ML19322C990

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Responds to 771025 Memo from Eg Case.Expresses Concern Re Min Containment Pressure Analysis for ECCS Performance. Thermodynamic Assumptions for B&W-approved ECCS Evaluation Model Unacceptable.Containment Isolation Safety Info Encl
ML19322C990
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/02/1977
From: Eltawila F
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Tedesco R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8002070519
Download: ML19322C990 (2)


Text

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UMTED STATES d-f, NUCLE AR nEGULATORY cOMMtsslON 3"'

pt WASWNGTON. D. C. 20555

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  1. 0y 2 1977 R. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Plant Systems, DSS MEMORANDUM FOR:

F. Eltawila, Containment Systems Branch, DSS FROM:

MINIMUM CONTAlldiENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS FO

SUBJECT:

iln reference to E. G. Case's acmorandum for Office of Nuclear Reactorin f

25,1977; Regulation Staff datedc 0ctober staff to report any information.of relevance, thereby state some concern regarding the subject above.

Branch Technical Position CSB 6-1 " Minimum Containm Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evalua 7

an additional heat sink as the subcooled ECCS water mixes with the The effect of the steam-water mixing should be

( ) ' '1 It is my understanding

" "in the containment.

considered in the containment pressure calculations."

that Westinghouse does not follow the above recommendation and we have previously approved their ECCS evaluation model for all licensed pla ts.

.In addition,5 B&W approved [E'CCS evaivation model.is based 'on completely

[ unacceptable,thennodynamic assumptions for these kind of' analysis a heat sinks less than those recommended in BTP CSB 6-1.

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F. Eltowila 277 H Containment Systems Branch Division of Systems Safet cc:

G. Lainas J. Shapaher I

l 80020707/f

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CONTAIN!'.rNT TsotATTO?f The General Design Criteria set forth in Appendix A to 10 requirements f or the princi-CFR Part 50 establish the 'r.inimu:2 t

pal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants *,

l-(10 CTR Part 50.34) General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56 and 57 4

establish minimum requirerents concerning isolation of piping I

systems that penetrate the reactor containment. Criterion 55 l

and criterion 56 specify four containment isolation valve ar-

[

I Each isolation valve arrangement involves a combi-rangements.

nation of locked closed isolation valves and/or automatic iso-

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[lation valves to prevent the release of radicactive material.

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These criteria specify that one of the four valve arrangerents I

  • shall be provided -- unless it can be der.cnstrated that the containment isolation provisions for t eific class of lines, such as instrument lines, are acceptable on some other defined i

basis".

In contrast to these specific requirements, the staff is aware that many of the lines at the Indian Point 3 plant do not have isolation valve arrangements which cc,crespond to any of the arrangements specified by Criterion 55 and Criterion 56.

Fur ther-moce, neither the staff nor the licenree has identified a " specific class cf lines" that need not utilize the specified arrangements.

i Nor has either the staff or licensee identified "some other de-fined basis

  • on whic.i the Indian Point 3 isolativn valve arrange-

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'i raent can be demonstratti to be acceptable.

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