ML19322C236

Deposition of PA Emergency Mgt Agency by CA Williamson on 790928 in Harrisburg,Pa.Pp 1-49

ML19322C236
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	09/28/1979
From:	Williamson C PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001160663
Download: ML19322C236 (99)

Text

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NUCLE AR REGULATO RY COMMISSION f

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IN THE MATTER OF:

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THREE MILE ISLAND 4

SPECIAL INTERVIEWS

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DEPOSITION OF CRAIG A.

WILLIAMSON l

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Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Octe - Friday, September 29, 1979 Peges 1 - 49 C

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

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1. l In the Matter o#-

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THREE MILE ISLAND 6!

l SPECIAL INTERVIEWS

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DEPOSITION OF CRAIG A.

WILLIAMSON I

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2ndandChestnutStreetsl Harrisburg, Pennsylvaniai 11 Friday, Septeter 28, 1979 12 '

10:00 a.m.

13 BEFORE:

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15 MALCOLM ERNST l

FREDERICK HERR 16 PETER SICILIA, JR.

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2 WITNESS:

EXAMINATION I

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3 Craig A. Williamson 2

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EXHIBITS

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IDENTIFIED 8

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')n the record.

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CRAIG A.

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was :allec as a witne ss ano, naving caen first ;uly swor7, 4

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<tes exeains; enn testified as folloets:

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EX A.'AIN ATION 1

1 hi MR. ER.85T:

State your name an: position for the recora.

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4/ full nue is Craig A.

Nilliaason.

I n ceouty le director of the dennsylvania Emergency '4anagement.

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'fr. W11113mson, have you received a le tter from us 14 aroviding c3,rtain important information concerning this e

i 15 ceposition?

That's this letter here.

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l-a A

Yes, I have.

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This letter is marked as Exhibit 1.

13 (Exnioit i icentifisc.)

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3( MR. ER:IST 2)

J This is a photocoJy of a letter tnat was sent ;o 21 you?

22 A

That's correct.

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Tnis confirms that your deposition here will os 24 under oath, i

2a A

That's correct.

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Have yS; reed the occuman; in full?

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A fas.

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2 Jo you understano the information set for:n in tne 4

letter incluaing the general nature of the incuiry, your rignt to neve an attorney present and tne fact ths; a

information you provide her, may eventually cecome oucli:7 A

I do.

o Mr. Williamson, is counsel reoresenting you

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personally?

13 A

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11 I wou1J 11%e to note for cne record tnat :ne 12 witna ss is not representec oy counsel tocay.

13 If at any time during the course of this interview you 14 fesi like you woula like to be represented oy counssl and i

I; have counsel present, plc'c= advise me and we will adjourn la these proceedings to afforc you the opportunity of obtaining 1/

counsel.

Is this agreeaole?

16 A

Agreeaole.

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0 You brougnt a copy of your resume to this 2J deposition.

This is that copy?

21 A

That is correct.

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VR. ERNST:

I would like to enter that as Exhioit l

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( Exhioit 2 identified.)

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ins document is entitled at t,he top "31ographi:a1

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5ke::h of Craig A.

.illiamson."

It's one page.

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4 accurately summarize your ecucational and em.o loyme n t 3

osc%grounc?

A I: does.

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J Mr. Williamson, I woncer if you woulo descrios for i

ne /our assigneo, regular duties at PEMA.

9 A

As deputy airsctor, I am responsiole for assisting IJ the director of state, county, and local emergency 11 management programs and to assure tneir coordination wita j

le like programs in other states and with the 13 Federal Government.

14 0

50 your basic res.Jonsibility is not coordinating 15 inside Pennsylvania out coordinating with other 13 governments -- otner state governments and the Federal 14 Government?

13 A

l4o.

It's coordination of state, county, and local 11 plans within the Conmenwealth with those li%e plans of other 20 states and the Federal Government agencies.

21 O

I see.

So to that extent, your reasonaoly 22 f amiliar with existing county plans and local plans?

23 A

Tnat's correct.

24 Q

How did these duties change during the Three Mile 25 Island accident?

Like the first week or so.

What were your

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i principal cucies curin; tnis period of cime?

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.ty principal dutias for tne first several veeks in J

the EMI incident were those of 1ssisting the director in the 4

conouct of amergency operations associated with the D(I 5

incioent.

In that respec t, not greatly unlike my cay to day 3

resoonsiti ties as fad: as my relationshi? With the director

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and One cuties and responsioilities of the agency.

3 Q

A Jiff erence -- I'm postul ating now -- might neve y

oeen that you were on essentially 24-hour emergency call so i

IJ you were snort of sharing the directing responsioilities?

11 A

llo t really on call out taere all the time, 1

Id a ssisting the director in taings that had to be dons in the 13 agency and working in conjunction with the Jovernor's offi:e 1

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14 and the Lieutenant Governor's office.

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15 2

Mnat responsibility does ?EMA have for assuring 15 the a xistence of county and local plans in correspondence 1e with the puolic law of 1978 in that such piens and sta ffing l

15 are adequate and plans are capable of being implemented?

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A The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Services Act 2]

of 1978 estaolisnes that responsioility with PEMA, and those 21 resoonsioliities are legally estaclished for the agency.

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As I understand it, is it true that all local 23 emergency coordinators were appointed at the time of tne TII I

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I were -- and tnat all county. alans were -- written aceroen:y

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c plans were f ormulated, at least to :ne extent of the six 3

councies involved in the TMI incident.

ihera were : aunty 4

plans that had oeen reviewed cy ?EMA and were effective et that tias?

A Prior to I'dI?

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Yas.

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A Ine plans reviewed oy PE TA were limited to the

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counties of dauphin, Lancaster, and Yors.

At that time de 1) were working with tne five-aile radius evacuation plans and 11 the/ only incluceo tnose three counties I centioned.

dhin 14 we went out to 10, we picked up Leoanon and Cumoerland, out 13 to 20. Pe rry, to come up to your total of six.

14 2

Let me clarify one point of a previous question I

% j) 16 nactomakesurethat the record is clear.

la Tne previous question, I also talkeo about local plans.

14 Joes PE:4A have a responsioility for assuring the existen:e 13 and aceauacy of local emergency plans?

dat the cou,ty plans le out the local.

23 A

Iney don't.

The county coordinators have that 21 resoonsioility under the state plan pro;rea.

Did I 22 understand your initial question to oeal with local 23 coorainators?

You started.off oy asking about local 24 coorainators?

25 0

I did ask a question whether, to your knowledge,

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all of tne :coroinetors nao ceen assignatec. recognizing a b

4 few were in tne proce ss of ceing replaceo.

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enswar was that taev -- the locai coordinators were in existence, cesignated at t n e'"

time.

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Inat's correct.

ne ha ve some 2200 local coorcinators of record, culy appointed emergency manegem?nt i

cooroinators, out of approximately 2600 political 3

s uca l visions.

So there are a few wno have not recommenced

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an appointment ano, enerefore, are without the services 13 of a duly appointed, at least, local c ooroin a tor.

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dnet physical planning, acministrative, l.d opera tional anc other-duties were assigned to the director 13 of ?5MA cy the Pennsylvania Emergency Management council in

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14 correspondence with the Public Law 323 of 1978?

b 13 A

The formal assignment of duties and 15 responsioilities for the director position are those 14 contained in the position description for tnat 13 classification.

I am not in a position to recite tnem out il that would oe the only formal setting out of duties and 20 responsioilities that I am personally aware of.

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21 J

During tne TMI emargency response, what one mignt 22 describe as a de facto command center was apparently 23 estsolished in the Governor's office, which concisted of 24 mayce a half a cozen people who were relied upon by the 25 Governor in making recommendations.

