ML19322C241
| ML19322C241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1979 |
| From: | Lamison K PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001160673 | |
| Download: ML19322C241 (45) | |
Text
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N U CLE A R R E G U L ATO R'I C O MMISSIO N f
i a
IN THE M ATTL.< C F:
i THREE MILE ISLAND I
SPECIAL INQUIRY INTERVIEWS l
i l
INTERVIEW OF KENNETH RICHARD LAMISON I
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l l
Place.Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Date - Thursday, 20 September 1979 Pages 1-45 r pS~d p' rP,il@((f, c >a u ;
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of, 10j y e;' 4. '
6 Qd.
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(:c:: M.37:o ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OffiaalReponors 444 Nonh Capisof Street i
l Washington, D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY i
Boo 11(tp 67Q
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1 1
CR 7188 UNITED STATES OF N1 ERICA
)
ISO t
9/20/79 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
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- - - - - - - - - - - - -X 3
l l
l In the Matter of:
4 THREE MILE ISLAND 5
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS 6
I
- - - - - - - - - - - - -x 7
DEPOSITION OF KENNETH RICHARD LAMISON 8
Holiday Inn Town i
9 2nd and Chestnut Streets I
10 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 11 Thursday, 20 September 1979 1:25 p.m.
12 13 APPEARANCES:
14 KGBERT CHIN, ESQ.
MALCOLM L.
ERNST 15 FREDERICK HERR 16 ROBERT SCHAMBERGER NRC Special Inquiry Group on TMI 37 6935 Arlington Road Bethesda, Maryland 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Ace-Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 4
CR 7188 2
rca 9/20/79 i
e CONTENTS 2
17ITNESS EXAMINATION I
i~
Kenneth Richard Lamison 4
4 5
6 7
8 EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED i
9 1
3 1
10 1 11 12
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16 17 l
18 19 i
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Ace-Federal Recorten, Inc.
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s
3
_P _R _O 'C_ _E _E D _I " _G _S 1
CR 7188 Whereupon, rco 2
9/20/M KENNETH RICHARD LAMISON 3
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, A
was examined and testified as follows:
5 MR. ERNST:
Please be seated.
State your full 6
i l
name and position for the record.
7 THE WITNESS:
Kenneth Richard Lamison.
I'm 8
the Operations Officer for the Pennsylvania Emergency 9
Management Agency.
10 MR. CHIN:
Mr. Lamison, I show you what has been 11 marked for identification as Exhibit 1.
Is this a ;opy 12 of the letter that the NRC Special Inquiry Group sent to 13 i
you regarding your deposition today under oath?
i 14 j
THE WITNESS:
It i3.
15 (Lamison Exhibit No.1 identified.)
16 MR. CHIN:
Have you read this document in full?
l 17 THE WITNESS:
I have.
18 l
MR. CHIN:
Do you understand the information 19 j
in the letter, including the general nature of our inquiry?
l 20 THE WITNESS:
I do.
21 MR. CHIN:
Your right to have counsel if you 22 i
i choose?
l 23 l
THE WITNESS:
I do.
l 24 i
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
MR. CHIN:
And the fact that the information that i
i 25 i
l I
t I
i 1
i you give here today may eventually become public?
2 THE WITNESS:
Yes.
I understand it.
3 8
MR. CHIN:
Mr. Lamison, are you represented by j
i A
ccitnsel today?
5 THE WITNESS:
I am not.
6 MR. CEIN:
I would like to note for the record 7
the witness is not represented by counsel today.
8 Mr. Lamison, do you understand that at any time 9
during this inquiry, this interview, you should feel a need 10 for counsel or would like to have counsel present, please 11 advise and we will adjourn this interview to allow you to 12 make arrangements.
Is this procedure all right with you?
13 THE WITNESS:
It is.
14 Mr. Lamison, did you bring a resume MR. CHIN:
15 with you today?
16
- T.
THE WITNESS:
I did not.
17 MR. CHIN:
Will you send us one?
18 THE WITNESS:
I will forward one to you next 19 week when our other witness is before you.
20 MR. CHIN:
I would like to note for the record 21 that Mr. Lamison will send us a resume.
Thank you.
22 Mr. Ernst?
23 E M INATION 24 l
BY MR. ERNST m n
,g 25 Q
The first question, Mr. Lamison, is a rather general I
I
)
I i
i
5 l
1 one.
I wonder if you would describe your assigned duties i
2 at PEMA; first, the routine duties and typical day-to-day 3
activities, and secondly, however those duties might have i
been altered by the Three Mile occurrence?
~
A On a day-to-day basis, I am routinely responsible 6
for the provision of assistance, staff visits, the approving 7
of plans, SOPS, and attendant Annex Es to all county 8
operations.
This extends, in some cases, down to local 9
levels, primarily as it concerns the guidance and'the i
10 direction of planning activities.
11 I am also responsible for the provision of guidance 12 and assistance in the form of training exercises and tests 13 that are conducted at the county and local level.
I am also responsible for training exercises and tests conducted 14 15 at the state level.
16 supervise the person involved with and assign the 17 responsibility for the provision of assistance and guidance, 18 policy and programming, human needs aspects, communications.
I am also responsible for radiological defense activities.
20 Those are, in general terms -- they have very broad 21 connotations as to many of these activities.
22 During emergency operations, as the operations officer, 23 I am responsible for the conduct of the emergency operations 24 center to include the supervison over state agencies in the
,,, g 25 provision of their response mechanisms furnished to us in I
6 1
meeting recuirements snich stem from other levels of 2
government that may be participating is whatever the 3
emergency may be.
4
\\
O With regard to guidance to counties, does 5
that include the preparation or review or whatever of the 6
county emergency plans' 7
A That is correct.
I have an individual responsible for that activity under my guidance and supervision, and 9
we receive and review plans that are prepared at the county level to include their SOPS and Annex Es.
Under 11 l
special occasions, we could do this same, or perform this 12 l
same activity at the local level.
It would be sort of a t
13 l
special occasion.
14 I
You know, the philosophy of our activities stems from i
i 15 1
the lowest level with the capability to conduct a response, 16 i
and it escalates to the higher echelons in government l
f 17 based upon need to supplement and resources for supervisory l
18 activities.
Of course, the emergency dictates then at what j
19 level it's conducted.
20 We follow this same concept in our administrative 21 activities or day-to-day operations likewise, so that you 22 might say there's a chain of command or activities from the top to the bottom.
Now, this is predicated upon who 24
. re..r.o.co n.coci.rs, ine, possesses the resources and authority.
This then dictates 25 the system which we have employed.
7 1
O So your work with the other state agencies in an 2
emergency situation is resource-dictated, which the resource 3
needs come from the local county into yourself?
4 A
That is correct, yes.
To be specific in this 5'
l area, each agency, state agency has two mechanisms to deal 6
on a day-to-day and during-an-emergency basis.
