ML19322C346

Draft, Opportunities to Improve Effectiveness of Nrc

ML19322C346
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	10/19/1979
From:	GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
To:
References
NUDOCS 8001160883
Download: ML19322C346 (23)

Text

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PROPOSED REPORT OPPORTUti1 TIES TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVEliESS OF THE T1UCLEAR REGULATORY COI' MISSION h

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A 2 ICE -THIS DR AFT RESTRICTED TO O FFICIAL USE reament ir a draft of a proposed report of the General Accounting Office. It was

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Dy GAO s naff as a basis for obtaining advance review and comment by those having N'cilities cor ming the subjects discussed in the drdt. It has not been fully reviewed

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C C a of this _.

t must not show or release its contents for purposes other than official l ** c :' comme

.ander any circumstances. At all times it must be safeguarded to prevent CC =n or othts-mproper disclosure of the information contained therein. This draft and

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thereof main the property of. and must be returned on demand to, the General

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L,1 u' :..,;* E CHAPi:R 1 INTRODUCTION The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (::RC) is the focal pcint for Federal regulation of commercial nuclear activities.

It influences, directly by regulation and indirectly by public confidence in its per-formance, the extent to which nuclear power is used to supply the Nation's electricity and nuclear materials are used for commercial. purposes.

NRC came into existence on January 19, 1975, with implementation of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5801).

That act

--abolished the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),

--created the Energy Research and Development Administration 1/

to develop both nuclear and nonnuclear energy technologies and ranage the military application of nuclear energy, and

--:reated NRC to regulate commercial nuclear activities.

REE._A I0f; C: COM:'ERCIAL NU;_iU. ACT ilTIES BEFORE NRC Re;ulation of commercial nuclear activities m.anates from the Atomic Ens ;y a t cf 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011).

inat act permitted and c

enenra;ed co imercial applications of nuclear energy, and directed AEC to rep. a E ti sse activities to insure that they were conducted in a manner tht cid : otect public health and safety and maintain national security.

Ur# Te IE* act, development and use of nuclear energy had been reserved to - e :ede

.=1 Gev ernment.

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,1577, the Energy Administration became a part of the

'-- er.: If E :eroy (DOE).

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Over the years the conflict between AEC's dual role of encouraging and regulating ccmmercial nuclear activities became mrre and more apparent; and AEC's research and development and military application prog-ams dnminr.ed both its Commissioners' time and the AE budget.

Therefore, in 1957 the AEC Commissioners established a separate regulatory organization, and in 1951 elevated and enhanced the autoncmy of the regulatory organization by making it a separate AEC Directorate.

In 1963 the Director of Regulation moved from AEC's head uarters at Germantown,' Maryland to Bethesda, Maryland.

Finally, beginning in 1971 the Director of Regulation received its own operating tudge:.

Curic; toe same period the Congress and the AEC Commissioners created Atomic Safi:y a.d icensing Boards and Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards t: :3nd:.:: hearings and decide on license applications.

This helped to insula a ti e :c=nissicners from the process of licensing and regulating the c:.sti::ic.

acid operation of nuclear powerplants--the commercial nuclei-3:-'vi. mere the AEC Commissioners' dual roles most obviously confli: a:.

THE E!:'? ECORA ZATION ACT 0; :37-9e E f"O T:scrganization Act of 1974 established NRC as an independent regultr. rie' r_.-

The President would appoint five NRC Commissioners, one desigra z: E 2-..i

man, Each Commissioner wo0ld have one vote in all Cemission

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h? s:Ii: W ssion is to in.ure, by means of open and responsive regula-r. :a: _

>ilian nuclear activities are conducted in a manner 2

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that will protect public health and safety anc maintain national security.

This is set out in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended.

NRC is also charged with other important responsibilities.

As a Federal agency taking major actions which affect the environment, NRC must evaluate both radiological and nonradiological impacts on the environment of proposed major commercial nuclear facilities.