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l How cid you relate to this function or how old PEMA relate 2

to it?

3 A

From time to time, Colonel Henderson, I celieva, 4

met with the group, either individually or collectively, and 5

on several occasions I had contact with this group, as we 6

will descrios them.

On one occasion, I had a lengthy I

conversation with Secretary Nilburn of the Office of S

Sudge t Administration concerning the adequacy of the then 9

5-mile plans.

10 On another occasion prior to the Governor's announcement li of his recommendation involving pregnant women and 12 pre-school-age children, I was in the presence of the group a s 13 they were discussing some of the ramifications of that r\\

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14 decision.

That's the only two occasions that I was directly 15 involved with them.

I was aware of the existence of those 16 supporting the Governor.

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0 On these two instances, do you recall the IS approximate time f rame of this involvement?

19 A

My conversation with Secretary Wilburn was on c

20 Saturday morning.

That would have been March 31.

The 21 occasion of the meeting with the group in the Governor's 22 office was in the morning, ?riday the 30th.

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Do you recall who was present at these two 24 meetings?

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The first meeting I described was limited to

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'tr. Gerusky, Press Secretary Critenlov, ana J

Jay aaldman anc ochers who I at tne momen: c en't recall.

Do you recall some of tne information sources that 4

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this group was relying upon at that time?

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In my conversation with Jr. Milourn, I was

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providing tne information.

On tha other occasion, tne 3

aecision had oeen made oefore I arrivec in the Governor's

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o ffice as to wnat tne announcement vould ce, so there wasn't I) a great deal of discussion associatea with what led to li maki19 that decision.

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'3nen I le f t our emergency operations center, we had 13 receiveo the telephone call from '4r. Collins reconmencin; (G}

14 evacuation out to 10 mile s.

Of course, we had the two 15 preceding calls fro.3 the plent.

As I lef t on my way *to the la Gove rnor's o ff ice, I encounterec Mr. Oornsife, who is an I,

empicyee of the Sureau of ladietion Protection, anc he li indicates to me as I was en route to the Governor's o ffic e 19 that he 'did not consider the NRC recomnendation for l

22 evacuation out to 10 miles to be a valia one cased on the 21 cata that he hac received from the plant.

22 He also indicatec that tne Bureau of Radiation Protec: ion 23 nad oeen attempting to reada our headquarters and couldn't l

24 because of the overload on the Commonwealth telephone system at l

l 2a that time end he was coming to personally celiver the o g p M. m p O D Y i h 3 a zw y a v-.w -

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50 when I left for tne Gavernor's office, I was not awers l

J of :sils that I suosecuently learned had oeen tade to 4

Connissioner Mendrie and conversations oetween the Governor I

a anc 1.r. Gerusky and these taings tnat led to the decision i

a and the Governor's announcement.

.Iy arrival at the i

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Governor's o ffice was the first that I knew that Colonel 4

3 ciende rson's recomendation to the Governor was not going to j

oe accepted.

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0 50 your arrival was af ter 'olonel Henaerson nao

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2 gona to tne Governor's offi:e.

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Talked with the Governor on tne telephone, y9s.

4-It was subseouent to that c;nversation.

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50 the pEMA -- or Colonel Hende rson's --

a recommendations were oy tel3 phone ana not in person?

i A

Tnat's correct.

5y teleonone.

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Inan you were the personal representative subsequent"to that time in the Governor's office?

y 10 A

Ihat's correct.

Il 0

The conversations with Mr. ililour, on Saturday, 12 what was it tnat was discussed?

(ou mentioned, as I recall, 13 on the record some appraisal or evaluation of the acaquacy

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14 of five-mile plans.

What specifically was discussed and how Iv/

15 dio.dr. dilcurn discharge his assignmer.;?

15 A'

He was interested -- and I assume hao been li assigned the responsibility oy the Governor to look into the 13 matter and evaluate the effec tiveness or the capaoility of 1s the counties to evacuate if called uoon to do so.

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So I explained to him initially the proceedings of tne 21 previous day,. riday the 30th, when we went f rom 5 to 10 to 22 20, and inoicated to him that we hac no plans for tne 23 current 20 eithough we had oeen working all night in 24 conjunction with the now six counties to cevelop them.

s 25 He was interested in my evaluation of their ability to c.y m y

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I perfor. or t erry off an evacuation even in the aosence of n

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Jetaileo plans at that poin.

That :onversa tion le; into e 3

dis:ussion aoout the adequacy of tn3 wri tten plans thet we 4

aid nave, tne five-mile plans.

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'tInat was your evaluation at that time?

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iney were acequat? for the circumstances 4

associatec with an evacuation in :ne five-mile zone, where 3

we were cealing with something in the neighoornood af 26,00]

9 people, and the evacuees would ce taken care of in the 13 county in which they resided.

Under those circumstances, it 11 was an acequate plan.

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Mare there any weaknesses identified at tnet time 13 that were surprising?

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tio, not really.

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.inat were the plans for taking care of some of the 16 more difficult evacuees, such as hospitals and nursing 17 home s ?

13 A

dell, tne state Department of dealth, working in 1/

conjunction with local health autnorities -- this was a very 2]

large part of the preparation of an evacuation plan for the 21 20 mile area -- they were busily engageo in that f rom 22 mionight.:riday on until they comoletec it, utilizing the 23 emergency medical system people in the county, the county 24 medical society, authorities from the hospitals, nursing i

25 homes.

A team effort to get in place.

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(NcLRd The county planning effort woulo ultimately reflect a d

2 def t.ciency in their resources to do what they wanted to do.

3 This would ce relayed to us and we would attempt to resolve 4

the matter f rom other resources outside the area.

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sufficient resources to do this were not available, then we 5

would place a requirement on the Federal Government in the 7

person of Bo b Adamcik, the then Region II director of the S

Fedacal Disaster Assistance Administration who had oeen cesignated as the coordinator of federal activities in 10 support of the Commonwealth.

Il Q

dare these resources required for hospital or 12 nursing home evacuation for the five-mile plan adequate at 13 that time?

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14 A

Yes.

Mainly because there are no hospitals A/

15 involved, for example, in the five-mile evacuation zone.

I 16 Delie ve two nursing homes.

Then, when we moved out to 10 is and then to 20, which would include the cities of Harrisourg 18 and York, we picked up a total of 12 hospitals and something 19 in the neighoorhood of 65 to 70 nursing homes, plus State 20 Correctional Institution and six or seven other prisons.

Ne 21 had a lot of special handling problems that didn't exist 22 with the five-mile treatment.

23 0

das Mr. Wilburn also looking at the adequacy of 24 the current planning activities for the IO-and 20-mile 25 evacuations or was he only interested in the five-mil e ?,

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Me was interested in ciscussing tais out I haa V

2 notning to snow nim et tnat point in time otner taen some of J

the,Jreliminary route assignments tnat nad oeen made, so 4

that was principally a discussion and a reporting to him on a

what we were doing and how we were doing it, which included a

at taat point, we had assigned additional state people and aoditional f ederal people to assist the county authorities in 4

d tas ir planning e f forts.

U Mare you aware of any otner activities cy 13 Air. W il ourn at that time in his evaluation?

11 A

No.

12 3

dere any other groups or people requestec cy tne 13 Governor, or perhaps somebooy alsa, to also assess the 14 adequacy of planning?

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1 15 A

'4r. McConne ll -- John McConnell from the defense li Civil Preparet less Agency -- had oeen designated to assist 1/

us in our evacuation planning, I celieve representing the l*

?lhite House, anc it was our understanding tnat we oc also 1/

utilize the experience of Mr. Acamcik and his outlet to the 2J other federal agency people.