- Iumber one, 7
we have an emergency point of contact in every state 8
agency, and he is the person that, on a day-to-day basis,
~
9 we call to gain an insight to resources or provision to 10 us, information or data that we need to conduct those 11 I
day-to-day activities.
l t
12 i
We also have, in each state agency, a response team and 13 it's comprised of an individual or individuals based upon the 14 I
l size of the agency who, when we mobilize our ECC, report I
15 to us to perform the responsibilities assigned to that agency.l 16 j
Along with this team is carried che authority to act for 17 l
the secretary of that particular department.
It is this l
18 i
mechanism that I control or exercise supervision over during j
19 i
emergencies, when we have our Eoc activated.
l 20 Now, the magnitude and the type of the emergency will 21 dictate the number of agencies, by title or type, who are present in our EOC.
There are usually some common 23 i
agencies that appear who have a responsibility to be fulfilled:
l 24 wm n, %
in almost all types of emergencies, such as the Pennsylvania l
25 Department of Transportation, Department of Environmental l
1 1
I i
8
3 1
Resources, Department of 2111itary Affairs, and certainly, 2
the state police.
We usually start with those agencies 3l and then we expand as the need dictates, as you gain better 4
information as to what are the requirements and just what is the nature of the emergency, and then you expand accordingly.
6 If it's determined through our analyses at the very I
7 outset to be extremely important, if it has a very profound i
8 impact upon the community, we may start with a full-scale i
9 mobilization which is what we did on the 30th of i
10 i
March when we fully mobilized our emergency operations.
11 We didn't retain all agencies on a continuing basis, 12 but as they were needed, we had, throughout, contacts with i
13 them.
Either the call would come in individually or l
14 collectively or whatever the requirement may have dictated.
l 15 I
For example, the energy council was there on a i
16 continuing basis.
The insurance people weren't there at i
l 17 the outset, though we had need to call them in.
Now, I l
18 I
have points of contact which we maintain through telephone l
19 i
all the time with these people, so it's not like we're 1
20 l
not in contact with them.
1 21 i
Q So these people are designated by their l
22 department heads or the secretary or whatever --
l 23 A
That's correct.
i 24 i
Q
-- in order to act for the agency?
- Am FWWW Roomn, lm:.
i 25 A
It is our philosophy if they do not possess those l
9 1
authorities to act for the agency, the secretary or the 2
head of the agency is to be present to do so, so that 3
we do have rapid response to meet those requirements that 4
are requested of us.
O And you are the de facto or formal chairman of j
6 this group?
7 A
Yes.
Of course, you must remember, I responc i
l' 8
and react to those directives and guidance that I get j
t f
9 from the director.
10 I
Q You mentioned a gentleman as being designated n
to review or whatever the ;*sunty plans.
Would tha' i
12 i
be Mr. Crowe?
i i
13 A
Mo.
The person responsible on a continuing
{
l 14 hasis is Mr. Blaisdell, who is a new employee with us.
15 l
MR. CHIN:
Will you spell that name, sir?
i i
16 THE WITNESS:
B-1-a-i-s-d-e-1-1.
I 17 Mr. Crowe, during the Three Mile Island incident, and likewise now, is conductins he initial review of all 19 planning activities to assure that the coordination that is essential is being provided to that activity and to those l
21 levels of government which are conducting the planning.
f' 22 The final approval of those plans will rest with me.
23 l
l Now, I say that in reacting to the directive from the 1
i 24 l
'l4.,
director and in his name.
l 25 l
1 1
9 8
10 i
t BY MR. EP24ST :
2 O
Organizationally, how are you and Mr. Crowe 3
related?
4 A
Well, we're co-equals from that standpoint.
5 Mr. Crowe is the director of our crisis relocation liCP 1
i 6
planning, and in the organizational structure, he is an 7
office manager the same as I am classified.
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In the order of succession, I am the third in order j
9 l
after the deputy.
i 1
10 O
Is there a difference in function between what j
1 11 Mr. Crowe is doing compared with Mr. Blaisdell?
)
l 12 A
We will review those plans from an administrative l
13 standpoint in relationship to fulfilling the responsibilities,i I
or tasks assigned by the disaster operations plan and 15 also Annex E, which is our deta_ led instrument, disseminating 16 the responsibilities.
And in that light, we will review, j
17 coupled with resource requirements, we will review from that 18 standpoint.
19 Mr. Crowe is more concerned, right now, with the l
l 20 i
coordination of activities to assure that there are no I
21 i
duplication of efforts and that there are no problem areas l
l 22 I
encountered in the planning effort, because we have several l
counties involved.
We have several counties vying for the 24 same resources so to speak, the use of road networks and l
b 25 I
this type of thing.
These would be issues that he's con.cernedj w r r--
w
11 1
with.
He is also concerned with providing assistance 2
where needed to get this particular aspect of planning 0
completed which is our first priority right now.
4 Q
You mentioned communications as one of your 5
responsibilities.
Does Mr. Kuehn then work with you?
6 A
Yes, he does, t
7 MR. CHIU:
Could you spell that, please?
THE WITNESS:
K-u-e-h-n, Mr. Kuehn.
He'll j
8l l
9 be here shortly.
l t
f 10 BY MR. ERNST:
11 Q
You mentioned some responsibility in the area l
1' 12 of human needs and radiological.
Would you explain that 13 a little bit?
i i
i 14 A
Well, human needs aspects are associated with j
l I
15 welfare problems, health problems, mass care activities.
16 This is our own internal link to all those state agencies 17 involved in these types of responsibilities to include 18 other organizations throughout the Commonwealth who l
19 have an interest or some association with the human needs
.l 20 aspect, such as aging, the blind, this type.
21 Q
Would you describe your specific duties during the i
22
-- well, say, the first seven days or so of the TMI l
23 accident -- with regard to the coordination of state j
24 agency response?
j
'aFwwwneomn.w.
l 25 A
Uell, as I indicated before that all the i
i i
li
12 1
requirements that stem from the echelons of government 2
come into me for fulfillment.
And we were prepared to 1
3 do this.
4 On the 20th, we prepared ourself based upon our under-standing of the problem, really, to conduct a limited 6
operation.
Right at the outset, we were led to believe 7
that it was strictly an on-site problem.
Tharefore, t
8 my most important task immediately was to notify all 9
persons with a responsibility or potential fulfillment of I
10 responsibilities under those conditions, be prepared in l
11
(
the event of ar3 escalation of whether the problem may lead 12 into something more serious.
Of course, it was i
13
. announced shortly after then t)at it had escalated, 14 and we immediately started to fulfill those announcement i
15 and alerting responsibilities as quickly as possible in l
16 the event that we had to conduct an operation, an evacuation.
i 17 At which' time, we would have called together our total l
l 18 response mechanism to fulfill that need.
)
19 l
We maintained this profile for a number of days on a i
20 prepared basis until the 30th when things became more 21 i
serious, when we activated our or mobilized -- I should say 1
22
-- our EOC in its entirety.