Furthermore, in the Energy Recrganiza-tion Act of 1974, the Congress charged NRC with new or expanded responsi-bilities its regulatory predecessor did not have, including (1) administer-ing major reculatory research procrams; (?) reculating certain OnE nuclear waste stroage and/cr disposal activities; and (3) increasing emphasis on safeguading nuclear materials and facilities against theft, diversion, or sabotags.

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.culater. system NRC employs to pursue its basic mission and dischar;e its othe.

asponsibilities generally consists of:

ing maf: regulate:y researchograps-H regulating certain nuclear waste ra agement a::ivit'

, and (3 r'es 'ng emphasis placed on safe-guardir; nu

.:Eterials and facilities against theft,s.dj,versinn, or sabotaos.

Thz regulate:y system NRC employs to pursue its basic mission and dischag it ot'.er respor.sibilities generally consist; of:

--Itan da rds.

NRC continually modifies its body of regulations and I Indards II it learns more about nuclear power and other nuclear l

ic-i vi ti es.

New knowledge comes from (1) design, construction, Ird operati.g experiences; (2) l_icensing and inspection activities; 2' NRC.=__,: others' research; and (4) the informed public.

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Nuclear powerplants and other major nuclear facilities must be designed to (1) prevent accid ents,(2) prevent or minimize damage from accidents which might o (3) prevent or minimize public health and safety cons ccur, and equences in cxase of accidents resulting in significant plant damage

--Licensino.

Nuclear powerplants may be built and operated only after lengthy construction and operating license proceeding consisting of NRC safety and environmental reviews, public and final decisions made by appeal bdySds or the NRC Com 1RC also lic' nses the possession and use of nuclear mat e

erials.

--ins oect i or and enforcement.NRC inspects the construction and operaticr. Of nuclear po'werplants and the use of nuclear materials an a routine basis and in response to incidents and allegations Inforce a :

sanctions NRC can use include letters notifying licens-Fs of v3 ations, civil penalties, and orders to suspend, modify r revoks icenses or stop unsafe practices.

Crtical NRC regulation is the opportunity for public parti i In all prpcsec c pation.

licensing and enforcement actions there is the o 2.nd for aclear :::.werplant construction permit

1. r pubi: hsar'-g-applications, the requirement--

In developing " standards, NRC also provides oppo

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generally publishes proposed policy s tatemer: fc r ; -

-ic comment before adopting them In developing a new or re vised rg;lati_-:1., NRC provides at least one and often more than one c mortunh for r_--lic comment.

Furthermore, anyone can petition NRC to deve a 7ew or Tris a:

sgulation.

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The Energy Rec ganization Act of 197' (42 U.S.C. SE25) assigned I;RC responsibility for confirning the safety of regulated nuclear technciogies by establishin9, thrcugh research, the validity of the safety principles that support the technologies.

In 1978 the Congress expanded ?iRC's.re-search resp:nsibility to include research in advancec concepts, systems, and processes hith the potential for improving nuclear safety.

The Corgress ir. tended that fiRC have an independent capability to develop and anal; re technical information, but not to ovn research facil-ities.

!!RC was :: use the facilities and expertise available from DOE, other Federf ags ies, and private contractors to carry out its analytical and experirI1t2' s search activities.

TiRC's research activities are manz;ed by ne :

1. ' :e of fiuclear Regulatory Research.

Its budget has grco frcr JE - ion in fiscal year 1976 to about 5185 million in fis:al year '93':

Both 52) E.r : :iRC's Office of Inspector end Auditor have periodically rep:-ted :n ee2..

-Erses in fiRC's management-of research projects, particularly in its rala: cc.s.-": and use oY DOE laborator cs.

Based on these reports and our rs:rt 3.- :-it work, we believe NRC has not established sufficient c.:.n-ols :/r *

- nuclear research r.ctivities tc insure that

--resis c r. jects done at DOE laboratories are conducted in the 1

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• cive and efficient manner, and 1

--rssercir :-- ojects are tracked from inception through completion and j

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CHAPTER 3

!i LACK GF EFFECTIVE C0i'.MISSIO:;-LEVEL LEADERSHIP HAS IMPAIRED UUCLEAR REGULATION The complacency, indecision and slow pace of progress in improving nuclear regulation discussed in the previous chapier is in large part due to the lack of leadership on the part of NRC's Commissioners.

