ML19322C859

Public Version of Deposition of Jl Fouchard (NRC) on 790917 in Bethesda,Md.Pp 1-92

ML19322C859
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	09/17/1979
From:	Fouchard J, Page R NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, NRC OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA)
To:
References
NUDOCS 8001280653
Download: ML19322C859 (92)

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1 I 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i 2

JCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x 4 In the Matter of: THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INTERVIEWS 6 i - - - - - - -- - - - - x i' 7 8 DEPOSITION OF JOSEPH L. FOUCHARD 9 Room 6211 Maryland National Bank Bldg. 10 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland 11 Thursday, September 27, 1979 12 9:15 a.m. '13 BEFORE: i 14 l; For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 1 15 RALPH G. PAGE WILLIAM H. FOSTER 16l 17 18 i 19 ' ll 20 l 21 i 4. 22 23 i 24 " Ace..oetra Reporters. inc. 25 i l

2 EEE1EE1E f-1 6 2 DIRECT WITNESS: l 3 Joseph L. Fouchard 3 l 4 5 bbbbb1bb 6 EXHIBIT NUMBER: IDENTIFIED 7 8 5064 7 9 10 l 11 l 12 13 14 e 15 16 17 18 19 20 i 21 i 22 23 I. 24 Ace.,.oerei neponen, inc. 25

CR 7202 3 LEONE ~ s t-1 mte 1 1 PROCEEDINS 2 (9:15 a.m. 3 Whereupon, I l 4 JOSEPH L. FOUCHARD 5 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, t 6 was examined and testified as follows: I 7 DIRECT EXAMINATION I i 8 i BY MR. PAGE: 1 9 O Please state your full name for the record. I 10 [ A Joseph J. Fouchard. II O Mr. Fouchard, I show you what has been marked for 12 i identification as Exhibit 5062. Is this a copy of a letter l 13 j sent to you by the NRC TMI Special Inquiry Group concerning 14, your deposition here today under oath? I 15 A Yes. h 16 li O Do you understand the information set forth in this l I! 17 ll letter, including the general nature of the NRC TMI Special l' I le j Inquiry? U A I do. 20 !.; G Your right to have an attorney present here today 21 ; as your representative and the fact that the information that ,i 6 22 l you provide here may eventually become public? 23 ll A I do, 1 24 G Mr. Fouchard, is counsel representing you personally l A&rerJ Rmoners, lm. 25ll today? i l l

4 mto 2 I A. No. 2 O I would like to note for the record that the j i 3 witness is not represented by counsel today. I 4 Mr. Fouchard, if at any time during the course of this 5 interview you feel you would like to be represented by counsel i 6 and have counsel present, please advise me and we will 7 adjourn these proceedings to afford you the opportunity to I 8 make the necessary arrangements. Is this procedure agreeable j 9 to you? 10 A. It is. f II O Mr. Fouchard, you should be aware that the testimony 12 that you give has the same force and effect as if you were i 13 testifying in a court of law. Our questions and your responses l 1 14,farebeingtakendown, and they will later be transcribed. You ; 15 will be given an opportunity to look at that transcript and 16 make changes that you may deem necessary. 17 However, to the extent that your subsequent changes are 13 ';F significant, those changes may be viewed as affecting your l ", credibility. i i So, please be as complete and accurate as you can be in 20 I 21 P responding to our questions. If you, at any point during the 22 deposition, do not understand a question, please feel free to 1 23 stop and indicate that and we will make the clarification at r i 24 ' that time. j Ace rederJ Reporters, tric. 25 Let me warn you of two basic ground rules. One is that i i ed

5 mt']'3 P 1 you permit us to finish our questions before you give your 1 2 response, even if you know what the question is going to be. 3 Because the reporter cannot take down both of us speaking at 1 4 the same time. 5 Secondly, respond audibly. Motions, such as nodding your 6 head, cannot be taken down by the reporter. l 7 I believe you have brought with you today a copy of your 8 l resume. i 9 A Yes. i 10 MR. PAGE: Would the recorder please identify this I I 11 as Exhibit 5063. 12 (Exhibit 5063 identified.) i 13 BY MR. PAGE: i la I G Does this document accurately summarize your educa-i i: 15ll tional and employment background? 4, 16 A It does. I 17 y G The letter that we have marked for identification 18 l'.as 5062 asks that you bring with you any documents in your i i-19 possession or control concerning TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be 20 1 4 21 in the official NRC files, including any diary or personal l 22 work file. l 1 23 Have you any such documents? 3 24~ ij A The only thing I have --'and I'm not even sure that Ace. Aers Reporters, Inc. 25 I can find them -- were a couple of tape cassettes that I i e

6 ) mt3 4 j I made while I was at Three Mile Island. And they're essentially 2 feature-type material, like stories that people told me about j 3 what they did. And I'll have to look for those. I'm not sure d I still have them. I have not played them since that time. i 5 I'll be happy to give them to you. There's nothing, as I i 6 say, that I'm aware of of any particular significance on them. i i I l 7 They're just more human interest stories. I. 8 0 Okay. Fine. i 9l Have you given a statement to any investigative body i 10 concerning the Three Mile Island accident? i A Yes, two. One to the representatives of the II I2 President's Commission and a second to representatives of i 13 j Senator Hart's 6ubcommittee. 1 14 lj Q Do you recall when these were given? li 15 ' A The meeting with the President's Commission people, 16 !! I am sorry, I do not recall. It was -- l l 17 BY MR. FOSTER: d 12 h 0 Would that have been about the third week of July? A I was going to guess about two months ago. That's 20 strictly a guess. I have not recei ed the tape. i 21 BY MR. PAGE: 22 G Okay. We will receive a copy of this and will j i 23 include it in our records. Yi d The other interview was September the 21st, for h A Ace +.oeral Reporters, Inc. { 25. which I now hand you a transcript. l I j

1 7 mto 5 I BY MR. FOSTER: 2 g Have you reviewed this transcript? 3 A Yes. 4 g Is it accurate?- 5 A Yes, to the best of my knowledge. 6 MR. PAGE: Would the recorder please identify this l 1 7 as Exhibit 5064. l 8 (Exhibit No. 5064 identified.) 9' BY MR. PAGE: 1 10 0 I do understand, then, for the record, that you Il believe the statements made by you in Exhibit 5064 to be f 12 complete and accurate to the best of your knowledge? l A

can't say that they're complete, because there 13 Idh were many things which I could not recall.

15 g Complete to the questions that -- 16 f A The most complete and honest answer that I could I i U h provide to the question, yes. Il i 8 8 :: 0 To begin our set of questions, Mr. Fouchard, would I' you give us a chronological briefing on your emergency M,! response activities following the TMI accident, starting on i 21 " Wednesday, March 28th, 1979, and going up through the first i 22 five days until April 1, 1979? 23 First, would you tell us when you first learned about the j 24 ) accident at TMI on March 28th? Ace...JeQ Reponen, Inc. l 25 A Some time between 8:00 and 8:15, we received a I '!I

8 mta 6 I call in the Public Affairs Office --I think I took it personally l 2 myself, but I can't recall for certain;-- from our regional 3 public affairs officer in King of Prussia, :'arl Abraham, i 4 saying that a state of emergency had been declared at Three 5 Mile Island and that is all he knew. 6; I subsequently went to the sixth floor of the Maryland 7 National Bank Building to see if the Executive Director for i 8 Operations had been notified. I believe he was getting a call 9 just about at that time. I believe it was from John Davis, i 10 but I can't be certain of that, either. { II Subsequently, Mr. Gossick, Mr. Case and I went to the t 12 incident response center at the East-West Towers Building, j i 13 where I remained 'til late on Wednesday evening of the 28th. i Id i Thursday morning, I went to a Commission briefing, which is ll 15 ] an open briefing, and it preceded the briefia.g on the Hill of 16 l Congressman Udall's Committee. That was the briefing of the il I7 Commission, was held at our H Street office. 13 b of course, the briefing of the Congrest.nen was at the U Capitol. 20 i! Thursday afternoon, I returned to the incident response t,i 21 1 center, where I stayed until that evening, and I don't remember; 22 when I left. Early on Friday morning, I accompanied ? I 23 Harold Denton to the NBC studios here in Washington, where 24 Mr. Denton was a guest on the Today show discussing the M-s er') Reporters. Inc. l 25 l Three Mile Island accident. l

= 9 i mto 7 1 By the time we had returned to the incident response center, 2 it began to be apparent that the situation was deteriorating l i f 3 at Three Mile Island. I believe the transcripts of the 4 discussions between the incident response center and the 5 Commission on that morning will indicate, unless you want me 6 to go into more detail, I had a number of conversations -- 7 number, I don't remember how many -- with the Chairman. I 8 g Do you recall what time you arrived back at the 9l incident response center on Friday morning? j 10 l A. I do not, because I cannot recall what segment l II Mr. Denton was on that morning. I believe it was the 8:00 12 o' clock segment, but I'm not sure, which would have put us l 13 back at the incident response center at 9:00 o' clock. But Id that's a very hazardous response, because I don't remember 15 whether it was the 7:00 or 8:00 o' clock segment he was on. f' 16 G Do I understand, when you arrived back at the fincidentresponsecenter,wordhadalreadybeenreceived I7 i3 l concerning the release of radioactive materials that morning? I" A. No, no, no, no. I do not remember the precise Z timing on when the word was released -- received on the -- p -n 21 ' what became the -- what the 1200 MR above the containment 22 building -- I just cbn' t remember at the time of that, but -- 23 0 Were you present in the incident response center 24 " when the first call came in notifying the NRC headquarters of Ace, worst Reporters, Inc. j 25 the release that morning?- i t .f li

10 mto.8 i A. I very honestly cannot recall. I have not read 2 any of the tapes of the incident response center. I've had 3 some presented to me in connection with some previous inter-l 4 views. But I don't remember the circumstances of the 1200. 5 0 And do you recall a telephone call that morning 6 from Karl Abraham? l l l 7 A I'm sure there were many telephone calls from 8 Karl Abraham -- I'm sure there were many telephone calls from 9 Karl Abraham that morning. 10 0 -- concerning the matter? II On the IRC tapes, there is a record of a conversation 12 apparently involving you with Mr. Abraham on Friday morning at 13 about 9:09, thereabouts, wherein he called and said that he Id had some information concerning a possible release that morning,' i 15 ' and was attempting to verify the numbers that had been reported 16 to him. I I7 ! Do you recall that conversation? 1 J II i! A. I very honestly do not, no. BY MR. FOSTER: G I have purportedly a copy of the transcript of that l 20 [ 2I call. Would you take a look at that and maybe it'll help out. l 22 I think it begins halfway down the page. 23 BY MR. PAGE: 2d O I have the same record here, but I listened to the i AceAers' Reporters, Inc. 25 I tape again yesterday and identified who I think made what

11 mtO 9 1 statements. 2 A All right. I'll use the one you've given me, i l i 3 Mr. Page. 4 g But this is strictly on the basis of what I heard, 5 and I could not definitely identify people. 6 A I notice that this is -- I notice that, while the i 7 voices identified are myself and Mr. Abraham, there is also j i 8 l an indication here that this is on the speakerphone, which 9i means it could be played to the people in the EMT section. i I 10 All right. I read it. I must say, I don't recall the Il specific conversation. But I'm sure there were many specific I i i 12 conversations I don't recall. d 13 0 And do you recall a discussion in the incident 14,1 response center concerning the possible need for NRC to recom-II i 15 [ mend to the Governor an evacuation around the TMI site? l l 16 ! A I do. i I 17 O Could you tell us something about the conversation, t 15 ! as you recall it? i A All right. And this is a sety hazy recollection, 20 jj and I will try very hard not to be selective in my recollection.'* d 21 And it's going to be general, not specific. g l It is my recollection that we did not know where this 22 23 1200 MR figure had come from. And we did not know whether 24 ' ih be other releases subsequent to this one. There Ace-2.om+ neoone i inc. l there m g t 25 was general discussion, and I believe Mr. Collins of the

12 mta 10 1 State Programs people was instructed to get in touch with the i 2 -- I thought it was the state health people. But I subse-1 3 quently was told by Collins that it was Colonel Henderson's i 4 people. So -- 3 l I 5 BY MR. POSTER: 6 0 Who made this instruction? i 7 A I think it was pretty well unanimous in the AMC. I've tried 8 g I don' t know that it was any specific individual. 9 l to recall who -- there was no disagreement that I'm aware of. 10 0 Offhand, do you remember who was present and would i 11 have been involved in this discussion? l 12 A Mr. Gossick, I believe was there. Mr. Davis, i f Mr. Denton, myself. Those are the people that I can recall. 13 14 There may have been others, because Collins was working out i' 15 ' of a side office, and I remember him coming in. And my 16 recollection, which does not gibe with what Collins subse-h 17 L quently told me, was that the recommendation would be to b '5 evacuate five miles in the direction of the plume. J Collins has subsequently told me it was ten. But my 2C recollection was five. n 21 BY MR. PAGE: l 22 0 Do you recall the arguments that were made that 23 ! morning for and against the evacuation recommendation? 24 A I do not, no. I do not. I guess I simply don't Ace roueral E eporters. Inc. l 25 ; recall anyone who -- there may have been, but I don't recall l I

mta 11 13 g anybody who didn't believe that we should be moving in that 6 2 direction. The uncertainty of the situation seemed to make l 3 that recommendation appropriate at the time, j 4 As I think you know, the events subsequently changed rather l 5 rapidly. And the off-site measurements indicated -- I don't 6 remember what they were, but they did not indicate any high 7 levels. 8 G Do you recall whether or not the EMT contacted the I 9, Commission concerning their recommendation on evacuation 10, before Mr. Collins was instructed to call the state? l 11 A It is my recollec'*.on that it was afterwards. And i 12 I think the -- I can't tell you who Mr. Gossick was te" king l i 13 to and when. Mr. Gossick was frequently on the phone, keeping 1 l the Commissioners and others advised as to what was going on. 14 i! 15 ' So I can't tell you, you know, who he may have talked with. 16 My subsequent conversation with the Chairman -- and I think ft 17 i we have to backtrack just a moment to understand that the h l! 15[ only line that we had going into the state capitol at l' Harrisburg was the one I had going into the Governor's press 'i 2;, office with Karl Abraham at the other end. 21 ' At that point, Karl Abraham was not performing public 22 affairs functions; he was performing a more vital function, in i 23 my view, and that was liaison with the Governor. And as this i, 24 i: transcript indicates, the need for accurate, up to date ' Ace-rece,J Reporters, Inc. 25, info: mation from the Governor--there is an omission here i i

