ML19322A065

Amend 13 to PSAR Including Corrected Population Figures, Slick Rope Slope Stability Analysis,Pipe Tunnels Design Change,& Miscellaneous Text Corrections & Changes

ML19322A065
Person / Time
Site:	Yellow Creek
Issue date:	12/28/1978
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML19322A063	List: ML19322A062 ML19322A065
References
NUDOCS 7901020151
Download: ML19322A065 (110)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. -. U<m rN U YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AMENDMENT 13 Instruction Sheet i Af ter filing this amendment into the PSAR, this instruction sheet should be filed in the front of Volume 1, behind the amendment checklist. TEXT Remove Insert Front /Back Front /Back Figure 2.1-9 (T) /- Figure 2.1-9 (T) /- Figure 2.1-10 (T) /- Figure 2.1-10 (T) /- Figure 2.1-10a (T) /- Figure 2.1-ll(T) /- Figure 2.1-ll(T) /- Fi gure 2.1-12 (T) /- Figure 2.1-12 (T) /- Figure 2.1-13 (T) /- Figure 2.1-13(T)/- y Figure 2.1-14 (T) /- Figure 2.1-14 (T) /- Figure 2.1-15 (T) /- Figure 2.1-15 (T) /- Figure 2.1-15a (T) /- Figure 2.1-16 (T)/- Figure 2.1-16 (T)/- Figure 2.1-17 (T)/- Figure 2.1-17 (T) /- - s Figure 2.1-18 (T) /- Figure 2.1-18(T) /- Figure 2.1-19 (T)/- Figure 2.1-19 (T) /- Figure 2.1-20 (T)/- Figure 2.1-20(T)/- Figure 2.1-21(T)/- Figure 2.1-21(T) /- Figure 2.1-22 (T)/- Figure 2.1-22 (T) /- Table 2. 2-1(T) /- Table 2.2-1(T) /- Table 2. 2-1(T) (contd. ) /- 2.3-9/2.3-10 2.3-9/2.3-10 2.5-11/2.5-12 2.5-11/2.5-12 2.5-12a/- 2.5-13/2.5-14 2.5-13/2.5-14 2.5-14a/- 2.5-14a/- 2.5-23d/2.5-24 2.5-23d/2.5-23e 2.5-24/- 2.5-37/2.5-38 2.5-37/2.5-38 through through 2.5-41/2.5-42 2.5-55/2.5-56 Table 2. 5-5 (T) /- Table 2. 5-5 (T) /- Table 2. 5-10 (T) /- Table 2. 5-10 (T) /- t Table 2. 5-15 (T) /- Table 2.5-16 p') /- Table 2. 5-17 C') /- Table 2. 5-18 (T) /- Figure 2.5-18/- Figure 2.5-18/- ('% Figure 2.5-18a/- Figure 2.5-18a/- Figure 2.5-58/- \\ through Figure 2.5-80/- 790102019 i s t Remove Insert ~.. Front /Back Front /Back 3.2-3 3.2-3 3.3-3/3.3-4 3.3-3/3.3-4 3.5-1/3.5-2 3.5-1/3.5-2 3.5-3/3.5-4 3.5-3/3.5-4 3.5-5/3.5-6 3.5-5/3.5-6 3.5-7/3.5-7a 3.5-7/3.5-7a 3.5-8/3.5-9 3.5-8/3.5-9 Table 3.5-1/ Table 3.5-2 Table 3.5-1/ Table 3.5-2 3.8-29/3.8-30 3.8-29/3.8-30 3.8-30a/- 3.8-33/3.8-34 3.8-33/3.8-33a 3.8-33b/3.8-34 3.8-37/38-38 3.8-37/3.8-37a 3.8-38/3.8-38a 3.8-39/3.8-40 3.8-39/3.8-40 3.8-41/3.8-42 3.8-41/3.8-42 3.8-45/3.8-46 3.8-45/3.8-45a 3.8-46/- 3.8-47/3.8-48 3.8-47/3.8-48 f 3.8-48a/- 6.2-46b/6.2-46c 6.2-46b/6.2-46c 6.2-46d/6.2-46e 6.2-46d/6.2-46e )Ci 6.2-46f/6.2-46g 6.2-46f/6.2-46g Table 6. 2-15 (T) (contd. ) / Table 6. 2-16 (T) (Contd. ) / Table 6.2-17 (T) Table 6.2-17 (T) Table 6.2-41(T)sh. 1/- Table 6.2-41(T) sh. 1/- Table 6. 2-41(T) sh. 2/- through Table 6.2-41(T) sh. 3/- Table 6.2-41(T) sh. 7/- Table 6. 2-41(T) sh. 4/ sh. 5 Table 6. 3-1(T)/ Table 6. 3-1(T) Table 6. 3-1(T)/ Table 6. 3-1(T) (contd. ) (contd.) Table 8.1-2 (T) sh. 1/sh. 2 Table 8.1-2 (T) sh. 1/sh. :2 9.2A-3/9.2A-4 9.2A-3/9.2A-4 9.2A-5/9.2A-6 9.2A-5/9.2A-6 9.2A-9/9.2A-10 9.2A-9/9.2A 9.4-1/9.4-2 9.4-1/9.4-2 9.4-7/9.4-8 9.4-7/9.4-8 9.5A-13/9.5A-14 9.5A-13/9.5A-14 9.5A-15/9.5A-16 9.5A-15/9.5A-16 10.4-19/10.4-20 10.4-19/10.4-20 11.3-5/11.3-6 11.3-5/11.3-6 11.3-7/11.3-8 11.3-7/11.3-8 Table 17.1A-3 (T) sh. 1/sh. 2 Table 17. lA-3 (T) sh._1/sh. 2 Table 17. lA-3 (T) sh. 3/- Table 17.lA-3(T)~sh. 3/sh. 4 i l l O l