To Some extent MRC's leadership problem may be a price that must be paid for the benefits of commission rather than single executive management.

Several important b5nefits ofgommissionIr: aro'that

--each decision reflects the combined judgment of each member,

--group decisionmaking provides a barrier to arbitrary and capricious

action,

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--decisiens are based on different points of view,

--each me-ber must convince the others of his point of view and understar.. the views of his colleagues.

These advan ages must be balanced against the many problems which critics of the cc. mission form suggest are pervasive among independent regulatory co=issions, including

--a failu-e to plan and develop longrange goals and objectives.

--a seemi.g reluctance to fermulate coherent regulatory policies as guides

adjudicstions and ru'.emakings,

--a negie-of program review and evaluation of regulatory effective-ness ar.c ".mpact, and

--a tend e.T.-_. toward procrastination and delay.

While the :::mmission form may make effective and efficient management mere difficult --.an. in single executive aper.:ies, the :PC Cccissioner's lack of leader -.? has exacerbated these problems.

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First and for':most, the Co=issioners have not provided clear and ticely direction for the NRC staff, the nuclear ir.d.::.ry, and the public by estab-lishing reasurable NRC ' side goals, objectives, and systems for recsuring performance.

As a result, the only real raeasurements NRC has of its regulatory performance are either in terms of schedules--its ability to meet self-itposed targets for completing regulatory actions--or in terms of the frequency or infrequency of accidents or events, the most obvious of which occured at Three Mile Island.

Second, the Com.$issioners have not controlled policymaking within

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While bere are exceptions, the Commissioners generally do not de-NRC.

cide when ne.- p:licies are needed, which new policy requirements should receive priority attention, or now p6Ticies should be written.

Instead, the Commissicrers have. generally left these matters to the discretion of the NRC staf" a,d eserved for themselves the prerogative of final approval.

The NRC staf", cn _he other hand, has been engaged in the day-to-day busi-ness of nuclecr re_:uletion, and has not had the time or ability to step back and objective ~y assess policy needs.

The result has been poor policymaking performance.

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has been slow to recognize where new policies were needed and slow to ceeveicp policies when there needs were recognized.

Finally, tne ;omissioners have not clearly defined their own role in nuclear reguiz-P.cn, and the proper relationships among the Comissioners, the Executive 5 ector for Operations, and the major NRC staff offices.

This has seric sly detracted from regulatory efficiency and effectiveness.

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I THE CC7J'!SS10"ERS HAVE tic DEVELOPED MEASURABLE GOALS, OBJECilVES, A*;D EVALUATICri SYSTEF.S Early in our review, we sought to identify and match t;RC's goals and objectives against claimed accomplishments.

While such a comparison vould have provided a starting point for measuring fiRC's performance--its own view of its successes an'd disappointments--fiRC had poorly definea goals and, for that reason,.no clear measure of its own success.

Various of--

ficials referred us to one or more of three principal documents for statements of f4RC goals and objectives.

These are a five-year plan and a management-by-objective document, both begun in 1977, and liRC's annual reports.

The five-year plan lists regulatory program otGectives and the accomplishments NRC must make to achieve those objectives; the management-II by-objective document identifies rr itRC-wide objectives of particular interest to f(RC's Co:r.1.issioners; and the Energy Reorganization Act recuires f4RC to include a clear statement of short-range and long-range goals, priorities and plans in its annual reports.

Collectively, however, these three sources have only limited value as statements, of fiRC goals and

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objectives.

Specifically,

--Goals and objectives are so broadly stated that it would be difficult or impossibl'e to measure performance.

For example, in the five-year plan the first objective of NRC's nuclear power-plant licensing activities is to continue issuing licenses after comprehensive reviews of safety, environmental, and antitrust matters ar.d public hearings to assure that oowerolants will cuerate without i

endangering public health and safety.