I anto 12 14 1 which does not indicate, you know, who the person was. If 2 I had to speculate, I'd speculate it was the Governor's 3 press secretary. Because at that point, everybody was trying 4 to get better information and nobody had any very good infor-5 mation. 6' You will recall in the tapes of the discussions between the 7 EMT and the Commission that I was urging the Chairman to gut 8 in touch with the Governor of Pennsylvania promptly. The 9: Governor, it seemed to me, needed the most up uo date informa-i 10 tion that the NRC had, and I was urging very strongly that i i 11 the Chairman get in touch with him, which he subsequently did. i f 12 But I -- well -- l 13 g Well, at the time Mr. Collins was asked to call the i ~ i 14 e state officials to advise on the evacuation, apparently the h I 15 l EMT was of the single mind as to 16 A To the best of my recollection, if there were -- I 17 can't single out anybody, for example, who I -- I can recall b is ll opposed the recommendation. l ir g Do you recall if that feeling continued or was there O a chang:e of sentiment within the EMT as time went on? 21 : A. I believe it changed as the situation. changed. 22 O Do you know what contributed to that?, i 23 A I think the readings from off-site, which indicated l i 24 l that the off-site levels were not anywhere near the level

Ace,.o.o a.conen, inc.

that was being measured above the containment building. 25 l'

mtb,a 15 I i I BY MR. FOSTER: 2 Where did this information come from? O 3 A I can only assume it came from the site. We had i people at the site by that time. 5 BY MR. PAGE: 6 g Do you recall who, from the IRACT, came in and 7 reported to the EMT? 8 A No. That detail, I simply don't recall. I 9 l BY MR. FOSTER: i 10 g i I'd like to back up for a second. Upon reviewing 11 l this transcript, are you -- would you say this is a conversa-12 tion, indeed, that did take place between yourself and i 13 bur. Abraham? i 14 l A I have no reason to question it. Are you satisfied that that conversation did indeed G 16 possibly take olace? l A I have not heard the voice, but I have no reason to I I30 say it didn't. So I would accept it as it is. f i; U O Assuming tnis call was made at 9:09 a.m., was there r v-'9 any information, to your knowledge, previous to that time, with; n 21 E respect to the 1200 millirem figure that EMT had? i 22 Not that I can recall. And the tenor of the ques-A 23 tioning which follows that -- keep in mind Abraham was not i 2 Ot talking to me. He was talking to everybody in the EMT on Am.. Aeral Reporters, Inc, g 25 l' the speaker -- would indicate that this was the first o et

mta 14 16 1 indication that we had of this 1200 MR. But that is the l 2 impression, not something I can -- it just seems to appear 3 that way. 4 0 Okay. Again, operating from the assumption that 5 this is the first time the EMT gets the information of the 6l 1200 millirems, how long a 6:h ussion or release took place 7 with respect to the evacuation decision? 8 A. I can't answer that, sir. I don't know. I 9 BY MR. PAGE: I 10 g Do you recall if there was any confirmation as to II who made the 1200 MR per hour measurement that was referred to 12 by Mr. Abraham when he called that morning? 13 A. I do not. I simply don't know the answer to that Id. question. You gentlemen have reviewed the tapes. You tell f ri 15 Is there nothing else on the tapes? me. G No. There's nothing that we can tell from the 16 l I7 l tapes as to who performed the 1200 MR per hour reading. We j i 18 i may be able to determine that through depositions that we are U getting from other individuals. But the tapes themselves -- 22 ] A. You're saying that this is the only reflection of 21 the 1200 MR figure that came into the EMT? 22 O On the IRC tapes, I believe that's correct. 23 A. Interesting. I notice there is reporting this i s i 24 number -- are you going to assert this in the record? Because Ac. r.oers Reponers, inc. 25; the number is being recorded by civil defense to the Governor's I j 1 p

mto 15 17 P 1 office. In other words, the state civil defense people were 2 reporting that. 3 0 This has already been included in the record as part, t 4 of Mr. Abraham's deposition to the Presidential Commission. 5 A. It was? 6 G Yes. This transcript that we're referring to is 7 identified as Exhibit 2 to the deposition given by 8 Karl Abraham to the Presidential Commission on the Accident 9 h at Three Mile Island. 10 I gather, then, Mr. Fouchard, your memory is a little fuzzy l t II on what kind of deliberations took place in the EMT after the 12! phone call was received from Mr. Abraham? 13 Do you recall what was said in terms of any need to 14 j reconfirm that number before advising the state to -- that 15 ll NRC recommended that the area around the plant be evacuated? I

i 16 I do not recall anything in that area.

I must say A.

7 l that the first few days of this accident remain a blur to me.

1 i. I lo dl' BY MR. FOSTER: E G Do you remember if you participated in that discussion i 20 yourself? i 21 A Of the evacuate?- 22 O Yes. t 23 l A. I wouldn't have been in a decisionmaking role. I 24 f believe at that point I shared the view of the others in the + Ac....ar.,n pon,i,inc.' 25 EMT, that some precautionary e vacuation should take place. f 1

mte 16 18 I

G Do you remember if you voiced that to the other 2 members of the EMT? 3 A I'm sure I did. I'm not a shrinking violet. i 4 G Do you happen to know what Lake Barrett's role was S in this whole decision?- 6 A No, sir. I don't recall Lake Barrett's role. 7 MR. FOSTER: All right. I 8 BY MR. PAGE: 9 G Would you continue describing your activities after I 10 l I these calls were made on Friday morning? What were your II activities later on in the day on Friday? 12 A At approximately -- I don't remember whether it was 13 late morning or shortly after noon, I accompanied Mr. Denton i Id l and his team to the Three Mile Island site by Air Force heli-ft 15 ' copter. We arrived up.there early afternoon. We were met by i 16.i a number of media representatives. We landed in a cornfield ll 17 ll behind the observation center at Three Mile Island. N l I3 II Mr. Denton went into the observation center to be briefed I E on the situation. The observation center was a very small 20 y building. They talked to, I believe, Mr. Herbein. By hat i il 21 i time, I believe the White House had wired in the hard lines I 22 so that we could talk to Washington. l 23 j Subsequently, Mr. Denton went over to a lady's house, the I 24 i little green house, we called it, which is-across from or Ac...o.rs m.pon.rs.lnc. 25 across a short lane from the observation center and.also i i l

mtol7 19 1 faces the Three Mile Island plant. 2 By that time, he had dispatched the NRC people into the 3 plant. The media were anxious for some statement from Denton. ! 4 I told them that he would come out at some point, but not 5 until he'd had a chance to talk to those people. There was 6 further discussion with Metropolitan Edison. One of the things 7 I recall is that a Metropolitan -- a representative of 8 Metropolitan Edison presented us with a draft of a joint 9 press release, which I took a look at, and I don't remember 10 the words, but clearly it painted a more optimistic picture II than it appeared to me the situation warranted. 12 BY MR. FOSTER: 13 g Let me stop you for a second. Do you know who the I4 ! Metropolitan Edison representative was? l l 1 15 A Bill Gross, but he was accompanied by the company's 16 p:3sident, Walter Crietz. l 17 g Did you have any dialogue with Mr. Crietz at this i H I3 time? i U A I told him I didn't believe we were going to be M issuing any joint press releases. Mr. Denton gave me kind of l i 21 ' a funny look. Then he took a look at the draft and agreed 22 with me. i l 23 g-During this conversation, did Mr. Crietz request I r I 4*; NRC's participation in a joint press conference? An rweret Roorters. IN. l 25 i I do not recall that he did. But certainly, anything A i i l l

-mto'18-20 1 a't that point, it seemed to me, of a joint activity would not 2 have been appropriate. 3 G And if he were to make such a request? c-1 4 A. I would have recommended against it. S 6 l. 7 8 I 9 10 11 12 i 13 I 14 l i 15 t 16 i 1 17 si IS 9 '}: 20 !! a l 21 '! i i 1 22 l -23 l ii 4 -24 'i Ace.r.aer:A Reporters, Inc. l 25 I t [

~ l 21 $2.02.1 [ ash I' St MR. PAGE: 2 U' Wnat is the reasoning for your f eeling tnat tne re 3 could not be a joint press conference or release as with tne 4 public releases with the licensee? 6. A I celieve that we are the regulatory agency. .. e 3 are the agency to wnom the public snould and hopefully does l look to f or oojective information. 8 I celieve that as days will demonstrate, we provided cojs:tive information. I believe also that the opportunities 13 f or appearance of conflicting statements, even though they 11 may not ce conflicting, tecnnical people tend to descrios 12 the same situation in different woros. 13 But the opportunities for that in a joint pre ss conference 14 woulo have made the situation unworkaole. 13 Jut my ossic reason is, as I celieve. tn? NRO has to remain 13 at arm's lenoth witn the licensee. Me are tne regulatory 1, agency. Se are responsible to tne Congre ss, to the ?resioent, la and to tne 3uo11c. 19 0 .Tould this decision on your part neve been maos -- 23 A I; would have Deen mace in a consultation with ?.ir. 21 J?nton. 2a O Would it have oeen made recarcless of who the 23 licansee was or was it mace oecause of any prior proolems witn '24

.te t id ?

22 A ..e ll, I'm just desling with the circumstances tnet /

52iO2.2. 22 PLD.gsh i existed at that time. I would have to, and am giving some 2 more thougnt as to what the: role of the_ NRC should De in the 3 future. 4 Bu t-I still oelieve that being tne regulatory agency, we 5 must maintain our independent point of view at all costs. 3 It simply is vital - to the credioliity of the scency. But tnis particular Juagment was mace on those particular 3 c ir cu ms t ance s. / St MR. FOSTER: 10 0 Could we have official policy with respect to NRC 11 participation with the licensee in press conf erences? 12 A I don't know that there's any official policy. '4y 13 ceneral approach has been not to. But, again, there may oe 14 exceotions. 15 2 Prior to coing to the site, cio you receive cny 15 instructions thatsoever witn respect to participating in any 1/ press conf erences with Aetrooolitan saison? 13 A .b, no. li di MR. ?A3E: 23

D

~*iny don't we continue wita your description of 26 activities after that. 2 A S3, after seing ondgered oy particularly the 23 television osople, wno were anxious to get their film to 24 H arr i s bur g, ir. Jenton subsequently ~went out, talked to the 23 recorters very oriefly, tola them xny he was nere, tolo them [?

23 02.02.3-

L gsh-I that we were planning to go 11n and meet with the governor 4

that evening, and that there would oe a joint press conference -3 in there, wnere he hoped by that time he would have some more 4 details on the situation at Three Mile I sl and. .ve were a oit late getting off to Harrisourg that nignt a. cecause Denton wanted to have the best information ne could a i cefore the first meeting with the governor. 3 Inere hed oeen a telephone conversation cetween Denton and 9 the governor. Ana es a matter of f ac t, a telephone 10 conve rsation cetween the President and '.tr. Denton af ter nis li arriv al at tne little greenhouse. 12 .ie went into Harrisburg that evening, met with the governor. 13 .tr. Denton met with the governor and then there was a joint 14 press conference in the governor's press room tnat evening. lo .3 cama 03ci: to Inree t'ile Island. I don't rememoer

nan, 15 if et all, we got to oed thet night.

Saturcay tas a cay 1/ whica I guess I will never f oroet. Mr. Crietz acviseo me, 13 ond I don't rememoer the time, I know he eavised me ano I'm 1/ not sure whe the r 1.ir. Denton was present or not. 20 I think ne was, out I can't swear to it, that they woulo 2i ce noldino one more news conf erence tnat dey end tn3t woulo 22 oe their lest. 23 inat the -- that we -- I Delieva there hed oeen ciscussions, 24 out agein, I can't ce precis e on tnis, aoout the NR0 taking 25 over as the spokeman since we were tnere. And since it was

24 l52. 0 2.~4 - i. (L-gsh 1 cleersthat there was some conflicting information emerging i from TMI, I celieve.Wr. Crietz mentionec that he had haa a 3-call from the White House on this matter. 4 3ut tnat is a recollection which -- that's just exactly what 5 it is. But in any event,.It had Dean pre tty well ce terminea - 5' that we were going to take over as the spokesman. MR..=05 TERT off the record. 3 'Jiscussion off the recora.) THE WITNES5: Well, Metropolitan 5 ison nela its 13 news conf erence. Ne -- at which Mr. Hercein was cuoted as 11 saying tna Orisis is over. 12-Vr. Denton hela : news conference earlier that afternoon 13 saying tnat tne-crisis won't be over until tne plant is in it cold shutoovn. 1; faen I n2d some discussions with dasnin: ton on 53turaay I; acauc the assiracility of the chairman noloing a news li

on!3rence asre in Washington.