21 Mr. McConnell visite? I celieve, all of the counties.

22 Pardon me, in the period of procaoly Saturday through Monday, 23 in tnat time f rame, he personally visited the six countie s 24 and I believe he reported back to tne Governor on the t

25 adequacy of their planning effort as he viewed it.

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Q Are you aware of ef forts 3f the anite House to

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2 evaluate pisns on Sunday, pirhaps, of Mr. Eicenourc or J

Jessica Matthews or anyone of tnat nature?

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A No.

You're not aware of any planc that they might nave a

evaluated or anything 1! ke tnat.

I A

I am not.

The only esso:ta tion tnat I woula o

mak? with tne White House was the pre sence of Mr. M:Connell.

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J dire any recommenda tions made oy Mr. dcConnell or IJ oy Mr. Plilourn as a result of their evaluations?

A As I recall, Secretary /iilourn had no specific le suggestions other tnan the oovious suggestion that wnere in 13 our judgment we thought we needed to cols ter the count-.he 14 most, we tried to direct our cest people tnere.

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13 Mr. McConnell's report -- it would be more of a report 13 than a recommencation -- would treat generally now the 1/

planning e f f ort was proceeding, and if there were tnings 13 that neede te

-a bolstered or strengthened, he would I/

sugg3 st that.

There was no formal recommencation and I 2J can't recall offhand anything that he specifically suggested, 21 out there were things tnat you would expect.

We reactea to 22 that.

23 Q

From the previous questions ana answers, I would 24 assume, then, that Mr. Milburn was looking at the existing

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2; five-mile plans for the three counties?

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fou mentioned feceral assistence f or the necessar/

3 resources to conduct an eva:uation.

I :nins you seio tnat 4

suca resources would not be necessary for tae five-nile a

clan, that there were suffi: lent Commonwealta resources to a

do tnat eva:uation?

e A

.bt nece ssarily Commonwealth resources, out 3

resou rces wi:nin the Commonwe alth, wi tnin de nnsylv eni s.

i 1 infer tram that, then, thet federal resources i

13 would have oeen requirad for a 10- or 22-mile evacuation?

II A

shat's correct, principelly in the areas of 14 additional doc tors and nurses, acci:ional amoulances, and 13 cots and Disn'<ets, and a neonatal airoorne unit tnat we knew I~D 14 of as ceing availaole for evacuating incucator inf ant

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15 faose are the ones that come immediately to my mind as 1,

being the most critical ones.. There were otners out those were 13 the most cri tical.

11 Q

Jnere would resources like this come from and whtt 23 kina of time frame was necessary for response?

21 A

4311, the American Red Cross-- there were a nuccer 22 of federal agencies that could proviae some resources in 23 ter:ns of ad;itional doctors a.d nurses, but the assistance 24 o ff ered to Ar. Adamcik by the 'mcrican Red Cross was the

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1 As I - rec e ll, ve were tol':ing ecout some:ning in :ne v/ s c

nei7acorhooo of 150 to 200 nurses an: 50 to 100 doctors.

3 I'm not surs of tne figure.

They said tne/ could provice 4

tnat, I celieve, within a matter of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

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the Letterkenney ordnan:e depot in Cnamoersourg, which is 6

acaut 45 miles from here, there were 100 or something class s

to 100 ambulences anc I believe the aelivery time, if you 3

will, on tnet was something in tne neigacornood of four v

nours cecause of their need to muster drivers, principally.

lu The squipment was ready to go.

Il inen there were additional re sourc es, but then you got 12 int 3 a time frame that was consideraoly greater than the 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> tnat we were 1 coking for.

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11 2

Jaat kind of additional resources woulo have oesn V

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dell, at that point we needec more amoulences than 14 the 100 at Le tterrenney.

I f orgot the aetails of where they 1

13 were.

?erhaps at Meade or something li.:e tne t, out they 1/

were talking accut a leat ime in hours that would neva mads 23 it extremely difficult working with the two-to eight-hour 21 kind of acvance warning tha we had oeen told we were 22

. Wor.cing witn at tnat time.

23 J

ahat was the sour:e of this two-to eight-hour 24 advence warning?

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nis up et on? of nis meetings or oriefinos witn tne s?C

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people an: :ne Governor.

On one of the occasions wnen na 3

attenced those sessions.

4 Consicering the necessar/ resource s, what was f our o

reasonaole estimate to conduct a 10-mile ena a 20-mile a

evacuation it the time that you wers first adviseo that you

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nac to start precaring for a 10- or 20-nile, cefore you nad i

started tne proce ss of working on plans and getting things

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in motion?

Is A

I don't really celieve that -- if you're talking la of tne period, say, midnignt Friday night, now long woulo it le nave taken us to concuct a 10- or 20-mile evecus tion, I 13 don't reall/ have any sophisticated Ouesses as to waat tnat f))

14 ti.ne element mignt os.

Me did compute with the g'

13 cir:umstances we were dealing with on Sunday, April I, taat.

3 l$

we could conduct a 10-m11e evacuation in seven hours, a 14 20-mile in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

Assuming that we cid not have any

{-

13 unusual proolem associatec with the special nandling cases, il nospi tals, nursing homes, c

23 0

How was tais computation made ?

k 21 A

Tais was made in ;onjunction with the Department 22 of Transportation as far as traffic flow was concerned, and 23 consultation with tne state Department of Health and Puotic 24 Welfare emergency response mem' ers working with us in tne o

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giva you more detail on Penn J3f's involvem?nt in tae 3

con. utation of traffi: flow.

4 2

I think I recall somewners on the recore nat tnis

enou tation might have oeen an assumption of mayce 30 miles per nour for cars and tnree occupants per car or something a

of taat nature.

3 A

Enat's correct.

/

J itayce half the people left in the area that h37e IJ to ge t out oy automootle ana a. f ew things li k? chat.

11 A

I don't os11 eve we used that nigh a factor on le voluntary evacuation.

I think it wes less than half.

I 13 thinx it was a thiro or something.

(~'

14 J

A third left or a third tnat ne evacuated?

\\_

16 A

d), that figure -- those figures of 7 anc 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 15 were on total evacuation of the ares.

As I r rall, th a' was 17 not taking into consiceration any voluntary evacuation.

At la that point, we were generally awara that there had oeen suca 19 a thing, but we didn't have any good inta lligence on the c

2) cegree of it.

21 Now, this was predicated on the situation as it existic 22-then.

The patient load in all of the hospitals ha: ceen 23 redu:ed to aoout 25 percent of what was normal oy tne hospital 21 authorities and everycody was leaning forwarc, if you will, in x

22 anticipation of having to do something.

Of course, tne b

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neignooracou of 4003 anc suosequently was reduced to 1993.

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O I know it's difficult to make a judgment, but I would

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2 like to pursue the point one more time.

Considering seven l

3 i hours and 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> for a 10- and 20-mile evacuation on Sunday, I

4 what would be your professional judgment -- realizing the 5

inaccuracies of the judgment -- of a 10- or 20-mile evacuation j

i 6!

at midnight Friday?

I 7

Clearly, I am not asking to the nearest hour or anything a

like that.

Would it be a factor of two or three higher; what, 9

generally?

10 A

I believe it would be reasonable to add a 10- to 12- \\

11 hour1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> period to those figures.

12 ~

Q There were a number of meetings with the Governor 13 and Lieutenant Governor, a number of press conferences, and 14 things of this nature.

How often were you a representative 15 from PEMA at meetings of this nature, say, through Sunday?