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Insrecticr Cf fice To Evaivate NRC Ferforrance n<<<

The Co=issionerfs have not fully used 1-Office cf Inspector and Auditor--an indepencent office within tiRC withcut vested prcgram interests--

to evaluate NRC's performa.ce.

In its initial audit program this Office planned to perform a full management overview of f;RC's principal functiors by about October 1977.

In January 1979 the Office director estimated that the plan had slipped 3 years because of unanticipated investigations and because it had been given the responsibility to surface and address staff f

di s ser. ting views.

The Office of. Inspector and Auditor has completed studies of I;RC's reactor standardization program, export licensinc procedures, and materials licensing, but has had to discontinue one nuclear pc.:erplant inspection re. iew, suspend a research review, and defer any work on nuclear waste

.1.agemen t.

These are all important elements of iRC's overall nuclear

-e ula tion program.

Increased staffing, fundinC, and use of its Office of Inspector Auditor could not only provide the Ccmmissioners with objective [

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12:raisals of NRC staff performance, it could also enhance acceptance of

.Enges by the NRC staff and provide solutions to problems not seen by

• T.-'s program offices because it is in a position to more objectively 22.s ess issues.

~ ~E CC%ilSSIONERS HAVE M0T T 9To.0LLEO POLICY MAYUn i

Policy making may be the most important part of NRC's system for E

7:ulating commercial nculear activities.

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Because t;RC regulates

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Despite the importance of policy making to nuclear regulation, the Commissioners have generally left to the fiRC staff decisions on when new policies are needed, which new policy requirements should receive priority attention, and how policies should be written.

The Com.issioners estab-lished a Commission-level Office of Policy Evaluation to advise them on proposed policies, and have generally reserved to themselves only the prerogative of fi al policy approval.

h'e found widespread agreement within and outsids ilRC--including several present fiRQ Commissioners--that Commissioners need to take a more active policymaking role, but we found

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few efforts to do so.

On the other hand, while the NRC staff has'both the..respons ibilit; and technical proficiency to identify and develop t!RC policies, it has. ot had the objective perspective necessary for effec-l

/ive policy aking-the staff has been engaged in the day-to-day business of nuclear mgulation.

As a result _he overall performance by NRC in the important area of policy makf r.;.as

,een poor.

Specifically,

--NRC :,as been slow to recognize policy ne'eds.

Therefore, issues which i

shou ~.d.". ave been addressed once in an NRC policy have been addressed over ard cwer in individual. licensing proceedings, and hearing and a ppe.E boa.-d '. decisions frequently have had the practical effect of sett' ; tiF.C policy.

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--tikt nas _a en far too long to dr.ve' c; r_;uht:.ry policies bc:aust of tir.ie consuming coordination ;:rocedures, tne lack of sufficient l

Commissioners direction to the staff, and conversely, ::RC str.ff dis-agreements with the Commissioners on proposed policies.

All of this nas impaired regulatory effectiveness by forcing the t!RC staff, licensing and appeal boards, t.he regulated industry; and the public to raise, address, and resolve issues in a piecemeal fashion in individual licensing proceedings.

NRC has beer. slow to recoonize colicy needs The t;RC ttaff offices with day-to-day responsibility for regulating commercial nuclear activities have often not been able to perceive either the need fc-NRC policies or the substance of policies desired by the Cortais si:ns rs.

The Commissioners have provided the NRC staff with very little guidar.cs er direction on issues which should be resolved by policy making.

As discisss: below, the NRC staff usually has not had any Comissionh-guidar.:s c proposed policies until the polic[have been drafted and submit:s: :: the Comissioners for review.

f As a -esult of the above, licensing and appeal boards have often

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found ',ict'e in the way of NRC policies to guide them in deciding issues raised i.

' dividual licensing cases.