Sy that time, wa naa set up l -: a press center in tne East / nest. Ton?rs Builoing ana.there was 1.- clamor to hear from the heau of the agency with respect to 2; Threa file Island. 2i .~5e 2nsirman suose7uentiv cia nold e news conference an n r o?lieve in di::ussing possiole evscuation, mentioned a '23 figure of 2J mil?s, which sort of was the fir st time that 21 s ts:e officials had heard tne figure 20 miles. l ) 23 inct created a oit of a furor. l l

25 62.?2.5 i. gsh' 11 In, adoi t i on, late that afternoon I haa a call in the 2 command trailer f rom Dick Lyons of the New York Times, wno .3-said, Joe, you got a proolem..This is a paraphrase. There is 4 a story moving indicating that the oubole is becoming ~ 5 potentially explosive. rihy don't you tell me aoout it? I put Lyons on the phone with Harold Denton and got tne r Tinas 'souare c away. I believe I called Washington from the 3 trailer. Ne were.getting reacy to go into darrisourg at tnat / tim?, and eskec Frank Ingram to check to see about the 13 Associated Press, which Lyons identified as the source of t'ne inf ormation, what sort of a story the AP was noving. li And I gue ss -- I can't rec all whether Mr. Ingram got osc1 13 to ma whi'le I was still in the trailer or af ter be got to 14 M arr i s our g. But irrespec tive of that, oy tne time we 10 reached Harrisburg that evenino, we were walking tnrouch the la capitol, nee ding f rom the governcr's office and we again ran 1. into Dici-L/ons of the New for'.: Times. And I askeo nim Iv where Paul Jritenlo.v. the governor's p. ess secretary was. 11 ia saic, he's in the press room down here trying to calm 2; .cha concerns of the reporters over tne aubcla. 21 30 Lent 3n ena I went inte the pr2ss room. heio 2n impromtu 22 news conf erence there with tne people wno ware present. 23 6/ '.G.-PA3E 24 7 Inis was acout about time? 23 A an, I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I've lost track of in s t-

$52.02.6-25 E. PL gsh- .I time it was. So many-events happened on Saturday that it 2 would have oeen -- 13 3 It was cefore you were seneduled to see tne 4-govarnor? 3 A Yes. 6 3 ?!aat time were you scheduled to see him? i A Tnere was no time scheduled. We just oct to tne 3 governor's. office when we could get to the governor's office. 1 / (ou know, tnere was a goal, out it wes understood. At 13 that point, Mr. Critchlow needed our help more than the 11 governor dia. 12 Anyway, we talked to the reporter there. I looked at the 13 Associated Press story. It did not seem to me to oe 14 particular1/ infla mmatory. There was a line in it, as I -1; recall, cuccing an unnamed :4R0 source as seyino that tne la ouncle coulc oecome potentially explosive in two deys, whicn 1, was a nutoer ahich des certainly new to me ano I celieve cuite 13 new co #1r. Jenton. 1/ In any event, we talked to tne reporters there. We want 23 up, met with the governor, gsve him an assessment of the 21 situation. 22 3y that tine, I has talked to Aashin? ton again from tne 23 gavernor's o f fic,e and has seen the news story oy tnan.

2. n d 21 I was :trying to figure out what was causing all of this 2o furor.

21 62.02.7; PL Ig'sh .. I 5nd'the report at that time was that the radio and possioly E the television were carrying not the story itself, out sort 3 of a teaser, which the wire services frecuently put out to 4 notify their clients of an-upcoming story. 5 - And I don't rememoer the precise language. I've never seen a it. But I'm told tnat it said something like, cuoDie oecoming /

potential explosive.

3 If that indeed was the language ano that flashed across the television screens in central pennsylvania, I can certsinly IJ understand the apprehension, because reporters themselves 11 were frightened for their own selves. 12 I've known, you anow, some of those people for a long time. 13 And we subsecuently went out and held a joint news conference 14 with the governor. They were feecing it live in many parts 15 of ?s nosylvsnia Inere ?ir. Denton receatec his views witn 16 re s.a ? c t to tne canger of the bucole. II I oelievi oy tnat time wa'd.haa an inaication from tne 13 '!hite House that the ? resident proosoly would come to Tnree 1) ..ii l e Island. 22 .fne next day Harold and I went oe:k, I tnink, to TMI. I 21 03, tell yoJ I nad an slee? that nicht. I ned ; cell from 22 the'?resicent's advance man end we arranged to meet at toe -23 site when tneir chopper came down aoout 7:33 the next 24 morning to os;in advancing tne ?resiaent's arrival there. 23 3/ that time, we had set up a press center at the Burro'nn

32.02.3 28 9L gsh i Hall in Middletown. This was done with the assistance of 4 the local congressman, Mr. Erdahl, cecause I celieve some -3 time on Saturday morning, I approached him and said, I'm -- 4 we're going to have a press center.up here and I don't know 3 anything. acout this locality. 3 And he recommended -- he put his assistant in touch with the town officials in Miodletown. 4 3 I suosequently told Karl Aoraham to go over and start 9 setting up a press center at the Surrougn HaII. So, I a viseo lJ the.. hite Mouse that we already had a hall, if that's wnst they wanted. 12 And Sunday morning was spent primarily with advancing the -- 13 preparing for the visit of the president. 14 0 Do you recall who you interacted with from the I; .ihi ; 3 House that morning? la A Jo. A Congressional Dire: tory woulo ref resh my li memory. There was a woman aovance person ano I think sne 'les 13 the cnief of the advance party. l/ And the cress sovence, with whom I worked, again, a 23 Congressional Directory again might refresh my re:ollection. 21 3ut the man hao just returned from advancing something in 2i. fokyo. - So ne hadn't had mu:n more sleep than I had. \\ 23 The President came. He used the durrough Mall. 'r. J? nton 24 again ' orief ed af ter the presidential visit. 23 "!e're now into Sunday.

2) baeO2.2 'L gsn 1 J (1911. now let me stop you there before you -- z A I'm ramoling on. Go ahead. 3 2 I gather from the events that ensued f ollowing 4 the discussion of the bucole, that Mr. Denton f elt that tnere 5 was no likelihood of an explosion in the reactor, at least in 5 the i mmediate f uture? e A I celieve the phrase that he used with respect to 3 tne oubole was tne same phrase that he used with respect to a story whi:n nad moved on tne wires on Fricay af ternoon y 13 whils le were still on our way to T.!l with respect to tne i li possi oility of the meltdown. l_ And that is tnat there was no imminent denger. 13 I believe he geve the best numoers that ne could witn 14 respect to the situetion as he saw it. I think it is also fair la to caserve that tne peo.Jle in Bethesda consistently were more 1; .Jorried ecout the situation at Three ?!ile Islano tnan tnose 1, of us ino N3re there. 13 I cannot explein it, but I celieve it's a f act. 1/ I rememoer thet Sunoay morning wnile I wes waiting for tne 2; advance certy, and you nave to realize what was coing on in 2i tan comnuni;v, tr. Soproa:ning me sayino, let's 30 22 taka e ws 1.:. He just r?turneo fron ' tass where ne receivec 23 g en er al sosolution from e priest wno saic, that's tne firs: 24 time ne nad aiven aosolution since the time ne gave aosolution 2a to :ne trocos in llorld..ar II.

562.02.10 30 'l 7sh I J From what you're saying, Mr. llfhadgoneto 2 chur:h that morning. I gather he dian't go there for that 3 r e as o n -- 4 A He went to church oecause he's a good Catnolic. But thac community was very, very tense. Ana -- a 6 2 03 you recall who in Betnesda were the proponents of possiole hyarogen explosion in tne reactor? / 5 A No, sir. I was not part of any of the technical 9 discussions et all. I was primarily working with Jenton, 13 witn Stello on news medie aspects of the situation, trying it to set up, trying to get an idea when we should brief. 12 fnen Sunosy night, we progress now. Somecody from the 13 Metropolitan Edison had saio that tne bubble was gone. 14 2 /.MR. ?OSTER: 1; Let me stop you for a second. Aas tnat Sunoav ni-nt la or iss tnet Mondey morning? r Tast wIs 5unday nicht. Monday morning papers will 1. s la ref1?ct it. Pretty sure of it, anyway, cecause -- I' ll get 1/ into Monday, which was anotner -- I Degan to receive some 2; calls. I tal%ec to Mr. Denton. Denton said tnat there were 2; some encouracing signs, that we were recciculatin7 :ne si$ ole 2. matter overnignt. 23 de aescrioed how difficult it was to oc tnese calculetions 24 and ne cave me a parase whicn I have used many times since, l 23 that the Ducole aidn't have a me ter on it. 1

31 52.02.'11-L :gsh 1 And so, my response to the media throughout that nignt, again, 'without much sleep were that the signs were encouracing. 2 3 ile-were calculating it. 4 Then Mona sy morning, we oegan to -- oy that time, of course, there was a good deal of' pressure from the media. What is a 5 the situation? h' hat is the situation? / .londay morning, late morning, I guess it'was, Denton neld 3 another. news conference and he said e ssentially what I nave / oeen saying, that there were encouraging signs, that he 1) was not preoared at that time to say that the cucole had gone 11 dway, but certainly, things were moving in the right direction. 12 - And I celieve it was another cay or so before we agreed 13 that th'e bubole was gone. 14 .Jo w, see, does tnat take me to April ?ools' Day? I tnink 13 it 07es. 13 B f.t!.R. P AG E : Ie 3 Yas. I would like to get into some specific Ir questions pertaining to the puolic information and activities 1/ that you were involved in. 22 But ao y7u have any other questions, Mr. Foster, at tnis 21 tina? .2 T. ?OSTER: No. 23 Bf $.1R. PAGE: 2? 3 A r? port prepared oy a Peter Sandman and Mary '2a ?adoe n, Columoia University Study Group, indicated tnet an a.

62.02.121 32 7' -gsh I article in tne Washington Post following the accident had 2 stated that NRC: " Worked hard to make sure mainly reasurring 3 information would reach the public." 4 How would you respond to this assertion? 3. A Inst's not true. What we were concerned aoout was 5 making sure that f actual inf ormation reached the puolic. I think that it's f air to say.that the article, which I 3 referred to, was a review prepared oy Mr. Sanoman, wno I / understand it, is a journalism profe ssor, not a working 13 newsmen, for the Columbia Journalism Review. Il There's another phrase in there, that same story, as I 12 recall, saying wnile you couldn't prove that NRO lied, dot, 13 oot, act, oot 14 I coject to that kina of journalism. If there is any la oemonstretion that we lied, I'd like to see it. 13 0 Do you celieve th3t some media people have allegea .I the: ARC actions on information releases were cromptea oy 13 2n unoerlying effort to protect the nuclear incustry? Is A Aosolutely not. 21 0 Inere has also oeen an assertion oy some of tne 21 media oeople tnet NRC playeo down potential radiation 22 hs:Srcs, tnet this is common or similar to one I ouoted f rom 23-the S anaman report. 24 Do you nave any comments on the assertion that potential 20 radiation hazards were played down in puolic?

33 2.02.83 ~csh 1 A In the first place, I object to anonymous I allegations. If there is any particular reporter who has 3 raised these, I woulo like to know who he or sne is. 4 l'11 answer your question generally, out with the o objection that I don't know who the reporters are, so I'm not o able to adequately assess their competence to make the 4 .statment. i 3u t no, we did not. We aid not attempt to play down 9 anything. de attempted to tell it as we saw it. The facc tnat 10 cur eyesight might not have.oeen as precise es it should have 11 seen at given points does not lead the motivation. 12 0 Do you oelicie that NRC gave timely and correct 13 information to the media? 14 A To the -- .or example, information concerning 10 30 sheed. 15 off-site releases, tne extent of core-damage, potential li radia tion. nez ards to the puolic, the hydrogen oubble prool?n, 19 et cetera? I/- A I celieve there were times when IJRC gave confusing 2J inf ormation to tne meola and to the public anc I cite tne 21 cucole cuescion as prime e x a mp le. I thini: that tnere are 2c scme ceneral observations which have to oe made. .23. irst, in the early days or early hours of en accident, 24 it is extremely difficult to octein accurate information. i 2; Tha;'s vny anything that we i ssue e arly on in an acciaen is

34 @2.02.14-6 :gsn-1 -described as preliminary infermation. It can change. J' Inceed, it aid. 3_ But with respect to our f ormal pre ss releases which we ~4 put out, which 'on the first day were three in numoer wita .5 respect to the suosequent briefings that we held, I thin'< 5 the ARC people were trying to tell it as they saw it. Inere was no effort on anyone's part, in my jucgment, to either s 3 overplay or downplay the situation at Tnree Mile Island. / Jnfortunately, early on, our information was of such a 12 tenuous nature that we may not have given a totally accurate 11 picture. 12 Sut tais was not a matter of motivation. 13 2 n'7C puolic release 79-65 issued 5: 00 p.m. on 3/23 14 stated that radiation levels off-site were not significant 1; and celieved orincipelly be c a us e -- 15 A I coject to the. cnsracterization. I con't oelieve 1, that's wnat ve said. 13 Jan I neve the release? 19 vo you have it with you? ) 2J \\ I don't celieve that we ever used the woro 2i "siinificantd or dinsignifi:ent" in descricing it. 22 J I ao not nave a copy of the.releese witn me. 23 A. I can ge t one up nere. 24 ~ V.7. PAGE: Plhy con't we ? 27 AR. ?OSTER: Off tne recoro.

