ML19322C793
| ML19322C793 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1979 |
| From: | Frampton G, Hayes R, Hitz G METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240559 | |
| Download: ML19322C793 (68) | |
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NUCLE AR REGUL ATO RY COMMISSION i
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IN THE MATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND j
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS i
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INTERVIEW OF GREGORY R.
HITZ o
i 200RORGNAL Place -
Washington, D.
C.
Date -
Wednesday, 12 September 1979 Pages 1 - 67 T.i.cnen.:
(202)347 3700 ACE -FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OffkkiReponers 444 North Ccpitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 NATIONWl0E COVERAGE DAILY 8001240 [ I
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS"ON
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- - - - - - - -X 3
In the Matter of:
4 THREE MILE ISLAND 5
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS 6
X 7
INTERVIEW OF GREGORY R.
HITZ 8
l 9
Trailer 11 i
Three Mile Island 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania j
11 Wednesday, September 12, 1979 12 APPEARANCES:
(~)
13 GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR.,
ESQ.
14 RON HAYES DENNIS ALLISON l
15 NRC Special Inquiry Group on TMI 6935 Arlington Road 16 Bethesda, Maryland 17 JOHN F.
DIENELT RALPH G.
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pmF9ra! Remners, Inc.
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_C _O N T _E _N _T _S f')
INTERVIEW OF:
EXAMINATION
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2 Gregory R.
Hitz 2
3 4
EEE1E11E 6
EXHIBIT NUMBER:
IDENTIFIED 7
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9rci Reporters, Inc.
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4981 01 01 2
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PR0CEEDINGS 2
MR. FRAMPTON:
This is a deposition by the Nuclear 3
Regulatory Commission's Special Inquiry Group of Mr. Greg 4
Hitz at Three Mile Island on September 12, 1979.
5 Could you give us your f ull name, please?
6 THE WITNESS: Gregory R. Hitz.
7 Whereupon, 6
GREGORY R. HITZ Y
was called as a witne ss and, having been first duly sworn, 10 was examined and testified as follows:
'l EXAMINATION 12 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
13 0
What is your pre sent po si tion ?
s, 14 A
Shift supervisor.
15 0
That was your position March 28, 1979?
16 A
Yes, sir.
17 0
Mr. Hitz, I have shown you a one-page witne ss lo notification form and have given you a copy to take with 19 you.
20 Have you had a chance to read that?
21 A
Yes.
22 0
Do you have any questions about it?
23 A
No, I don't.
24 0
Let me begin by asking you whether we are correct 26 in our understancing of the times that you worked on the
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I b981 01 02 3
LRW l
four or five days following the beginning of the acciden t.
2 I understand that you came to the plant about 6:00 3
a.m. on March 28 and stayed on site until about 7:00 4
a.m.
the next day, which would be Thursday, is that correct?
5 A
Tha t's correct.
6 0
Then you came back again to the site f or the first 7
time at about six in the morning on Friday, March 30.
6 A
That's correct.
9 0
And you re portea at that time to Unit 2 where I 10 think you were su pposed to re place Mr. Zewe, the shift 11 su pe rvi so r?
12 A
Tha t's corre c t.
13 0
How long were you on the site on March 30?
14 A
I left approximately 7:00 or 7:30 that night, I
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lb believe.
Tha t is approximate to the best of my knowledge.
10 0
Were you working again on Sunday at all?
17 A
Yes, I was.
~
16 0
When was that?
19 A
I worked -- I got to work about six in the morning 20 and lef t about f our tha t evening.
21 0
6:00 a.m.
to 4: 00 p.m. on Sunday.
22 A
Yes.
23 0
I am sorry, I gue ss I didn't ask about Saturday.
24 A
Same hours.
25 0
Same nours Saturday and Sunday.
-)981~01 03 4
LtLRW l
A Yes.
I' ') ~
2 0
All right.
When you reported to work on Friday 3
morning at 6:00 a.m.,
do you recall who was in the chain of 4
command above you at that time and who was there during the
~5 day while you were there?
6 A
I will try and go back, okay?
I'ts a long time 7
ago.
I relieved Zewe in the morning.
Bill ha to go to an 6
interview.
9 Are you asking who is in my chain of command or Bill's 10 chain of command?
The shif t changed.
il 0
I guess I am more interested in who was in your 12 c hain of command.
That is, after you arrived.
13 A
Okay.
Friday is a bad day because it overlapped 14 because of the venting of the makeup tank.
15 0
As I understand it, Bill Zewe lef t for an 10 interview but returned anc then for a period of time both of 17 you ended up --
lo A
Both of us, that's correct.
19 0
Were you --
20 A
Jim Floyd was there.
21 0
So /ou were reporting to Mr. Floyd?
22 A
Yes, I would report directly to Floyd, right.
23 Floyd was there.
Gary Miller came later on in the morning.
24 0
Did Mr. Miller come shortly af ter the venting of 25 the makeup tank had begun?
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6981 01 04 5
l tLRW l
A I lose track of time.
When you say shortly af ter.
O 2
in my de position I had with the NRC, I thought that we had 3
done that about 7:30 or 8:00 o' clock.
Here it was closer to 4
9:00 c' clock.
5 When you say shortly after, I would probably say yes, 6
shortly af ter, but not narrowing down the time.
7 I can' t do tha t.
He did report shortly af ter that.
S 0
But you recall that your immediate supervisor was V
Mr. Floyd.
10 A
Well, Floyd was there with me in the control 11 room.
Zewe was there.
Floyd would be the guy I directly 12 re por t to.
13 0
Was anyone else there on the same level with r,
14 Mr. Floyd or above him other than Mr. Miller?
-)
~ s' 15 A
I am trying to remember.
I am pre tty sure Joe lo Logan was there.
I think Potts was in Unit 1 at the time.
17 I think.
I am no t po si ti ve.
16 Po tts came f rom Unit 1 to Unit 2.
Potts and I worked 19 toge her the first day in Unit I and eventually Bill came 20 down to Uni t 2.
21 I don't remember if it was the 30th he came down or the 22 31st.
23 0
If Joe Logan was in the control room, would you 24 have haa any understanding as to what his role was, what his 25 posi tion was in the chain of command?
@981 01 05 6
LRW l
A Sure.
He would have been in charge of the overall 2
operation.
Floyd would have been under him.
Then I would 3
report to Floyd.
4 0
So Mr. Floyd would have been reporting to 5
Mr. Logan.
6 A
Yes, if Joe was there, that's correct.
7 0
If Mr. Logan wa sn' t there, Mr. Floyd would have 8
been the senior man in the control room?
9 A
Tha t's correct.
10 BY MR. ALLISON:
11 0
On that day, Friday morning, were there any 12 particular standing orders that you can recall that said 13 Floyd is here because he is in charge of the control room?
,r'3 14 Don't oo anything unle ss you talk to him.
Or as you just V
15 described it, if Logan was there, he was in charge.
Or were 16 you pernaps working on your normal relationship?
17 A
No, what we done is normally -- let me tell you 16 how it normally worked, okay?
I worked with Gary Miller and 19 Mike Ross and then myself.
Okay?
20 That was the crew I normally worked with when we finally 21 set up a shif t rotation.
So Gary would give the orders.
We 22 did wha t came out of the meetings that Gary was in.
23 We also had emergency procedures that were wri tten.
For 24 example, with the reac tor coolant pump trip.
We had one 25 reac tor coolant pump working.
If the reactor coolant pump g
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4981 01 06 7
}ltLRW l
were tripped, we have a specific emergency procedure we
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2 follow.
We follow that procedure.
As far as day-to-day 3
operations, that came from Gary Miller through Ross to me.
4 So Ross would know everything that I was doing.
If I 5
would do something, I would tell Ross.
I would get the okay 6
f rom him.
7 That would come through Miller.
But the three of us 8
would always make sure the other two knew what the third guy 9
was doing all the time.
10 0
So later, when you went in, the shift chain was
.11 Miller to Ross to you.
12 A
That's right.
13 0
Who wsa your shif t foreman?
14 A
Adam Miller.
15 0
The three of you would always keep each other cut 16 in.
17 A
Absolutely.
18-0 So that --
l9 A
If I seen a change in plant status by scanning the 20 board, the first thing I would do is talk to Miller or Ro ss.
21 O
Now, you know, tha t is a change that can be not a 22 drastic change where steps had to be taken right away.
23 A
Right.
24 0
Now, wa s the rela tionship that clear on Friday 25 morning, I guess is my question?
O
1981 01.07 8
1.tLRW~
l A
What you want to know is how we got to start doing
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2 wha t we were doing, right?
That is what you want to know.
3 How we set about the chain of the makeup tank.
I s tha t 4
what you are getting at?
Because Miller wasn't there.
5 Floyd was --
6 O
I understand.
Floyd was there.
7 A
Floyd ws there and I was there.
8 A
Maybe Logan was there.
9 A
Logan was probably in the process of turning over 10 to his relief.
11 A
I amnot really ge tting at why you vented it right 12 now but just trying to understand what was the chain of 13 c o mmand.
.l 14 Was it strict?
Was it vague?
f3 G
15 A
No, I knew that Floyd was in charge of me.
Or the lo guy in Floyd's position which on my shif t was Ross.
17 0
Did you f eel that because anyone had told you --
18 this is your boss?
)
19 A
Yes.
We had discussed that.
i 20 0
Did you ever hear of any instructions that said 21 nct to change the plant status at that time without going 22 higher than Floyd?
Without going to Logan and/or Miller or 23 Herbetn?
24 A
We had talked about, if at all possible, not 25 changing the plant status until we discussed it but I can't
981 01 08 9
1 LRW l
remember if that was March 30 or April I or 2.
2 The days all ran together.
But we had talked about 3
t ha t.
