ML19322C875
| ML19322C875 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Sequoyah, Diablo Canyon, McGuire, Zimmer, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1979 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322C876 | List: |
| References | |
| ACRS-MS-0585, ACRS-MS-585, NUDOCS 8002010134 | |
| Download: ML19322C875 (2) | |
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(? O (2 '/7 7a ENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR THE AD HOC SUBCCMMITIEE MELTING ON EREE MILE ISIAND 2 ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS AND SEOUOYAH NUCLEAR STATION NOVEMBER 5, 1979 8:30 a.m.
REPORT FRCM THE LESSCNS LEARNED TASK FORCE 3 hrs.
(1)
Long-Term Lessons Learned (2)
Implementation of the Short-Term Lessons Icarned - Status Report 11:30 a.m.
DISCUSSIONS OF SEQUOYAH/ ICE CONDENSER - UHI PLANTS 31/2 hrs.
(1) Status of NRC Staff review 1 1/2 hrs.
a.
status of non-TMI-2 open items b.
status of IE review c.
new W reactor generic items d.
implications of issuance of a low-power licensee e.
status of Sequoyah seismic reevaluation l
f.
status report on UHI g.
brief report on the status of the McGuire review IUNCH 1 hr.
12:30 p.m.
1:30 p.m.
DISCUSSION OF SEQUOYAH/ ICE CONDENSER - UHI PIANTS (CONT'D)
(4) Status of the NRC Staff review of the Sequoyah response to the Lessons Learned Task Force recommendations 1 hr.
(5) Status of the NRC review of the Sequoyah response to the Bulletins and Orders 30 mins.
(6) NRC response to ACRS M I-2 Implications Subcomittee questions (See attached letter, dated October 12, 1979, Savio & Major to Vassallo) 30 mins.
(7) Updated report on hydrogen control in ice condenser contairunents - F. Rowsome 30 mins.
4:00 p.m.
MI-2 IMPLICATIONS AS WEY REIATE TO DIABLO CANYON AND SIMILAR PLANTS 2 hrs.
- NRC response to ACRS 1MI-2 Implications Subcomittee questions (see attached letter, dated October 12, 1979, Savio & Major to Vassallo) 1 8 0 02 010 / 3 y O
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6:00 p.m.
ADDITIONM. ITD4S (1) Staff review of emergency procedures - brief status report (2) Operator Actions - actions an operator may take under emergency conditions which would further degrade the condition of the plant (3) Pressurizer heaters - potential failure modes for pressurizer heaters and associated consequences (4) Shutdown heat removal capacity available to operator following an accident for various degraded plant conditions 8:00 p.m.
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