And again, we were prepared to l
conduct an operation.
However, that never materialized, 24 and we found ourself then going into a full-scale planning l
25 l
activity.
i l
1
13 I
i 1
This then put our response teams in a different configura-2 tion, so to speak, and they were fulfilling planning needs 3
and responsibilities.
In many cases, they were the catalyst 4
or the link between ourselves and their department to get the proper people to assist in planning or to maintain liaison 6
with the counties who are ?oing the detail planning.
7 And this is the posture we remained in for a number of 8
days till things looked like they were improving to where 9
we could sort of cut bact in some of our staff activity --
10 j
not in the planniny activity, because it v s being l
11 fulfilled then from the department locations rather than i
12 from our EOC.
I 13 O
You didn't have any function in the area of l
14 review or upgrading or whatever of the county plans during 15 that time period?
l 16 A
Well, I wouldn't say I had no responsibility.
17 Yes, this is something that I think we all get involved in 18 in varying degrees.
I was not directly responsible for the j
19 i
review, let me put it that way.
I was still maintaining l
20 an operational posture, but I was responding to the issuance 21 of guidance and things of this nature as a manager.
t 22 In that respect, I was involved, yes.
u 23 O
Intheeve'ntofadeclaredemergency,whichthiswas!
24 l
m-Federal Reporters, Inc.
not -- suppose TMI had been a declared emergency, which is essentially a multi-county emergency response, who would be i
^
14 1
in charge for the state, outside of the governor.
- Clearly, 2
the governor is responsible for everything.
3 A
You mean at our level of operation?
4 0
Who is the doer in charge?
5 i
A Well, the operational aspect of it would be 6
controlled and directed by our director, Colonel Henderson.
7 He is charged with that responsibility, fulfilling the 8
response for the council.
The council would charge him 9
with that responsibility.
l 10 I
Q It would be a designation at that time' 11 i
A Well, that is his assigned responsibility; and 12 during the time of an emergency, he automatically fulfills 13 that unless he's given guidance or direction to the contrary, 14 l
i which would be rather hard to conceive.
15 Specific guidance, specific direction would be provided 16 i
through him by the council, or the lieutenant governor 17 in that case who is the chairman of the council, which he is l
18 in constant contact with during periods of emergency.
19 Q
At that time, I guess as I understand i'. the 20 function of PEMA shifts from a coordinations rdla to more of a!
21 direction and coordination role; is that correct?
22 A
Yes, more a management rols.
We are in the 23 direction business, too, based upon the guidance and those 1'
24 w
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decisions made by the governor.
And in those cases, they l
25 i
begome directive in nature.
Sometimes they are advisory in j
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15 1
nature.
2 Our coordination is among state agencies and in conjunction with the counties.
We deal with the counties, basically, i
4 and not the subdivisions within the county.
That is just t
a little bit voluminous when you start talking about 2600.
6 Q
What problems were encountered, major problems, in the coordination of state agencies for the first few 8
cays?
9 A
Well, we had no problems with state agencies.
Our l
10 l
problem rested with the fact that we were unable to j
11 inform state agencies precisely what was going on, what l
l I
were the precise conditions.
We knew that thev were havine l
13 problems at the facility.
We knew that they were trying i
14 to resolve these problems and go back on line.
There 15 were indications that in a matter of hours, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, 16 that they would have their problems resolved and be back 17 on line.
18 This was dispelled rather rapidly and definitely, I guess, on Friday morning when things became more serious.
But i
20 this was the basic problem.
We had no problems communicating :
I with them, from that standpoint, or gaining whatever we need 1
22 from them.
The problem was to tell them precisely what l
i 23 we were about to do, it was to be prepared for the worst j
'24 l
possible condition.
It was under those conditions that we 25 fully mobilized our EOC on Friday morning, the 30th.
N 16 I
Q But you really had no problems with either physical 2
communications or communicating whatever you had to communicate 3
to people in an understandable way?
A I think we need to clarify a point.
We have 5
approximately 121 telephone lines coming into our EOC.
6 Some of those go through our switchboard, and 1 think our 7
switchboard has a drop of about eight lines.
Now, those 8
eight lines, it was practically impossible to communicate in or out on those eight drops, 8150, they were tied up f
9 10 all the time.
11 i
Our private telephone lines coming in there are not 12 announced at large, and for a considerable period of time l
13 until communications became saturated going into the other l
t i
14 agencies, we were able to communicate.
And during the l
15 initial moments of this incident, both on Wednesday, on j
16 l
Friday, we were not hampered.
But as time evolved and i
1 l
II went on, why, it became extremely complicated.
And I 1
would dare say there were probably times when all 121 l
18 t
i 19 I
lines were busy and all 121 telephones were going.
20 Now, the more people we have in our EOC, the more l
i 21 saturated the lines become, because we have in our booths, j
22 which house our response team, several telephones.
And j
23 I
they can receive a call off of our switchboard drops and 5
24 they likewise have private lines in them that they can use.
,,r 25 I
And they have a line from there back to their office which j
17 1
they can use.
So there are a lot of ways that we can 2
l communicate out to a period of time, and when we become 3
saturated, why, we're just out of communication.
And for 4
a period of time, we were experiencing that, both on Wednesday and on Friday.
And as time went by, why, it 6
clarified itself.
7 As more information became available, as more credible i.
8 information became available, which I say that word in 9
terms of what I surmise the public was considering as 10 i
credible information, the less calls we were receiving.
I i
11 i
And as the systems came into being, as an example, right l
12 i
at the outset, we were receiving calls from private and i
13 Public alike on all aspects of what was going on at l
14 Three Mile Island.
15 l
Well, we consider ourself not the technicians, and there-16 fore, we shouldn't be answering technical questions as to the l 17 facility itself.
We will answer the questions associated with our responsibilities which we are the professionals at.
19 Once the systems were estabilshed where the coint of l
l 20 contact essentially became the governor's office for technical l i
21 data, that's through his press secretary, and we were l
t 22 associated with our own responsibilities, it started to ease i
23 the problem.
And that was after the counties and the j
24 governor's press secretary set up the rumor control centers.
w.p.., con,,, w, i
?
25 i
And this started to ease our problem considerably.
O
+9
'h
10 1
And the first two days of this incident, we found 2
l ourself actually playing a big part in that role.
3' Q
Who is -- well, let's see, I guess as I understand 4
it, there is a desk or a booth or something for each 5
department?
6 A
Correct.
t 7
Q And with a line going back to their departments so they know exactly where they are supposed to go and 9
everything.
For example, who represented the Decartment 10 of Health in the EOC, do you recall?
i 11 l
A They had numerous representatives.
When we i
i 12 i
first called the Department of Health, Mr. Welsh l
I 13 accompanied his response team.
I'm trying to think of 14 the names of those people that were there.
15 l
Q It's not that important, j
A But they had, they came in initially with about 17 a team of three people which is rather a normal response j
mechanism.