When you are looking at the plant status and you are 4
ready to make a change, such as, for example, pumping down 5
the waste gas tank, that would be discussed before we 6
actually did that.
7 We took the pressure readings.
W5 said, okay, we are S
getting close to pumping down the tank.
Y This is what we want to do.
Then they set a meeting and 10 discussed i t.
Il 0
When you came on at 6:00 o' clock --
12 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
When you came on at about 6:00 13 o' clock in the morning on Friday, I think that you recall 14 for teh I&E inspectors you had spoken briefly with Mr. Zewe
(~)
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15 about the plant status, i s tha t right?
16 A
Sure, we do that.
17 0
Did he tell you anything about the makeup tank 16 being overpressurized?
19 A
I had talked with the CRos.
I can' t remember -- I 20 prooably did but can't remember yes, hey, I actually talked 21 to Bill about tha t.
22 We have a turnover sheet.
The notes were written on the 23 turnover sheet plus I scanned the panel and talked to the 24 CRos.
What I did was Bill told me he had to go to a meeting 25 or had to go to an interview, somebody wanted to interview r
4981 01 09 10 LtLRW l
- him, so I took the turnover sheet.
.I )
2 I told him I would read the turnover notes, scan the 3
board and talk to the CRos and talk to the other peopple in 4
the control room and by that time, he would be back and we 5
could have our formal turnover at that time.
o T ha t's w ha t I did.
I know specifically I talked to the 7
CRos about the makeup tank because the pressure caught my 8
eye right away.
Y 0
When you say the pressure caught your eye, you 10 mean on the control board.
11 A
That's right.
12 O
And the CRos were Mr. Faust and Mr. Frederick.
13 A
Tha t's correct.
14 0
Mr. Faust was primarily in charge of the makeup O,,
15 and let-down system and Mr. Frederick on the secondary, is 16 t ha t correct?
17 A
I believe that's correct.
They were both at the 18 panel.
I talked to both of them.
Exactly who was in c harge 19 of primary and secondary, I can't remember.
20 0
Did they describe to you the periodic venting of 21 the makeup tank that they had been doing?
22 A
Yes.
23 0
How did they describe that to you?
What did they 24 tell you?
25 A
What they told me wsa ga sses were coming out of AV
)981 01 10 11 LRW I
solution in the makeup tank and that they were periodically 2
sending an auxiliary operator in to start the waste gas 3
compressor and cycle the vent open for a short period and 4
close the vent and stop the compressor.
5 There were trying to hold the pressure in the makeup tank o
but weren't very successf ul because thegradually incre sing.
7 0
Did they communicate any sense to you tha t thi s 8
was a problem that had been building up that was going to 9
have to be f aced with some different kind of action in the 10 near future?
You know, a hour f rom now or half hour from 11 now, this will become a problem we will have to deal with.
12 Do you recall anything like that?
13 A
If I remember right we had discussed that we are
(
14 not keeping up and will have to do something.
One of them
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15 was concerned aoout -- I can't remember which one -- so at 10 t ha t time I asked what are you doing right now?
17 He said we have an auxiliary operator down ge tting 16 dressed to go in and start the compressor.
I thought with 19 it and looked at the level traces.
You don't have a 20 pre ssure trace.
You just have a gauge.
I got a feel for 21 how high the pre ssure was going over a period of time.
22 What we had ciscussed was leaving the compressor on and 23 bringing the operator back out and then leaving the vent 24 open for a longer period of time.
25 0
You discussed this as a possibility of the dealing l
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b981 01 11 12 LRW I
with the situation which was that you weren't keeping up 2
with the gasses.
3 A
Tha t's right.
4 Q
At t ha t time, were you aware that somebody had 5
correlated the cycling of the valve with releases, with the 6
leak?
7 A
I believe they said the reason they were starting 6
the compressor was every time they opened the vent, they 9
would get a short release or increase in background.
10 0
Did they tell you whether that was a release f rom 11 tne auxiliary building or release up the stack that somebody 12 could cetect traces of on or off si te ?
13 A
I can't remember.
You know, at that time, I can't cS 14 remember what the readings were on the stack monitors.
But i'
15 I know they had correlated.
Whether there was a reacing lo that somebody took with a me ter in the building or whether 17 they seen it on the radiation monitoring people, I am not le sure.
19 Or even the monitoring teams on site.
I can correlate 20 t ha t.
21 0
Did you observe the makeup tank pressure valve 22 indication?
Did you observe that the relief valve opened on 23 the makeup tank?
24 A
Did I actually know the valve opened?
Did I 25 actually see -- you can't see the valve open.
Wnat you can
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$981 01 12 13 LR'M i
tell is the pressure indicator changes drastically.
2 Q
There is no light or other indication f or the 3
relief valve.
4 A
No, sir.
5 0
You saw the pre ssure IcVel went to zero or went 6
down.
7 A
The level indicator went downscale, right.
And 8
the pressure indica tor changed drastically, too.
Y Q
You observed both of those things.
10 A
Yes.
11 0
From that, you concluded the relief valve must 12 have opened.
13 A
Plus the indication at that time bleed tank levels 14 were going up and the pressures were all going up.
x 15 0
In the bleed tank.
16 A
That is where tha t disc harge s to.
17 0
Did this happen more than once before you made the 16 decision to open the vent valve on the makeup tank?
Did 19 this relief valve appear to cycle open and closed more than 20 once that you recall?
2!
A If I remember right, it cycled severfal times.
22 You know, more than once, okay?
I am pretty sure that's 23 correct.
24 But our concern was, I guess, the second or third time in 25 the cycle, we definitely knew we had a problem because they n
4981 01 13 14 LRW l
coul dn' t kee p it f rom cycling.
2 Every time the relief valve cycled, the le'vels came up 3
higher in the bleed tanks.
My fear was draining the BWST to 4
the bleed tanks and overflowing the bleed tanks onto the 5
floor of the basement through the vent.
6 7
6 9
10 11 12 13
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e 14
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{N) 15 16 17 ie 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (3
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b96 02 01 15 itLWR I
O Let me ask you about that.
Your concern was that 2
the inventory of the BWST would be drawn directly into the 3
reactor coolant bleed tank?
4 A
Sure, through tha t relief valve.
5 0
Through the makeup tank and out the relief valve?
6 A
Because what they eventually were doing was 7
fica ting the BWST on the makeup tank and on the system.
8 0
Wha t wa s the purpose of that, of cutting in the v
BWST af ter the makeup tank level went down?
10 A
Suction to the pumps.
Il 0
To keep suction in the makeup pumps.
12 A
Sure, so you nave water going to the reactor r~;
13 coolant system.
t 5
m-14 0
But instead of BWSI water all going to the makeup 15 pum p, some would ccle through the makeup tank out the 16 relief valve and into the reac tor coolant bleed tanks?
17 A
Ine water goes into the suc tion of the pump s.
lo O
Suction of the makeup pumps.
lY A
Right, and can go back into the makeup tank.
20 0
That is a recircula tion line ?
21 A
There is a recirculation line.
I don't believe 22 it's a cneck valve on tnat line.
23 0
Is that a line wnich provides pump seal water to 24 the makeup pumps:
25 A
I t coe s provice seal water, yes.
Seal water is
?
9981 02 02 16 ltLWR I
provided on the discharge side of those makeup pumps plus O
2 makeup order on the -- the relief valve is in the discharge 3
line.
4 I t's not sitting on top of the tank.
I t's on the 5
discharge side of the line.
On the water side of the tank.
6 When the relieve valve opens, the water takes the path 7
of least resistance because it has to have the BWST pushing 6
it.
So it comes into the system and right out that open 9
path.
10 BY MR. WORAM 11 0
Le t me ask a question.
It's not necessary for the 12 water to go tnrough the makeup pump to, say, the main 13 recirculation line?
14 A
To get to the makeup tank or the g
~
15 0
To get to the makeup tank?
Io A
No.
17 0
It's a common suc tion situation.
ic A
Sure.
Common suction goese into the suction of IV all three pumps and the three pumps are separated but two of 20 the pumps are tied together and one is the isolated pump f or 21 ES.
There is separation.
22 0
00 you have any f eel for about how much water you 23 mignt have lost altogether through that path?
Sallpark?
24 A
Somebooy nollered and I can't remember if it was 25 Sill, you know, because Zewe had come back by that time.
"h,
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a 3961 02 03 17 l_tLWR 1
Somebody hollered the BWST dropped a couple to several
/T#
2 feet.
8400 gallons a f oot in that tank.
If you lose 3
several feet in a short period of time, the water is going 4
somew he re.
5 All the bleed tanks or at least two of the bleed tanks o
that I remember, I looked at the bleed tank levels.
They 7
all peggea high on scale.
This is an indication to me with 6
the grade level drop and that quick a rise in the bleed 9
tanks that the wa ter was going in the bleed tanks.
10 0
How big is tha t relief line from the makeup tank 11 to the bleed tank?
12 A
I don't know off the top of my head.
An inch, two 13 inches.
14 0
Hot a 14-inch line or some thing like that?
15 A
No, but there was a great amount of pre ssure on 16 tha line, too.
There was over 80 pounds.
The relief valve 17 was about 80 pouncs or some thing.
I don't know the size.
16 0
So if I read you right, it's conceivable that 19 something on the order of 30- or 40,000 gallons could have 20 gone, assuming the BWST i s 8500 gallons per f oot and you are 21 talking between two-and five-foot lo ss.
22 A
Yes, right.
23 Bf 14R. CU.96 INGHAM 24 0
Can I ask something?
I want to make it clear j
.2b_
exactly wha t flow path you thought it wa s f rom the BWST to (v3
18 4981 02 04 ItLWR I
the bleed tanks.
h 2
A The suc tion of the pumps.
3 0
Going through the pum ps?