35 [62102.16 fL'gsn .I (Discussion off the record.) 2 Bf MR. PAGE: -3' O Let's go back on the record. 4 as have a copy of the public announcement coming to us 5: f rom Mr..?ouchard's office cased on a call that he's mad 3.

o While waiting for the releases to arrive, let's move on to

/ som3 other questions that we have. 3 In retrospect, looking osck on tne situation in hindsignt, _are /ou satisfied with the number and quality of the puolic / 10 announcements thet NRC issued concerning the accident? 11 A Wa ll, the answer is obviously no cecause tne 14 announcements contained information which subsequently turn 3d 13 out to oe not the case. 14 Sc with respect to quality the answer is no. 15 f.'i th respect _to quantity, you have to keep in min tnat in 13 addition to issuino f ormal releases and unfortunately, in tne 1 le cureaucracy, some paools think unless you put it cown on I?_ papac,-it do3sn't count. 1/ Pie were answering-questions all cay long on Wednesday, 2J-inurday, an; Friday from the mecie. Ar. Ingrem and tne 2e rensinder of my staff, wnica is a tot al of f our people, wera 2c ansaerino questions f rom nere in the Maryland National Bank i 23 ouilcing. 21 If they nas a cuestion, we would try to get them the 2; .snsNerffrom the E/.T.

36 1.$2.02.16 k. 7sh i In addition, :Ar. Abraham was working out of the King of 2 drussia office on Wednesday. He went to Harrisourg.ve dnesday 3 ni;nt. 4 I guess in - you're never satisfied, and I don't think that anyood/ in this particular accident should take any 5 -saris f action. I would lump into that the NRC, the utility, i end the news media. 3 I think.we all had proolems. I think the state had / oroolems, too. 1) I recall, you know, reading of some criticisms of the la governor's press secretary, that he was the only person in 12 Harrisburg that could answer the meala's questions. And 13 they coulcn't find him. 14 inat's a cum rap. We were all working as herd as we coulc. 13 There just waren't enougn of us and there wasn't enougn 1; information. I, 3 .vaulo you descrion the circumstan es leading to tne 13 estaolisnment of a press oriefing room in 3ethesde on, - 1/. I celieve, inursday? 23 A It voulo have Deen Friday. 2i 07.riosy. 2_ A I cannot oecause et that time, I was on m.y way to 23-diddletown with 3enton. I celieve that -- '241 2 Have you any more to add on tnat? '25 ' A'- eb. Mr. Ingram aovised me that he was plannin7 to 4

37 92.02.17-L :gsh - i set up a news center in Bethesda and this was proosoly my 4 first call oack froo TMI. 3 I told nio-thet I thought it was a good idea. 4 Subsecuently, that. afternoon, I guess Brian Grimes - ana 3 Dudley Thompson orief ed the press on that information. And S that's where the meltdown story originated. I And I co not f ault either of those people for that. In 6 this agency, people have been encouragea to answer questions / as -- in the most straightforward f ashion by the commission. 10 Any discussion of the ultimate in a nuclear accident leads 11 you to melt;own. 12 Bf '4R. FOSTER: 13 C riith respect to the briefing center which was 14 estaolisneo in the East / West Towers, do you recall receiving 1; any requests f rom the media ?.'ecnesdey or Tnursday tnat ye s, 16 you should go ahead and estaolish sometning like this, it i li was cadly needed? 14 A I don't recall any, but tnere may have been. No, li I don't reca ll. 23 -2 37 you recall !.tr. Ingram mentioning anything aoout 2e tae: the mesia had oeen recuesting a brie fin 1? 2> A .30. I'll tell you. On Inursday, aft. the Chairman 23 and the senior staff hac oriefed tne Udall .m i ssion in a 24 very heavil/ covered sessic, on Capitol Hill, I must say 20 thct rigntly or wrongly, I tnought we were on the cownhill . - ~. -

38 62.02.16. ?!. gsh I - track on tnis acciaent. I went back to the EMT and there 2 really as I recall on Thursday, it was not that much, you 3

now -- on, ooviously mecia calls continuing.

I don't m? an 4 it tnat way. 6 But I_ mean the pressures s eemed to be releasing a bit. 1 hen we got into tnat Thursday evening, to the water, tn? a discharge of the water whicn created a oit of a hullacalloo e i up in Harrisourg. But as I say, my f eelings generally Tnurscay was that we lJ mignt be on the downhill sice. ~ 11 2 But do you recall Mr. Ingram mentioning any such -- 12 A I 30 not. But it's conceivable. It was my 13 impression that we were hand 1'ing the mecia pretty well. !? ile'll have to check with the mecia. I must say, let me -1; follow tnat one uo. la I must sly that I have had very f ew :omplaints from tne - 1/ news media 'tita respect to t' e way we attemated to serve n 19 them curing inree '411e Island. l/ If tnere are any, they haven't oeen stated to me personally. 2; and I've.hed a numo?r of people saying we dian't do a 21 nalf oad joc, consicering. 22 De you rememoer having any conversations witn ne 23 air?: tor of news at 150 wita respect to estaolishing a -24 orialing room? 25 A .Jo.

39 62.02'.-1l9 Li gsh 'l 0 In any of the conversations Wednesday, Thursaay L 2 that you had with Chairman Hendrie, do you recall him 3. -mentioning to you that the nnite _. House had suggested that 4 the NR0 'estaolish a briefing room? . 5 A N7, not'on Wednesday or Thursday. 16 0 How aoout Friday? i A Sy friday, I was already heading f or TMI anc 3 -getting ready to locate something up there. 9 2 Is it f air to say in summary, then, that as far 13 as the cecision-making. process to establish the briefing 11' r oo m, it's your recollection that it was simply a decision 12 reached by you and Frank -Ingram? g)V 13 14 lb 16' i,- 13' ' l/ ~ 2J ---2 24 - 23 ~2 4 2r l ,w- .r y w m-_, ,we . ~. ....cwe. .m-wr .rm.e+---+, r-w*

CR 7262 40 LEONE t-3 m2-1 p I A. No. I can't answer that because I don't really 2 know. I recall Frank telling me that Commissioner Gilinsky 3 had mentioned that we ought to set something up. This was 4 Friday afternoon after I arrived at TMI. I think you have 5 to keep in mind that the situation was a good deal different 6 .on Friday than it was on Wednesday and Thursday, not only in f 7 terms of media interest, but in terms of the facts. There 8 was a serious accident at Three Mile Island. Wednesday, the 9 facts were reported as best people could. Thursday, the media l 10 had full opportunity with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory II Commission on the Hill. The Chairman talked to any number of 12 them down there following that briefing. We were getting l 13 l information out. I# I think in hindsight, if -- and it's something we are 15 l trying to dc. We, in my view -- an accident cannot be managed i 16 from Washington. It has to be managed by the people on the I7 i site. And it has -- we have to have an adequate number of l II I ..r! public affairs people on the site. And in a situation like i '3 ! a i ". Three Mile Island, pray it does not occur again, but should it, n I think we would have to move our people in the local area. f 7* 1 21 I believe that's the place to handle it. 22 And if there is a criticism of our operation, it is -- and l l 23 it's a valid one -- that we did not move sufficient numbers of I 2 Ii ' people into TMI soon enough. I think that's also a criticism Ace rederat Reporters. Inc. 2"c j valid of the technical staff, but for a differer.t reason. I O I r

mto 2 41 N 1 G You had not yet established a briefing room when i 2 Frank Ingram called you to the site Friday afternoon? 3 A No. We were beginning to. Abraham and I had already ' 4 talked. 5 g Excuse me? 6 A The press center at Middletown was established on 7 Saturday. 8 G I'm thinking of the one at East-West Towers in 9 Bethesda. i I 10 A My. impression was it was established on Friday Il afternoon. But again, I wasn't here. I'm sure it was, l 12 because that's where Grimes and Dudley Thompson briefed the i 13

people, 14 'l 0

Okay. Let me clear something up for the record. Ilf 15 The call from Frank Ingram on Friday with Chairman or 16 Commissioner Gilinsky's suggestion that you estab ish a l l 17 briefing room or press center -- I3 A That is my recollection of what Frank told me. i ,in H G Okay. That would be with respect to the one in i e 20 j' Bethesda, as opposed to -- j i II i 21 A Yes, sir. l i 22 4 Okay. S 23 SY MR. PAGE: O You had indicated earlier that you thought that i 24 Act. oderst Reporters, Inc. 25 NRC sh'ould get more people out quicker to the site. - it

mto 3 42 1 A Should get more people, period. Public affairs 2 operation. 3 g Well, that was my question. Are you presently 4 adequately staffed to respond if another accident should occur 5 tomorrow? 6 A No. We're moving in that direction, but we are not. 7 We are presently recruiting for a second public affairs officer 8 in Region I. We have requested the Congress for two additional 9 positions for second public affairs officers in Regions II and 10 III. We're recruiting for a deputy commissioner of public II affairs. 12 The '81 budget has an additional person in it, and I 13 believe that person will be located in headquarters. I think Id it's also fair to observe that you can never staff up to 15 handle an accident.. If you have as many people as you need 16 to handle an accident--while this was a very busy office, I 17 would love to have 40 or 50 professionals at Middletown. 18 You have to draw on other resources, which is what we did at j I9 Middletown. Belatedly, but we did. 1 l 20 Another mistake that we made in hindsight was not havi.ng 21 technical people in the pressroom at all. Robert Bernaro and 22 Tom Elsasser did not get to Middletown until some time Monday. 23 0 . Why was that? A I think clearly an error in judgment. I'm sure they 24 Acc i eders! Reporters, Inc. 25 would have come if we'd have called them earlier. l

.mta 4 43 1 BY MR. PAGE: 2 G Are plans under way to establish some kind of a 3 training program for technical people within NRC to throw in 4 to help respond to a situation like TMI, to help out in the 5 public information department? 6 A I think it's a goori suggestion. Nothing formal has 7 been done. I think it's possible among those of us who work 8 with the technical staff every day, to identify people who 9 are particularly talented in translating difficult technical 10 language into something that the public can understand. We II spot them around the place. We know who they are. I just am I2 not quite sure what a training course would encompass. I just 13 look for the natural instincts, frankly, and I think we have a Id I good number of people around this gency who have good instincts 15 in this area. 16 I think the two who came were exceptionally talented and I 17 told them so. 18 G All right. We have had delivered to our room, where I l9 we're taking Mr. Fouchard's deposition, the public announcements 20 that were issued by NRC on Wednesday, and I have looked through 21 them and in fact confirmed what Mr. Fouchard has said, that 22 there was no statement made that the radiation releases from i 23 the plant were~ insignificant or anything indicating that. 24 I recall now the basis for my earlier question was a Ace rederst Reporters, Inc. 25 preliminary notice that was issued on Monday. It was not a 1 i

mto 5 44 1 public announcement as such. This was something that was 2 referred to in an exhibit to the deposition that we had with 3 Karl Abraham earlier. He was interviewed by Mr. Sandman and 4 Mr. Reuben of the Presidential Commission on the accident at 5 Three Mile Island. We included in his deposition as 6 Exhibit 5046. 7 In that exhibit, on page 104, and making comments to 8 Mr. Abraham, they had indicated concern with the statement in 9 the PN. I guess the "PN" stands for public notification? 10 A. Preliminary notification. 11 Q. Preliminary notification, that radiation levels at 12 the boundary were not significant as of 8:00 o' clock that 13 morning, I believe is the way that it was put. And they had I# made a comment that they felt that NRC should not aave issued such a notice at that time, making that statement, because 16 they felt that the radiation levels were, in fact, significant at that time. 18 In responding to the comments that they had made, 19 Mr. Abraham did not seem to disagree with what statement they 20 had made. And the point I wanted to get at with you, 21 Mr. Fouchard, is whether or not you believed that any informa-22 tion -- any inaccurate information may have been included in 23 the Preliminary Notification that should not have been put in 24 there? l Acor ders Reporters anc. A.. If that's a question, I haven't read the PN, but l I i

mta 6 45 I if they describe the radiation as being significant or insig-2 nificant, I just personally don't use those terms if I can 3 avoid it. I try to relate it to something. But -- 4 g Would you like to read for the record what is stated 5 in the public announcement that was issued that morning about 6 what the radiation levels were? 7 A Well, we said -- and this was when you say 10:30, 8 it means we were using it beforehand. What we say is: 9 "There has been a release of radioactivity inside the 10 reactor containment system. Measurements are still being made 11 to determine if there has been any radioactivity detected 12 off-site, and there is no indication of release off the site." i' 13 This was the first release we issued, which was mid-morning 14 on March the 20th, i 15 Second one -- in between the times, keep in mind we were 16 answering questions from everybody. The secend release, which l 17 went on the wires about 5:00 o' clock, which would have meant 18 that probably it was being used by 4:30 at least, indicated: i i 19 "Some more precise readings off the site. Maximum confirmed, 20 reading of about 3 MR per hour about one-third mile from the 21 site; one mile, one MR." 22 We indicated that this was -- we believed it was principally 23 _ direct radiation coming from within the containment building. i 24 O Do you recall what the basis for that statement was? ! Aa4mw) Rrerwrs tv. 25 A The basis for that statement would have been the l l l

mto 7 46 I considered judgment. of the senior people of the agency and the 2 EMT, because these were all checked with them. 3 BY MR. FOSTER: 4 0 I have a question. Metropolitan Edison, earlier on 5 that day, 9:00 o' clock, 10:00 o' clock that morning, was 6 publicly stating that the radiation was principally coming 7 from a spillage of radioactive water into the auxiliary 8 building. Wouldn't NRC have access to this information some 9 time during Wednesday? 10 A I would have hoped so. But I can't tell you for a II fact that we did. I2 BY MR. PAGE: 13 0 I referred earlier to the PN system of reporting 14 information, the so-called Preliminary Notification. Can you 1 15 tell us what is the relationship of those to public announce-l 16 ments? Are the PNs made a matter of public record? 17 A Well, there is no relationship except that they 18 deal with the same thing, with public announcements. We issue I t or write public announcements in far different language than l 19 20 is used to write the preliminary notifications. I think this 21 is regrettable, because I think that the PNs could serve a 22 more useful purpose. 23 For example, they are sent to the Congress and placed in 24 the public document room. They could serve a far more useful A mewee sc=rwes.ine. l 25. purpose if they were written in language which members of the I i I m