And as time went by, they changed some of those 19 personnel.
But Mr. Welsh had, just prior to TMI, joined 20 the Department of Health.
He was previously with the 21 Department of Environmental Resources.
He was sort of l
22 their emergency point of contact at the department.
He I
was quite familiar with our activities, so he accompanied 24 his team, as he should, for his own edification.
Who were i
25 i
they?
What were they doing?
This type of thing.
10 1
Q Mas the national guard represented in the IOC?
2 A
That's correct.
3i O
Were they there?
4 A
Yes, they were there.
~
Q How about the Bureau of Radiation Protection I
or DER?
7 A
DER was present.
Their normal response teams l
8 were there.
l 9
i Q
Do you recall who that was?
Were they BRP 10 personnel?
l 11 A
No, they were not.
Radiological protection 12 personnel were not there.
i 13 O
What are the interests of DER, major interests 14 of DER, other than radiological protection, in an incident 15 like this?
16 A
Well, water control, hazardous material problems, j
l'7 air pollution, mine subsidences and this type of thing; I
all of which we are concerned with.
And based upon the i
19 type of activity, they may be playing a very lead role in 20 1
21 Q
I was thinking specifically of the TMI.
22 A
Okay.
TMI, actually under that circumstance, it was!
I Radiological Protection Bureau that was playing the key role. !'
23
\\
24 3
Q But they were not --
.pg g,,,
,m 25 A
They were not present in our EOC.
It was and is I
t i
20 1
in our plan that under those types of conditions, those 2
types of incidents, that they would be represented.
At 3
the outset, again, I think they probably felt like we did, 4
that the nature of the emergency was such, at least initially i
5 related. that it was probably at low density, tnet it would not 6
evolve into something as serious as it did.
7 And in short order, they, like we, became so involved I
8 that it was a little difficult to disengage from their 9
l environment to move them over to our EOC.
However, under 10 our current planning and directives, this situauion has 11 changed.
i 12 O
What types of problems get aired or dicussed in the :
I 13 i
EOC?
What comes to mind is, apparently, there was some i
14 controvarsy over the distribution and possible use of i
i 15 i
potassium iodide which clearly involved the Department of 16 Health.
There was some, I guess, taking cows off the l
17 pasture and things of that nature which involved other agencies.
Were some of these matters at least initially 19 discussed in the EOC, or were decisions made elsewhere?
20 I'm just curious about the function --
21 A
Well, a little bit of both, as is normal of l
22 staff activities.
We became involved at the outset because l
23 of the needed transportation upon arrival of the potassium, 24 i
As to hoW We Were going to get it -- it Came in by air from j
Am FWwW Rgom,s, W.
25 the International Airport '-- to wherever we were going to l
l e
(
21 I
dispose of it, whatever we were going to do with it.
2 So we became involved in that activity, although the 3i overall responsibility for the potassium iodine was with the Department of Health.
And we laid on the transportation
~
4 through general services.
We gave them transportation for 6'
us and coordinated it with the Department of Health so that 7
it would be picked up at the appropriate time and delivered f
8 to the facility where they wished to store it.
That was done.!
9 The next order of business which came up was its l
10 distribution.
Before that occurred, the Department of Health,!
11 after examining the product they had, wanted to assure that 12 there were instruction for its use and that it was a l
l 13 reliable type of protective agent.
Some of it came off the 14 l
shelf, as I understand it.
And I further understand that 15 sore of it was on an expedited basis, manufactured and 16 sent into us.
And they immediately went into considerations i
j,'
and the development of its distribution as to how it would l
be handled.
l 19 We were censulted on this matter.
I personally had j
20 discussed it with Mr. Welsh and I believe Dr. Washington i
i 21 I
was there.
We were doing this by telephone, and informing 22 them that this was not our responsibility, it was 23 l
1 primarily a medication so-to-speak and it was the responsibi-1 24 lity of the Department of Health.
And they should arrive 4..pe,, no..,,, w, 25 at the distribution plan, j
l
(
)
22 1
We would assist in any way that we could to help this, 2
and once they
.ad their plan, we would be very happy to 3
review the plan.in coordination with them.
And then we 4
would see that its distribution requirements were fulfilled.
i 5
And this was the part that we played in it and the part of the 6
Department of Health who, again, was coordinating with the 7
Bureau of Radiological Protection.
8 l
Q I take it you offered to do this.
Did they actually, 9
provide a plan for your review, or were you supposed to 10 particip&te if it had been distributed?
I 11 A
We would have participated if it would have j
12 l
been distributed.
Yes, sir.
I 13 l
0 In your view, what is the responsibility of PEMA j
l 14 with respect to the adequacy of county plans?
I 15 A
Well, we're talking about a changing environment 16 by virtue of legislation.
Previously, under our old 17 pamphlet law, we really had no assigned responsibility in 18 approving plans.
This has been changed by our recent law, 19 Act 323 of '79, which assigns us the responsibility to f'
I 20 review and cause changes to be sure that they are appropriate.!
21 So in that realm, we now have the responsibility f t'-
22 l
approving plans.
t i
23 j
It was sort of an assumed tertiary type thing, really, i
24 4.-Fe-w ram m n.ix.
previously.
It was more of an advisory and assurance l
25 I
factor frc a federal standpoint to permit other i
l l
1
+
23 things to be fulfilled, matching funds and things of this 2
nature, which established the requirement for counties to 3
have certain type of documentation.
And this was the role we were fulfilling previously.
4 5 ;l aI say, we've changed that role.
g 1
0 The current state plan, I understand there are j-lj
}
7:
some drafts of it now or updates, but the 1977 state plan is rather general.
When you get down to the county level --
8 and perhaps you might want to comment about the state 9
10 plan itself
-- what degree of detail do you think is l
l 11 appropriate for a county plan regarding who does what to 1
whom and when?
12 A
Well, I'm sort of a detail guy.
I'm a retired 13 ja army colonel, and I've spent a large portion of my career i
15 in the planning business.
Therefore, I like to see details 16 so that any person, uninitiated, if you wish, may pick up j
j7 that plan and be able to fulfill those tasks that are 18 outlined there without wasting an awful lot of time to 19 find out what are they talking about.
t I think you will find that our revised Annex E is more 20 I
detailed in the assignmet.t of responsibilities to not only 21 state agencies but to the counties involved, both what we 22 referred to as those counties in the risk area or risk 23 counties and those counties in support of those risk counties.!
24
- Am Federal Reconers, Inc.
25 So that there is very little question in their mind as to l
24 1
what we're expecting them to respond to and be capable of 2
I doing.
I 3'
Now, if you follow that philosophy, in order for them to 4
fulfill those tasks, their planning effort must outline 5
and cope with each and every task that is given to them.