In the absense of specific NRC policiEF-

,ey have in effect made NRC policy in their decisions on these issues.

example, a major nuclear powerplant regulatory ' concern in recent _.=I I has been NRC's failure to r'esolve, on a generic basis, several z

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s i' il issues co=on to many or all povierplants.

The Commissioners have not establi: P any policy on how the NRC staff should recognize and address these issues in each nuclear powerplant licensing case.

In the absence of an NRC policy, an appeal board directed, in the context of the board's decision on one licensing case, the NRC staff to explicitly document in its safety report what the NRC staff is doing in the subject licensing case, and all future licensing cases, to address each unresolved generic safety issue.

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We found many similar examples of appeal boards' and licensing board decisions setting out guidance--in effect NRC policy--to the NRC staff for f

addressing is' sues in future licensing cases.

It is no wonder that' hearing and appeal boards find they must provide guidance to the NRC staff in the absence Of.'iRC policy.

Following the appeal board decision in the abov' example, the principal NRC staff officer sought Commissioners ciarification i

and guicance on how to proceed.

The Chairman, however, told this official j to talk to reople and make his own decision; and the appeal board would let hic 4.:s if he decided correctly the next time the staff presented these iss ss in a licensing case.

Fcl': ".ng are two additional examples demonstrating that NRC's tardiness in recep-it'ng and acting on policy needs results in inefficient case-by-case consider::f on of issues in licensing proceedings.

'. vember 1975 a citizen grcup petitioned MRC to correct the

's.r".ronmental cost" NRC had a~ssigned in a regulation to radioactive

. r emmissions from uranium mill tailings piles.

The NRC staff

-c a;- sted that the assigned value was inaccurate, but did not correct

-- s egulation because it considered the discrepency to be in signifi-

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,od c the regulation.

The same citizen group had also raised this issue n a nuclear powerplant licensing prcceeding.

In this case the

!!RC Commission in April 1978, agreed to review the appeal board decision.

When the ftRC Commissioners finally appreciated the importance of the discrepancy they ordered the tiRC staff to correct it.

Futhermore, the Commissicners ordered hearing boards on 17 other licensing cases to reconsider this issue using the correctedreggiation.

--During hearings on nuclear powerplant licensing applications issues

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arise which have general applicability to classes of powerplants.

NRC staff studies issued in June 1977 and in June 1978 both concluded that NRC could improve regulatory efficiency by resol"ing these types of issues by policy making rather than on a case-by-case basis.

In January 1979 the NRC staff identified 10 candidate issues, but NRC has not yet developed day-to-day procedures to identify future candidate issues for resolution by policy making.

One suggested possibility would be to have the chairman of NRC's licensing board panel routinely submit to the Conmissioners a list of new issues surfacing in public hearings which could be more efficiently resolved by Con =issioners' policy making.

NRC Has Taken Too Lono To Develoo Procoseo Policies On many occasions in previous reports, we have found that NRC has taken a long time--sometimes over 5 years--to develop and implement new policies.

This appears to be due to two rea:ons.

First, it often takes a long time to' coordinate a proposed policy among the various NRC l

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D... u. i; staff offices and the NRC Comissioners.

Lcac liRC staff offices--usually but not always the Office of Standards Deveicpnent--must obtain the cen-currences of various URC staff offices, including the staff's legal office.

Frequently two or more of these effices disagree on the need for policies, the basic regulatory approa,ches taken in draft policy statements, and/or specific language in draft policy statements.

Resolving these disagree-ments, or at least narrowing them to agreeable extent, often takes a long time.

In this regard, the Executive Director for Operations told us that the NRC staff does not want to submit proposed policies to the Commissioners until. the staff believes it has come up Cith the best possible effort.

Once the NRC staff has completed the often lengthy process of coordinating proposed policies at the staff level, it may still take an I

additional long period of time to obtain Commissioners approval because:

--meetings between Commissioners and the NRC staff to discuss proposed policies tend to be more like sterile staff presentations or hostile encounters than useful exchanges of ideas in pursuit of common objectives;

--Commissioners are usually not familiar with the basic objectives of the NRC staff's proposed policies so they often return policies with requests that the staff address specific questions and/or consider alternative policy approaches; and

--Commissior.ers have different individual regulatory priorities and work schedules which add to the time reauired to obtain Commissioner's coments or concurrences.