4 A
Back into the discharge line f rom the tank.
5 MR. FRAMPTON:
Off the record.
6 (Discussion of f the record.)
7 MR. FRAMPTON:
Back on the record.
6 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
Y 0
Mr. Zewe had returned at this point, i s t ha t 10 right?
11 A
That's correct.
12 0
Who then actually made the decision or was in on 13 the cecision to open the vent valve in the makeup tank?
-m, 14 A
Bill and I discussed it between ourselves to the i
15 best of my recollection.
I talked to Bill and said you lo know, the relief valve is lif ting.
We have to keep it f rom 17 lifting.
le Tne only way to ao it is open the vent valve.
I turned IV to one of the Cdos -- it could have been Faust -- and told 20 him to get that auxiliary operator moving into the auxiliary 21 building and get that compre ssor on.
22 0
Were your instructions to nim to have the 23 auxiliary o perator star t the compressor anc leave it on and 24 leave?
25 A
Yes.
Because there is no sense in that guy
-)981 02 05 19 L,'iR I
standing down there receiving radiation he doesn't need.
2 At t his time, I didn't know how long the compressor would 3
be on but I knew I would "eed it for a period of time.
4 0
You and Mr. Zewe discussed this and decided to go 5
ahead with venting the makeup tank, right?
o A
When I say discussed it, I looked at Bill and 7
said, you know, it was quick.
We have to do something, 8
Bill.
The makeup tank is -- the bleed tanks are going v
solid.
10 BNST is emptying.
The problem is that relief valve.
11 Open the vent, decrease the pre ssure, get off the BWST and 12 back on the makeup tank.
What we had to do was get water 13 back in the makeup tank cecause the level of the makeup tank
-y 14 was incicating low so in that short period of time, what we 15 did was decided to start two de-min transf er pumps and put lo straight de-min wa ter into the makeup tank because the 17 discharge pressure of the tran sf er pumps was 100 pounos or le so, ly Greater than the makeup tank pressure.
It forced water 20 into the makeup tant.
When we got level inaicated back on 21 the mal:eup tank along witn the vent being oper.
we isolated 22 from the E'"SI.
23 0
When you say isolated f rom the BWST, you isolated 24 the BWST f rom tne makeup tank?
25 A
Right.
'cl e got that problen straightened out wnere P
$981 02 06 20 l tLdR 1
we don't lose the water.
Now, to ge t the pre ssure down in O
2 the makeup tank so I can get the water back from the bleed 3
tanks in the makeup tank.
4 So what we did was we continued to cycle the vent.
I 5
believe we cycled it -- we lef t it open until the pre ssure 6
was down low enough -- the relief valve is about 80 pounds.
7 i'!e got the pre ssure down somewhere in the 75-to 78-pound 8
range and went back to the long burst, the long cycles along Y
with the compe ssor run.
10 Eventually we got water from the waste transf er pumps 11 which sucked f rom the bleed tanks into the makeup tank.
12 0
Okay.
Let me go back to the beginning of the 13 decision proce ss.
You ana Bill Zewe discussed this.
Did 14 ldr. Floyd come in on this discussion that you recall?
r s
15 0
Jim was there.
I don't remember.. Jim was sort of lo like standing -- Bill was behind the panel looking at the 17 BWST and he wa s looging at the bleed tanks.
16 I had lookeu at them earlier and came out in front of the 19 panel.
I don't remember turning to Jim.
It may have been 20 t ha t I turned to Jim and said, look, this is wha t we will 21 do.
22 I can't remeaber that.
We might have.
But we just 23 teldea down the line.
Faust was between Zewe and I.
I 24 saiJ, chey tnis is what we will do.
You got a problem,
25 Craig?
He dian't have a problem.
Let's uo that ano take
.)981 02 07 21 LdR I
water in the makeup tank.
I can't remember if I said 2
something to Jim or not.
3 0
How abou t Mr. Logan ?
Do you recall whether he was 4
there at the time?
5 A
No.
Like I say, Joe might have been turning o
over.
I can't remember if Joe was there or if Po tts was 7
there.
8 But those guys at that par ticular time, I wasn't involved 9
witn them and haa not yet gone to see them to give them my 10 turnover of wnat I had and where I planned to go for that 11 day.
12 0
Was it your intention to leave the vent open and 13 take the pre ssure all the way down to zero or down very low 14 or was it just to get it down low enough to get some level s
~
15 again in the makeup tank?
10 A
To s tart of f wi th, the intent was to get the 17 level or the pre ssure down to get water back in the tank.
16 Eventually get over a period of time, get the pressure IV down.
That is where the release was coming f rom.
20 0
Some of the other people we have talked to seem to 21 recall that once the vent valve was opened, it was pretty 22 much left open f or a long period of time with short closings 23 later on in the norning or af ternoon, pe r ha ps.
24 A
Later on in the day.
Once we receive the initial 25 burst anc then le:t tne valve open, we knew what the
/
W81 02 08 22 ItLWR l'
radiation levels were, tha t's wha t we did.
To get the
./ T
\\
i 2
. pressure down to try to get a vacuum on that tank and keep 3
i t.
4 0
So you would say it was pretty much lef t open 5
during the day once you saw the radiation levels decreasing?
6 A
Tha t's correct.
That's to the best of my 7
knowledge.
de cycled it back and forth.
8 Later on in the day, I talked to Jack Herbein about it.
9 He called and inquired about it.
We talked to Gary Miller 10 about it.
11 We all discussed what we would do then.
That pretty well 12 got turned over in their hands as to how we would handle 13 i t.
The initial process was strictly Zewe.
14 O
Do you recall when Gary Miller came into the
. x_/
15 control room whether you discussed with him what it was you to were doing with the valve or aid he ask?
Can you recall 17 t ha t ?
le A
I am sure he arked.
I can't recall.
I know we ly went back in notifying all the peo ple in Pennsylvania Bureau 20 of dad heal th ano so forth and so on.
21 de went all through that pro gram.
We set up an 22 cppointment in the control room where we were relaying the 23 informa tion back to Unit I and they were talking and so
.24 f orth End so on.
1 25 I ar. positive we talked to Gary bu t can't say, yes, this OV-
b981 02 09 23 LWR I
is what time I talked to him.
2 0
Fine.
If you can't recall, just say you don't 3
have a recollection of it.
4 A
Fine.
5 0
When you first opened the vent valve, do you o
recall calling the Unit I control room and telling them that 7
you were starting to vent the tank?
6 A
If I remember right, and I am not sure how the 9
sequence falls, I know we called the control room and said, 10 look, make sure the helicopter is up cecause we will open 11 this vent and leave it open until we get the pressure down 12 and the relief valve seats and then we will close it and go 13 from there.
(^
14 I don't know tne sequence but we called and talked to 15 them.
16 0
When Mr. Miller came in, am I rignt in thinking 17 t ha t ne a ssigneo Mr. Zewe to be in control of the plant and to assigneu you to take care of notifications cod so on?
Iv A
Right.
I was a ssigned to make sure Unit I got all 20 the a ppropriate information they needed to make their 21 orf-site calculations anu on-site calculations.
22 Zewe was in cnarge of tne control room operators.
23 0
Did you specifically ask the Unit I control room 24 people to call eennsylvania Civil Defense and the 25 Pennsylvania BRH?
I
$981 02 10 24 LWR I
A Yes.
2 0
Those were the two main contacts for emergency 3
planning.
4 A
Yes.
I made sure Mr. Miller was -- he wa s very 5
acamant about the f ac t make sure they talkea to Maggie 6
Reilly.
7 0
or Mr. Gerusky?
6 A
Yes.
That -- specifically had them people on the y
pnone and talked to them.
Which they had reconfirned to me 10 they were doing.
11 0
What wa s your expectation about whether there 12 would be a release of any kind or substantial release?
Did 13 you excect a release or were you really taking precautionary 14 mea sure s?
s 15 Can you rememoer wha t was on your mina at the time?
16 A
I didn't expect a big release, no.
I expected a 17 puff but I diun't expect c big "elease.
Wha t I was doing le wcs trying to get tne people in position so they knew it was lv coming.
They could monitor it and everybody knew what we 20 did.
I didn't expect a release that we got.
21 0
Were you aware at the time of any ac tions tha t 22 iir. Floyd was taking or any phone calls he was making 23 indepenaently of you to notify anyone?
24 A
- 1. o.
Jim was behind me.
There were other things 2b going on.
The pre sr irizar started to go solid at the same
- )v81 02 11 25
- LWR I
time.
The very same time this happened, the pressure 2
started to go solid.
We were trying to figure that out, 3
a l so.
4 I can't -- Jim was looking at that.
Also, Jim was behind 5
me a bit so I didn't watch what he was doing.
I was.tco 6
involved with what I was doing.
7 0
Do you recall whether there wre any NRC people in 6
the control room at t ha t time?
Y A
I can't recall seeing any NRC people.
I know they 10
-were around.
They were around me all day Wednesday.
11 I am sure they were there.
I just didn't see them.
12 0
Were you aware that anyone consulted with them and 13 said, now, here is what we will do and here is what the 14 results mignt be?
fS O
15 A
I know I didn't because it was happening right now 16 in f ront of ne and it was ha ppening f est and I had to take 17 action then and there.
It i didn't ta1K to tnem.
Whether somebody behind me did, I 19 con't know that.
2C 2
Now, I t ake i t tha t one of the primary problems 21 t ha t you were concerned with was the possibility that the 22 reactor coolant ojeed tanks would overflow and get out in 23 the ficor crain system.
24 A
Sure.
2S 0
W hy. wa s tha t water hot?
n_;
-)961 02 12 26 LWR I
A The tank area was hot.
I went in the auxiliary 2
building Wednesday te see about the problem with the water 3
on the floor and see if I could do anything about it.