6 Anything that is assumed by them or deduced from those tasks 7l that has to be fulfilled must be outlined by them.
This 8
is the type of detail that should be reflected there.
l f
9 l
And we're talking about the county level who, again, are 10 i
responsible for assisting in the development of plans by i
l 11 their political subdivisions who, again, are involved in the 12 fulfillment; which means, in turn, their portion of the I
13 planning must be somewhat detailed.
And the lower you go, i
14 l
the more detailed it must become.
Because, eventually, i
15 somebody has to talk about an individual etanding on a 16 given street corner which has to be designated to do some-i i
17 l
thing.
And you have to tell them what to do.
j
~
18 So at that level, which is at the local level, they have l
19 1
to be rather precise in what they do.
I 20 Q
I understand there are no local plans per se, t
l 21 written local plans, j
22 A
Well, I can't answer that question.
I can state 23 that I have not seen a plan designed by a local level in 24 i
4..p.e.r.i n
,,,,,,inc, support of Annex E or a county plan.
But that doesn't say l
25 l
there is no plan.
I i
1
25 1
Q
.What responsibility does PEMA have for assuring 2
that local plans exist?
3 A
Well, we're looking for the counties to do that.
4 We've assigned them this responsibility to be fulfilled.
r I'm sure in the processes of this very important area, we're 6 '
going to assure ourself that they do have plans.
We're 7
not going to approve them at that level, the courty is 8
going to do that.
We'll approve the county plan.
We'll 9
seek assurance that at the local level they have plans.
10 Now, there is another aspect to this, I think, that will i
11 lend a little credence to what I just had to say.
In 12 l
our training in the future, we're requiring, through our revised Annex E, for counties to participate in the training 14 exercise at least annually, for the purpose of evaluating 15 and taking an in-depth view of their plan, taking a look l
at their organization, taking a look at their systems to 17 be sure that they can meet all of those requirements.
And a part of that directive and direction is that the
{
local levels will participate, and that will give us an 20 opportunity to review and to view and to comment and direct, I
i 21 I
if necessary, what changes have to be done to improve the j
i 22 situation.
23 Q
How do you really accomplish that with unfunded 24 l
local coordinators that have their own livelihood to watch
,,.p,,,,,,,
y, 25 i
out for?
}
26 1
A With great difficulty; it is extremely difficult.
2 I think the communities contiguous to our nuclear fixed 3
facilities as well as some of the other ha:ards which impact 4
upon our communities significantly and frequently sense 1
their responsibilities and they are doing more in these 6
areas to be prepared to respond.
I I
7 Regardless of the level of government, the elected l
8 officials have the responsibility for life and the protection i 9
of property.
And I have never seen anything which ties l
10 that to the availability of revenues.
So it's a 11 constitutional responsibility.
i 12 More and more, we see these people fulfilling that l
I 13
~
responsibility and increasing their capabilities to respond.
14 We will continue to have problems in that area.
We recognize,;
15 probably as well as anybody else, we would like to see 16 a subsidy so-to-speak, at least a grant or some approval 17 l
of monies for these things.
Hopefully, we could gain more from the federal government, but we may have to do this 19 ourself.
Right now we do not have monies for this.
They i
20 are not in our programs.
i 21 Q
Typically, I guess, though, your locals are 22 members of the, maybe, police force or fire department or 23 l
something like that so there is a governmental arrangement?
24 A
That's right.
They are tied to other things, l
w.pe n i
there's no question about it.
In some cases, the township
[
1 i
l
27 I
supervisors are the emergency management coordinators; 2
it may be a policeman or it may be some other walk of life 3I altogether.
Many of them are duel-hatted.
4 O
There were dedicated lines installed during l
5 the weekend of the accident to six affected counties.
And I
6 as I understand it, some three weeks or so later, these 7
dedicated lines were removed.
Would you explain why there is I i
8 no longer a need for dedicated lines?
9 i
A Well, as a state of normalcy evolved, we had a j
10 better or an assured capability that we could, by nornal 11 land line, communicate, nave contact to these counties to I
12 l
conduct our business.
The recuirement for the conduct ofbusinessdiminishedaswereturnedtothestateofnormalcy.!
13 14 We were doing much of it by lidson, but we are billed on 15 a monthly basis for communications.
We were oprating in 16 an environment, at least as far as I was concerned, without 17 additionc1 approcriations, which meant that whatever we did t
l' 18 become involved with, up to a point in time, unless it was 19 a declared emergency, we were going to have to pay out of 20 our existing operating budget.
And it is a little austere, 21 to say the least.
22 On that basis, when Mr. Kuehn came to me, why, I agreed 23 that I thought we should take them out.
We could, at that 24 l
Particular time, provided that the jacks and the line'.
l 4..rews no w3. w.
internally were there, it would be a matter of activating I
20 1
which would only take us a few minutes to do because we 2
were retaining instruments that were in the EOC, and it 3
was just a matter of plugging us in.
The Bell Telephone 4-has representatives right there -- as a matter of fact, l
5 I
within 50 feet of me or more -- in their own office at 6
the end of the hall, so it's just a matter of calling those I
7 people.
j 8
O So there is still a dedicated line from a jack?
9 A
.Well, internally it is there.
Now, they have to 10 activate it, of course, to make it hot.
l 11 Q
But what does Bell have to do to activate it?
l 12 A
I can't answer that question.
I don't know whether :
13 l
it's to tie into our board or whether there is some place in the building they have to do something or not, but it only 15 i
takes a few minutes to do it, whatever it is, not an 16 l
extensive period of time.
And we could activate it.
17 l
But there was just no longer a need for that type of direct, 18 l
communications.
I think by the 30th of April was when we
{
19 j
disconnected our hot lines.
i 20 l
Q What are you currently doing to convince the locals that they should have a plan?
I guess people are more j
22 1
intereated right now, but is there a program established, j
23 not right now, maybe some milestones, or something that's l
24 l
wo.o.r.i n nonm, inc.
been disseminated to the local level so that you can 25 maintain the momentum?
j l
29 1
A Well, we have placed this planning effort in 2'
priority based upon geographical location and our analysis 3
of need for the planning effort.
I 4
For example, we had -- and we knew this based upon our S
review and our constant working efforts during TMI that l
6 those counties contiguous to Three Mile Island had plans i
7 that were detailed plans that, in our mind, again, would work out to 20 miles.
So knowing that, we felt we better 9
start taking a look and working with some of the other f
facilities in the development of their plans.
11 We knew also that we had five-mile plans
- r Peachbottom 12 I
and that they were about to be upgraded and reviewed.
And l
l 13 so we started with Beaver Valley which is a little more l
14 i
complicated because it has other states involved in this i
i 15 i
planning effort, like Ohio and West Virginia.
Therefore, t
i 16 it's just a little more complicated than dealing with your 17 own people.
18 So this was our first priority.
Now, this doesn't say l
19 i
that there was ne effort going on elsewhere, because there i
20 was.
For example, there are revised plans right now for i
4 21 I
Peachbottom.
This was going on concurrently.