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e The seconc major reason NRC has taken toc ler.g to develop colicies I

is the lack of firm Commission # direction on he. policies should be developed.

Rather than the -Conmissioners taking the lead and giving the staff early directions on what it wants to see in a policy, the general practice is that the staff presents policies to the Commissioners after the staff has decided on its own what the policies should be.

Because the Cc=1issioners do not have early input, they often have problems with the staff proposed policy which require, the staff to go through the time consuming process of drafting a new concensus position.

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to revising their positions to accept Comissiorf desire modification's to proposed policies.

Such resistence results in unnecessary rounds of time-consuming redrafting.

The following examples demonstrate how the time-consuming process of coordinating Orc:: sed policies among the various !!RC staff offices and the five Commissioners, the absence of firm Commissioners' direction,and; con-versely, NRC staf disagreements with Comissioners, all lengthen the time NRC has taken to develop policies.

--0ver a 4. ear period the NRC staff presented the Commissioners with a series :" interim papers on a proposed new policy on reducing occt::ati

--l radiation exposures.

'..' hen the MRC staff presented the fina'. aaper for Comissioners approval, the Comissioners sent it back fr-the NRC staff to reconsider an i'ssue the Comissioners lo had rat se:

4 years earlier-how the policy could be made inspectable and enf:msable.

The basic approach the NRC staff had been using disa_:res: 4:ith t. hat tne Co:=issicner nac v. anted en t.o occasicas 4 year sc=_ rt.

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--Siuce 1972 AEC and no.v liRC nave been developing e prc;csed policy en requiring redical licensees to report.indministrations 1/ to fiRC so it could determine the causes and assess v;hether licensees took adequate corrective actions.

Two reasons for this lengthy period, particularly over the last few years, have been major disagreements among three fiRC staff offices and between Co:missioners and the tiRC staff.

--In June 1975, the Commissioners directed the fiRC staff to develop information necessary to revise fiRC's nuclear powerplant siting regula, tion, and to prepare a proposed new siting regulation.

The many siting issues surfacing in hearings had raised questions about the adequacy of the existing regulation.

Three years later, in August 1978, after the fiRC staff had sub.t.itted and the 'Ccamissioners hac rejected several versions of a proposed new siting regulation, the Commission *' set up a special task force to try again.

The task force anticipates presenting final recommendations for a revised siting policy about May 1980--5 years after the project began.

The Commissione*s-Chairman told us that the major reason for the length of this policymaking proceeding has been a basic disagreement between the Corimissioners and the fiRC staff on the technical approach to the new regulation.

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--ft:0, and AEC before it, hed' been considering a proposed policy recairing licensees to establish qualit; assurance programs for fat,ricating radioactive material transportation containers for almost 7 years before llRC finally adopted a policy in August 1977.

The policy llRC finally adopted was essentially the same as AEC had published in draft for public comment 4 years earlier.

The principal reason why fiRC took from January 1975 to August 1977--

over 21/2 years--to finalize the subject policy was disagreement among the f1RC staff over the value of the proposed policy compared to the'NRC r,esources that might be required to enforce it.

THE COSNISSIONERS HAVE NOT DEFINED THEIR ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH STAFF OFFICES There is much disagreement within and outside NRC about the Commis-sioners' basic role and the relationship among the Ccamissioners, the Executive Director for Operations, and major staff offices.

Clearly, nuclear regulation would benefit from a clear definition of what the Chairman's and other Comissioners' roles should be, and by extension the roles of other NRC components'.

By doing this the Commissioners would be in a better position to lay out what areas the snairman and other Commis-sioners will deal with and what will be left to the Executive Director for 0;,erations and major office directors.

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 provided the Commissioners little guidance on what their roles should be.