4 I took an LP tech with us.
The readings we were ge tting 5
were extremely nigh.
The readings in the room were high.
6 over the 10-R.
7 0
Where had the reactor coolant bleed tank 6
water, the water that was already in there before the 9
makeup tank started relieving into it, where had that water 10 come from?
11 A
I don't know the answer.
I don't know wha t they 12 did all day Wedne sday.
13 0
Do you know wha t the valve lines up with on 14 Wednesday that resulted in hot water ge tting into the RCBT?
~
'a lb A
No.
16 0
viere you also concerned simply about the problem 17 of losing inventory f rom the borated water storage tank and le theref or no t having emergency cooling water if you had an Iv addi tional problem?
20 A
Sure.
I knew that would be a problem.
That was 21 my next problem in line as I looked at my priorities.
Tne 22 first priori ty wa s K eep the bleed tanks f rom overflowing 23 back through tne vent lines into the traps and on the floor 24 and also losing the inventory.
23 I acnieved both by stopping the water going to the bleed 7
bV81 02 13 27 LWR I
tanks.
2 0
Do you recall a li ttle later in the morning on 3
Friday Mr. Frederick calling you from a sub shop in 4
Middletown?
5 A
Yes, I recall it well.
6 0
lihat do you recall about that conversation?
7 A
He called me f rom a place called Auggie's and d
a sked me wha t I was doing.
We got things really under 9
control.
nl 10 He said you ought to think about what you are doing o
11 because people in Middletown are running away.
I said what 12 do you mean, running away?
They are running down the 13 streets loading their cars up and running away.
-D 14 I said, thanks for telling me.
I went into t shift (V
15 supervisor's of fice and asked them if taey knew the people 16 in Miodletown ran away.
They aidn' know, either.
17 2
What co you recall about what happened in the it shif t supervi sor's office?
ly A
Ine NHC guy called the guy in Unit I and they 20 culled the regional office.
I think Miller called Herbein 21 out I am not positive.
22 I lert.
'ty job was out on the board.
But I know they 23 got the wneels in action to find out what was going on 24 outsice off tne islanc.
2a 2
I think 2.cybe we will take about a five-minute 20 orsak.
/
27
( Re ce ss. )
)96 03 01 28 sonLRW l
MR. FRAMPTON:
Back on the record.
The record 2
snould reflec t while we were taking a break, we were trying 3
to get Mr. Hitz' help in drawing a diagram of the flow pa ths 4
between the BWST and the RCBT, so we could identif y what the S
concern was about losing water out of the borated water o
storage tank.
7 We were also having discussions about ot'ner possible ways o
in which water coula have been lost out of the borated water v
storage tank.
10 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
11 0
Mr. Hitz, I would like to go back now to 12 Wednesday, March 28, and ask you some questions about your 13 role in the Unit I control room.
You, I believe, arrived 14 about c 15, norning, and were told to go to the Unit I la control room since the shift supervisors there had already lo gone tc Uni t 2; is that right?
l 'i A
Yes.
linen I came through I hao paged the night to shir t supervisor.
I always do that f rom security.
To find 19 out whic h uni t is in.
The guy in Unit 1 picked up on the 20 phone ano saic, come to Uni t 1, so I went there.
21 C
When you arrivec in Unit 1, were you the senior 22 person tnere at that time?
23 A
There was ano tner shif t supervisor.
24 0
rno was that?
25 A
Een Bryan.
/
20 w
m bVbl 03 02 29 nLR.1 1
0 The two of you were senior people in the Unit i 2
control room a t t ha t time?
3 A
That i s correc t.
4 0
Shortly thereaf ter, I think you learned that there o
had been a 600 r per hour measurement f rom the reac tor o
coolant sample?
7 A
Wnat I had cone was sat down and asked Ken why I o
was a t Unit I and where Zewe was.
He said they had a trip 9
down there.
Stay here because Mehler was called out.
10 So Eryan was in Unit 2.
I came to Uni t I and we 11 discu sseo what nappened.
They said they had a trip last 12 nignt and the unit i s down.
Why don't I relieve him since 13 Mehler is already down in Unit 2?
I saic, fine.
At that 14 time it was like a regular trip.
Ib 3
Wha t did you regard as your role at that time?
Io A
I was going to take the duty in Unit I until Bryan 17 came back ano then we would swap units.
lo 0
You cicn't Know at that time they were having any ly particular problems?
i 20 A
No.
Not until I heard -- about 20 after 7:00, I l
21 heard one of the HP tecns over the page system and he 22 sounced excited.
I pickea it up and asked what was the 23 problem.
He saio he was registered 100 r on the sample.
24 Inat oerinitely got ny attention.
25 0
At about that point a site emergency was declared 7m
981 03'03 30 ftnLRW l
by Unit 27 lj 2
A Yes.
3 0
Did you declare or did someone in Unit I declare a 4
site emergency as well?
5 A
We had an annoucement.
The 600 r field was in our 1
6 unit.
We made an announcement.
7 0
That therefore is a site emergency?
6 A
Yes.
9 0
By we, who instructed --
hO A
I instructed my CR to do that and also corrected 11 the CRos to set set up the emergency control station.
The 12 i so pl e x.
13 0
Was tne emergency control station to be set up in 14 the Unit I control room or its regular place at the health 15 physics a cce ss?
10 A
They se t up the ECS and ECCS.
I set one up in the 17 Unit I control room.
They se t up the ECS down in the HP lo lao.
Unit 2 set their own up.
I do back-up calculations 19 for unit 2.
I cack them up, that is all.
20 0
Did you do or instruct the doing of notifications?
21 A
Yes.
-l l
22 0
Do you recall what those we re?
Who was called?
23 I didn't make the calls.
I turned to my shift 24 fort. nan and saic, make your notifications per the 23 procedure.
I hac the CRos ao their jobs.
O
4Y81 03 04 31 nLRd I
We hold a drill every year.
I hold specific drills 2
t hroughou t the year on shift.
Each of my people know 3
exactly what they are su ppo sed to do.
They rent into their 4
roles.
Certain people, phone s and headse ts.
Certain guys, 5
on the i so ple x.
Certain people make the offsite 6
noti f ica tions.
7 0
That was done under your command in Unit I rather d
than f rom Unit 2?
Y A
I understand Unit 2 also made calls.
I didn't get 10 involvec with t ha t.
I did wha t I felt I should do in Uni t i 11 to support what was going on.
That was to make the phone 12 c a ll s.
13 0
Do you remember which CR0 actually was assigned to r
14 make the tele phone ca 'I s?
15 A
No.
I remember turning to my shif t foreman and to saying -- David Jame s -- and said, make the calls.
W he ther 17 Davey made them or one of the auxiliary operators who ld r e por tea to the control room a t the notification of a site l
l>
emergency made the calls, I don't know that.
20 0
Do you remember what time Mr. Seelinger turned up?
21 Did he report to the unit I control room?
22 A
Y e s, but I can't give you a time on that.
I Know 23 he s nott e d u p.
I don't know what time.
I didn't look a t my 24 weten.
25 0
tas he the first person who came to tne unit s./
1
)v61 03 05 32 sbnLRW I
control room who was your senior?
O 2
A Yes.
To my recollection.
3 0
Did he have control over the Unit I control room?
4 A
He relieved me, yes.
5 0
Did you stay on the Unit I control room?
o A
Yes.
7 0
After he arrived, do you recall what you were o
doing f or the next couple of hours in the Uni t I control V
room?
10 A
We got qui te busy be cause of the wind speed il direction.
We were sucking all the releases f rom Unit 2 12 into our ventilation and filtering them again over in Unit 13 1.
All our radiation monitors were high.
,s, 14 0
Your air monitors in the buildings?
l 15 A
Air monitors and a tmospheric moni tors.
The wind to speed and wind conditions that day were not what you call 17 iceal.
It wasn't very windy or anything.
Everything 16 staying right over the island.
Our ventilation we suckea 19 f rom right ou tsine.
So we just sucked everything right in.
20 0
Soon af ter the site emergency was declared, a 21 general er.er'Jency was declared?
22 A
fes.
23
- 1 Do you nnou who declared that?
24 ilo.
25 J
9:nen that was d.tclarec did you in Unit i begin N__
4961'03 06 33 sbnLRN i
to try to get monitoring teams out?
Did you play a role in
(%>)
2 t ha t?
3 A
Monitoring teams. were sent out by the people even 4'
during the site emergency.
When you get into a site 5
emergency, you use the on-site and of f-site monitor teams.
o They are dispatched from downstairs.
7 0
Were you the one who began to organize sending out 8
monitoring teams?
9 A
No.
They were set up downstairs.
10 0
From the ECS?
11 A
Yes.
12 0
ECS had control of directing monitoring teams into 13 action?
14 A
Yes.
qV.
15 0
Whereas Unit I control room at that time was lo prepared to do calculations an3 basically back up the Unit 2 17 control room?
16 A
That is correct.
Ir 0
Did there come a time when the ECS in eff ect moved 20 in to the Unit I control room?
21 A
fes.
22 0
Were you still there in the Unit I control room at
-23 t ha t time?
24 A
Yes.
25 0
Was tnet later on in the morning?
Do you recall O
i'
$981 03 07 34
- 3LRW-I when that was?
U 2
A Right.
If I remember right, it was 10-11 3
o' clock.
4 0
A.M.?
5 A
Yes, a.m.
6 0
What was your understanding then as to who was in 7
charge of the ECS?
8 A
Seelinger was still in Unit i et this time.
9 0
He took over being in charge of the ECS?
10 A
Right.
11 0
Then all of the monitoring effort and so on was 12 being run out of the Unit I control room af ter the ECS moved 13 to the Unit I control room?