mt3 8 47 I Congress and the general public could understand. 2 The answer is yes, they are made, placed in the public 3 document room, is my understanding. They are not issued out d of our office. They're issued out of the Office of Inspection 5 and Enforcement. 6 g I believe you said that the public announcements 7 whichswere issued were reviewed by EMT people before they were 8 released. l 9 A. That's correct. 10 Are the PNs likewise reviewed by EMT before they're 0 II released? 12 A. I can't answer that. My expectation is that they 13 probably were not. But I couldn't -- Id Do I understand that PNs are not written principally g 15 to inform the public, then? 16 A. If they are, they don't serve that purpose. 17 g I believe you indicated earlier that Chairman Hendriei 18 held a press conference in Bethesda Saturday afternoon. Did I9 I understand you correctly that you had suggested that he hold 20 such a conference? l 21 A. It was suggested to me, but I do not remember by i 22 who. It could well have been Mr. Jam, because we talked frequently. My recollection is that Frank said that there 23 24 l were a number of reporters in the center that the Chairman Ace-Fooers Reporters, Inc. l 25 had -- we are now what, four days into the accident, you know, j l

mto 9 48 I had not yet held a press conference, and there was a good deal 2 of urging that he do so. 3 I told him I thought it made sense to me. In essence, I 4 approved it. 5 0 We were informed by at least one -- well, we were 6 informed by someone from the AP that after the press conference 7 was held in Bethesda, he was somewhat concerned about why a 8 press conference would be held back in Bethesda, when press 9 conferences were also being held in Middletown. He had thought 10 perhaps the purpose of that was to give out bad information Il far from the site, so it wouldn't be picked up. 12 g I __ 13 g Or words to that effect. 14 A In the first place, without challenging the accuracy 15 of your report, I know most of the people who worked for the 16 Associated Press in this town and cover the NRC. And I find 17 it very hard to believe that any one of them would have made 18 such a statement. I9 BY MR. FOSTER: 20 g The statement was indeed made. 21 A If the statement was made, I would like to see it 22 and have it identified by person. Again, we are -- you're 23 asking me to respond to anonymous allegations and I have no 24 way of determining, you know, the credibility of the person { A=4~w.irmonm. w. 25 who says it, except to tell you that I find it dif ficult-i I i

mto 10 49 I for any reporter to complain that the news conferences held -- 2 0 Let's back up a second on that. 3 A In other words, what I'm challenging is the accuracy 4 of the interpretation. I find it hard to believe, from what 5 I know of the AP reporters in this town. 6 0 Number one, it was the Associated Press Harrisburg 7 bureau chief. Number two, it was a feeling on his part -- and 8 he felt that it was shared by other members of the media -- 9 that this was a possible reason for holding the press confer-10 ence in Bethesda, that information of an alarming nature may 11 be best coming from Bethesda, away from the site. 12 A Well, if indeed he made that statement, the allega-l 13 tion is ridiculous. The reason for holding the news conference,! 14 as I have stated it, is that there were probably -- you'll 15 have to ask Mr. Ingram, but my guess is that a hundred or so 16 reporters were in the news center over at East-West. They 17 were clamoring for information. 18 I would suggest that you might pose the same question, f i f lattributingittothebureauchiefatHarrisburg, to the 19 i l 20 ' reporters who covered from the Associated Press here in 21 Washington, and see if you get the same view. I seriously 22 doubt that you will. i 23 We're all exercising beautiful hindsight, including some of 24 my colleagues in the nedia. n*Fmwa n.conen. w. 25 l

mto 11 50 1 (L Were you in any way involved with giving the NRC 2 clearance on that AP bulletin that we talked about earlier 3 Saturday night? Press release, I believe, was cleared with 4 Bethesda. At the time you heard about it, it had already 5 been released on the wire, is that it? 6 A. Yes. The word " clearance" is a bit strong. Let me 7 describe the situation, and this is repetitive because I think 8 I described it earlier. 9 But after talking with Dick Lyons of the Times, I did call 10 Ingram in Washington saying I had this report. You remember, II we are out in the middle of a cornfield in a trailer. So we 12 didn't have access to radio, television, or what was moving 13 on the news wires. l Id I asked Frank to check with AP. Frank did. And subsequently 15 -- and this is not my personal knowledge, but what I have 16 read and had reported to me by the person who wrote the 17 story, Stan Benjamin, that he read the story to Ingram. 18 Ingram said it sounded accurate to him. He read it to Case I' I9 or portions of it to Case, and Case says, yes, that was what 20 was said. 21 And I think that what we're missing here is not that the 22 story was necessarily accurate or inaccurate or inflammatory, 23 because I believe I told you before, subsequent to getting 24 to Harrisburg, AP bureau manager -- I don't know if it's the Ace 4 oer.' Reporters, inc. l 25 l same man ~who we just discussed -- handed me the story and he j I

mto 12 51 I said, this is what people are raising hell about. Is there 2 anything wrong with it? 3 And I read it and I did not see anything inflammatory 4 except for that one paragraph about the two days. And I 5 object -- and I told the AP this -- to attributing it to an 6 anonymous source, a statement of that sort. If a man is going 7 to tell you a bubble's going to explode in two days, he ought 8 to have the courage to have his name attributed. 9 BY MR. FOSTER: 10 0 That wasn't the story that was run by Mr. Case and II Mr. Ingram? 12 A It was, yes. 13 0 The two days -- 14 l A Yes, it was, if it was the same story that I saw 15 in Harrisburg. There's no reason to think they moved a 16 different story for Harrisburg. 17 MR. PAGE: Off the record. 18 (Discussion off the record.) 19 THE WITNESS: I think what is confusing you, because l 20 you're not familiar with the terminology that the wire services 21 use, is that there was an advisory, I am told, put out by the 22 Associated Press that they had what they call a new night lead 23 coming up on the Three Mile Island situation, and that it 24 would say that the bubble is becoming potentially explosive. Ace.r.o.r. Reporwri, inc. 25 Now, I have not seen that advisory. I have had people i I

mta 13 52 I tell me about it, as this transcript will reflect. I earlier 2 said that if indeed that was the advisory and rather than waiting for the story, the radio stations and the television 3 d stations of central Pennsylvania flashed across their screen 5 the lines, bubble becoming potentially explosive, I can 6 understand the apprehension of the people up there. But I'm 7 also saying that the story, as I read it, did not have that 8 impact. 9 It might have said the same thing, but there were so many 10 qualifications in it that I think the reporter was trying to II do an honest job of reporting what he was told. 12 I have had a number of discussions with the executives of 13 the Associated Press on the matter. They have -- they tell Id me, go over their entire file that night. They do not believe I 15 that they were responsible for upsetting the people of 16 central Pennsylvania. All I know is somebody was. I l I7 BY MR. FOSTER: 18 g Unless I misuncerstood you, I thought you had e i mentioned that the story that was cleared by Mr. Case and 20 i Mr. Ingram had a time frame of two days in conjunction with 21 the -- A. The story that I saw in the press room in Harrisburg 22 23 on Saturday night had a statement attributed to an anonymous j 24 NRC person as saying that the bubble will explode within two Ace rederj Reporters, Inc. 25 t days. I will hr.ve the copy up here shortly. \\; i i

U mto 14 53 P 1 O Was it also your understanding that this is the 2 story that was read to Ingram and Case? 3 A It was my understanding that this was the story which 4 was read to Ingram and Case, yes. 5 g Do you know now, in retrospect, who the source of 0 that information was? 7 A No, I do not. If you find out, please tell me. O BY MR. PAGE: 9 0 In light of the TMI experience, how do you believe 10 NRC can improve its effectiveness in communicating with the 11 news media following a nuclear accident? 12 A Move in sooner, in force. I think that the word 13 " accident" is sort of an all-encompassing one. There are different varieties of accidents. For example, subsequent 15 to Three Mile Island, there was a problem at Oyster Creek. 16 The agency moved its regional director and I put my -- 7 Karl Abraham on a helicopter from Middletown to Oyster Creek. I8 It soon became apparent that there was no need to move 19 gobs of people to Oyster Creek. On the other hand, TMI taught us that we've got to be 21 prepared to move in quickly. 22 I think that the NRC has under way an effort to locate an 23 off-site emergency center where state, local, federal, and 2 I guess utility people would gather to assess the information. Ace recer;J Rsporters, Inc. 25 There would have to be a press center, either in that 1 l

mta 15 54 1 facility or nearby, it seems to me, where the press could be 2 accommodated. Certainly in the times in which we live now, 3 anything involving nuclear creates a good deal of media 4 attention. 5 So we are -- we have some preliminary planning under way 6 in conjunction with what the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula-7 tion is doing. Our people are ready to move if the need 8 arises. I'm also hopeful that Congress will give us the 9 additional people we requested. 10 0 Do you have any suggestions for ways in which there 11 could be an improvement on the information that reaches the 12 public, information that reaches the people from the site 13 following'an accident? Of course, now, you must depend upon 14 getting that information from NRC technical people on site. 15 A I still believe that that's -- from where else would 16 it come? You have to rely on your technical people. I think 17 in this agency we have good techr.ical people, people whose 18 judgment I regard very highly. They are people with whom I've 19 worked for many years. f 20 I think Three Mile Island has taught us all a lot. But 21 that doesn't mean that we know everything. And each accident, 22 I think, is going to be a little different. I think you have 23 to keep in mind that the accident that people have always 24 contemplated in this agency is a little like the DC-10. It's Ace. Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 down and it's over. Then you're playing consequences, but the l l

I mta 16 55

1. ~

1 accident is over. 2 Three Mile Island went on for days. 3 Let's go off the record just a minute. 4 (Discussion off the record.) 5 BY MR. FOSTER: 6 G With respect to the information that NRC has 7 available to it, how do you think in the future the NRC should 8 use technical information coming from the utility? 9 A I think that if the situation ever arises where this 10 agency does not believe that the information it is receiving II from a licensee is accurate, that this agency should immediately 12 revoke that license. 13 In other words, you have to trust it. And if you can't Id they have no business being a licensee. 15 0 Did you trust the information obtained from 16 Metropolitan Edison? 17 A I didn't get information from Metropolitan Edison. 18 I got my information from NRC people. I9 BY MR. PAGE: 20 0 What do you believe can be done for the future, 21 Mr. Fouchard, to lessen the impact of public demands placed 22 on NRC for information following a nuclear accident of the 23 type that occurred at TMI? As we understand it, the phones 24 were ringing offithe hook and many people were involved in AC; rederaf Reporters, Inc. 25 answering these phone calls. Anu some of these people who l j-i

mta 17 56 1 were answering phone calls wera. high officials of the NRC. 2 Is there some way that the public affairs organization 3 could be structured to take some of the burden off of the 4 people in the emergency response center? 5 A Well, I think indeed the r ecord will show that by 6 far the number of telephone calls handled by the public affairs 7 ataff exceeded those handled by people in the emergency center. 8 At the same time, I think you have to understand that news 9 media, particularly in Washington, have become well-acquainted, 10 as t hey should, with the senior technical staff of this agency. II A statement coming from a senior technical person on a techni-12 cal matter is and always will have more weight than that made 13 by a public affairs person. Id That doesn't mean the absence of any credibility on the 15 one hand. It just means that medical doctors are more 16 believed when they're talking about medical subjects than are 17 the public relations spokesmen for the American Medical Asso-18 l ciation. I9 I don't believe there was any undue burden placed upon the 20 staff. I don't believe it's a burden to ask technical people 21 to speak to the media and thereby to the public. I think it's 22 part of all our responsibility. 23 To try to segregate ctatements by the agency into one 24 l office or another office and say, no, I can't talk to you, au+eni nwortm. ix, j it would be a gross mistake and 25 !,you'vegottotalktohim, I i

mto 18' 57 1 very poor public policy. 2 g Was any kind of arrangement made whereby the NRC 3 operator. knew who to direct phone calls to when they came in? 4 were certain individuals designated for certain types of 5 calls? 6 A No. I believe most of the calls probably came into 7 our office down here on the third floor of the Maryland 8 National Bank Building. We set up a whole new bank of phones. 9 The Department of Energy provided us with some of its 10 nuclear public affairs people to help answer the phones. I 11 believe this was not an NRC problem. I believe it was a 12 government problem, and we are very grateful to them for the 13 help they gave us. 14 But there is no way, it seems to me, that the volume of j 15 telephone calls which came into this agency following and 16 during the days of TMI could be satisfactorily handled. I 17 don't believe there is any agency in government that's prepared! c-3 18 to do it. I 19 O Shifting over somewhat to some different line of 20 questioning, woula you tell us what you heard, if anything, d 21 following the accident concerning any plan of NRC to take 22 over direct operation of the TMI plant? 23 .A I guess I cannot recall any conversation in which l ltherewasasuggestionthattheNRCtakeovertheoperation 24 - Ace rooea Reorms w. 25 l of the TMI plant. I I I