1 i i ( NRC QUESTIONS Remove Insert Front /Back Frort/Back 110.9-1/110.9-2 110.9-1/110.9-2 110.9-3/110.10-1 110.9-3/110.10-1 130.13-1/130.13-2 130.13-1/130.13-2 130.30-1/130.30-2 130.30-1/130.30 2 4 130.30-3/130.30-4 130.30-3/130.30-4 130.30-5/130.30-6 130.30-5/130.30-6 130.30-7/- 362.1/362.2-1 362.1-1/362.2-1 1 372.32-1/372.32-2 372.32-1/372.32-2 372 32-5/372.32-6 372.32-5/372.32-6 i 372.32-7/372.32-8 372.32-7/372.32-8 372.32-9/372.32-10 372.32-9/- 421.5A-2/421.6-1 421.5A-2/421.6-1 421.7-1/421.7-2 421.7-1/421.7-2 421.9-1/- 421.9-1/- 421.10-1/- 421.10-1/- 421.11-1/421.11-2 f 422.1-1/- i!O l l O [ [ i

N NNW NNE 100 NW 3 NE o 5 o s 25 "3 ENE WNW igs rs 'O

1. o

\\0 ' g5 /g 'o s b 43 - ~ E 120 10 ' 20 [ - 15 5 120 g 30 ,s.- s 20 30 1 g 15 t 2o 4 o e e G /o

1. 60 s00 3

+ e 4 ESE WSW g $5 e# SE SW i.u0 SSW SSE ig S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT ~ PRELIMIN ARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 1970 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE SITE FIGURE 2.1-9(T)

d(s N NNW NNE NW NE 9, O WNW ENE s o p 'o s \\0 9 ~ 20 - b is s 4 so s E 180 10 l 25 s - 15 1 - 5 130 g p ..~ s 30 1 J 20 o ~g \\0 20 f 4 ) e 0 e ??s go 3 20 WSW 4 ESE g 65 ,n os SE SW i.e0 SSW SSE ig S Added by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMINARY SAFETY AN ALYSIS REPORT 1987 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION v WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE SITE FIGURE 2.1-11 (T)

O N NNW NNE

• 2 NE NW o

S Y o 30 WNW ENE g 5 233 \\b 'O a b Ib /$ 5 /s + 3 S So - E g 155 10 ' 20 - 15 5 120 30 -,,- 5 30 1 s 20 o 20 g g p 2 G /s '60 \\b 3 p p 9 15 WSW 4 ESE g 60 5 s, e i.38s SE SW SSW SSE in S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMIN ARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CN 1980 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION b WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE SITE FIGURE 2.1-10(T) 4

O N NNW NNE NW 'o, NE 0 D 33 ENE WNW o s \\ 28o ps 'O

1. s go i,' 20

'S b o s '~ ss s p,

is s

130 E ns i i 25 W s s 9 1 J 20 s o 20 2$ w g s o i o ~ s

1. 1. 0 sto 3

20 WSW 4 ESE g 63 OO S 'b i SE SW i.343 i SSW SSE in S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT j [V^') 1990 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE SITE FIGURE 2.1-12(T)

( N NNW NNE 150 NW c NE n

1. G h

s 40 ENE WNW 5 30$ 200 t o f j g \\0 1 is p, ' b o {'y b SS ~ g 240 10 l 20 - 20 1 - 5 135 E s f '1 4 20 n 50 C) ,,'e 20 1b /s c s" 's s2S

1. 95 3-5 20 WSW 4

ESE g 70 o /s 8 SW i.620 SE SSW SSE jo S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 2000 POPilLATION DISTRIBUTION WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE SITE s FIGURE 2.1-13(T)

O N NNW NNE NE NW G, h o 40 ,G ENE WNW 5 Y 33g no 'O ~ 's 20 \\O l0 2 b 3 n s 53 10 20 E s i3s 35 ' 2o '. 2' W p ,8s' 10

1. 3

\\0 f% 's 2 e e 's /,

1. 1. 0 0

3 e e 5 25 ESE 4 WSW g g 10 s# SE SW voo SSW SSE jo S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ll fT 2010 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION -d WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE SITE FIGURE 2.1-14(T)