There is j
22 effort being conducted for Berwick, which is not on line I
23 i
yet, but Luzerne and Colun6ia County are working on plans, i
24 l
w.p no,,,,
Our eastern area director, under whose jurisdiction you will j
25 l
find Berwick, Luzerne County, is in contact with that planning!
t i
30 1
effort in assisting.
And we have attended several meetings 2
with those people.
3 We're also talking about and we have some limited effort 4
from our standpoint going into Limrick.
Of course, that's i
5 not going to come on line for several years.
But these 6
efforts are ongoing.
We're concentrating, number one, 2
7 Beaver; number two, on Peachbottom; number three, on TMI.
i 8
i We have to take TMI 20 miles and revise those into the 9
I ten-mile criteria which we're working with right now.
j 10 And this is where our effort is going.
11 Now, within that, the counties are working with their 12 l
municipalities in developing plans in support, one step 13 at a time.
You get the county plan working, at the same 14 time there is some activity down in the local level, and it 15 becomes accelerated when all the factors are known.
I 16 l
I am not personally involved in the detailed planning aspect of this, as I indicated before.
It's under the 18 charge of Mr. Crowe, and we have made available the state i
19 l
resources to permit this planning to go on with assistance.
20 Now, I say knowledgeable as to what's going on all the time, 21 because I do have to participate in the conferences and 22 I
things of this nature.
And on occasion, I head the conference, 23 l
wherever it may be, so I am knowledgeable as to what they 24 are doing.
Ac Feded Reponen, Inc.
25 Q
Have lines been installed, inactive lines but ones I
31 1
that you could plug into, as you said, to the surrounding 2
counties around the other nuclear facilities?
3 A
I'm not sure whether they are into Beaver or not 4
at this time, this point in time, but they will be.
5 Of course, we have a direct line out to TMI through NAWAS 6
i which has always been into TMI.
7 0
I was thinking of the surrounding counties more?
8 A
The other counties are not.
Now, this is a 9
situation that involves the counties themselves with the 10 i
facility to get the direct lines into those counties, but 11 from our EOC, I don't think it is essential that we have l
12 direct lines into all those counties.
I 13 Q
You would not perform the same function for the 14 other facilities that you would have performed for i
15 TMI?
16 l
A Let me put it this way:
If we have to go to l
17 Beaver, we're going to be located out in that part of 18 the state, geographically located.
And part of our planning 19 l
exercise is to select what we will call an advance CP i
20 location, which will be some place in the vicinity of the l
21 ten-ndle railts from that facility.
And there we will have 22 an advance segment of our staff.
There will be an advance 23 i
segment of radiological protection.
There will probably j
24 i
Ace-Fede,Q Coporters, Inc.
De other elementL.
Maybe some of the federal elements will 25 be located there.
I'm thinking primarily of those with the i
l i
32 7
mnnitoring capability or requirement.
elements in there.
We will probably function in support of 3
this activity from our western area headquarters which is
~
located in Indiana.
Therefore, we want the tie to go from the facility to that advance CP.
We have communications 6
from our location here to Beaver County.
I 7
We can get in there with teletype.
We have other i
communications which we could activate to give us voice 9
communications in that area, too.
This is probably the way we would treat it.
11 I would surmise that TMI is going to be treated a little 12 I
differently, and more similar to the way we operated during l
l 13 the recent event.
And it is based upon the geographical 14
.'.ocation as to how we're gcing to treat these activities.
15 We will have a direct lina fr:m the facility into radiological 16 protection.
There will be a direct line from radiological 17 protection into our CP.
And we vill still, regardless of where we're functioning from, our EOC in Harrisburg will be 19 our backup and support and it will be active.
20 0
On the morning, Friday morning, March 30th, someone 21 i
in PEMA apparently called Carl Abraham in Region 1, l
22 I
Region 1 Public Information Officer, concerning the 1200 mr 1
23 per hour reading and requested advice from the regional 24 office regarding evacuation.
Do you know who made that
- 4c..p.a.r.i n,... ine, 25 phone call?
i
33 1
A No, I have no recollection of such a call.
I 2
wouldn't know who in PEMA would be making that call.
3 0
Apparently, also on that morning, there were two 4
phone calls from Met Ed to PEMA about the 1200 mr.
Apparent;y, one was from Floyd to Mr. Kuehn; and then one was from 6
somebody to Mr. Cassidy.
You wouldn't happen to know who 7
that somebody from TMI was on the other end of the line?
i 8
A No, I don't.
tou know, I was aware of both of i
9 those calls simultaneously, because in front of my office l
10 i
are the two primary desks of my office assistants.
And I 11 l
just happened to be standing out there when those calls came l
12 in.
And I had firsthand knowledge of those calls at that i
13 point in time, i
14 l
That's rather unusual that something occurs that way, 15 especially from the same office.
I don't know who that other 16 person was.
t O
Again on March 30th, there was a meeting, apparently:
17 I'
18 in the governor's office, shortly before noon before he t
19 made a noon press release in which he was issuing the advisory, 20 I guess, on pregnant women and children and also making some j
i 21 statements about the take-cover order that had been made 22
~
earlier that morning.
Were you at the governor's office 23 i
or was Mr. Williamson?
i 24 l
A Mr. Williamson was at the governor's office.
l Ace Fedwel Canon, Inc.
25 O
I just wanted to make sure it was not you.
34 A
No.
jl Q
I'm curices if you might have anything else for 2
the record regarding your activities or PEMA's or your 3
observations of what might make things better, that might 4
help our inquiry.
There's an awful lot on the record.
f 5
i A
I can imagine so.
I think that we have learned l
6 I
a considerable number of lessons from this incident, and I 7
w uld say that most lessons that we have acknowledged that 8
we are doing something about, at least within our capabilities.
9 We're talking to others of those things that need to be i
10 11 done beyond our capabilities such as need for legislation and this type of thing.
12 We have changed som= of our training requirements to assure 13 ourself of an effectiev state staff in recognition that ja personalities change rather frequently.
Therefore, you 15 just don't have time in this type of an incident to train 16 people.
You must be able to respond instantaneously, 17 pr bably more so than under that normal, what we call a 18 normal and natural disaster or emergency-type thing, which j9 is more aligned to the normal day-to-day activity and 20 pr vision of resources.
21 We're taking a hard look at communications.
We have haC 22 this requirement for some time so that we have a communications 23 24 system of both voice and hard copy which is not tied to j
! Ace-Federal Reporwes, Inc.
i land line services, so that we have continuous communications j 25 and we do not have to call for outside help to provide this i
35 I
for us.
That takes time.
2 We're looking at the local -- in this case I'm using 3
local as county -- that level, to improve expertise through 4
accelerated and improved training.
There is a change in i
5 our law; our recent law now requires training of local i
6 levels to be conducted by the county level of government.
i 7
We offer the guidance and the help to permit this to occur.