58 mto 19 I I would add as an aside, I think that would have been a 2 serious mistake, since the most important thing for the safety 3 of the public was to have ti people who were familiar with the operat' ion of that plant continue to operate it. 5 I have heard it reported to Harold Denton and I have been 6 asked about it, that at one point in a conversation Met Edison 7 threatened to walk away. I never heard anything like that. 8 I never saw any sign of anything like that. And I assume 9 there were some very tense moments between the technical 10 people, and I can or'v assume that tempers flared on occasion. 11 But I never took that subject seriously, primarily because 12 I guess I believe it would be bad policy. 13 We talked earlier about the deliberations on Friday 0 morning concerning a possible NRC recommendation for evacua-15 tion of the surrounding area around the reactor there. Do 16 you recall hearing any conversations about desirability of I7 recommending evacuation on any other day, Wednesday, Thursday? IO A. I do not. And I've been askcd this question before. 19 I recall no discussion of evacuation prior to Friday morning. 20 If you have anything to refresh my memory, I'll be happy to -- 21 0 No. I have nothing. 22 Did you hear anything about possible need to evacuate on 23 Saturday mor..i.ng or Sunday morning? f A. Well, I was at the site at that point and I did not. Acower.i n.ponen, inc. 25 But I have the benefit now of listening to testimony by j i I i l I

59 mt3 20-I members of the Commission. And also, I have read the text 2 of the Chairman's news conference, which was Saturday afternoon 3 where evacuation -- as we bring the bubble down, we may have 4 to do this ourselves. As I pointed out, the 20-mile figure 5 was used, which did not -- well, it surprised the people in 6 Harrisburg, I mean, the state officials. 7 Sunday, I understand the Commission was still working on 8 something involving evacu7 tion. But my knowledge from that from testimony given -- I believe of the Commissioners, 9 cou.as 10 given before the Presidential Commission. II O You heard nothing while you were at the site, then? 12 A No. And I would repeat that throughout the early I3 days, Bethesda seemed to be more concerned than those of us 14 at the site. 15 BY MR. FOSTER: 16 g On Friday, did you make any recommendation with 17 respect to evacuation to the Chairman or any of the other 18 members of the Commission? 19 A I think the record will show that I asked the l 20 Chairman, do you not think there should be some precautionary 21 evacuation. And his reply was, I suppose so, but. And that's 22 where we got into it like a couple of blind men. l 23 0 Then you suggested to him that this may be a con-24 sideration? Ace 4 wed Reporters, Inc. 25 A Yes, indeed. I believed it should be a consideration. I

mto 21 60 I g What did you base this recommendation on? 2 A The fact that at that point there was radiation 3 coming from the plant and we weren't quite sure of the source 4 of'it. And we didn't know whether there was going to be some 5 more of it. 6 O So you felt that you had a -- 7 A Let me clarify. The Chairman, Mr. Denton and I 8 don't remember who else was in on that conversation, we were 9 all talking to the Chairman downtown. The tapes are available 10 to you. So you can determine the precise language that was II being used. 12 The Governor had, through Karl Abraham, passed word that 13 he needed some more information from the NRC, that he was Id getting information from the utility. He didn't have a good l source of inforination. 15 I0 At that point I was talking to the Chairman about getting I7 on the phone with the Governor of Pennsylvania. Even if we 18 didn' t know very much, we could tell him that. I believe I I9 used the phrase: Don't you believe some precautionary 20 evacuation should be made? 2I And the Chairman, as I recall, said: I suppose so, but. 22 But that's all a matter of public record. 23 0 You were comfortable enough, then, with the technical 24 understanding you had of -- Ace Feder') Reporters, Inc. 25 A I trusted the people that I was working with. I l i 1

mta 22 61 I O Were you basing, then, this recommendation on the 2 technical information that you had gotten from the other 3 members of the EMT? A Yes, sir. ~ 5 BY MR. PAGE: 6 0 Mr. Fouchard, were you personally involved in any 7 way in NRC's effort to keep the State of Pennsylvania inforned 8 concerning the accident? 9 A You had better believe it. 10 0 Did ycu have personal conversations with the Governor 11 or his press secretary? 12 A No, sir. The press secretary had enough work to do 13 without being bothered by that. In any event, Mr. Abraham 14 was in Harrisburg on Wednesday evening. So he was our liaison 15 with the Governor's press office. 16 I believe my first involvement was on Thursday, when, as 17 I recall, Commissioner Gilinsky was Acting Chairman that day. 18 He came to the EMT and we discussed the desirability-- and I I 19 ! don't know whether it was his suggestion or mine, and I think 20 it's not very important, but we did discuss desirability for l 21 him to talk with Lieutenant Governor Scranton, who the 22 Governor had designated as the State's lead in this matter. 23 I know that Mr. Gilinsky tried to reach Mr. Scranton. I l l 1 24 I don' t know whether he did or not. But this, and then of f AwFerJ Roorwrs, lm. I f 25 course, Friday, I think as the transcripts reflect, there l 4 l I i l l

mto 23 62 I was a keen need for us to communicate with the State. I 2 believe then, in a situation like this, the State has every 3 right to look to the federal agency for the best technical 4 advice it can get. 5 And in addition, subsequent to my arrival at TMI, I talked 6 several times a day with the Governor's press secretary. I 7 met, Mr. Denton and I and the staff met, every evening with 8 the Governor and his staff. I think once we got on the scene 9 the -- I think the State would tell you that they were satis-10 fied with the relationship between NRC at the site and II Harrisburg. 12 In addition, the State had a technical person in Denton's_ l 13 trailer at all times. So he knew what was going on. Id G He was there to keep Mr. Critchlow informed? 15 A He w.a there to keep the Governor informed. 16 Critchlow didn't need anybody to keep him informed. We talked 17 regularly. 18 BY MR. FOSTER: 0 During the Friday, Saturday, Sunday, it's my under-I9 l 20 standing that prior to each one of the Governor and Mr. Denton's 21 conferences, there would be a briefing by yourself and 22 Mr. Denton. 23 A Not a briefing. I would call down to the press 24 I would ask them what sort of -- what are the key center. ' Am+wr3 Reorms, W. l 25 questions that are coming up down there that you haven't been j i l

mta 24 63 I able to handle? What should we make sure we cover so that -- 2 because die press briefing is the best way to get at lots of 3 people in the shortest possible time. There are only sev en 4 of our people trying to serve 300 people down at the press 5 center. It's obvious that was unsatisfactory. We knew that, 6 they knew that. 7 So what we would try to do in these briefings is just cover 8 the areas which were coming up most frequently, handle a lot 9 of people's questions with one answer. 10 0 Had you prepared briefing papers? II A No. 12 O There wasn't a briefing paper handed out to members 13 of the media after these -- Id A No. It was transcripts of the news conferences. IS Here they are. Occasionally, we would have, you know, a press I 16 release. 17 First place, let me tell you how it worked. The morning, 18 Bernaro and Elsasser would come out to the trailer. We would i 19 by that time be getting the PNs. We would talk to them about l 20 what was in the PN to make sure they understood. If they had 21 any questions, interpretation, either Stello or Denton would 22 talk with them. 23 So then they could go down to the press center and be l 24 available to answer questions on what was in the PN when we Ace.e.cer7 Reporters, Inc. lmadethePNavailableinthepress 25 center. As I say, that's l l l l t

mto 25 64 I why two of them simply were not enough. They did a beautiful 2 job, but nobody could have handled that mob. 3 Then, some time later on in the dcy, Denton would come down 4 and brief. So the morning, the afternoon story was usually 5 the preliminary notification. And then, as we got on later 6 in the day, Denton would brief. 7 So there were really two sources of daily activity, plus 8 the questions which arose. And of course, if anything of any 9 significance took place, we would advise the press center. 10 But there were no briefing papers prepared. Harold would call 11 in Boyce Grier and Stello or whoever the senior was, and we'd 12 just go over what the questions were and what the developments 13 had been. i 14 He'd just make a few notes and off he'd go. 15 g You indicated that the PNs were distributed to l 16 Mr. Bernaro and Mr. Elsasser, with copies of these also given 17 to members of the press that asked-for them? 18 A Sure. The reason for bringing them out was so they 1 19 ' could read it. And then if they had any questions on it -- l I 20 because these were the boys that were going to have to answer 21 the questions in the press center until we got down there. 22 Do you have any questions? Do you understand this? You know. 23 And that's why they would meet each morning with Stello or l 24 sometimes Denton. Au-rwerst Reporters, lm. I 25 g At what point did you start relying on the PNs f l i

mto 25 65 I rather than writing a separate public announcement? 2 A Oh, very early in the game. We didn't issue very 3 many separate public announcements after we got to TMI. 4 G That was after you arrived at the site? 5 A Sure. You didn't have tome to construct press 6 releases and word engineer. 7 0 Were you involved in preparing the PNs or were they 8 all prepared by technical people? 9 A I was involved in critiquing a couple of them, 10 because unfortunately our approach on PNs did not change. It 11 was still too much technical jargon. But let's face it, it's 12 all we had. 13 So we used what we had, but we made sure not only our 14 people in the press center, but also the technical people 15 we had there understood. So that if a fellow comes up with 16 a PN and says, hey, Karl, what's this phrase mean, why, you 17 can help him with it. 18 G But you were not involved in the writing process? 19 A No. I blew my stack on a couple of them, however. I 20 MR. FOSTER: Off the record. 21 (Discussion off the record.) 22 MR. PAGE: Back on the record. 23 BY MR. POSTER: 24 G Let's go back on the record.

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l 25 Were transcripts of press conferences held jointly with i l l 1

mto 27 66 1 Mr. Denton and Governor Thornberg provided to the press? 2 A That was a function of the Governor's press secretary. 3 But I believe the answer is yes. d g Was the preparation of the transcript then handled 5 entirely by the State of Pennsylvania? 6 A With respect to the joint news conferences held in 7 Harrisburg, the answer is yes. That's routine for any 8 Governor's office. 9 0 Did you have any discussions with Mr. Critchlow at 10 any time on how these transcripts should be disseminated? II A Absolutely not. That is his business, and it looked I2 to me like he was doing a good job. 13 BY MR. PAGE: Id O With respect to the press conferences held by NRC 15 in Middletown, were transcripts of those press conferences 16 distributed to the press? 17 A Yes. 18 0 What kind of turnaround time did you have on getting 19 those back? 20 A We finally got around to two hours turnaround time. 21 We had a little difficulty to begin with because we couldn't 22 find a printer in Middletown. The first day or so, we had 23 hoped to have them. We didn't make two hours. Let me put it 24 that way. I don't remember what it was, but it was embarrass-4=+.o.r.i n.oorters, inc. 25 { ingly long. I think this was just part of a logistical i l i l' 1

mto 28 67 p I situation which we encountered in a community where very little 2 business was going on. 3 After the President left on Sunday, the White House took 4 its PA system and its television mult system back with it, so 5 that Karl Abrahams, simply between that afternoon and the 6 following afternoon, could not find a PA system. So our 7 Monday news conference was very unsatisfactory. And if you 8 will check the transcripts, I think you will find me lecturing 9 my news media college very hard. .i 10 But these are just some of the things that were encountered.I II We had the Commission's reporting service come up, Ace 12 Reporting. But it was difficult to find a printer. They I 13 weren't used to that sort of spe'ed turnaround. l Id So ultimately, we brought up our own fast Xeroxing and did i 15 our own work. I think it's fair to say that this may be the 16 only accident in the history of mankind where news conference i 17 transcripts were available on the scene two hours after they 18 were held. I 19 G Turning to a different line of questioning, were 20 you involved in conversations with representatives of other 21 federal agencies, such as DOE, EPA, other Defense Civil 22 Preparedness Agencies, concerning the assistance that they 23 were providing to NRC at the site? 24 A Yes. As I told you, I believe we used some DOE An rwed Roorters. IN. l 25. public affairs people. f l I 4

mto 29 68 1 0 Did you have any involvement in addition to that? 2 A In addition, the nightly meeting in the Governor's 3 office was attended by a representative of the Federal Defense 4 Preparedness Agency.--and I'm trying to think of Bob's last 5 name -- as well as, I believe, Mr. Adamcik, who was the 6 regional representative. 7 It is my understanding that that organization had the lead 8 in coordinatingjthe non-NRC activities at TMI. In addition, 9 I had any number of discussions with the radiological people 10 who were located out at one of the airports. The HEW people 11 came through. 12 But these were, you know, just casual discussions. 13 g Were you calling these people for information that 14 they might have available? 15 A No. I relied upon the program people to get that 16 kind of information. 17 0 Were they calling you for information? 18 A Occasionally they would. I I 19 0 We would like to turn now to what contacts you had 20 with the White House following the accident. Could you tell 21 us with whom at the White House you spoke following the 22 incident which was first reported on Wednesday morning, and 23 give us some indication of about when the conversations took 24 place and the subject of these?

Ace bederd Reporters, Inc.

