwn, lm.
25 i
dv7 07 01 162 ltou I
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I t can't be a separate
(
2 ma tter, if tnat's the critical point.
3 C0JMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I am saying if you in your 4
mind are not convinced that that -- tha t we have the right 6
to take action on that i ssue, that item, that's a different o
matter.
7 You just regard it --
d COMMISSIONER AHEARJE ihat's the fuzziest area in v
this paper.
10 Co.%4ISSI0 DER GILINSKY :
I don't think i t's fuzzy, 11 but if you do, that puts you in a diff erent situation, I 12 agree.
13 COMMISS10dEtt HENDRIE:
I have some doubt you will 14 maKe it stick for S4000, let alone a license revocation.
la COMMISSIONER AHEARdE If I really reached the lo conclusion that Met Ed's gross income -- I keep on 17 reiterating it is not TMI-2 I am worried about them Id o pera ting.
It's TMI-I I am worried about.
ly You say we have a hearing.
Someone will have a 20 hearing on TMI-2.
That hearing is no t tne same magnitude if 21 we revoke their license.
That's why I want to review what 22 Mr. Hogovin's eff ort ends up wi th.
23 At that stage, it may be I will try to push for 24 trying to pull 011-1.
It might be appropriate ac that stage 29 that the conclusion is tha t tha t plant does not operate
'ev7;07 02 163 ltuu I
unle ss it's transf erred to another utility.
(}
2 Revoking the license of a plant that's not going 3
to operate f or many years, it ' at all, I still am having 4
difficulty with that.
5 COMMISSI0dEd HEUURIE:
I have difficulty with it o
because the specific grounds on which you revoke it just 7
seem to me to be as John says, sort of the mushy end of the d
enforcement list.
v' COMMISSIONER BRADFORU:
Tnose are two diff erent 10 points.
John's point is that he's not sure that the f ac ts 11 are as stated here.
12 COMMISSIONEH AHEARWE Right.
13 CortMISSIONER BRADFORU:
There's a separate 14 question about the question as to the legal grounds.
I ~
IS COMMISSIONED AHEARNE:
Oh, I have no problem abou t 16 that, the legal grounds.
17 COMMISSI0 DER HENDRIE:
My problem is with regard lo to the facts.
Indeed, you know, you ascribe -- all I can ly say is pulling a guy's opera ting license, that can be a 20 serious proposition.
21 I a ssume tha t i t is taken in a high -
you know, 22 with a high urge for revenge or wha tever.
ilow, I look 23 aroured and see who the -- who the culprit i s.
24 It turns out to be some gen tleman or set of 25 gentlemen who didn't get to the NRC until the evening of the
ov7 07 03 164 1tuu 1
26th, sometning aoout high temperatures f rom the
-(
2 thermoccuple.
3 I must say I have the most limited sort of 4
information wnich would allow me to conclude that these guys 5
were saying to each other, Jesus, don't le t the inspector o
s ee t ha t.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Doe s it take that?
o COMMISSIONER HEdDRIE:
Good Christ, if you are v
going to say -- if you are going to pick out af ter an event, 10 second guess the licensee -- although we manage to get li second-guessed that way all the time -- some particular i tem 12 whic h t he o pe ra tor a t the time, the shift supervisor, 13 whoever it may have been, cidn' t see or didn't notice or it 14 didn't occur to him that that was a crucial matter to get to 15 the NRC, then you say, aha, you didn't do that, whomp their lo license off, there isn't a stable license for man or beast 17 in the coun try.
Id COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
'/le are not talking about 19 any little old item.
20 COMMISSIONEH BRADFORD:
The facts that are 21 concerning me don't quite sum up tha t way.
The 2500 degree 22 reading as I understand it, the NRC didn't learn about until 23 well into the days, if not weeks, of the accident.
24 The fact the thermocouples had gone off scale, I 2d thinK, Hoger Matson was talking about on the 29th or 30th.
i
/dv7 07.04 165 ituu i
Exac tly how f ar off scale the potentshome tar 2
readings indicated, ~I-don't remember learning that for a j'
-a month.
4 The 4000 degree reading -- obviously the person 5
who cio the interviewing learned abou t that in the ensuing o
months.
I don't think we learned about it until August.
7 COMMISSIONED HENDRIE All I can tell you about 6
4000 degree readings witn those themocouples is it's g,
9 garbage.
Na ture doesn't work that way.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Is it all that clear that il people in the control room.didn't do tha t?
12 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I really can't say.
All I 13 can say is that what you have before you in the way of facts 14 about what was or was not known and what was or wasn't given 15 to the HRC is in no way or shape in my view to pulling a i
!6 license on that basis.
17 The pressure spike in the containment, what are lo you going to do with somebooy that had a block valve being IV closeo or open or some thing like that and thought what he 20 was seeing was electrical cross-talk on the circuit?