14-A I'm. talking about the ECS f rom Unit 2 control room
{
15 moved over to us.
The ECS in the HP lab stayed there.
lo O
Didn't they have to evacuate?
17 A
They moved later on and came upstairs, yes.
But lo Seelinger ran the show in Uni t i until he was called to Unit 19 2.
Then it was turned over to Dubiel.
20 0
When he was called to Unit 2, were you in charge 21 of the unit I control room?
22 A
I was for a short period of time.
23 0
Unti-1 he came back?
24 A
I don't believe he came back.
I turned over to 25 Dick. Dubiel la ter on_ in the day.
,m-
$981 03 08 35 sbnLRW l
0 Do you recall what direct or open telephone lines
-( '1 2
there were from Unit i outside the plant during the first 3
morning, during the mornin, of March 287 4
A There was one or two in the shif t supervisor's 5
office.
One was -- both were to the NRC, I think.
One was 6
I think down to fill in.
I don't know where the other one 7
was.
8 0
Fill in in the Region 1 office of the NRC?
9 A
Yes.
We had one to Maggie Reilly also that we 10 ke pt open.
11 0
That would be Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiological 12 Health?
13 A
Correct.
Inose were the only two I can remember.
14 0
Was that part of the emergency plan, to try to get
()s IS an open -line to BRH or ria s that something you decided to do?
16 A
Inat is something we decided to do.
Keep them on 17 the phone and updatec as best we could.
16 0
Were you feeding them the monitoring information ly that you were receiving f rom the teams and helicopters?
20 A
I personally wasn't but somebody was.
Somebody 21 was f eeding them information.
They also were doing 22 calculctions.
i 23 O
Co you recall a pproximately when the first NRC 24 peo,le arrived onsite?
25 A
No.
I know when they came but I don't know the rx
%Y y
-$981 03 09 36 ErbpLRW I
time.
2 0
Was that in the late morning or around noon of 3
March 28?
4 A
Yes.
Late morning.
In that general ballpark.
5 0
They came to the Unit I control room, did they 6
not?
7 A
That is correct.
6 0
Prior to that time had you had phone conversations 9
with NRC people either in Region 1 or back in Washington?
10 A
I didn't.
11 0
Do you know whether other people did in the Unic 1 12 control room?
13 A
We made a phone call to notif y them.
If somebody 14 actually sat and held an on-going conversation, I don't know 15 t ha t.
Io O
Af ter tne initial notifications and prior to the 17 time NRC people arriveo f rom Region 1, do you recall when lo you were on the phone wi,th Region i or on the phone with 19 Wasnington giving them information?
20 A
I don't know.
21 0
You aon't know one way or the other?
22-A No,-I don't.
23 0
What ha ppened when the first NRC peop13 showed up?
24 A-I took them into the shif t supervisor's office and 25 explained to them, to the best of my knowledge, what we had
/~N-tg -
i-e
4951 03-10 37
.sbnLRW I
with the information I was given.
Then they set up their
'2' office.
~
3 0
They set up their of fice in the shif t supervisor's 4
office?
5 A
Correct.
6 0
Do you recall whether one or two of them went over 7
into the Unit 2 control room?
6 A
I don't recall but I understand somebody did.
I Y
don't know who it was.
I don't recall when they went.
I 10 just ' understand somecody aid eventually go over there.
11 0
Did you have discussions with them, with any NRC 12 people who were in the control room in Unit I curir.g the 13 af ternoon of March 28?
14 A
Sure.
O 15 0
Wha t do you recall about those conversations?
Io A
I would f eed them plant information I was ge tting 17 f rom Unit 2 as of ten as I got i t.
Io 0
Was that your primary role, to be ge tting 19 information on the tele phone line f rom Unit 27 20 A
No.
My primary role was to be in charge of the 21 operations of Unit I and keep things under a stable 22 condi tion there.
I would talk to the people in Unit 2 and 23 get as much information as I could to give it to the people 24-running the bacK-up calcula tions and also f eed it to the NRC 25
. guys cecause tr.ey were hungry for information.
-)981 03 11 38 sbnLRW i
It got a little out of hand because they actually got O
2 in the way.
They would stand around the table and the guys 3
couldn't do their calcula tions and I had to keep moving them 4
back.
S Finally I decided one guy comes out and asks and that is o
it.
That is how it evolved.
7 0
Your primary responsibility was to run Unit 1.
6 You were on the console basically.
In c harge of i t.
Y A
Yes.
10 0
And you had a f oreman or --
11 A
I had a shif t f oreman.
12 0
And control room operators?
13 A
Three control room operators.
e 14 0
That was your primary responsibility but a second w/
15 responsibility was to be getting inf ormation f rom Unit 2 lo aoout plant s ta tu s, pl an t parameters?
17 A
Yes.
ic 0
Where were you giving that information in addition 19 to tne iiRC people wno were hungry f or it?
20 A
We have a sta tus boara we try to keep up to date.
21 I woulo give it to my sta tus boardkee per.
He would also 22 upda te ni s boara.
23 0
You weren't involved in getting results from 24 monitoring t3ams and pa ssing those along?
25 A
No.
I wruld get some information from time to
B981 03 12 39 sbnLRri i
time.
As I was going in to give the NRC whatever 9
2 information they wanted, I would take notes along.
But I 3
didn't play a particular role in gathering that information.
4 0
Were you involved in pa ssing information back to 5
Unit 2 about off-site readings or anything like that?
6 A
No.
The of f-site readings come directly to the 7
ECS via radio communication.
The telephone communication or 8
the headsets we have set up send the inf ormation back and Y
forth between the control rooms.
10 0
Wha t did you perceive the role of the NRC people 11 who were in the control room, the people onsite, to be?
12 W ha t did you perceive what they were supposed to be doing 13 t here ?
14 A
Tney were there to a ssist in any way they could.
15 Give me some information.
Have you looked at this or that?
Io Just to a ssi st.
17 0
Here they doing that?
le A
Sure.
19 0
Were they making suggestions?
20 A
Sure.
21 0
Do you recall w' rat kind of suggestions or any 22 specific ones the people who were there in the Unit 1 23 control room made during the first day?
24 A
We held a lot of conversations.
From what i s t he 25 flow path in the makeup systen to wha t is the
3981 03 13 40 nLRW I
temperatures and pressures.
It involved a whole lot of 2
t hing s.
3 I can't pick one specific instance out and say we talked 4
about this.
They wanted to know pressures, flows, 5
temperatures, what pumps were on.
6 0
I understand they were asking you for a lot of 7
information.
My question is really were they making 8
suggestions and recommendations to you saying, gee, you 9
ought to look at this or ought to do this?
10 A
Sure.
And I would relay that inf ormation back to Unit 2.
12 0
Who were the people that you were talking to in 13 Unit 2 primarily?
14 A
- Well, I tried to talk -- they had a chain of 15 commanc set up over there.
I would try to talk to the shift to foren.an or shift supervisor over there, or Mike Ross was 17 over there also.
I tried to talk to him.
Ic If I couldn't get a senior person, I called to the 19 control room operator.
Whoever picked up the phone.
I 20 would ask for Seelinger, Ross, shif t supervisor, shif t 21 foreman, and f inally, CRO.
If they were all tied up.
They 22 held special minimeetings, li ttle mee ting s, to discuss this 23 a n d t ha t.
Sometimes everybody was involved in these.
24 So I would pa ss the information through to a CRO.
And 25 have him give that inf orma tion to whoever.
(.
~.J
$981103 14 41 sbnLRW I
O Were there any people in the Unit I control room
(/
1
\\-
2 f rom NRC who had knowledge of the plant in Unit 2, detailed 3
knowledge, as far as you knew?
4 A
Not as far as I knew.
The people I had met who 5
came in, I had never met before.
o O
Mr. Gallina, was he in the Unit I control room?
7 A
That's right.
8 0
Who else, if you remember?
9 A
I think Nimitz was there.
That is all I can 10 remember.
11 0
Can you characterize the kinds of suggestions that 12 they were making?
Were they saying maybe you should try 13 this or were they putting some pressure on you to suggest to 14 Unit 2 control room to take a particular course?
O-15 Were they really recommendations or were they more in the lo way of saying, gee, maybe we should try this or that?
17 A
I had talked to whoever -- I don't know who.
ic We had a phone communication set up.
We were on a 19 conference box.
From time to time we were in respirators.
20 It makes it difficult to communicate through the respirator.
21 I got the impre ssion sometimes they said, look, do this, 22 and I would ask, are you telling me to ao that.
No, I'm not 23 telling you.
I'm asking you to think about doing tnat.
24 Ano it went along those kind of lines.
That type of
',2 5 situation.
I would say, okay, I'll tell them in Unit 2
[').
v
3981 03 15 42 l
,s.bnLRN 1
_you are concerned about this and want them to look at this
\\l 2
and I would relay that information.
3 0
But the NRC people were really drawing back from 4
trying to make it seem as though they were recommending or 5
trying to com:nand you to do anything?
6 A
They were drawing back, saying, hey, I recommend 7
that you look at thi s.
They were recommending rather than 8
commanding.
That is the impre ssion I got, anyway.
Y 0
How would you communica te that to the people in Aq 10 Unit 27 11 A
I would say, look, I talked to a guy f rom the NRC f
12 and he wants you to look at this, this and that because they 13 are concerned about this, this and that.
Please take a look 14 at it.
O 15 16 17 le 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 l.
i i
I
981.04.01 43 cmn_.
1 0
dnen yuu said before that the NRC people at times p
LG-2 really got in the way, did they get in the way more because 3
they physically were standing around trying to get infermation 4
or get in way because they were always or sometimes bothering 5
you about what to do next?
Or both?
6-A It is a little bit of both, I guess.
Mostly because you are in a confined space with a large amount of people i
3 doing a specific job.