I 25 A Oh, that's a tall order. On Wednesday, when I was l I

mto 30 69 1 in the incident response center, I told Mr. Ingram to call 2 Walt Wurfel, who was at that time the deputy press secretary, 3 to let him know what we had going. I don't remember any 4 conversations personally with anyone from the White House on 5 Wednesday or Thursday. I'm sure the situation room was being 6 kept apprised, and I know that the National Security Council 7 people were being kept advised. And I'm sure that if they 8 were kept advised, the White House press office was also 9 advised, I mean, by internal White House people. 10 The first contact I had with Jody Powell, I guess, was 11 Friday, right before I was going to TMI. And I think the 12 tapes -- somebody told me that's in the tapes. We,were talking 13 about the central location for a press center. And I told 14 Jody that things were moving pretty fast and I'd have to take 15 a look at it later, that I was going to TMI with Denton, and 16 I would call him from there. 17 And he said, is there anything we can do for.you. And I 18 said, it seems to me you're already doing it. You're getting 19 us hard communications, which we desperately need. And you 20 are getting us to Three Mile Island. 21 Subsequently, when we reached Three Mile Island, we were 22 in the lady's house, and I believe I talked to Powell about 23 the meltdown story, which I had not seen. l 24 BY MR. FOSTER: A m F W w el R u m m m.inc. i 25 g This would have been Friday evening? v

mto 31' 70 1 A. Friday afternoon, early. Well, transcripts reflect 2 it. My wife said I shouldn'~t'say things like that, because I 3 said " God damn it." 4 I didn't know about the story. Then Denton and I subse-5 quently talked to Powell, and I believe the transcripts also 6 reflect that Hendrie and Powell were talking back and forth 7 here in Washington. I think there was some plan that Hendrie 8 might go over to the White House and use Jody's facilities for 9 a briefing. 10 Powell was concerned, and very rightfully so, as every good 11 newsman is, that we not get a situation started where -- if we 12 could avoid it, where a statement was made in Washington 13 which might be contradictory of something which was said in 14 Harrisburg. Good goal. Hard to achieve. 15 But we certainly agreed on the principle. I did not want 16 Denton to go out until he at least had a feel for the situation. 17 That's in terms of -- the green house by that time was sur-18 rounded by reporters. I did not want him to go out until he I 19 at least had a feel for the situation out there and until he 20 had talked with the Governor. Because I believed that it was 21 important that when we said we had been in contact with the 22 Governor from the site, that people knew that we were talking 23 to one another. I 24 We subsequently talked to Powell after this. Then there Ae. Foo.o neoonen,inc. 25 was the news conference that night. And I don't know. Denton i i

71 mto 32 I was talking to the President almost daily after that, and I 2 guess I probably talked to Jody every day at least once. I'm 3 just telling you what we were doing. There was no interference, 4 if anybody suggested that. 5 0 In your early conversations with Mr. Powell or with 6 any other contacts, did the NRC request the White House to 7 provide the communications system that it had available to it, 8 or was this an offer made by the White House? 9 A. I can't answer your question. I don't know how the 10 hard line -- I think it really came to the fore on Friday, when Il you just could not get a 717 number. That's why I told 12 Abraham and told the people in the EMT, the person that cuts 13 off that line is in deep trouble, because that's all wa had to Id l Harrisburg. 15 But I don't know the sequence of the hard line. I seem to 16 remember Gossick being involved. But I'm guessing now. I 17 don't know. 18 g Okay. We discussed somewhat earlier the question of l9 White House involvement in the decision that NRC should be 20 the sole spokesman at the site. Could you tell us a little 21 bit more of what you know of this? 22 A. I don't remember any personal conversations with 23 the White House on the matter. I do remember talking with 24 Mr. Crietz on Saturday morning. And I believe Mr. Denton was 1 . Ace +edory Reporters, iric. 25 present. But it's possible that he wasn't, because we were l l I I

mta 33 72 I all on the same site there and we would meet, sloshing through 2 the mud from one place to another. 3 But they said they were going to hold their last news 4 conference that day, and that I believe Mr. Criet: told me 5 that he had been called from the White House. But that's right 6 now hearsay. I mean, I did not discuss it with him. I 7 certainly had made up my mind by that time that we had to have 8 a single spokesman and that it had to be us. 9 BY MR. FOSTER: 10 0 Were you aware of any prior conversations, or is II there a possibility that prior conversations would have been 12 held with other NRC personnel with respect to coming to this 13 l conclusion? Or was this the first time NRC heard about this? Id The first time I had heard about it, I believe. l A. 15 You're asking for specific recollection six months back, at a I0 time which was pretty chaotic. I7 Let me say that, however it came about, it was the right 18 move. BY MR. PAGE: I 20 0 Did Mr. Criet: indicate to you any concern with 21 NRC being the sole spokesman? 22 A. No. I think at that point Mr. Criet: was probably 23 relieved. 24 BY MR. FOSTER: i Ace Federat Reporters, Inc. 25 Do you remember who would have been with Mr. Criet: I g l I i i

mts 34 73 I during this conversation? 2 A. I do not, no. I don't even remember. I just remember 3 it was held on the site. I don't remember whether it was held, you know, out in the parking lot or where it was. I do remember 4 5 we discussed it, because I often second-guessed myself in 6 saying maybe I should have told him not to hold the last news 7 conference because it added to the confusion. 8 g Did you tell him to go ahead and hold the press 9 conference? 10 A. I said -- in his view, as I recall, this would be II their last one. I had then and still have some difficulties 12 in the concept that a federal agency can interfere with the 13 public information activities of a private corporation. 14 g Federal agencies, including the White House? 15 A I stand on what I said. 16 But at the same time, there was a real need -- and I think I7 this particular area should be clarified, and I would hope i I !8 that maybe your organization might have some wisdom. It's not ! I9 i an easy thing, believe me. 20 0 Mr. Fouchard, you mentioned that you believe 21 Walter Crietz had said he had a call from the White House, 22 although you can't be certain? 23 A. Ask Walter. He would remember. What does he say? O At this point in time, speaking of today, are you l 24 Ace Feder: C eporters, iric. absolutely certain, though, that the White House provided f 25 l I

-mta 35 74 I the impetus for Met Edison to hold a press conference? 2 A No, sir. I did not suggest that. That was not 3 the meaning of that at all. I don't know who was the father 4 of this particular idea. All I can say is it wasn't a bad 5 idea. But I do have some basic problems with how hard a 6 federal agency could come down on a private company. 7 0 Saturday evening, this would have been Mr. Denton 8 and Mr. Stello's trailer, do you remember Bill Murray, 9 Herman Decamp, Blaine Fabian? This would have been some time 10 . Saturday night and would have been in conjunction with dis-11 cussing the Presidant's visit the following day. 12 A That would have to have been awfully late, because 13 I think -- I can't remember when we first got word of the 14 President's visit. I don't remember whether it was in the 15 Governor's office or what. But I think the Governor by that I 1 time -- we're talking fairly late. 17 See, we held that new s conference in Harrisburg some time 18 between 11:30 and midnight. Q Do you remember what time you left for the site to 19 20 go to the Governor's office?- 21 A Do not. 22 g Was it -- 23 A The meeting in the Governor's office was an extended ^ . 24 9 Ace Foceret Reporters, Inc. 25 g . Would it have been prior to the AP bulletin of I

75 mt0 36-I 1 Saturday evening? ~2 A Yes, indeed. 3 G It was before that? That was about 8:00 o' clock? 4 A No. Excuse me. It might have been afterwards. I 5 knew we were late getting to Harrisburg that night, and I'm 6 sorry, I can't reconstruct the times. I can reconstruct the C-4 7 events but not the times. 8 G You don't remember any Met Ed-GP people ccming over 9 to discuss it? 10 A No. I'm sure they did, because the White House was 11 going to begin advising us at 7:00 o' clock in the morning. 12

• We didn't go to the motel.

We went back -- as I say, I don't 13 think I got any sleep that night. We went back to the trailer 14 after the press conference. So I can't believe that, you 15 know, some discussions didn't take place. I just don't 16 recall them specifically. Did you ever recollect having a discussion 17 0 I see. 18 with Vic Stello, either at the time of the event or now, with i l 19 respect to a call you were to receive from Jack Watson? 20 A I would have received -- 21 g Mr. Stello would have received. 22 A Mr. Stello' told me -- and this is very recently -- 23 that while Harold and I were on the way to the capitol that l 24 night, that he had a call from the White House. This must AaFen! Roomes. tnc. 25 have been on the bubble thing, because he was then very i

l mto 37 \\ l 1 ' afraid that v' were going to get sandbagged when we arrived 2 at Harrisburg. See, Vic was on the night shift at that time 3 and he probably didn't know that we were already alert that there was a problem through Dick Lyons' earlier call. He didn't' a 5 say he had a call from the White House. He did not say who 6 it was from. 7 O And it was to discuss the impact of the bubble story ; 8 or seek a confirmation on the accuracy of the information? 9l A I don't know. Did you have any conversations with any Met Edison-GP', 10 0 I i 11 official outside of the one, the possible mention with 12 Mr. Crietz, either at the time of the event or subsequently, ~ 13 with respect to the White House involvement? i 14 1 A Not that I can recall, n 1: 15 BY MR. PAGE: l 16 G In listening to the NRC tapes on Saturday evening l 17 ll following the confusion of or the possible explosion of the O 18 j bubble, the conversations seemed to say that they have received instructions not to take any more calls from the 20 j' press, based upon a hold on information, and that all subse-i quent reports should come from the site, NRC people at the l 21 \\ 22 site. J Was 23 f.l Are you aware of how this policy was brought about? n 24 !; this prompted by a call from the White House? a re rederst Reporters, Inc. l What I tell you now is not of my own direct knowledge. 25 A l i l

77 mte 33 1 It is what I subsequently learned. Apparently, there was a 2 call to Mr. Case, who was the senior person in the operations 3 center that Saturday night, from someone in the White House i complaining about the stories that were moving on the bubble l 4 5 out of Washington. Apparently Mister -- the White House 6 didn't know whether it was a suggestion or what it was, that 7 we refrain from answering any more calls. 8 I learned of this in Harrisburg and it was very late. I I i 9 can't tell you when. 1 10 By that time, we already had a press center set up in 11 Middletown. I only had three people there at the time, two, i 12 three, something like that. By that time, Ihadalreadyprettyf f 13-well made up my own mind that we had to take the con in I l 14 ! Middletown, anyway. l 15 I told Ingram to move the field people first thing in the morning to Middletown, that I wanted him there by the time the 16 17 President arrived, and indeed, they were there. 3 i n is [ What I've told you about the call from the White House is what people have told me. I do remember a conversation with i i 2; q Mr. Ingram on Saturday night, and this was a very hectic day l I 21 for all of us. And I told him to -- that I had -- that I thought we had taken care of the story with the press confer-22 t t 23 l ence in Harrisburg. We'd done all we could for that night, ) i 24 and to have the other people move up and begin on Sunday Aa+ Mwd Reporters, inc. l 25 morning, telling the media that the information on the i

78 mto 39 i I activities at Three Mile Island would be issued by the NRC for l 2 Middletown. So in other words, come to Middletown. 3 0 Was the news center in the Bethesda East-West Towers 4 Building, was it closed at that time? 5 A Was closed, yes. 6, BY MR. FOSTER: 7 G Do you remember who told you, gave you this informa-8 tion? A Initially it was Mr. Ingram, I believe. But it could 9l 10 have been Mr. Case. I didn't pay much attention to it on ? II Saturday night, to be very honest with you, because I'd already 12 made a decision that we were going to have to move everything I i l to Middletown, anyway, just based on the fact the President I3 i 14 was coming the next day. The action had already shifted to j i 15 ' Middletown, and whatever the Commission was going to do here l i in Washington would be with respect to getting information 16 U, from us at the site or taking care of some of the -- you know, i ll 1 M what generic issues on other B&W plants were. So I didn't have any problem with what was suggested, but i. I had already made up my mind that when you have got as few 2; a I I 21 I troops as I have, you try to use them as best you can. And 22 on Friday, they needed them at Middletown. We kept a 24-hour 23, news center in Middletown and I think we made arrangements l v 24 with Middletown police not to arrest reporters that were on -cr e.cers: Reoorters. inc. 25 the street after curfew. t d I

79 l mtn 40 1 BY MR. PAGE: 2 Q Do you recall arrangements that were made with people in Bethesda as to which phone calls they should refer to 3 Middletown and which ones they could answer themselves? 4 5 A It was easy. If they were any activities on the 6 plant, they came to Middletown. Was this from any member of the public or only from 7 8 news people? Me had public lines going from Middletown -- we had 9 A 10 a public tape, public lines, and we changed the tape periodically, during the day, so people could call in and get the status of 11-12 the report. I think we were still servicing the public out 13 of Bethesda, but again, I wasn't here. I don't -. certainly I any media activity would have had to be centralized at 14 i 15 Middletown. l l And we also--if you will talk to my good people, will find 16 l out they handled hundreds and hundreds of calls from the l 17 15 ] public all night long. You haven't lived until you've had a call about 4:00 a.m. in the morning from a hippie radio 2; ; station in California. i i 21 G Mr. Fouchard, were you involved in any way in the NRC coordination activities with Congressional offices follow-22 23 l ing the accident? 24 A No, sir, except -- well, let me amend that. l Ace Federal Reporters. Inc. 25 l Congressman Udall and Congressman Walker were on the site l i

80 mto 41 ? I frequently at TMI when I was there. I had several conversations >

• 2 i

with them. I wouldn't -- you know, Denton would brief them on 3 what was going on, if we had any, you know -- I would let them know when we were going to brief that day, if I knew, and what the highlights were. But that's the extent of it. 5 6 How good do you believe NRC's emergency planning was G prior to the TMI accident, to assure that the news media would 7 8 I be kept promptly and effectively informed following a nuclear 9 accident of this type? A. Inadequate. 4 I What do you believe was the main reason for this? G A. I don't.think the NRC, nuclear industry, and probably 12 I3 some of the states ever believed something like this was going N to happen. I G What thing s have been done since the accident to l 15 b 16 l assure a better response by NRC for an accident? A. Well, as the record -- I believe you have a copy of I7 a memorandum which I sent to the Commission in May on lessons learned. I think we need some more staffing. I think we i l a" 2" ii need some more planning. I think Karl Abraham is doing some i! 21 l planning and trying to use Region I as a model, so we can try I 22 to adapt it to other regions. I 23 f We are trying to identify off site cente.rs. We have pretty e M well concluded that we will move into tae site more quickly. I ..m Fedtral Reporters. Inc. 25 And I think in the events that have transpired since that l .1 -