21 You mean we are going toogo around pulling 22 licenses because of that kind of misjudgment at that time?
23 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I have been stre ssing the 24 thermocouples.
In fact, w ha t the staff said about that 26 is -- well, let me just leave it there.
- ov7.0? 05.-
166 ltou I
If there were people in that control room who had
.{
2 other interpre tations about what the staff thought of the 3
spike, then_ it may be just as serious.
4 The reason I have the problem is because of the 5
ambivalence about wnether or not we had people in the o
control room who might have seen it and relafed it back to 7
t hi s.
o I would think the staff should -- as long as they V
are satisfied that that was not the case, they should press 10 ahead on tha t ground and Met Ed can prove to the contrary.
11 That issue can turn on the f acts, whether or. not 12 the law was broken.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Just think of the me ssage 14 that you are sending from this Commi ssion.
I t means if yo i
15 screw up to the extent that Met Ed has in this instance, yo lo end up with a fine whien is -- the original version double, 17 now three times, something like tha t what VEPCO received for lo f ailing to supply us with a document which never did make 19 any dirrerence in the review but might have.
20 It seems to me a very strange sort of me ssage to 21 send out the re.
It's haraly a pin prick.
l 22 COMMISSIONEtt AHEARNE:
Well, I did vote not to 23 i ssue.
24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I oon't quite understand 25 your comment.
697;07 Go 167 Ituu i
Coi4:4ISSIONER AHEARNE:
I don't think that it
(
2 really is complete, but I think that the issue of revocation 3
is a serious one.
4 As I keep saying, if revocation is appropriate, 5
i t's TMI-I it's appro pria te to revoke.
o Col 4MISSIONER GILINSKY:
You know, it is a 7
possibility that we may revoke that license.
I guess I don't understand the argument that you O
9 are making.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
As far as I can see the
).
facts at the moment, this is about as far as the facts II
[
12 support and certainly if we had civil penalties that we I3 have finally asked the Congress for, this would be a 14 heck of a lot more.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You know, there are a lot 30 of people out there, and I went and spoke to some of 17 them yesderday, who wonder whether we are really up to to regulating this industry.
I told people -- if you IY will bear with me for a few minutes here -- that I 20 thought -- You know, people ask:
"Can we live 21 with nuclear power?
22 I said, "Yes, if we take sufficient care and a 23 sufficiently disciplined approach."
24 k
25
697'0d 01 Owuu i
'And they said, "Well, how are you g6ing to get that?
2
' (u The utilities are out to basically make money.
They 3
are not the most careful organizations; how are you going 4
to get them to take all of this care?
o 7
I said, "Well, the government just has to regulate in a really tough way.
People step out of line.
They have o
v to get whammed.
It is up to us to impose that discipline."
10 Le t me tell you I was meant with a pre tty cynical 11 retort to that.
"The history of regulation in this country 12 shows tnat regulatory agencies just don't do tha t."
13 I made some effort to assure them that I thought 14 we woulu take a tough a pproach.
Wha t we are doing here or i
16 wha t we may do is just say, you know, "You get a slap on the 16 wrist, not ma tter how bad the behavior is."
17 It strikes me that that's an unfortunate me ssage lo to pu t ou t.
IV COMl4ISSIONER AHEARNE:
Please, he challenged my 20 point.
You used the word " discipline."
To me that also 21 means loqical.
I t has to be aefensible not in the sense of 22 emotion, but it also has to be def ensible on rational 23 grounds.
I just think the logic isn't there.
I agree that 24 the emo tional response woula be -- it would a opear tha t now 26 we are really being tough.
Ne are going to revoke the I
1>
169 oV7'Od 02 owou I
license of Tl.il 2.
But I think in the cold light of -- at j
2 lea s t to me, in trying to think through it logically, it 3
doesn't hang toge ther.
4 COMMISSI0 DER GILINSKY:
It seems to me we are 5
dealing here -- you come back to this TMI 1, TMI 2.
We have o
a process for evaluating Ti.(I 1.
We can apply cold reason to 7
i t.
d COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
We will also end up having 9
a hearing on TMI 2?
At least to me, I have to reach 10 conclusions on the basis that I'think I can defend to 11 myself and others on the fact that this is now logical and 12 sound.
13 I have difficulty if the point is tha t I am trying 14 to make a -- teach a le sson, but I can't really explain
(
IS carefully what the lesson is.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
If you think that poin t is 17 f uzzy, why did you su pport a s4000 fine?
Io COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Tha t element I wasn't 19 going to argue 3000, 5000, 4000, all the great specific 20 details.
Vic, I&E concluaed there is a question there.
I 21 think it has been pointed out by many people t ha t if the 22 licensee comes oack in the hearing and objects to that, t ha t 23 will be resolved there.
24 My vote on not even going ahead was that I don't 25 think it's yet coupletely clear, at least to me.
Four of
dv7-Od 03 170 bwou i
you cid vote to go ahead.