8 We will continue to do that.
9 We hope to stress and emphasize the need for more 10 competency among our leaders so to speak, more dedication, i
i 11 i
more understanding of needs and requirements and the l
12 I
ability to analyze hazards and their impact and how to 13 deal with them.
l 14 i
We need at least an identified structure within our i
15 emergency management organizations who can be brought to 16 bear to do planning, be brought to bear to respond.
- Again, 17 the recognition that with the limitations and constraints 18 of funding, you can't have a standby staff, one that reacts l
periodically.
20 These are the thir, that we're looking at, and the things 21 that we are doing to improve our capabilities along with 22 our first priority which is this planning.
And it's a i
23 total spectrum of planning to include the review and approval 24 1
of it.
These hopefully are going to be the things to l
Am FewW Reorwn, W.
l l
25 permit us to do better and handle this type of situation
(
36 1
better.
2 I would be the first to say that we were prepared to 3
handle it within limitations before.
We were prepared to 4
evacuate out to five miles, and we could have done it S
extremely well with short notification.
i 6
I O
In your judgment, how long do you think that 7
might have taken?
A Well, I think we have to consider the time frame that we're speaking of.
Now, on Wednesday morning when 10 I received a call from the shift leader who told me that 11 it appeared that there was an off-site release moving 12 at about 30 degrees, if I remember, would put whatever it 13 was in the direction of Goldsboro and Brunner Island.
And 14 I presented this to radiological protection who in short 15 order came back and said, you know, we think it's only in 16 the neighborhood of 10 mr, but it would be advisable to 17 probably prepare the mechanism in the event you have to 18 conduct an evacuation.
19 And I called Mr. Lothrop -- I had Mr. Lothrop call to 20 York County, and he was seated beside me.
And I just happened 21 to have two phones on my desk and.he was using one and I 22 was using the other.
And there was no hesitation on the l
23 part of people.
When they were told, we think this is 24 w-remo reco,ws, inc.
what you should do and you should notify your municipalities 25
. involved to alert their structure and sort of standby; don't
37 l
do anything, but sort of get the wheels in motion in case 2
we have to conduct an evacuation.
And there was no 3
hesitancy on the part of other people to respond to that 4
type of thing.
l 5
This, or course, had been the second or third call they hadl 1
6 received that morning.
They had been alerted to the problem; I
7 and to reassure that everybody understood, because j
some people were on the way to work, we repeated those 9
calls.
And then this is the third call to some of the 10 counties.
11 And likewise, when I went back to withdarw that sort of a 12 status, put things back to normal, again there was the 13 response to it.
And we discussed this on numerous 14 occasions, but that's a long way around to getting to answer 15 your question.
16 A lot of things had happened within this geographical 17 area.
A lot of people had moved out, so we're talking 18 about a reduced population over what we had planned for.
19 And instead of talking about relocating maybe 26,000 people, 20 we were talking maybe 10,000, 13,000, 15,000.
21 Q
That's on Friday?
22 A
That was on Friday.
We could have responded, 23 and I would say somewhere between two and a half to three 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, we could have probably evacuated that within a five-25 mile radius.
That's all I'm talking about, because we had no l
l e
38 l
)
i i
1 special care or special treatment that had to be given to 1
2 people in that area.
The population is certainly not very i
3 dense.
4 i
Q How about Wednesday morning, at 7:35 a.m.?
I
~
5 i
A Well, first of all, it is my opinion that if l
6 there is a release of radioactivity, I question whether we're !
going to conduct an evacuation.
We will probably issue 8
take-cover type of thing.
On a precautionary basis, leadtime 9
sufficient so that you can effectively and efficiently get 10 people out, that's something else.
Unless we know precisely 11 where our problem lies, I don't see hastily telling everybody 12 to go outdoors.
That's probably the worst possible condition 13 i
that we could precent.
14 O
Well, let me try again.
Suppose that at 8:00 15 BRP had called down and said, We understand the problem.
16 We've talked to NRC and the word is, Get out?
)
17 A
You're talking about something hastily.
If there 18 had been no uncontrolled release of material, on Wednesday
~
19 morning, we probably could have made it in somewhere around 20 three, maybe three and a half hours, in that time frame.
Any questions?
22 MR. CHIN:
I have two quick ones.
23 You mentioned earlier on Friday morning, the EOC 24
%.pm no received two calls simultaneously, and that you had firsthand 25 knowledge of those calls. 'What do you mean by that?
1
i 39 1
I l
THE WITNESS:
Well, I was standing between these j
1 2
two desks, and they are buttressed right against each other.
I I
And I overheard the conversation from both of them, you know; 4
I wasn't putting it all together, but I overheard what they were talking about and realized in short order that there was a very sensitive problem going on.
f 7
The details come in to Mr. Cassidy and not necessarily 8
to Mr. Kuehn.
Mr. Kuehn was apprised by Mr. Floyd that 9
there was a particular problem and that he was seeking some 10 help from radiological protection and that they were preparing 11 to possibly get some excess or unnecessary people off-site 12 there.
13 The details came in to Mr. Cassidy, and it said, you know, 14 we have something like 1200 mr 600 feet above the stack, 15 so much at the fence.
16 MR. CHIN:
Did Mr. Cassidy tell you this, or 17 you just overheard this conversation?
18 THE WITNESS:
Well, I overheard some of it, but 19 then he told me.
I asked him, I said, you know, What was 20 the information you had?
So he told me what it was.
And 21 concurrent with that, he was writing it down.
He was taking 22 notes as it was going on.
23 I called Maggie Reilly and told her of the report we l
24 had received, and she inferred to me that she had had this jS..swwwnamen,imo 25 same type of information.
And that's understandable, because I
40 I
it probably was coming in directly from the plant to them.
2 MR. CHIN:
And subsequently, did Mr. Kuehn brief 3
I you on Mr. Floyd's call?
4 THE WITNESS:
Yes, he did.
5 MR. CHIN:
And did you sense that theru was some 6
l difference between those two calls as to the urgency of the i
crisis at Three Mile Island?
8 THE WITNESS:
Well, probably by the story that 9
Mr. Kuehn told me that there was considerable excitement 10 in the voice of Mr. Floyd.
I do not recall Mr. Cassidy relating any' excitement on the part of the individual 12 except that a determination to get the information through.
Piecing them both together, you could sense very readily 14 that there was an extreme emergency occurring that we 15 should look at very, very carefully and immediately.
16
.And Mr. Kuehn cited the extreme excitement on 17 the part of Mr. Floyd.
18 MR. CHIN:
Did you sense that there was
~
something strange about getting two calls on the same 20 subject matter that morning?
21 THE WITNESS:
Not necessarily, no.
22 MR. CHIN:
Had that happened before?
23 THE WITNESS:
Not to my knowledge, no, not from 24 Three Mile Island.
25 MR. CHIN:
Did you act on each, on any one of these I
41 I
1 calls?