16 l A

I attended or participated in several press confer-17 ences and meetings with the Governor and Lieutenant Governor 18 on Wednesday, the 28th and Thursday the 29th.

I participated 19 in the single meeting and press conference in the Governor's 20 Office on Friday morning.

Those are the only press conferences 21 or meetings that I personally attended during the period.

(

22 Q

Was PEMA represented -- by "PEMA," I mean the staff, 23 not the Lieutenant Governor or the counsel -- was the PEMA

(-)

24 staff, yourself, Colonel Henderson, or some other staff member

\\drederna neoarters, inc.

25 present at all or most of the meetings with the Governor, f

I) 20 jl 2 i

lI

(~N 1

Lieutenant Governor,.at press conferences and things of this l

2 nature through Sunday?

I l

3, A

I would say n.-st of them in the period Wednesday 4

through Sunday.

I attended one additional session, which I

S relates to your previous question, that just comes to mind, I 6j believe Sunday evening.

The Governor had a briefing for members.

t 7

of the General Assembly in the vicinity of the area, at the 1

8 Mansion.

Colonel Henderson and I both attended that function.

9 Q

There was quite a bit of information presented at O

these meetings, technically, after Mr. Denton was a participant 11 at the meetings.

What did PEMA do with the information gathered 12 at these meetings?

13 A

When the agency was represented at one of the meet-14 ings, it was Colonel Henderson that represented the agency, and 15 I would bring back to the staff those pieces of information 16 that were of interest to our evacuation planning effort.

17 Q

This was for use by the PEMA staff?

18 A

Righ t.

There were a number of those meetings and a 19 number of associaced press conferences that we weren't included 20 in.

We didn't know of their occurring.

21 Q

I am a little confused.

Would you clarify, please?

(

22 I thought you answered a previous question saying PEMA was 23 represented at most, if not all, meetings and press conferences D)

(

24 through Sunday.

'de.o.r.e n oort ri, inc.

25 Now, it seems like there were a number --

l

ji 3 21 i!'

I

(~N 1

A Let me clarify that.

I mm now talking about the 2

period subsequent to Sunday, April 1.

There were a number of 3

meetings, particularly those between the Governor and f

8 4l Mr. Denton, that we waren't included in.

O Okay.

Getting back to the time frame Wednesday S i i

)

6i through Sunday, this was the time of interest for this particu-7!

lar question, which was:

What did PEMA-do with the information I

gi obtained at these meetings Wednesday through Sunday?

I 9

Your answer there was: The information that was pertinent to 10 emergency planning was disseminated by either yourself or 11 Colonel Henderson to the PEMA staff.

12 A

That's correct, and then to the field.

If it had

()

13-something of application to our PEMA assigned to the counties,

14 we gave it to them with the instructions they were to share 15 it with the counties.

16 Q

Is it true that another function of PEMA, othcr than 17 planning, is one of information dissemination?

18 A

That's correct.

19 Q

Again, sir, there was considerable concern expressed 20 by the counties that they weren't getting timely information 21 regarding the status of events and the status of the plant and

(

22 what might happen next.

Why wasn 't PEMA routinely disseminat-23 ing information of this nature that they obtained at press

( d) Federal Reporters, Iric.

24 conferences and so forth to the counties?

L 25 A

The information that was obtained at these meetings I

22 ji 4 I

was provided to the County Directors.

Our principal source 2

of technical information, of course, according to the plan of I

3 the Commonwealth, is the Bureau of Radiation Protection.

4 The bulk of the information and guidance we were getting S

f rom them was such that it was a no-change situation, about the 6

same, this kind of thing, which really didn't give us a great 7!

deal to imcart to our field people.

8 Q

That's a fair statement for Wednesday, Thursday, and 9

Friday morning; but what about Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, 10 which was, I think, the time frame of most concern expressed 11 by the counties, to our knowledge anyway?

12 A

As I indicated in previous testimony, we attended --

( )

13 Colonel Henderson attended most of these conferences.

He 14 didn't attend all of them.

The information that had anything 15 to do with our role as we then believed it to be, that of 16 purely preparing evacuation plans, was given to the counties.

I'7 Everything that we had they got, but Tuesday or Wednesday,

~

18 which would be early April, we learned of the daily reports 19 that were prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 20 learned of them indirectly through some source -- the Federal 21 Disaster Assistance Agency had a copy of one -- and then, when 22 we managed to get on the distribution list for that, then we s

23 had a little bit more to provide the counties with, and we did ry 24 that regularly, with the information we could get from any j

(

j

\\LJeewW Reorwrs. loc.

25 other sources -- authoritative sources.

i

$15 23 I

gN 1

Q As I understood it, these NRC announcements or brief

(

)

%d 2

ing papers, or however you want to describe them, were distrib-l I

3 uted to the press at every press conference -- at least once 4

they started to be distributed.

5 Are you aware of when these NRC releases first were made at 6l these press conferences, what day they first were started to 7

be distributed to the press conferences?

8 A

Yes.

I can't recall the date, but when we learned 9

of the availability of the report and when we got on the dis-10 tribution' list, we also asked for past copies and these were 11 telecopied to us and covered the previous -- it must have been i

12 l five or six days.

Whenever that process started, when we

/O 13 learned of it, we were about six or seven behind.

w) s 14 Q

Was there ever a formal or informal instruction 15 to state agencies that the Governor's press office would be 16 the sole source of information on TMI?

17 A

I ': was our understanding that that was the c

18 Governor's desire, that Mr. Critchlow, his press secretary, 19 would be the source of information relating to the incident.

20 Q

Was this a contributing factor to PEMA's distribu-21 tion of only planning information to the counties instead of 22 status information?

s 23 A

Yes.

()

24 0

On March 28 th, at about 2 : 00 to 3 : 00 o ' clock in the LJ.o.,e n.oon.n. inc.

25 afternoon, Mr. Miller, Mr. Herbine of Met Ed, briefed l

t

24 ji 6 l

1 Lieutenant Governor Scranton.

Were you or a PEMA representa-

)

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• tive present at that particular meeting?

3 A

I was not.

I don't believe any representative of our i

4 agency was.

But I am not absolutely certain of that because I 5

was not'present.

6; O

Are you aware of the meeting at all or who may have i

7' been there?

8 A

No.

9 Q

As I understood it, you were on duty when the two 10 phone calls came in from Met Ed on Friday morning.

11 A

Yes.

l 12 i O

One was a Mr. Floyd, calling Mr. Kuehn; and another 13 c'ne was sceone frcm Met Ed, calling Mr. Cassidy.

Are you aware la of who made the second call, the one to Mr. Cassidy?

15 A

No, I am not.

16 Q

Could you please describe the calls or how you 17 became aware of these two calls?

18 A

I became aware of the two calls as a result of being

~

19 advised of them by, I believe, our operations supervisor some 20 minutes after the conclusion of the individual telephone 21 conversations.

(

22 Q'

Jo this was. secondhand, either Mr. Kuehn or 23 Mr. Cassidy talked to you directly about these.

')

[L /.aww n. con.n. inc.

24 A

That's correct.

25 Q

How did PEMA decide to recommend evacuation e

ji 7 25

[L/]

1 following these calls and the ones from Mr. Collins.

2 A

Please state that

3. gain.

3 Q

Rephrased:

After these calls, these two calls, 4

combined with some telephone calls from Mr. Collins of the i

5 NRC, Colonel Henderson reccmmended to the Governor a five-mile,

6f 360 degree e~racuation.

I was curious about the discussions l

7 within PEMA prior to Colonel Henderson's recommendation and 8

what was discussed, and how was it decided that this recommenda-9 tion should be made.