Of course he has a job where ha is 9
supposed to get information.
He would keep bugging the guy 10 who was trying to do.the off-site calculations and the guy 11 couldn't continually run a train of thought or go on with his 12 calculations because he was answering this guys questions.
13 I finally had to run them away from the calculations 14 table and tell them if they want anything, come to me and I is will see that they get it.
As far as bugging me to do lo something -- do this, do that -- they would come out and get 17 me. I spent a lot of time at the calculations tabie looking at 18 my radiation monitors because unit l's radiation monitors were 19 all going of f-scale high.
20 That is my primary concern, unit 1, and the people 21 involved in unit 1.
When a guy wanted something and tapped me 22 on the shoulder and said come in the office, somebody wants to 23 talk to you, I would go in.
24 0
Did the NRC people in the unit I control room ever 25 make a specific suggestion or recommendation about the overall em
I
$81.04.0 2 44 cmn i
strategy that unit 2 ought to take for cooling the plant?
L f.~s 2
That is, did they ever say look, the NRC thinks you 3
should really be blowing down now instead of keeping the 4
pressure up?
Or vice-verse?
Do you recall that?
5 A
I can't recall.
They might have.
I can't recall 6
it.
I rememoer sometime during the day they said -- I talked 7
to the guys and they said they will try to get on decay heat 8
r emov al.
I don't know if they discussed 16 over thsre, 9
because we talked earlier that the NRC sent people to unit 2.
10 I don't know what transpired between the people in unit 2 and 11 the people down in region 1.
12 Maybe they decided to do that.
I don't know that.
I can't 13 spe:ifically remember hey, you ought to decrease pre ssure 14 rapidly during decay heat or pressurize rapidly and pump back 15 up.
I know they were concerned about the temperature 16 relationship, the NRC people.
1, I relayed that information to them.
Look at your pressure la and temperature.
What do you believe ?
11 0
Could you explain that a little more?
Was the 20 question whe ther the readings were really believable or what 21 the radiation showed?
22 A
Well, I think it was questionaole as to whether the 23 readings were believable or not because of some of the.
24 temperatures they had seen and whether or not the RTD f ailed.
22 Ane large range or spectrum in temperatures -- they looked
')81304.03 45 amn I
at the in-core temperatures which ranged from 60 degrees to LRjll 2
14 03 degrees.
You look at that whole thing and say do I 3
really believe this or not?
4 3
'Nare you aware saf the morning or af ternoon of the 5
28th they had gotten some very high in-core temperature 5
readings in unit 2?
7 A
I don't think I paid particular attention to the 3
in-: ores because of what I was involved with.
I would take 7
the number and run it in and say they are reading this or 10 that.
I may have looked at the in-cores.
The one that 11 struc k me was the T-hot where it read 620.
That is pegged 12 high.
Tnat one really concerned me.
13 0
?las the NRO input there to find out whether that 14 was really believed to be accurate oy the people in the
_J 15 unit 2 control room?
15 A
I know they were concerned about it.
I don't know le what they were thinking at the time.
They took all the data Il and I would go attay and they would go away and use the pnone 19 and look at what they had.
And I would go back in the control 23 r oo m.
21 I know they were concerned about the temperatures.
Where 22 they were headed, I didn't know that.
23 J
0.: a y.
I want to ask you whether you have any 24 recollection of a telephone call or telephone calls you may 22 nava been in on with NRC people you.cself.
F m-I
1 981.04.04 46 cmn i
I would lre to have marked as Exhibit 9 a very rough l
L[,)
2 transcript of a tape which is a recording of a phone 3
conversation that apparently occurred on March 28 between 4
4:00 o' clock in the af ternoon and 4: 30 in the afternoon on one 5
of the incoming phone lines in the NRC's incident response 6
center in Bethesda.
It appears to be a phone conversation 7
between some NRC people there and some people in the unit i 3
control room.
9 (Exhibit 9 identified.)
10 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
11 0
I have shown this to you ce fore we started today.
12 See if that jogs your memory as to whether you are one of the 13 people in this phone conversation and generally as to when you 14 knew about it or were in on any phone conversations with NRO
,-(>)
15 people in Bethesda during the af ternoon and what you can 13 recall them telling you.
17 Jo you recognize this transcript at all?
13 Jo you recognize the conversation?
19 A
Tne conversation -- I talked to a lot of people.
23 Plhen I talk into that conference box, I don't know where they 21 a re on the other end.
If it was Bethesda or Philadelphia, I 22 don't know that.
The conversation itself, though, we talked 23 acout a lot of things.
In this conversation they talk about 24 temperatures and so forth and so on.
We talked about tha t.
23 I can't say yes, this is it.
But we talked about a lot of
(~'v)
981.04.05 47 cmn I
things.
Temperature was one of them.
O LE,/
2
.0 When you say we talked about a lot of things, you s
3 mean you talked with NRC people on the phone at various times 4
about temperatures.
3 A
Sure.
6 Q
Having read this rough transcript do you have a recognition of participating in the conversation of which s
3 this purports to be a transcript?
As you sit here today, do 9
you recall this?
10 A
It is possible, yes.
I would imagine the guy that 11 they call "Greg He ss" is me.
We were in respirators.
My 12 conve rsation with him -- it is quite possible.
We talked 13 about temperatures and pressures.
That is what they are 14 talking about here.
tO s-15 MR. RIDDELL:
The record should reflect the fact 16 that he never saw this transcript before 9:30 this morning.
17 MR. FRAMPTON:
That is correct.
IS BY MR. FRAMPTON:
19 O
As I understand it, you are saying this could well 20 have been a conversation you participated in but as you sit 21 here right now you can't absolutely confirm that from your 22 recollection.
23 A
That is right.
It is quite possiole.
24 0
Do~you ever recall talking to somecody from the NRC 22 called Vic 5tello?
981'.04.06 48 cmn 1
A I didn't pay any attention to names.
That wasn't (m
LL.)
2 important.
3 0
So you would not recall that name?
4 A
No.
5 0
Do you ever recall someone from the NRC on the 6
squawk box telling you that they were concerned about the core
/
being uncovered or about superheat condition?
8 A
I rememoer him talking about the core being uncovered.
I remember coming back and talking to them about 10 the core flood tanks.
I said they are floating on the BWST in 11 the c ore flood tanks.
The guy said how do you know the core 12 is covered?
I said I don't.
Let me get back to them and get 13 all the parameters and get back to you.
14 0
Some of that conversation -- some conversation about (m
15 that subject appears in this transcript.
16 A
Right.
Ie 0
Whicn we marked as Exhibit 9.
13 But from your recollection, what you recall about that 19 conversation, do you then recall talking to somebody in unit 2 23 and passing that concern along?
21 A
Sure.
22 0
Do you happen to remember who that particular person 23 was you tal.<ed to on that occ asion?
24 A
I don't.
I talked to so many people at so many 23 diffsrent times.
N.7C had ma answering 100 questions.
I don't
281.04.07 49 cmn I
know.
LRllI 2
0 Do you recall whether there was any response back 3
from the unit 2 control room af ter you relayed this 4
information?
5 A
I know they said they would look at it.
They would 5
look at their pressure temperature and look and see what they I
think is going on.
8 0
Do you recall whether they ever got back to you and 9
said tell the NRC we looked at it and decided thus and so?
10 A
No, I don't.
11 J
You couldn't have any recollection of whether there 12 was any f eedback?
13 A
No, I don't have any recollection.
I don't know 14 what they ware talking with the NRO guys -- there is a guy
(_/
15 over there in unit 2 also.
I don't know what happened there.
16 I only know what happened on my side.
Ie 0
I am asking about whatever knowledge you had with 13 respect to things that went through the unit I control room 19 you may have heard.
23 A
Right.
21 2
Do you recall any other specific concerns or 22 recommendations that NRC people, either those in the control 23 room or those talking over the phone, made during that first 24 day a bout strategy in the plant or aoout specific concerns?
23 Jo you recall any other specific items like this that came
,m
$81.04.08 50 cmn 1
up?
- LFL \\)
2 A
No.
Not anything really great, earthshattering.
3 0
Nothing that stands out in your mind?
4 A
No.
It seems to me one of the guys -- I think 5
Havercamp was down where I was talking.
I thought he said these -- Don Havercamp -- I think I said, hi, Don, how are you I
doing?
I think he was down there.
That might help a bit.
8 0
- nen you say down there --
9 A
Whoever E -was talking to on that box.
10 2
At the otner end of the phone?
11 A
Wooever they were.
I think Havercamp was there.
12 0
I note in this Exhibit 9 there is a voice saying 13 Don?
Don?
Is that Mr. Havercamp's first name?
14 A
Don Havercamp, yes.
T 15 0
Do you recall having more than one conversation li whera there was input coming from NRC people outside the 1/
shift supervisor's office?
13 Jo you recall hearing NRC people f rom region I or Bethesda
-1/
ta1Xing into the squawk box and saying we are concerned about 23 this or please look at that?
21 A
Otner than the people I talked to?
Other than the 22 people I talked to?
23 0
Other than the people actually in the control room 24 who had com3 from region I, do you recall concerns ceing 25
-expressed of NRC people back in region I or Bethesda over tne O
981.04,09 51 cmn l~
squawk box direct to you while you were standing there?
o LL,)
2 A
Sure.
That is part of the conversation that we s
3 talzed aoout.
They would say look, how about this, how about 4
that?
I spent a long time explaining to them how the msk Jp 5
system works.
6 0
Over the phone?
/
A Yes.
Because they only had unit I prints.
Not unit S
2 prints.
9 0
At region !?
h3 A
Wnoever it was.
That irritated me a bit.
I had to il spend time teaching this guy a system when I thought they 12 had all our prints.
