ML19322C702
| ML19322C702 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1974 |
| From: | BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322C700 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR PROC-740919, NUDOCS 8001200018 | |
| Download: ML19322C702 (5) | |
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ATTACHMENT I
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O 9/19/74
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REACTOR START-UP CERTIFICATION DURATION:
Five days CLASS SIZE:
3 or groups of 3 LOCATION:
Nuclear Training Center, Lynchburg, Virginia PURPOSE:
To provide a prospective reactor operator an opportunity to qualify for having accomplished his reactor startup on the B & W sbnulator thus eliminating plant off-line time for training and reactor operator examination.
DESCRIPTION: The course consists of four days of classroom and simulator instruction in reactor startup technique and an introduction to power operation. The fifth day will be utilized to examine each student as to his ability to perform a reactor startup.
A certification to the sponsoring utilities plant nanagement will be made of those students who satisfactorily complete the operating examination for a reactor startup.
TYPICAL SCHEDULE:
DAY I Classroom Instruction Introduction to Control Panels Introduction to the Startup Procedure Practical Session Reactor Criticality DAY 2 Classroom Instruction Reactivity Balance Calculations Plant Startup - Hot Shutdown to 25% Power Practical Exercise Plant Startup - Hot Shutdown to 25% Power with turbine generator in operation.
DAY 3 Classroom instruction Technical Specifications and their Relationship to Startup Power Operation and najor malfunctions Practical Session Power Operation with student walk through of malfunctions, demonstrations, and explanations.
DAY 4 Classroom Instruction Review of Startup Procedure Practical Session g () () y,() () (q j{
Reactor Startup Practice 9
DAY 5 Reactor Startup Examination
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O CRITIQUE - B & W SIMULATOR EXX'.S CENERAL,
(1)
B & 9 should adopt Oconee procedures not use Cid Forrest Roa'. procedures.
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B & W should use Oconee Emergency Plan (3)
B & W should include H.P. training and have portable radiation instruments available to control room'.
(4)
Instructors should be flexibic at operatine censole ie: Discuss theory and operating aspects to trainees during training exercise (Based on Sains refusal to discuss theory and move to other assignments)
(5) Think it would be advisable for B & W to move reactor protection channel mock up into control room and utilize during training exercise.
(They have cock up in classrecm)
(6)
B64 needs to emphasize plant systems as they relate to annunciator alarms ie, air supply.
Think they s.ould redo their annunciators and pick our Oconce system annunciators and install ie electrical, heat tracing, etc.
SPECIFIC Theory-(1)
Poor on subcritical multiplication - effects on count rate if operator stopped pulling rods and remained subcritical for some period of time.
Status of reactor if count rate dcubled with Keff 0.95.
Observing ef fects of delayed neutrens af ter leveling ef f.
(2)
Didn't know how lower beta fraction at EOL would influence operation of the reactor.
(3)
Poor understanding of redial & axial flux profile-poor sketch ci radial flux following rod drop.
(4) Neglected boron in calculating reactivity balance in problem at Xe decay with saf ety rods withdraun-Rx going critical (5) Didn't plot both A & B detectors in 1/n plot problem.
Didn't show work-got incorrect answer.
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37 Procedures & Operation (1)
Poor perf xmance in handling letdown during plant startup.
Violated heat up rate - poor explanation of how to monitor heat up rate - instrumentation involved.
(2) Thought a primary leak casuality was taking place during startup (it wasn't) requested operator assistance to make a makeup tank calculation during transient plant condition (cannot be done).
(3) Reluctant to put feedwater control in manual and operate when he was instructed to do so.
Did poor job of fu control in manual.
. (4)
Showed lack of knowledge of secondary system.
Told me heater drain pumps accounted for 15% of feedwater (more like 30%).
(5) Didn't know the preamplifier in Source Channel was not in control cabinet but close to the reactor.
(6) Unable to associate electrical available in control rocn to Oconee plant (incoming lines).
(7)
Couldn't identify plant black out casuality (even though lights in C.R. uent off came bach on).
Failed to initiate high pressure injection when pressurizer level was lost.
(8)
B & W has no black out procedure.
(9)
Poor discussion of how to re, duce temperature decay (cool down rate) during natural circulation.
Concentrated on reducing emergency feedwater uhich would reduce circulation.
Neglected steam relief.
(10) Poor answer en reasons for difference of boren concentration between Pressurizer and primary system (normal dilution over core life).
Use of heater & spray to equalizer-failed to indicate this.
(11) Poor on interlocks on fuel handling br:dge.
(12) Very poor understanding of Oconee Emergency Plan (13) Poor explanation of recctor internal valves and how they operate during LOCA.
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(14) Poor response on transient (decrease of 10% in power from 100%)
(,15) Poor response on motor fault I.C.S.
(16) Poor understanding of procedure to fo'llow to make a temporary change in operating procedure.
l (17) B & W should get Oconee Administration procedures if they don't l
have them.
l (18) Use of work clearance form and required authorization for use of jumpers.
(19) Very poor sketch of electrical 4 primary instrumentation for an instructor.
(20) Poor explanation of use of sump to IIPl during LOCA (21) Poor on data requested on coolant pumps in 4P, levels, etc.
(22) Action to take on steam generator tube Icak (23) Poor on quadrant tilts question-Technical Specs (lef t out parts b&c on question K.5 worth 2.5)
Technical Specifications (1)
Poor response on Oconee T.S. relative to use of electromatic relief valve malfunction. Told me electronic valve req'd by T.S. said was in T.S. bas,is,couldn't find it.
(2) Didn't know temperature greater than 619 F was viciatinc safety limit.
Had trouble distintuishing among ahnernal occurrences, safety limits and limiting safety cenditions.
(3)
Poor on bases of T.S. on coolant activity li. P.
(1)
Poor on 'etector location at'Oconee for gaseous releases.
(2) Problem with calculation layer of lead chielding req'd.
(3) Very poor response on procedure to handle radioactive spill in auxiliary building.
(4) Neglected tritium as hazard in discussion of potential hazards in Re.x ter buildin:: in event of rrinary le.nace.
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.g. P (5) Failed to indicate ternary fission as source of 113 conditions (6)
Poor on respiratory requirceents under gaseous plant e
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