10 A

Following Mr. Collins' conversations with 11 Colonel Henderson, I subsequently reported the gist of the 12 conversation to Mr. Gerusky and asked him to cet back to us

,a 13 with their reui.e.udaticn. At that point, or shortly thereafter, we had 14 a second call from Mr. Collins, indicating that his previous 15 recommendation had the support of the -- I forget -the exact 16 words -- the brass or the Commission -- or the Commission, 17 something -- and there was a very limited discussion among the

=

18 management element of the agency because so many different 19 things were going on at the same time and we were doing so 20 many things simultaneously.

21 What we did -- shortly thereafter, the Governor called x

22 Colonel Henderson and asked for an analysis of Mr. Collans and l

23 l

asked him what his recxmrendation was, and we had a hasty conversation O) l 24 prior to ColonelHenderson talking with the Governor.

Ace-Feoeral Rooorters, Inc.

l 25 Under the circumstancet that we had at the mcment -- the two '

26 8

ji 8 I

calls from Mr. Collins, two calls from the plant, one of which s_-

2 was identified as a very excited kind of conversation -- we 3

felt that we had no other prudent position than recommending 4

a 5-mile evacuation.

5 In the absence of any information to the contrary, that end t 3 6

seemed to be the prudent thing to do.

i I

st 4 7

0 Was there a telephone call from Colonel Henderson 8

or perhaps yourself to the Governor's office after the TMI 9

calls but prior to the telephone call from Mr. Collins?

10 A

There was a telephone conversation between Colonel II Henderson and the Lieutenant Governor.

I don' t believe there 12 was a conversation between Colonel Henderson and the Governor r-b)l 13 during that time frame.

14 Q

And the purpose of that was just to advise the 15 Lieutenant Governor of the TMI telephone calls?

16 A

Right.

And a similar call was made following 17 Hr. Collins' initial call.

18 Q

Which counties were called by PEMA on the morning 19 of March 30 regarding a possible evacuation; that is, Friday?

20 A

Dauphin, Lancaster, and York Counties were informed 21 of the calls and were told to stand by and that evacuation was 22 a possibility.

1 23 Q

Do you recall who made each of these calls?

O 24 A

I believe Colonel Henderson made them.

I don't knew.}

(

)

li~euws Runners. tnc.

25 I believe Colonel Henderson did.

+

I

27 jl. 9 A

1l Q

At the Governor's' meeting Friday morning, you 2

indicated that you weren't present at the decisionmaking 3

process -- during the decisionmaking process.

Could you 4

describe to me what was decided?

5 A

When I entered the room, I noted Mr. Gerusky lament-6l ing the fact that the announcement was going to be made.

He 7

didn't believe that that kind of action was indicated.

But 8

he indicated to me that he understood that the Governor had to 9

do that in light of what had been recommended by NRC.

10 There were a number of questions addressed to me by the Governor i.

11 and others in the group as to numbers of schools involved and 12 where would the people go and these type of things.

Then most O

'\\_,)

13 everyone left the session except the Governor, myself, and, I 14 believe, Mr; Waldman.

15 The discussion then had to do with the upcoming press con-16 ference, arrangements that were being made to carry that.

17 Q

There was one discrepancy that we seem to have run 18 into in these advisories that went out.

Let me describe to 19 you the problem.

At noon on March 30th PEMA sent a teletype tot 20 all affected counties lifting the " stay indoors" advisory.

21 You are aware of that teletype?

t~

22 A

Yes, sir.

i l

23 0

However, also about noon, the Governor held a press i%

24

(

)

conference at which, in answer to a question, he said that the l

w:mwn neoonm. ine.

25 advisory still remained in effect.

i

jl 10 28 I

I I

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1l Then subsequently, at a 10:00 p.m. news conference on

\\,)

2l Friday, the Governor officidly lifud this advisory, effective l

l 3

immediately.

We were just unclear as to the circumstances I

i 4!

regarding this apparent disrepancy.

l 1

i Si A

It would appear to me that it's a discrepancy.

I f

I 6,

was not present in the headquarters when the teletype message i

7!

was transmitted to the counties.

I learned of it later.

It 8

appears to me that it was a misunderstanding between PEMA and 9

the Governor's office as to that item.

10 Q

Do you know where PEMA headquarters got its informa-i II tion to support the teletype?

12 A

No, I don't.

O(,)

13 Q

Do you recall the nature of the original advisory 14 that was to "take cover" at 10 :00 o' clock?

Was the nature of 15 that the two-hour advisory or an open-ended advisory?

16 A

It was until noon, as I recall.

17 Q

The original one, m

18 A

The original one, the one that was issued mid-1 19 morning.

20 0

We are a little curious as to how there could be a

- 21 teletype out to the affected counties saying one thing and then i

22 the Governor at a press conference saying something else, and 23 the public not reacting to whether or not they should still 9 4 24 take cover.

Is there any explanation of why this went i

w.rm amomes. ix.

l 25 unnoticed by the public?

i l

jl 11 29

("N 1l A

The teletype message is directed to the County b

2 Emergency Management Coordinators.

At this period, and con-I 3i tinuing, we were doing our best to keep the counties informed 4

of decisions that were being made, press conferences that were 5

being held, and announcements that were being made.as a matter 6

of information to the emergency system.

We didn't -- we 7

weren't providing that for them to notify the public, because 8

in most instances it was after-the-fact kind of information 9

which frustrated us, but we kept plugging along.

10 Q

So you would not have expected the county organiza-11 tion to do anything with regard to notifying the public based 12 '

on the teletype ?

O)

(

13 A

No, because the pr'ss conference and the Governor's 14 announcement had already been rade at the time that that was 15 transmitted.

16 Ideally, we would like to get this kind of information to 1

17 them ahead of the fact so they have it and don't have to hear 18 it from some other source, but even under those circumstances, 19 we would not expect them to make any public announcement 20 unless we requested them to do so.

21 If this was necessary or desired, we would so indicate in 22

(

the body of the message.

23 Q

During your meeting with the Governor at 10:00

[ ) w auenm. ix.

24 o' clock or thereabouts on Friday morning, what was your L sww opinion to the Governor regarding the state of readiness for a l 25 i

I l

I

$1 12 30 1

five-mile evacuation?

2 A

I wasn't asked that question.

3 Q

As I understand it, for nuclear power or fixed-fault

.1 kinds of accidents, PEMA relies on BRP for technical evalua-5 tions and recommendations regarding protective measures and 6,

things of this nature.

7 However, the emergency response to implement a protective measure such as evacuation again, as I understr.nd it, it is the responsibil-g 9

ity of PEMA as far as coordinating, directing, things of this 10 nature, what are the peacetime, radiological exposure criteria 11 for eriergency deses and lifesaving doses for PEMA personnel and l

12 other people who would be critical to a successful evaluation 13 such as the State ?olice and National Guard?

1.1 A

I can't answer that.

That information we would 15 expect to be provided by the Bureau of Radiation Protection.

16 Q

But there are no criteria existing.

This would be 17 an ad hoc determination?

18 A

It has been established,and it's part of our plan.

19 I can't personally quote the numbers.

20 l Q

What are the consequences of an evaluation?

Clearly, 21 an evaluation is taken to protect public health and safety from 22 some potential or actual hazard, but what are the consequences s

23 of an evaluation?

It clearly is not a consequence-free O

24 measure.

(.3.a.,e meno,i.ri, inc.

25 A

Well, you are disrupting the lives and exposing them

jl 13 31 1

to certain dangers which are an inherent part of any evacua-V(~3 2

tion.