It was tough to teach unit 2 off of unit 13
- 1. The basic system is the same out the check valves are 14 different and so forth.
)
15 I don't know who was there, but we talked at great length to over a long period of time.
Il a
Did the role of NRC people either in the control 15 room or on site change in any way Detween Wednesday and.;riday?
19 A
Not to my recollection.
23 2
dhere were you on Saturday and Sunday?
Unit 17 21 A
Unit 2.
2J Q
Tnere were inspectors from the NRC there on Saturday 23 and Sunday, right?
24 A
Right.
25 0
das there any change that you noticed in the role of fh V
l
')81.04.10 52 cmn 1
NRC people Saturday and Sunday?
/~s LL )
2 A
Yes.
m 3
0 Could you describs what you observed or understood?
4 A
Well, they got involved in everything we did.
If 5
we even thought aoout doing something, we discussed it.
We 6
set up a group and our procedures flowed through this group i
f rom our people who wrote it to NRC, GPU, to ALARA, back to 3
us.
They are the people in charge of health physics, making 9
sure we don't exceed anything and so on.
10 They definitely were in on everything we did.
The makeup 11 tan 4 and the pressure in the reactor building was a big 12 concern.
Where to vent the decay tank to the -- tne waste 13 tans decay tanks, we wanted to pipe the decay tanks oack to 14 the reactor ouilding.
15 I had to help a guy get dressed from NRC to go in so ne 13 could watch them run this pipe.
le 0
Do you have a recollection that you wanted to do 13 this before the NRC was prepared to give you permission to do 11 it?
20 in otner words, was this action held up or delayed by 21 necessity to get NRC concurrence in it?
That you can recall?
22 A
You mean for any actions we war.ted to take as f ar 23 as --
24 0
I am talking about specifically the putting the gas 23 f rom the makeup system cack into the containment.
That was a s
-)81.04.11 53
.cmn i
decision that was made by the company, was it not?
/m.
LT(,)
2 A
Yes.
Somebody in the company made that decision.
3 0
Do you recall whether the actual implementation of 4
that decision or the actual pumping of the gas was delayed 5
on account of NRO being slow in concurring in the action?
6 A
I don't know about them concurring in the action.
7 I don't know if that held us up.
I don' t believe it did.
I 3
think that is a good ' idea, So to speak, you meet together and 9
look around and make sure it was right.
Where we got bogged 10 down is shift reliefs.
Taking a guy down, dressing him up, il sending him in the ouilding to waten a guy lay copper tubing 12 is ridiculous.
He is exposed to that radiation for no reason 13 at all as far as I am concerned.
14 Why he has to oe there when they lay the copper pipe is
(
15 beyond me.
I had to wait to get his clearance.
I had to wait 16 to ge t his e xposures and so f orth and so on.
Shift relief I,
time was horrible.
The guy who came in to relieve the guy 18 there had to be explained everything all over again.
Tell me 19 why you are doing this and that.
He wants to know what I am 20 thinking.
Fine, out --
21 0
You are talking about NRC people replacing --
22 A
Another NRO guy.
23 In other words, the guy shif ts -- his shif t is done.
He 24 wants to go-home.
They relieved a half hour an hour after w'e 23 did.
Not-tne same time we did.
They had continuity there.
r^s 1
~-
i
$81.04.12-54 cmn~
l Another problem is procedures.
I would write a procedure l
e~
LI _)
2 and send it around the taole and everybody here would approve s
3 it 'and we went home.
New people sat down at the table and 4
somebody at the end didn't like it.
It completely stopped 5
everything.
Though everybody approved including the guy 6
from the NRO who was there.
That became quite f rustrating.
7 Q
Wnen did this change that you have descrioed in 8
which the NRC people got much more involved with plant 9
opera tions and procedures begin?
10 A
-Saturday-Sunday.
Il O
Saturday or sometime Sunday?
\\
12 A
It had to be Saturday because Sunday is wnen we lit 13 off the recombiner so it was probably late Friday and 14 Saturday when we set up the process for the procedures to 15 flow.
15 3
Friday night or early Saturday?
1/-
A That is when it really started to affect me.
It 13 really aff ected me on Saturday.
19 MR. FRAMPTON:
Let's take a five or 10-minute creak.
23 (Recess.)
21 22 23 24 25 Ox4 e
,r.-
a 55 cr6981 1
MR. FRAMPTON:
Back on the record. Dennis?
je 1
1r 2
BY MR. ALLISON:
3 Q
First of all, were you involved in any way with the 4
decision to stop steaming from the atmospheric vents on the 5
afternoon of the 28th?
6 A
No.
7 Q
Do you know what was done, whether the steam 8
generators were steamed at the condenser immediately there-
'9 after or not?
10' A
I don't know.
Il Q
Were any special precautions taken to prevent any 12 containment isolation valves from opening up, that you recall?
I'
'~}
13 A
Ue talked about that later on.
Terry Harpster 14 and I talked about it.
And I believe that we looked at 15 opening breakers for specific valves.
We at least talked 16 about that.
What happened thereafter I am not sure.
I know 17 we discussed it.
Terry and I talked about it.
Bring it up l
18 to his people and I would bring it up to mine and we would 19 caucus about it.
t l
20 Where it went from there, I am not sure.
I am quite l
21 positive a lot of breakers got opened for isolation valves.
l 22 The valves would be closed in there isolation -- reactors I
i 23 would go through isolation position.
The breaker would be l
opened so the valve coulda"t cycle.
4
/-
24 We had caution tags on Swim a a no n m.ine.
I 25 the valves, too, I believe.
56 Jori 2 1
Q Had one of those valves opened, what would the O/
2 consequences have been?
Let's say been open by accident.
3 A
I guess it depends on which valve you open as to 4
what the consequences would be.
From a release out of the 5
building to nothing.
It depends what system.
6 0
tiost of them have another valve backing then up, 7
do they not?
8 A
Yes.
9 O
Had you been able to op3n a valve by accident you 10 would have been able to reclose it?
II A
Sure.
12 O
Would it have been worthwhile in your opinion to
()
13 have a selective engineered safety feature bypass feature 14 so you would bypass the containment isolation signal for 15 the valves you needed like the reactor coolant seal isolation 16 valves yet leave the others locked closed by the engineered 17 safety feature?
The question is whether that was worthwhile, 18 in your opinion.
l f
19 A
You want to bypass specific portions of ES instead 20 of the whole system.
That would be a convenience, sure.
21 That would be nice.
22 O
It would have been nice in this situation so you j
i 23 didn't have to operate circuit breakers or something.
I
()
24 A
Sure.
It would have been nice.
Ne-E-~,si anmnen, ine.
25 O
But you are able to handle that by disabling the f
I.
57
'jerif I
electrical circuits if you want to make sure certain valves
~(~'%
\\l 2
can't get open.
3 A
That's right.
Go down on the breaker and the 4
valve can't cycle.
That is not as easy as it sounds.
The 5
guy has to get dressed and so forth but eventually that could 6
be done.
7 Q
When you were on duty:as the shift supervisor, I 8
was asking you earlier about command control and instructions 9
not to change the plant status without approval of upper 10 management.
Regardless of any instructions you may have 11 gotten in the later days, did you always feel free if 12 something unexpected happened that you had the responsibility
()
13 and authority to take action right then?
14 A
Sure.
I never doubted that, i
15 0
No matter what anybody says, when you are in charge I
16 of the control room, is that your view of things?
17 A
If something needs immediate attention or needs 18 action right now, what I consider action right now is the l
19 make-up tank relief valve cycling open and closed, we will i
l 20 take action then and there and then discuss what we have done.
21 I have specifically told the CROs I work with also, they are I.
22 not to change a thing in the plant under normal conditians l
23 unless they talk to me.
Don't start stop pumps, don't change
~s 2 *,
(
i valve line-ups unless we talk about it as a group unless the pcendal Eepo,ters, Inc.
25 world is caving in, andtheywillandtheyhavetodosomething!
i 58
.jcri 4 1
now.
I will be right there and know that.
()
2 Q
This is normal procedure prior to the accident you are speaking of?
3l 4
A This is after the accident.
Normal procedure is CRO has a procedure to follow and he will follow that 5
6 Procedure.
Pre-accident times.
You seem to be talking about that quite a bit.
Let me give 7
8 an example.
When the reactor coolant pump tripped, two CROs 9
on the console plus myself.
Each of them were familiar with the EP but when the pump tripped one got the EP out and 10 11 Opened it up to that portion that applied.
The other CRO 12 scanned the panel.
I stood behind him.
We went step by 13 step down the EP.
He didn't just reach over and start the
(}
14 other pump.
It's not quite that simple.
15 We had the EP out.
We read step by step exactly what to 16 do before we did it.
We took the time to do that.
That is 17 a good example on that pump trip.
18 Q
When did that happen?
19 A
I don't know the -- it happened sometime probably 20 during the first -- I know the pump tripped.
I just don't 21 know when.
27 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
23 Q
Let me ask you one or two questions on another I
(')
24 subject.
On the early afternoon of March 28, you and wi ' temnen, inc.
25 Mr. Carl Myers wne into the Unit 2 auxiliary building.
I i
59 jeri 5 1
A That's right.
[D N/
2 O
Was that basically reconnaissance?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
To see whether there was water on the floor or 5
whether there were leaks and what the activity level was?
6 A
We knew there was water on the floor because of the 7
releases, the large releases we were ge' ting and the effect c
8 we saw on our radiation monitors.
We wanted to go in and see 9
if there was anything we could do about it such as pump it 10 from the sump into another holding tank and get the 11 floor levels down so the radiation levels wouldn't be as high.
12 Q
You tried to restart one of the sumps to get that
(}
13 water out of the drain system, did you not?
14 A
Right.
We went in at the auxiliary building sump.