The act specified that the five Commissioners would have equal authority and responsibility in all decisions and actions.

The only specific guidance the act provided directed *.hc Cnair.an to 48 h

--preside at meetings of the.Cer.missioners,

--be the official Ccmmission spokesman in relaticns with the Ccngrass, Gcvernment a;encies, persons, or the public; and

--see to the faithful execution of the Commissioners' policies and decisions, and report thereon from time to time to the other Commissioners.

A 1975 amendment to the act made the Commission Chairman the princi-pal executive officer of NRC.

The amendment states that the Chairman "shall exercise all of the executive and administrative functions of the Ccmmission including functions of the Commission with respect to (a) the appointment and supervision of personnel em-i ployed regularly and full time except in the immediate offices of Commissioners other than the Chairman, and except as other-wise pro.ided in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974v (b) the P

distribution of business among such personnel and cmong admin-istrative units of the Comnission, and (c) the use and expendi-ture of #unds."

This ame-dment was enacted as a part of the NRC fiscal year 1976 budget author # zation.

Its purpose, according to its sponsor, was to strengthen a -tatutorily weak NRC Chairman so he could manage and lead NRC.

The expansion of the NRC Chairman's authority and responsibility placed that o#fice approximately on par with the Chairmen of the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Co= 'ssion.

The first NRC chairman, however, had recuested the anendment ov-- the strong objections of the other NRC Commissioners; and since then t EE l'RC Commissioners have so opposed any change in the relative authority bervleen the chairman and other Commissioners that no NRC chairman v/'

has attempte-to define and use this new authority, b'hile t. EE act left to the Commissioners the task of establishing their c'..n rc':ss, t'.e Cormissior.ers do not seer. to have : lear.? v done so.

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i As discussed earlier, the Comissioners have not set measurable f:RC goals and objectives or controlled policymaking.

Also, the Co=nissioners have not agreed on how directly they should supervise the I;RC staff, and how actively the Commissioners should be invoived in deciding cases in public i

hearings.

One Commissioner told us that because his role was not sharply

[ defined, he decided to spend much of his time traveling and speaking on nuclear regulation to various industry, public and governmental meetings.

In ont very important instance the f!RC Commissioners carried over'a role the AEC Commissioners played in a very different environment.

Although the AEC Connis'sioners had the right to act as the final decision authority for matters in adjudication, they relied almost entirely on appeal boards to perfom this function, the AEC Cemissieners :cr.~.:: */ : :i ci :'. r' r, N-search and develop-ent and military weapons programs, fiRC'sCommissioner[

however, devote all of their time to regulating comercial nuclear acti-vities.

Therefore, the first flRC Commissioners could have reasserted their responsibility for making final decisions on licensing cases.

The O rst i

i HRC Connissioners, however, retained the appeal borad to make final decisions and also retained the preroga.tive of ordering hearing and appeal boards to elevate cases to the Commissioners for final decision.

InJune197f, the Commissioners for the first time began permitting parties to appeal mA.

licensing de.:isier.s to the Comnissioners, but to date the Cocnissioners has-chosen to review few appeals.

The Commissi:ners' continued reliance on appeal boards as the final agency decision makers in adjudication--with a seldom exercised option for the Comissic.ers to make final dedisions--has extracted a heavy price 4<:e in efficiency anc. effectiveness.

In order to prote:t i+s option to mahe' 50

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wir u i;nal de:itions the Co=issioners must abide oy M rule strictly limiting interaction with the tiRC staff, license applicants, or other parties on any substantive issues in active public hearinps.

This makes it difficult for the Commissioners to talk with the !!RC staff about new regulatory issues and for the ?!RC staff to seek Co=issioners' guidance on these issues.

With the Commissioners staying out of issues to protect their right to review appeal board decisions, and then rarely using that right, they have eff,ectively taken themselves out of the cases.