We attempt to minimize those in doing our best to 3

effect an orderly evacuation' with the kind of traffic control 4

and the kind of assistance that are required under those cir-5 cumstances.

6, The consequences of some of the special-handling kind of l

7l evacuees is quite a decisica.

If you are moving aged or infirm, a

ill people, the gamble there is you are going to lose some if 9

you move them.

10 The consequences of particularly that group who have medical 11 problems, some of the consequences are quite ' difficult.

You're 12 '

damned if you do, and damned if you don't, that kind of thing.

( j) 13 Q

How strongly do these consequences enter into your 14 decisional process for making recommendations regarding 15 whether or not to evacuate?

16 A

Well, some of the later consequences that I described i

17 are more appropriately applied to movement plans for a special 18 group as contrasted to an evacuation of a large area.

Maybe 19 under one set of circumstances it would be better to let the 20 residents of a nursing home or hospital, a certain segment of 21 the hospital patients, remain there even though the area 22 generally would be evacuated.

23 A number of these kinds of special considerations would be rx

!(

)

24 treated perhaps independent from the general decision to L a os.,a n.ponen,snc.

25 evacuate an area.

I

jl 14 32 1

Q The Dauphin County emergency plan, dated April 6, 2

1979, which was put together after the TMI incident and was a 3

planning document for 5, 10, and 20-mile evacuation, states 4

that "After evacuation of hospitals, PEMA will provide 5

emergency services in the evacuated area. "

We were curious 6l what this type of statement means.

Generally, how would an l

7 injured person or someone wichin the evacuated area, after the 8

hospitals are no longer functional, what would PEMA do about 9

this kind of situation?

Is it PEMA's responsibility?

What 10 would they do?

11 A

Are you talking about someone that was injured as 12 part of the evacuation?

13 Q

Perhaps.

14 A

I don't understand your question.

15 Q

Perhaps.

The statement basically indicates to me 16 that somehow PEMA picks up the responsibility for somebody who 17 is injured within the evacuation area, but after the hospitals 18 and facilities are not longer functional --

19 A

I don't know that that is meant in that manner.

20 As far as the Dauphin County plan is concerned, those ser-21 vices provided outside of Dauphin County are the responsibility 22 of PEMA.

Medical assistance would be provided in the support

(

23 counties through available medical facilities, just like it

(

)

24 would for any other resident of that parti nlar county utiliz-u.ome n.oorters, inc.

25 ing available medical resources, perhaps augmented where the i

$1 15 33 I

support county has indicated a deficiency.

'~#

2 Q

Augmented by PEMA actions?

3 A

That's correct.

4 O

To what extent i:.eliance placed on the State Police 5

during an evacuation?

6'.

A Well, they are the principal traffic control element j

7' associated with this kind of planned evacuation.

This is their 8

set and assigned role.

9 Q

As I understand it, the State Police was on a four-10 hour white alert during this time pe'riod.

Would that affect 11 their ability to respond in case an evacuation had been 12 '

necessary?

13 A

I believe it was the National Guard that was on a 14 four-hour white alert.

15 0

If they had been on an alert status, would that 16 substantially affect the ability to evacuate?

17 A

It would increase the mobilization time.

If I

~

18 understand your question correctly, it would increase the 19 mobilization time by that number of hours that it would take 20 l for them to muster sufficient forces in the area to effectively 21 control an evacuation.

I think it's important to understand 22 that our understanding of our mission, following the TMI t

23 incident, was to proceed with your evacuation planning.

But

(

)

24 we understood very clearly, and accepted and supported the WrederW Reporters, loc.

25,

Governor's desire to play this down as much as possible, so i

f l

I l

jl 16 34 i

1 things that we would have done normally had we been anticipat-2 ing some other kind of emergency 6r disaster, we didn't do in 3

this instance because of the affect that it would have on the 4

public.

l 5

This includes the mobilization of State Police.

You don't 6!

move e. lot of troopers into an area without arousing somebody's i

7 curiosity.

i a

The same thing is true of the Pennsylvania Nat. aal Guard.

9 We would normally move some of our stockpile facilities, 10 resources, in closer to where le plan for their possible i

11 use.

12 These things weren't done because of the effect it would

/

.4 13 have.

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

(

22 23 l

24 M.,. a n.. i.

25 -

I t

i i

9 35 217 06 21 h

ins Jeuanin County emer:9.: / Alan of *pri! '73.

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s J

wai:n is n?

ne i., effect et the time of tne Til accide70, anti:1petes tnat 2 represe1:stive from UR? Nill ce 30 tne i

county emergency operations center, if possicle. to assist in :ne evaluation of incoming informa tion.

Al so, as I rec:11, during tne T.!I ac:iden t, there was an s

samitted snort:caint in eitner ?EMA or uncerstandin; One i

.araciems, taat 3:19 would have perhaps been more sole to

/

effe:tively communicate witn PEMA nad they had a 13 representative in your emertency operations center.

II

\\

Right.

12 2

In your view, how importan: is this direct 13 intirface with SR? st the state level anu at the county 14 lavel in a situation li'<e tais?

I; A

I think it's extremely important tnat rad I5 protection of caoable and competent personnel in the state Ie emergency operations center to give direct technical edvice 13 to tne coun:11 and the agency ano tne emergency resaonse li teams.

23 I don't celieve it's necessary for them to be directly 21 represented in any one county.

We nave the means of getting 22 that information to the countiec when it's made availaole to 23 us.

24 I assume that the reason that that was included in the t'

25 Jaupnin County plan is that they were given some l

1 i

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a nc ou recemen t to inclfoe the: as 2.slannino a ssumotion os se; e

on :ne if ;ossicle.:ind of --

3

)

It's clear from r3 edin; :ne s ta t 3 plan tast tnere 4

3re different functions to ce performed oy pi'.!A and the state and a

local smergancy coordinators, and clearly in my mino there should oe a difference as to what is containeo in One e'

various amer 7ency. alans as you go from tne state 13791 co n i

to cna local level.

?lould you please give me your oose rvations as to anet IJ 1evel of detail shoulo ce contains; in state plans, county 11 plans ana local plans?

.ihat you might expect to fino to 1:

nave the most effective reasonaole olen.

13 A

In my view, the state emergency coerations clan

()

la should ce a guide f or state, county and local e neroency 13 forces to conouct oisaster operations.

As you go aown from 13 the stata plan to county plans and to local plans, more and I,

more detail should as provided cown to the point wnere you 13 nave telephone numcers ano intersections and assignments ano le individual's named and that type of thing.

That is the kind m

20 of de tail tnat belongs in tne local plan.

21 A certain amount of specific detail, less than tnat 22 contained in the state plan -- more than that contained in 23 the state plan but less than that contained in most local 24 plans, should ce what is found in county plans.

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23 Now, there is some variation as to the method of I

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plo'ain; in sever:1 counties in tne Connonweelth.

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ounty organizations rely T. ore heavily on tne count /

3 organization to conduct emergency operations with less involvement on the part of local orgeni:ations.

The re is a oit of flexicility in tnat across tne Conmonweelth.

s 2

.io w, tne incividual Commonwealth departments end agen:ies

/

snould nave, alans in consiciracle de tail a ssocis ted fita d

their duties and responsioliities associatea wita emergencies, all under the umore11a of tne Pennsylvania is Disaster Ope rations Pl en.

11 Jow, genere11y that's our approach to planning in the la Commo nwe alta.

Under most circumstanc es, it seems to tra:k 13 well.

The one possiole exception has been planning

()

14 associated with fixed nuclear facilities.

15 Ne are proviaing more detailad guide answer in Annex 2, 15 f or e xample, than we would normally for some other kind of 11 disaster, out we f eel we have to ao this.