15 The water level was full to the top of the floor.
We went up 16 to the panel and tried to start one of the auxiliary building 17 sump pumps.
It wouldn't start.
18 Q
Who decided somebody ought to go in there and take 19 a look?
20 A
I sat down with Jim Seelinger when Jim was in 21 Unit 1 and said we ought to look and see if there is anything 22 we con do.
It was myself and Seelinger -- there were several 23 other people.
We held the meeting in the same room the NRC
_ [')
24 was in.
And then I told them I ought to go because my
!ce F_.al Reporms, W.
exposure was low compared to the'other guys involved in the l
25 t
l
60 I
ri 6 Unit 1 refueling outage.
So I went in.
2 When you say " exposure is low," you mean for the O
3 quarter?
i 4
A Yes.
5 0
And you therefere were the one who suggested you 6
were the appropriate person to go on this trip?
A Because I knew the building and the combination of 7
8 both.
I knew the building, knew where to go and my exposure 9
was low.
10 Were the NRC people listening in on this conversa-Q 11 tion?
12 I don't know that.
A
(,)
13 O
It's possible but you don't know?
Id A
I don't know that.
t 15 Q
Thank you.
16 2 Denny?
i BY MR. ALLISON:
l 17 l
18 O
When you left at 7:00 a.m.
Thursday, you had not 39 been intimately involved in the Unit 2 control room 20 l
operations up until that time.
2I A
That's correct.
I 22 Did you think when you went home that morning that Q
i 23 the incident had been terminated?
l f
'~S 24 A
Terminated?
No, not terminated.
Controlled.
,xc.4. is n pon.n. inc.
25 Arrested.
But not over, i
fl.
61 gi 7' I
Q Did you consider the plant still in a state of flux 2
to be brought ut.?er control or did you consider it under 3
control --
4 A
Under control and now in the process of cooling 5
down decay heat.
6 Q
You started then on Friday morning in a 12 on, 12 7
off shift relieving Bill Zewe as shift supervisor?
8 A
Yes.
We seren't actually on 12 on, 12 off.
There 9
were three shift supervisors in Unit 2.
We sort of worked 10 anywhere from an 8 to a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> day depending.
We weren't Il specifically on a 12-hour shift.
12 Now some of the upper management people were on a 12-hour O
aife-14 0
Were you on and off with Zewe in a port-starboard
'15 arrangement or was there a third shift supervisor?
16 A
There was a third shift supervisor.
17 Q
Who was that?
I
~18 A
Brian Mehler.
19 0
What was your understanding of the structure above 20 the -- I believe we had Floyd and Ross at port and starboard.
21 A
I believe that is correct.
For a period of time 22 they were, yes.
23 Q
Do you know whether they got into that configuration 24 and were constantly manning the control room?
l'
-s
(
)
4 W F_~.at Rewners Inc.
f, 25 A
No That changed somewhat.
The shift
~
l l
62 jori 8 1
s,t'ructure and arrangement changed at a later date.
Maybe 2
Monday or Tuesday.
We went into almost a five-shift rotation j
I 3
I believe.
4 Q
I am only interested up until the weekend at most.
5 That was when it was being formed.
6 A
Okay.
They were basically port and starboard.
7 O
Once it got formed, changed to four sections or 8
something, I am not interested in that.
9 A
All right.
10 0
Okay.
Above Flgst and Ross, do you know what was 11 happening there?
Let's say Thursday, Friday and Saturday.
12 A
Should have been Miller and Logan.
13 O
So it was your impression it was Miller and Logan,
('))
v 14 A
Right.
Miller is the one I worked with.
15 Q
But you worked with Miller.
You weren't there when 16 Logan was on duty.
17 A
No, sir.
18 Q
Do you know when that started?
l 19 A
No, I don't.
{
20 Q
Do you know who was above Miller and Logan?
l 21 A
Arnold and Herbein.
l 22 Q
Can you recall when that started?
23 A
No.
They seemed to be working that way Friday when I
f]
24 I was there.
It must have started sometime Thursday.
I don't l BaA-i nereners, ine.
1 25 know specifically.
1
l 63 juri 9 1
Q And then who had the Unit 1 controirroom, the
()
2 radiological emergency plan considerations?
3 A
That changed. _ Bill Potts was over there.
I 4
talked to Howard Crawford. I can't remember.
5 Q
Do you know who they would be reporting to?
Would 6
that be Miller and Logan that they would report tc?
7 A
They basically -- it ultimately boils down they 8
report to Miller and Logan, yes.
9 0
So Miller and Logan had responsibility for --
10 A
They were the emergency directors.
11 0
-- both plant operations and radiological monitor-12 ing teams and so on.
- 13 A
Sure.
pg O
14 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
15 Q
One of the things we are looking at is the question 16 of what kind of manning and expertise it's really helpful and 17 necessary to have in the control room to deal with transients 18 and accidents.
The technical specifications for TMI 2 which 19 I believe are standard tech specs only require that one 20 licensed operator be in the control room during equilibrium 21 power operation and the minimum total crew size is one SRO, 22 2 control room operators and 2 non-licensed personnel or j
i I
23 auxiliary operators.
)
r-The specs also permit that crew exposition to be reduced l
24 cek,S) Reporters, lmc.
25 from 3 licensed operators to 2 licensed operators for a per2od (
l
64
~
1 I
cri_x,0 of up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Theoretically at least you would be within 2
your tech specs for up to a two-hour period with only 2 3
licensed operators in the plant.
One ;at at the plant and one d
' in the control room.
5 Let me start by asking this question:
Do you think that 6
having only 2 licensed operators in the plant with only one 7
in the control room is adequate manning to handle a transient?
8 A
No.
9 Q
Do you think that the minimum required in the tech 10 specs for longer periods of time, which would be 2 licensed 11 operators in the control room with a senior person out in the 12 plar. t, let's say, do you think that is adequate with two O
'3 eux11iery overetors for hend11ne ehnorme1 treneients or Id accidents?
15 A
With two auxiliary operators handling the 16 transient?
Q Right.
l 17 i
IO A
No.
9 Q
I think that Met Ed has a larger than minimum i
20 normal crew manning, is that correct?
2I A
That is correct.
22 O
What is your normal complement on a back shift?
l 23 A
Normal mor minimum?
2#
A Your normal.
Start with your_= normal on the back
!ce f LA) Reporters, Inc.
25 shift.
I i
I
)
65 11._.
1 A
Two control room operators who are licensed.
I have
/
s
(
J
~
2 got a shift foreman who is licensed as a senior reactor 3
operator.
Control room operators are just RO.
I have got 4
anywhere from 6 to 8 auxiliary operators.
5 Q
Does the company also have a policy to have a shift 6
supervisor --
7 A
On-site.
8 0
-- in other words, in one nit or the other at all 9
times on all shifts.
10 A
That's correct.
Il Q
Do you think that normal complement is adequate 12 to handle --
f3(,)
13 A
Yes.
I4 0
-- a transient?
l 15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Does the company have some rule about its --
l 17 A
Excuse me.
You said transient.
Not an accident.
l 18 Q
Yes.
[
19 Q
Yes, transient.
l 20 Q
What about handling a accident?
I 21 A
The accident, you need help.
I can handle an l
22 accident for a short period of time.
I am trained to do that.
23 My operators are trained to do that, to man the off-site and l
24 on-site teams but they will need help.
That time period where f lh lce Feceril Reporters, Inc.
25 I call people on my emergency calls I -- that is not i
I l
l t
66 jcri 12 I
including the HP people.
You are only talking about operations.
2 Not health physicists and so forth and maintenance.
3 O
That's correct.
I am only asking about the number 4
of people necessary for operation.
5 A
Okay.
6 Q
Now you said there is a distinction between normal l
7 and minimum.
Does the company have a policy, a minimum crew 8
complement policy that requires a certain number of people to 9
be present on a unit at all times?
10 A
Four auxiliary operators.
That is our policy.
II We don't go less than that.
12 O
Company policy is you are not supposed to be
~
(~)T operating with less than four Aos.
13 Id A
That's right, in each unit.
i I
15 Q
Is it also company policy you shouldn't be 16 operating without a shift supervisor on-site?
17 A
That is correct.
I 18 Q
That is part of the minimum policy.
{
19 A
The shift supervisor will be on-site.
l 1
20 Q
And a foreman and at least two control room operators 21 for each unit.
22 A
That is correct.
23 Q
The foreman and shift supervisor each have senior i
24
- licenses, i
pa-~f~~') l Roorters, inc.
l
.aa 25 A
That is correct.
l h
I i
L
67 I
BY MR. ALLISON:
jeri 13 O
t\\/
2 Q
There is one last question here.
Did you ever 3
receive any orders during the first few days af ter the accident 4
that you disagreed with?
If so, what were they and what was 5
your recommendation?
6 A
Offhand, I can't remember any orders I disagreed 7
with.
8 MR. ALLISON:
That is all I have.
9 BY MR.) WORAM:
10 Q
One question I have.
Over the course of the firs
- Il day, looking at the reactimeter data, the spray valve was 12 used on and off for reasons I can't understand from looking f)'\\
13 at the data I have seen so f ar.
x Id A
March 28?
15 Q
Yes.
16 A
I hs.ve no idea that was done.
17 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
18 Q
Mr. Hitz, thank you very much for your time and your cooperation.
I want to ask you one last question.
Are 19 20 there any areas that the I&E people didn't ask you about at 21 all and we haven't asked you about at all that you think are 22 especially important to your role in the response to the 23 accident or that you think are important that we have missed?
I 2#
A No.
You pretty well covered it all.
>m&-)d Rumtm, Inc.
j 25 MR. FRAMPTON:
Okay, thank you very much.
f l
the hearing was concluded at'12:10 p.m.)
i (Whereupon, i
f
_