As a re-m /

sult (1) appeal boar'ds sometimes set policies which the Commissioners 7!

should set, ('2) the 11RC staff receives needed Commissioners' guidance lite, (3) the Commissioners have a more difficult time monitoring staff

trfor. ance cn a wide range of issues, and (4) the Commissioners effec-tevely

lese their collective eyes and cars to substantive issues in

ses sedi -

their attention.

'e RC's C' -':e Executive Director For

.:e ra : : r.5 5 oulo Be Clarified And

'i renc: a e -

Se::i:.- 209- "Other Offices"--of the Energy Reorganization Act

1. 1971 (1_ '.'.S.C. 5049) established the positior of an Executive

- ect:- f:- Operations and authorized the director to perform "s.uch fmetir?.s -s the Cor:nission may direct."

It also prohibited the Executive

s::r

1. :- pre / anting the directors of the Offices of t!uclear Reactor

s;ula:":, :egulatory Research, and'iluclear Materials Safety and Safe-

. 2 rd s = :-- communicating directly to the Commissior.trs.

The Act nade the E mti '=E N +ctor for Operations eoual in rank to these Offices ' directors.

. 2 ' - '. I 2 ucture the three Office directors mentioned above did not even u e ::

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the Executive Direc:or advised of their con acts with the- -

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'cr.mi:.:.iur.':r:--this cespite the Ex?cutive Director's assigned responsibiliQ for ccordir.ating the offices' activities.

'le found substantial differences of coinion among Cc nissioners, the Executive Director and Deputy E>.ecutive Director for Operations, senior NRC staff, and others on the Director.'s role in nuclear regulation.

In

'4ay,1977, the Comissiorfrjdefined the Executives Director's role in part as follows:

"The Executive Director for Operations is responsible for supervision an'd coordination of policy development and operaticnal activities of the following officers....."

lhile on paper the' Director's operational authority over URC staff offices is clear, so: e of the major office directors and Commissicners are not clear that the E.xecutive Director is a superior authority in the chain of co rz-d over -he five major staff offices.

One Commissioner, for exampie, descr' bed.the Executive Director as a senior staff--rather than l

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l ine--cf#i cer.

A.n office director and an industry representative de-l scribst :he Exe: tive Director as an executive director for administration rathe- : an cc-Era tions.

These conflicting views suggest that the posi-tion's c ties., au-thorities and responsibilities are ambiguous, and, as a

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.m.iss":mer suggest6d, should be crystallized.

Mi :urre.: ambiguous authority has contributed to past prnb'cas.

For e:1=Ie, 2.7s former Deputy Executive Director told us,it had been

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diffi-f: to gs-the staff offices to work together harmoniously to resol e re iss:. sis which the March 1975 Brown's Ferry nuclear powerplant fire -I' sad arr.: <. hich required multi-office involvement.

Other NRC staff told n :' si:- ~ rr difficulties getting the various cffices to centur in ur.a: s t:a"" positions.

They also pc.inted out that the concurrence

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process often takes a long time.

A stronger role for tne Executive Director for Operations would better insure that the various offices both cooperate in these and other important areas and devote sufficient resources to MRC-wide goals.

The Executive Director has the main responsibility, although apparently not the authority, for coordinating NRC's budget.

As discussed on page 3B various major staff office budget priorities are sometimes

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inconsistent with agency wide goals and objectives.

Again, because the Executive Director's authority and responsibility is not clearly defined the Director'seems to be in a weak position to insure a unified agency approach to nuclear regulation.

The Commissioners are amending the ijRC organization manual to make clearer that the Executive Director for Operations is in charge of the staff offices.

A February 1,1979, draft would change the chapters dici-i h[ with organization and function of the Offices of nuclear Reactor

.egulation Research, and Materials Safety and Safeguards to make the Exe:utive Director's authority over these offices more nearly eoual to his responsibility for their. actions.

The draft states that these office directors report to the Executive Director for Operations.

Y; 'USIONS The complacency, indecision, and slew pace of progress in improving n.u:7.sar regulation discussed in the previous chapter is in large part c.us to the lack of leadership by the Commissioners.

The Commissioners Puavs r.st 1

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