81 mto 42 1 time, we have. At Oyster Creek, we've had the Erwin, Tennessee, 2 matter, both of which we sent public affairs people to. I l 3 think the real question is what is the role of the NRC. And I will repeat what I said to the Commission in my memorandum, 4 5 and that is: At what point do we take charge? In any situation, 6 somebody has to be boss. Clearly, the Oyster Creek situation wasn't one of those. 7 8 I think the recent situation in North Anna is not one of those. 9 But what's the dividing line? 10 Obviously, it's a matter of judgment. When you send NRC 11 people to the site, what is their role? 12 Now, up to the point of Three Mile Island, the NRC role t i I 13 had been primarily an inspection and investigative one. i I4 think that situation changed at Three Mile Island. Where do i i I 15 ' you draw the line and when do you draw it? Those are basic 16 i policy questions, which I think the -- or excuse me -- the I I '.7d agency has to face up to, and in my view has not done so. 18 h So if you ask me, are we better prepared today than we were it on March the 22nd or 27th, rather, I would say somewhat, but i 20'! only because of lessons we learned. s i !l You mentioned the project that Mr. Abraham has under 21 O I I This was a question I wanted to get into, whether or 22 way. 23 not that was being done country-wide or just in Region I? We were trying to tailor one and then -- well, there's 24 A ra bedtr:A Reporters, enc. 25 a good deal of work being done nationwide. But Karl's project i

82 mta 43 I is just adaptit to Region I,. see how it works out, and then we 2 could adapt it for the others. i 3 Could you indicate what he's doing? 0 4 He's looking at everything. He's looking at where A He's 5 press centers might be located at the various sites. I 6 looking at the logistical situation: How do you get typewriters, and how do you get telephones, how do you get Xerox machines, 7 8 who does this? Let's face it, at one point I had signec'. for a trailer, a Xerox machine, a White House mult, and I t'old somebody, I'll 11 either wind up in the graveyard or Leavenworth after this 12 is all over, because we had no requisition authority. i Do you get somebody from the agency to go out with pad and 13 I# ! pencil? Just simple logistic matters that have to be handled 'l I 15 and have to be handled rapidly. t I 16 In addition to -- but Karl's activities are primarily more i detailed activities than they are policy activities. As I say, ; n 'q 'l I3 I think the agency has to determine what its role is and when u that role changes. i vl 0 Is he examining that at all as part of his project? I 21 I don't think so, no. I think he figures that's A probably got to be done from here, and he's right. And soon, 22 23 I hope. 1 24 O He indicated to us that he expected to complete I his project some time, I believe, in December or so. Do you 25 l b i

I mts 44 83 L 1 expect that the other regional offices would be asked to do I

l. something similar to this in the foreseeable future?

2 I 3' A When you have one public affairs office in each region, particularly regions which are as busy as Region I is, 4 5 and now II and III and the others, also, when you hold a meeting 6 here in Washington or someplace else, you uncover yourself all 7 the way around the country. So we really don't hold enough 8 meetings. 9 What I want to do is bring the staff together as soon as I I And I don't think it has to await Abraham's project, justi 10 can. Il to talk about this in a little more detail. I 12 Actually, I was hoping that the reports of some of these ti I 13 l organizations, like the President's Commission and like this l: i i would be out by the time we held that meeting, because I 14 one 15 am hopeful that there will be some constructive criticisms. 16 If there are not constructive criticisms, thenMI think both 17 1: i f-ll organizations would have wasted their time. l 1 i IS : BY MR. FOSTER: i I l. G Going back to that early morning call you got from P 20 ' Karl Abraham, I wanted to clear up something. Did he mention + I i 21 ' that he had a site or a general emergency? 22 A My recollection was he said site emergency. t 23 l 4 Okay. During this call or any of the early calls j 1 3 24 "; in the morning of the discussions you had with Mr

Abraham, Ace +.oeci neponers, inc.

25 what instructions did you have for him with respect to what i, ,m

84 mts 45 I his duties would be? 2 A~ I told him, I think, to stay there for the time being,: i 3 because by that time the calls were already flooding into both I 4 Washington and into the region. And it was act until later that day that I decided to send him to Harrisburg and to bring 5 6 Jan Strasma in from Chicago, Region III, to fill in for l 7 Abraham at King of Prussia. I thought it was important to have people answering phones 8 9! both in Washington and in King of Prussia. obviously, we should hakm moved more people 10 In retrospect, II into -- there wasn't much going on at the site. I mean, in 12 terms of the communications, they were horrible and, you know, , even NRR sent people to the site and then never seemed to hear 13 14, from them again. l 11 b 15 What you really had to do -- the best place for Karl to be 16 was where the press action was, r.nd. the press action at that i 17 !, point was in the Governor's press office, which is where I i l I '3 sent him on Wednesday night. i e I don't have to tell Karl Abraham what to do, by the way. t 20d He's a thoroughly competent public affairs man. 21 0 Did you have any specific instructions for him when 22 you sent him to the site? \\ 23 L No. 2' O How about, example: Don't get involved with any An Ferr'J Reporters, W. 25 joint press conferences with the utility? i k a

85 mte-46 1 A No, I can't remember ever discussing that. But I 2 can't think -- you'd have to ask Karl that. 3! G Did you ever receive a call back from him saying, l 4 look, I've had a request. What's our position on the matter? 5 A Not that I can recall. I think Karl and I are in 6 no disagreement on that matter. So he wouldn't really have 7 to seek much guidance from me; confirmation from me, but not 8 guidance. 9I O How about any instructions or any dialogue you may 10 have had on his interfacing with the media upon arriving at II the site? 12 A He went to the Governor's press office and he was 13 interfacing with the media regularly. I understand he was 14 greeted with open arms by the Governor's press secretary. At 15 last, some help. 16 G This would probably have been Thursday. Do you l t 17 l remember personally receiving a call or conversations with !I l 13 i Mr. Ingram, who may have received this call, a request by 3 CBS to make Mr. Abraham available and your office declined the P I 20 !' request? I I 21 A I don't remember such a request. But that doesn't l 22 mean it didn't occur. i 23 0 If such a request would have been made, would you 4 24 I have declined? ..orenei cenners. ine. 25 A I guess I can't answer that. I t would depend on the t I

86 mto 47 1 circumstances. And I don't.know of any reason why we would 2 have. But at the same time, our people at the site were being 3. interviewed, Galina and -- well, Galina -- the name, yes. My l guess is what I would probably have said is that the people at 4 5 the site are probably better people to be interviewed, since 6 'they have got more current information. But -- 7 0 You don't remember? 8 A No, I don't. But then, turning television stations 9 down on interviews is something I've done with a good deal of It's just, 10 regularity, but not for any particular purpose. i do you have the time and can you be -- can you help them in 11 12 ' any way. 13 l 0 You mentioned earlier, I believe, if I understood 14 you correctly, that Mr. Abraham was principally functioning as j i 15 liaison with the Governor's office? 16 A On Friday, he certainly was. But on Thursday, he f i 17 was acting as a public affairs spokesman out in Harrisburg. I3 b G Did you instruct Mr. Ingram to keep Mr. Abraham G constantly informed about the decisions that were being made i 20 l out of Bethesda? i 21 A I don't know that it would be necessary to give 22 such an instruction.- We do that routinely. l Did you notify him of the decision to have a pre-23 b 24{ cautionary evacuation at Mr. Collins' recommendation? j Au FWMil Rucrters. f nc. My recollection is that the last conversation I 25 A I i I

l I 87 mto 48 had with Karl :.- and the tapes may sh'ow something different, I I don' t know -- was just to say that :the Chairman was about 2 to call the Governor. And Karl subsequently told me that he 3 had a runner, which went between his office and the Governor's 4 ffice, and the runner took the message up that the Chairman 5 i will be calling momentarily. 6 And what took place in that conversation, I do not know. 7 But Karl reports to me that a short while later, the Governor's g i advisory came out over the loudspeaker systems there in the 9 10 press room. So it looks to me that, given the number of people we had, that the right place was for Karl Abraham to be that 11 12 ' day was Harrisburg. 1 MR. FOSTER: Off the record. 13 i' (Discussion off the record.) ja l BY MR. FOSTER: 15 l 16 G You mentioned I believe, earlier, also, that when i 7 ; you arrived Mr. Denton went in and had a discussion with i i l 3j Mr. Herbein. Were you a party to that discussion? A I wasn't paying much attention to it, frankly, because I had some media people out front and I was in a very t t 1 -...g small office. The red phone had just been, I think, connected 21 And it's a direct line which the White House put in.! in there. 22 I 23 i And you know, I thought it was - let the technical people get l d t'; ether and worry about the technical things, and I'll start j 24 " Ace-FN?rd Reporters, Inc. thinking a little bit about logistics. So you know, I was 25 i i

i-88 mt9 ~4 9 1 not -- I was present, but recalling anything, the answer is no. 2 O Other than what we've discussed, did you have any 3 other dialogue with any Met Edison-GP officials in the first t 4 three days up there? 5 A Oh, sure. 6 O Anything of significance you'd like to relate now 7 for the record? 8 A We talked all the time about lots of things. There 9 were certain areas, for example, that I thought Met Edison l 10 was -- should talk about. They backed off almost completely. 11 For example, I encouraged them to talk to reporters about the enormous job which I thought the industry was applying, bring-12 I 13 ing all of these top people in over there in the armory. i thought that was a story that American industry ought to be i 14 t It 15 proud to tell, and I didn't think it was getting out. 16 really wasn't our job to tell it. 17 They finally issued a press release, but it was pretty f

3 L sterile.

Any number of discussions. I talked, when stuff i. would be attributed to Met Edison people who were, you know, i I let's face it -- they have offices all over the place, and 20 ll' l 21 while they might not have been saying it on the site, they may have been saying something out of one of their other 22 23 ! offices. l ii l i i 24 I would talk to them about it i 7ce+eer i nnenm, w. 25 0 Who principally were you interfacing with? l

89 lmte 50 i 1 A I was interfacing with Crietz, Decamp, Bill Murray, 2 Pabian to some extent. 3 G Did you have any recommendations f.or any of these gentlemen with respect to what they should include, what they 4 5 should not include in their public statements? 6 A No, no. 7 O Did you have any advica for them on how they should 8 hold their press conferences, logistics, whatever? 9 A They didn' t hold any press conferences af t er 10 Saturday. They asked -- I believe they asked if they could i hold their press conference the same place we did on Saturday 11 12 and I said, no. I didn't think that was a very good idea. I 13 G I want to move to something else that we had touched 14 l upon a little bit earlier, and I have some different informa-I 15 tion. Let me tell you what I have. This is again on the i l 16 bubble is gone story. I l 17 The way I got that was, this was Monday morning and a l I 1

S U statement was put out over AP that Mr. George Troffer of I

l Met Edison has said that the bubble is gone, danger is over. ) 5: li 20 il A That's what he said. l 21 I G You hear about this. You go over to a trailer. 22 Mr. Fabian is present. Mr. Decamp is there. And you said, i hey, did anybody from your company make a statement that the 23 24 bubble's gone? And then at that point Met Edison checks into i A::e Feders Reporters, Inc. 25 it. j J

'90 mta 51 I believe I did have a' conversation on the bubble I A Monday morning, because the bubble story kept me awak all 2 3 Sunday night. And I'm sure by the time I arrived at the site But there was a story 4 Monday morning, I was in a foul temper. reported, and I cannot -- my recollection is it was Met Edison, 5 maybe not. Troffer was involved, saying that the bubble was 6 and that's why I told the reporters that there's some 7

gone, encouraging signs, but we don't want to create false optimism 8

and we're recalculating it overnight and we'll have better l 9 10 information for you in the morning. And then I'm sure I had a conversation with Met Edison on Monday morning, and I'm sure I was on the bitter end. 12 1 4 Do you remember what you might have told these 33 i Idj people? 1 15 A No, no. i Under any circumstances, would you have instructed 16 0 I l i 7 I them to retract that story? l I3 "f I don't think I have the authority to tell them l A No. l ._1 to do anything. [ i 2 ",' Did you have any discussions with any of G Okay. q the state officials with respect to the credibility problem 1 21 22 that had developed with Met Edison? I don't know that I had any discussions with them. 23 A j t I think there was general agreement that there was a credibility 2s "' Ace-Feders' Reporters. Inc. l problem. I don't remember any specific discussions. But I do 25 f I i i 1

91 mto 52 1 know that the Governor was terribly displeased with some of p 2 the information he got. I can't cite chapter and verse. It's 3 just my impression. As a result,.the Governor's press secretary and others were 4 5 not very happy. 6 g Were you given any instructions with respect to 7 dissemination of information before you went up to the site? 8 A No, sir. 9 g Did you have -- did you give any instructions with l 10 respect to dissemination of information? II I A To who? No, no. i 12 g Any of your people. l 13 A No. Our policy is to answer people as quickly and 14 i as honestly as we can. i 1 f BY MR. PAGE: 15 I i 16 g I have asked all of the specific questions that I i 1 U l have, Mr. Fouchard. And I believe Mr. Foster has, too. I 13 i Before closing the record, though, there are a couple of j d t general questions I wanted to ask. i2 20 ;d Do you have any additional information that may be pertinenti ,i 21 to the inquiry of the Special Investigation Group that you did not give in response to one of our earlier questions? 22 23 l A That sounds like an. entrapment question, Mr. Page, l 24 t To the best of my knowledge, no. But that doesn't mean n&Ferd Reoorms. W. that I won't recall something this afternoon that I didn't 25 l i

f mto 53 92 I remember this morning. 2 g Is there anything else that you would like to say 3 for the record? 4 A No, sir. 5 0 In conclusion, let me indicate that this is an ongoing investigation and, although we have completed the 6 7 questions that we have for you today, we may need to bring 8 you back for further depositions. We will, however, make 9 every effort to avoid having to do so. 10 I will now recess this deposition rather than terminate it. 11 I wish to thank you for your time in being with us here 12 today. 13 (Whereupvn, at 12:00 p.m., the taking of the c-5 14 i instant deposition was recessed.) 15 16 f 17 1 18 ; ) 9 20 21 22 l 23 i 24 A:e Fac:wat Reporters. Inc. 25

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