(
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
As I foresaw at the time, 3
there. might be an issue on that.
Your vote would be 4
important.
Maybe in view of the status of this proposition 5
now, we would want the Staff to make a o
revocation.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARflEs That's correct, u
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Is going to call for an 9
interesting paragraph in the letter.
10 COMi4ISSIONER AHEARi4E I notice there is already a s
li line in there about possible revocation.
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORO:
There may not be much more 13 than that that can be done on that.
14 lb lo 17 10 19 20 21 22 23 24 2S
171
'897-0o 01 ituu 1
COMMISSIONER HEh0RIE:
I think we are going to
(
2 nave to decioe whether we take the issue as it appears by 3
now.
4 We will have to move with this package or let it 5
in effect continue to. lie before us.
At the moment on the o
ma tter of revocation, if I read wrongly, plea se tell me.
7 John is not prepared to agree to revocation, 6
particularly on the grounds cited here.
v I am.
Vic, I gt.;s you are strongly for it on any 10 grounds.
II (Laugnter.)
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That's a rather odd 13 description.
14 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Peter on the specific information that you have been citing.
15 Io We can - either declare ourselves bound two and two 17 and leave it on the table or I think we read Cbr.missioner le Kennedy correctly not in f avor of revocation, at least at IV this time.
20 We can go ahead with the package without 21 revocation.
I don't know.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I have a bias.
Clearly I 23 find it very consistent with my original position if we 24' split two and two and could go ahead.-
2b COMMISSI0 DER HEhDRIE:
True.
/dE7 Od 02 172 ltuu 1
COMMISSIONER BRAOFORU I would like to review the 2
package at least overnight' and think about it.
Because 3
without revocation in it, then I have to go back and look at 4
the penal ty.
5 There are some tradeoffs, I think, with revocation o
and following the staff recommendation that we stick to the 7
conventional method of doing it or leaving revoca tion out 8
and taking what would be a radical departure from the Y
staff's original civil penalty package or holding revocation 10 as an open question; and if so, then which civil penalty.
Il COMMISSIONSI AHEARNE:
Let me ask Vic Stello a 12 question:
Maybe I misinterpret your opening statement on 13 this new pe na l ty.
14 My interpretation was that you did not view this 15 increase as necessarily a radical departure?
16 MR. SIELLO:
No, I don't.
I am concerned about 17 throwing it out of balance, but over those things which the 16 licensee had control of, that have had a real impact on the IV a ccid en t, the block valve, that sa ti sf ied that need.
20 I f elt no difficulty in pulling the full 21 enforcement capability that was available.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
In effect, John, you are 23 saying that INE aid an inaaequate investigation?
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
This is a very 25 complicated -- obviously this has had many people -- many peo pl e
4 1697 0$ 03
'73 ltuu i
people have pointed out it is the most serious accident, i
2 most significan t event.
It's complicated.
A 3
We debated at the time, if you recall, when we got 4
the effort under way which eventually ended up being the b
Rogovin effort, whether or not it would be appropriate to 6
s tar t INE off on its investigation, recognizing that it was 7
of necessity a more limited and a more rapid one than the 6
other one might become.
Y We have now reached the point where I think one of 10 the results of that is now pa s t.
I am not faulting the INE 11 effort.
I think with their resources and their charter, 12 they went af ter it very rapidly and quite thoroughlys but 13 one of the f undamental issues has turned out to be of 14 suf ficient difficulty to wrestle with that, I don't think 15 they have ended up ge tting there, ge tting through it.
Io Now, the conclusion that you see it leading you 17 to, I con't quite reach.
I'm not faulting INE's effort.
I le am just saying that we as a Commission did attach a much 19 larger effort which hasn't reached its conclusiori.
20 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE Well, the pause fits John's 21 inclination.
Peter needs to read it overnight.
I must say 22 I would recommend to you that -- going ahead with the 23 revised enforcement package, but it appears to me that 24 there's a sufficient inclination not to have to reach that 25 this af ternoon one way or the other.
j
r;
=o
'897.0804.
174 lt00
.I So I think we -- barring people's questions, 2
comments, or f urther remarks -- have come to an end.
(:
3 MR. SIELLO:
Mr. Chairman, do I understand that 4
you are now directing me not to take any action until I hear 5
f rom the Commission?
o COMMISSIONER HEbORIE:
I guess so.
7 MR. STELLO:
Okay.
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I_would expect-that would 9
be soon, but I can' t tell you when.
10 VOICE:
In the even t you decide not to take any 11 actior at this time, I think you should say so for 12 publication.
13 COMMISS10NEd AHEARNE:
To no t?
14 VOICES-In the event you don't decide to wait for 15 the completion of the other investigations.
16 I just try to look ahead to the next day.
17 (Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the hearing was 16 aujourned.)
19 20 21 22 23 24 2S' L
.