Did you recommend to Mr. Henderson that we should 1
2 take this matter seriously?
f 3
l THE WITNESS:
I don't know whether I used those 4
precise words, but I did tell him that there was an 5
emergency at the plant and these were the conditions that 6
had been reported.
I also informed him again of the l
7 conversation that Mr. Kuehn had with me, about the report 8
he had received and his observations so to speak of that 9
call.
10 It was only a matter of maybe ten, fifteen minutes until 11 Maggie Reilly called me back and said that the release had 12 been contained, had been stopped.
13 MR. CHIN:
All right.
Another question:
I 14 would like for you to describe as an example for us how 15 the EOC functioned on the stay-indoor advisory?
16 THE WITNESS:
How it functioned?
17 MR. CHIN:
Who notified you of this advisory and 18 what steps you would take to disseminate that information.
19 THE WITNESS:
I received my report of this 20 information from Colonel Henderson that the governor had 21 issued a statement earlier in the morning as an advisory for 22 people to stay indoors until noon.
Now, we disseminated that 23 information to all the counties within a ten-mile radius.
24 I recall that was out to ten miles.
And which is normal, up 25 to put this advisory out to all concerned.
I
_._. ~
42 i
1 MR. CHIN:
And that was the sole act taken by 2
EOC on this particular advisory?
3 I
THE WITNESS:
Well, we had notified all the agencies!
~
4 l
also, because the agencies, by that time, were in our 5
EOC.
Now, it was my understanding then and it still is that 6
the governor issued this as a press release and was not 7
solely relying on us to disseminate the information.
- Although, 8
it was our responsibility to do that, to be sure that 9
all of our organizations are aware of what guidance has 10 come out.
11 MR. CHIN:
Would the same apply to his advisory 12 on pregnant women and preschool children?
13 THE WITNESS:
That information was received by 14 Colonel Hendr'; son, and I cannot tell you who made the call to 15 him.
We disseminated that information also.
16 MR. CHIN:
In the same manner as the other?
17 THE WITNESS:
Yes.
MR. CHIN:
And that was all that EOC needed to do?
19 THE WITNESS:
That's correct.
20 Now, there were a lot of other things that went on along 21 with that, because that meant that those counties that were 22 involved had to open mass care centers and facilities to 23 take care of these people, which they did.
And there 24 were some requirements th't evolved from that activity.
a u,% no, %,
25 As an example, the mass care center that was activated at the
43 I
i 1
l Hershey Sports Arena, under the control of Dauphin County, there was a requirement for cots which were delivered there.
3 l
When we closed it, we picked those back up.
l MR. CHIN:
That's all I have.
5 THE WITNESS:
When I say that's all we have to do, 6
at that particular time, for dissemination, and all of 7
the agencies were notified because the agencies were in the 8
EOC.
Now, when we have the response teams there, we 9
announce these things to the response teams and rely on them 10 to get it back to their departments.
Now, it was effective 11 that way because the office of administration called me, 12 who has the responsibility, among state agencies, for 13 notifying all state agencies of these types of things.
14 And in the midst of all these things going on, the office 15 of administration called me and said, This is the advisory.
16 I said, Thank you.
17 And off the record, I might state --
MR. CHIN:
Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
20 THE WITNESS:
It was effective, as you can see, 21 in short order.
22 A lot of other things happened just about that same time 23 after the announcement of that advisory, the warning system 24 was activated, the siren was activated.
There certainly 25 was no intent for that to lun activated, but it was caused, I
44 1
as best as we can relate, through a surge of power or 2
workmen that were working on lines, this type of thing.
I 3
But those things sort of coincide with everything else that 4
was going on; that caused a litule havoc for awhile.
5 Many, many calls, that was a problem.
i 6
MR. ERNST:
I have a couple of incidental questions.
7 l
BY MR. ERNST:
j 8
Q How old a man is Mr. Cassidy?
What is his l
9 background and experience?
j 10 A
Well, I would say Mr. Cassidy is in his early 11 30s.
He was with our western area headquarters for several i
12 years, and we moved him into Harrisburg when that position 13 became open which was a promotion to the extent that it
,l 14 l
brought him back to where his wife's family is located:
l 15 for personal reasons, it was more convenient for him.
16 He's a hard-working, dedicated individual, and he's 17 intelligent, capable of writing and understanding.
He's 18 e
one of our planners.
19 Q
Does he have military experience?
l 20 A
I would say, based upon his age, he probably l
21 has maybe short-term military experience.
I don't 22 know specifically what it is.
But I would assume so.
23 i
l Q
What was the emotional state of Mr. Cassidy when l'
l 24 j &ce.FedeC Caporters,1,ic.
relaying the information to you?
25
45
.. CR 7188
,.rco 1
9/20/79 A
He's a very calm, cool, and collected individual.
2 I've never seen him otherwise.
He doesn't get excitedt he's 3
a very mature individual, really, for his age.
4 Q
What was Mr. Kuehn's' state?
5
^
MR. CHIN:
I think we ought to go off the record.
6 i
(Discussion off the record.)
7 MR. ERNST:
In conclusion, let me say this t
8 is an ongoing investigation; and although I have completed the questions that I have for you today, there is a 10 possibility there may be a need to ask further questions.
11 We will make every effort to avoid doing so.
12 For that reason, instead of closing this particular 13 deposition, I will just recess it.
I i
14 We wish to thank you for your time and the information f
15 i
you have provided to us.
I'm sure it will be helpful.
16 T!IE WITNESS:
Very good.
17
!!R. ERNST:
Thank you very much.
18 (Whereupon, at 2 : 4 5 p.m., the taking of the 19 j
deposition was concluded.)
20 j
21 l
i 22 Kenneth Richard Lamison l
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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September 4, 1979
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In Reply Refer to:
,j, NTFIM 790904-10 Mr. Kenneth R. Lamison Operations Officer Pa. Emergency Management Agency Room B-151, Transportation & Safety Bldg.
P. O. Box 3321 Harrisburg, Pa.
17105
Dear Mr. Lamison:
I am writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for September 20, 1979 at 1:30 p.m.,
in a meeting room at the Holiday Inn Town motel, 2nd and Chestnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pa.
Please bring with you a copy of your resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official NRC files, including any diar, or personal working file.
The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
This Group is being directed independently of the NRC by the law firm. of Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommendations for change. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the deposi-tion is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you.
However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.
Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at the deposition as his representative.
You should realize that while we will try to respect any requests for confiden-tiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can make no guar-antees.
Names of witnesses and the information they provide may eventually become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem A
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2 appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Informa-tion Act. M,oreover, other departments and agencies of government may request access to this information pursuant to the Pr'ivacy Act of 1974. The information may also be made available in whole or in part'do' committees or subcommittees of the U.S. Congress.
If you have testified previo isly with respect to the Three Mile Island accident, it would be useful if you could review any transcripts of your previous state-ment (s) prior to the_d.eposition.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely, t.*A.$-
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Mitchell Rogovin, Director NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group a
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