13 0

Why?

In what areas?

19 A

'!sinly because emergency plans associated with m

20 fixed nucleer f acility incidents are scrutinizeo oy people 21 who, for one recson or another, either don't have our 22 disas ter ope rations plan availaole to them or don't take the 23 time to wade througn it, it oeing a document of considereole 24 s ize.

So we have attempted to have our emergency planning i

23 f or fixed nuclear sites be not so dependent on our

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umorilla plan as vs co in other -- I don't <no.! i f tnat 2

ma'<? s any s?nse or not.

3 J

Ta'<ing the Cauchin County olan of April 5th as an 4

3xample for discussion purposes, this particular clan a

con ained a fair amount of Jetail, as I recall, in the area a

of routes a73 placement of signs anc people and cars and

/

buses anc things of this nature.

5o I guess it woul: on 3

f air to :hsracterize that as a comoination county / local

/

plan.

i IJ A

Yes.

11 J

That is, in e ssence, I guess, how it was 11 developea?

13 A

Right.

()

14 Is this the kinc of detail that you feel is 15 necessary for local plans?

15 A

In support of county' plans, yes.

Since tnat l

II April 6th date, in this vicinity, a numoer of local plans 19 have been developed oy suodivisions in the immediete ares 1/

that strengthen, if you will, the county plan and flow with d

2]

it.

21 0

How of ten would such plans have to be updated, 22 since they are so very specific?

23 A

Our current instructions are at least annually.

24 0

Is it a f air statament that existing county plans

-'s 25 at tne time of TMI had virtually no detail in tnem except l

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notif ication requiraments ?

V d

A Limited d2 tail.

3 J

Ic's also fair to say tnat the re we re no -- or 4

ess3ntially no -- local plans in existence at tnat tim 3?

3

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inere were few local plans in existence.

3 0

Then we sesm to heve a disagreement of what

/

pernaps yourself or mayce PT4A in general f eels is nece ssary 3

f or adequate planning on the one hand, as opposec to what was in existence on the other hand.

Is that a fair IJ 5tatement?

II A

do.

I think that's based on the assumption tna t J

14 if you don't nave a written plan you can't oossibly react to 13 an emergency.

I don't believe that's a valid assumption.

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14 71e find in our daalings with county and local emergency d

is organizations that written plans are not tasir strong point, 16 out they can implement their plans -- they have Ie organizations who we have confidence in as a result of 13 wor <ing with them tnat can Lmplement and get the joo done IV without volumes of writt n pl ans.

20 do w, we would like to have many more written plans of th?

21 type that we are all comfortable with, out ge ttina thea is 22 something else.

One of the proolems that we have following 23 an incident, for example, like TMI is to convince or somehot 24 interpret for someone who is not familiar with the county i

2a emergency organization, for example, the fact tnat they w

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n av 3 the ca,;soility to impliment tneir plan, even tnouca tna 4

olan is not written or if it is written, it's in less taan 3

desirsola form in suostance.

4

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Tnen you woulo characteriza an emergency plan -- e 3

detailed amaroency plan as desirable but not nec e ss ary?

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A fast's enrrect.

iighly desiracle.

e 0

aaat aoout plans f or f ederal cooraination?

Is it 3

clear that everycody knows who the ac tors 3re and vast tne

/

state-feceral interf ace is and who you go to in an emergency 17 quickly and how f ast the response can be?

And are these il procidures an; cefinitions of responsibilities clearly set 12 forta?

13 A

I celieve they are clearly set forth and (J\\

14 undarstoca oy employees of dennsylvania Emergency Managenent la Age.7:y, yes.

Now, some of the relationsnip cetween f ederal lo agencies ana other Commonwealth depertments and agencies 1/

sometimes is not tnat clearly known to us.

16

,ie are generally f amiliar with the kinds of emergency 19 assistance availaole f rom all feceral agencies out tne 2]

intricate detail of some of it is contained oy individuals 21 in enat state agency.

They know more acout tneir f ederal 22 counterpart than we do.

23 J

Okay, is it fair then, to rephrase that tnat you 24 are intimately f amiliar with those agencies providing

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air s:t support to thinas lise evacuation, su n as J;?A ano a

/vA t, out '4r. Jerus':y would os.nors f amiliar with :nosa

' inds of r3sponses necessur/ from DJE anc radiolo;t:31 a

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4 monitoring?

a A

faat's correct.

Na are g3nerally f amiliar that S

thit Rind of assistance is generally availaale, and g3nerally wno can provide tnem, out the Eursau of laaistion i

? rot 3ction : nows specifically wnet xind of assisten:e is i

availabla and how to ootain it.

13 The same concition exists, for ex3cple, with US 11 Jap 3rtment of Agriculture.

/le are familiar with many of 12 their disastar programs cecause we are in and out of them 13 alnost on e daily casis.

There are other kinas of

()

14 a ssis tance that is availac13 to a ste te tnrough USJA that we la don't have that much occasion to become involvea in, but the 15 State Department of Agriculture knows these avenues and we il loor to them and their emergency response team memoers to 13 provide the missing link.

li O

Inst's about all I have in the way of questions.

23 Jo you have anything else you would lik3 to-stat? for the 21 record at this time regarding any aspect that micht help our 22 inquiry?

23 A

I don't believe so.

I can' t tnink of anything.

2?

In tnose instances where th3re has oeen sometning tnat I

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25 thought I could add that would cetter descrice the i

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suo; ence ating talkso acout; I hsve cone aat.

( J' ros 2

La t me as% you one more oue stion, I guess to try s

a and wrap uo tais local plan aspect.

4 I think you previously said tnat ?E'dA has no resaonsioliity for the existence or adequa:/ of local 3

piels.

3ut you neve also said that detailea lo:31 olens, 3:

lasst in your view -- and I assume i n p Eid A's v i e w -- ars higaly desirsole.

It woula appear to me tnat ?2.'!A would os 5

intarested in trying to assure that sucn plans exist, and I

/

10 wonder if you could tell me to what extent p55tA aiant carry Il this interest?

u 12 A

I don't know that -- if I inaicatec we hava no 13 responsiollity for the preparation of local emergency plans.

14 Legally or tacnnically, that's so.

3ut we are constantly 13 worcing wita county directors in the dev?lopment of model 15 local plans and continuing t'o pressure them, if you will, to 1/

get aut and work with their locals and oevelop the.cind of 13 plans, detailed plans, that are essential anJ will meke an is emergency operation go that much more smootnly.

2)

.ie do a lot of this.

This is the kina of day-to-day 21 a ssis tanc e t.'at we provide counties.

We are constantly 2a after them to 1., prove end update th?ir own planning e f f ort 23 and to get in and.71tch and help the local folks develop ana 2;

update their plans.

t' 26 MR. ERNSTs Mr. H3rr?

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I have several areas *there I toula li e to tie

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some loose enos.

You mentioned at :ne start thet waen tne 4

evacuation 31anning went occ from five to 10 miles -- I 5

02111ve it was. riday -- tnat tais expanded the numoer of 3

coun:les from tnree to five.

I tnin': you seid Loosnon and Cumoirland counties wer) in:1udea.

A Inst's :orrect.

io your knowleoge, was Leoanon County adviseo to 1) cegin a lO-qile evacuation pl e n on. r i day ?

A I would have to answer taet of I assune 53.

I 12 Jidn't personally speak wita Leoanon County concerning thet 13 out I assuma that soaeona else on tne staff aid.

II 14 3

Uo you know when tne notification went out to the V

la counties to cegin 10-mile planning?

15 A

33.

It happened in tnat perica from mid-oorning 1.

to noon, wnile I was in the Governor's o ffice, out I assume 13 it occurreo during that perica, ' ut I can't know that as e o

I/

matter. of f act oecause I was not in neacouarters.

That C

23 would ce my educated guess, that we notifiso them curing 21 that period.

2 0

Okay.

You mentioned also that there are somewnera 23 around 2200 localities within the state that have local 24 coordinators and I celieve you said at the time of the

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25 accioent there were a few localities that did not have lace!

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oorjinators?

A fn30's Oorrect.

3 2

'.a re any of those 'fitnin ene 20-mile zone 4

surrounding f tI?

J A

I coulon't tell you taat.

I coula cet that 2

information for'you out I don't nave it at my fingertips.

/

I would sopreciate if you could orovice tast 3

information to us.

/

A Fine.

1)

You mentioned that a ?E:.tA representative was il present at most of the meetings or oriefings in the 14 Jovtrnor's o ffice tnrougn Sunday.

However, you weren't IJ present ef ter Sunday.

I celieve the Lieutenant Governor was-

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14 present in most of those meetings and he serves as chairman V

15 of tne coun:ll, Emergency Management Council.

15 des pEMA receiving oriefing or information from the I.

Lieutenant Jovernor following Sunday as to what was takinc 13

,olace at these meetings and oriefinas in the Governor's

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offi:e?

23 A

I would like to quelity my previous statement 21 aoout we were present at most of the meetin;s curing this 22 period from Fricay to Suncay oy adding that I am aware of.

23 I'm sure there were meetings conducted that we were not 24 aware of.

How many they might add up to, I really don't i'

2a know but I'm sure there were meetin:s conducted during tne nD)nh >\\ \\

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.-riaay to Sun:sy period 72 aid no:.:now : out.

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inviteo to cost of One ones Ne /.ne.i scout.

s Ls me clarity oy 7uestion a cit.

I gues.1 I am a

interestec primarily in the meeting orec? ding the Governor's aress conference, tne joint pre:ss conferences ce twe e., Haral:

J2nton and tas Governor whid1I oelieve too>. place almost i

svery evening, and tnere was 9.meetinc are:eJinq tnose pre:3 3

onferences.

A Calonel Henderson was present at only a vsry f 3w 13 of tnose.

Until Sunacy.

Af;er 3un31y he. was not present at 16 s

la any?

13 A

Tnat's correct.

l 14

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Mas PE'JA receiving information from the Lieutenant i

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1; Govirnor, or any otner person tnat was present f or that Ib matter.

. 1/

A Colonel Henderson was recalving some information 11 fron the Lieutenant Governor Scranton, information tnat 1/

Lieutenant Jovernor Scranto, considerec to ce of some value 2) to our evacuation planning effort.

ll

.ies PE4A notified when tnese meetings wer3 taking 22 place or wnen the press conf erences were going to ce helo so 23 you could et least listen to the racio, that kind of thing?

- ;24 A

Frequently we would hear of them f rom somacody

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23 outside.

We would attempt to keep our television and raaio

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?ouipment 17 our em?rgency : enter tuned to loc 1 station 2 2

out very fraquently we woula near ?.cout announcenents from 3

some outsiatrs.

4 1

2 U:ay.

ane final question.

I celieve you s aio a

that you were present in the Gover73r's office. riday a

morning snor:1y oefore noon, cefore the press conference.

Juring tne aesting precedin; the ore ss :onferenca, was :ne s

a lif ting of cae stay indoors advisory dis:ussed?

/

A bo.

12 0

It was not discussed at ell?

11 A

.10.

12 J

As far as you wer3 concerned, the acvisory whi h 13 went into e f f ect at noon -- e xcuse T.e, une aavisory that

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4ent into effe:t at 10 : 00 o' cloc'< ano was at tnat time to 1;

last two hours was to expira at noon as originally planned?

15 A

That was my -- this was not discussed specifically li in the discussion ahead of the press conference.

The empnasis 13 of tnat discussion was on tne pregnant woas, and pre-senool IV chiloren ano closing schools and prooleas associateo wita c

2) those three things.

21 0

Jo to your knowledge, the Governor's response to 22 the reporter's cuestion curing ths press conference as to 23 whether the stay indoors advisory would remain in effect or 24 would be lifted was a persons 1 cecision made cy him witnaut

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25 any input from you or --

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nat I was 3 Mars of, yes.

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I neve notnin; els7.

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4 2

I would li%e :o ask one clerifying cuestion an:

mayce one 3d ditional. If you tal% scout catail in amer ency

.a l e,3, from waat I neve near: cefore there :oula os two tyues of detail.

One type of deteil coula ce e listin; o f 4

s available resources or resources that might ce taposo or mignt ce availecle.

I l -J A secona type of detail might ce e specific evacuation li rou:3, specific things that specifi: people do end et what 12 ti.me they do tnem and who tasy pick up and things of that 13 nature.

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14 Jo you perceive any oiff erence in these two types of j

13 uetail?

Which one would be more adv entageous than tne la other?

'i 1/

A Tae resource inventory, wnich is something tne; we 13 have long advocated that county and local emeroency 1/

cooroinators have and constantly uposte, is not really a da plan in my mina.

It coes not qualify as a plan.

21 four second description woulc more closely agree with my 22 impre ssion o f a plan.

However, man / peorle in the emer:ency 23 system will point to their resource inventory as "my plan" 2d and therein lies the basis f or -my comment aoout the kind of

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23 detailed pl:nning that approval planners are lookin; for.

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'rou know, vnen :nars is e scarcity of this, they 209':

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nin en or:anization coul possiole res. con yet tn7t fellow a

vita nis resource inventory in nis nip poc%e t, sone:ines 4

4 i t's amaz ing, you 'e.now, an operator, a corn c,nerator, wi h j

som3 thing like tnet can get an awful lot done in elmost a complete aos?nce of written plans.

is your tnowle:ge, diu s r:n resource inventori>s 3xis; et ta) county and local levels at the time of tne ill acciuent?

i 10 A

faey existeo at the county level.

I wou12 not 11

.<no a a bou t t he local level.

I:

3 Tais is separate from tae plar..

13 A

In3t's Correct.

4 N'

14 a

H3vs you personally revised some o f these files la ano so forta to Jet a f eel 3s to tne extent that the ld counties know acout their resources?

li A

.i311, this is sone thing tnat we constantly pursua li at our annusi seminars.

I nave reviewea tnea on tnos e le occasions when I have oeen visiting e county coorainator.

2)

Otners in tae. agency regularly review these for accuracy and 21 update thea, i

22 It's something we put considersole effort into osc aus t 1

23 it's a very necessary ano useful device in the conduct of l

22 emergency operations.

If you don't snow whare your 2a resources are, you're sort of lost.

1 1

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a In conclusion, I toulci 11.: 3 to 3.1/ : mat you till 4

ge t 1 Cooy'of tqis 23 position for ?qv corr? tions vou f 911 j

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mi;n: ce warrant 3(i.

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I woulo also 11%2 to s1y this is an ongoing inv3stigation l

and -31thou7n I have congletid tha 7tn stions I have f or /7u j

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l today, it's cossiol? t? mig 7t nee: :o crin? you c10.

f" i.

f ur:a ?r que s tions - I dount i; and till car:sinly

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)v3r/-?ffor; not to ao so -- cut for that raeso, o717. I i

s will recass tnis deoosition ratner enan class it, out I do I

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13' wisa to chan'.< you for your :17e and your help in our

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11 in4uiry.

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li (anersu?ca, tne tding of the Japosition 133 1-i IJ adjourneo at i1833 a.a.)

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