O N NNW NNE I65 NE NW L e 's %o Y A5 ENE WNW ho 2\\o 'O ~ 3 \\O 9 ]$ 20 y 0 O 2 60 \\0 [ - 20 s i43 E a5 is 2 W p .s.~ fo e go. e /, 9 3 UO O e 5 2s 4 ESE WSW g g 70 5 pf 's 2 s8 SE SW u3o SSW SSE in S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMINARY SAFETY j ANALYSIS REPORT j 2020 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION \\- WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE SITE FIGURE 2.1-15(T)

N NNW NNE 8 675 e e s" NW u e, NE Y [ ~ D 2.875 [ s ~% ENE WNW e,, j j ?spo 'q "'*** $ sess tofg 145 \\.4,o g g /.c go p s5 a co 260 QD W 3.690 4.i25 2.58o 17.385 l 155 1401 925 4.790 9.645 8.840 E 0 290 g9 \\.37 Ow

1. J#
2. 50 e 8 #o s.

3.315 fooo to <q, . *p 2.sss 69,, 2 S 2 ,.3 is j e,'3 4 6,, WSW 20 ESE S 2.045 v g 30 g G SW 6.775 8 "O e 5 2,595 SSW SSE 3o S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMINARY SAFETY AN ALYSIS RE, PORT C' 1970 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION b) WITHIN 50 MILES OF THE SITE FIGURE 2.1-16(T) l

N NNW NNE , g,,, 2 2 NW

4. iso NE

%s f ?., E dp e ups WNW ENE

1. 3'o

'?o h sV 10.39s E220 Q 3.hD Js /o 8 65 o3 3,3 < 170?o l/ bib 23 S O p r 305 \\9b m s.3 % i i.360 ioo2s E W 3 ass

4. s am 20.380 l i%

l i40 D 290 q\\ \\.6\\b hQ# IS$ 19 ib '4$ 0 T 0 %.) 'ps g 7,'*S N 2.22s ~*s +h /"o q.1b N N23$ WSW 2o ESE 5 p 3

2. l?5

'J 30 3~ SW 7.s

• SE p

40 g e t 2.690 SSW SSE 3g S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Q] / 1980 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION WITHIN 50 MILES OF THE SITE FIGURE 2.1-17(T) i

N NNW NNE 10./% f NW 4.390 NE [ 'e, g* s s. 4.105 E885 ^ ENE WNW e'9 h s,s@ 0 11,615 6/g ^Q h 3@ E b \\.h3D 4//0 s 195 o lI Q p lo 3 h3 20S W 3.385 4,190 3.080 24 2 220 150 1 1.065 8.355 11.930 10.635 E 220 Jos %l6 y,b7b 3 I ls o 10 'Es 2.s* p s O. Ip '\\ q k3 j Q h E g (j ,y 2.325 e e '0 r.9 +$ s'3 / ESE o i 02s WSW 20 S v 9 2.215

1. v, 6

~ f* f 49 SW s.2 SE R -? r,.

7. nt, SSW SSE 3o S

Added by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 1987 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION p WITHIN 50 MILES OF THE SITE ( FIGURE 2.1-18 (T)

J' N NNW NNE ,,g,, 8 3 v NW 4.480 NE g "e h s e,, f r 4.32s z o WNW e ENE 'll$ O 12.190 4a 4, 8 3.# 443 s \\- O' ' ?o e o, ?$ s2O - o ag 355 grO W 3.34 3 4.iw

095 26.s80 l 233 l

15o I i.i m 9.350 12.17s 10.900 E 210 310 s.# fgo '85

2.

• 10

<s, 330 1 m

1. 3.293 2.k1 0

o ~ 2 3IO 1 ssO 0,5

• 4+>

q 3

1. 3 20 ESE WSW o

o f ~ 2.255 63 30 p /,'a s s w ~v 847o SW SE 40 t y 9 2,740 SSW SSE 3, S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMIN ARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT .r N 1990 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION i (f)' WiTHIN 50 MILES OF THE SITE Fl6tJRE 2.1-19(T) i

' N N NNW NNE 11.580 p 0 N 5, 4 NW NE u,.n > 'O,, 'q, l s 5, /

• * 's ENE WNW '6s s's's s*

o s gg N s? 'spo o ,o Jara ,n 2 tecs s,q 9 go 38o 2 '> 2 W

3. iso 4.cas 343s 30.52o l 27s iso I

i.160 t i.230 13.60s 11.545 E 1so , 4s \\N O h%# 8/s 29 ib '909s 7* "o 1 330 2 ,g 20 ESE WSW ? ~ 2.290 / p \\ SW 8 855 SE y 40 s 8 5 2.690 SSW SSE 50 S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NOCLEAR PLANT PRELIMIN ARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT [ 2000 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION .s WITHIN 50 MILES CF THE SITE FIGURE 2.1-20(T)

Iv N NNW NNE 12.125 5 e NW 4.90s NE u '%s 8 v# s 9 4.580 pn Y, 8 h WNW 'o# ENE

1. 8//o

' #o 'd 13.800 ""o ,? 'sss Je9o ,*o , 230 s.6* 6, N 1 63o s '> 9 o o 1 s 4o5 2'50 '.3io ico i 1.18o 13.115 14.970 12.055 E W 3.ms 3.9ss 3 s20 34230 11b 330 \\.$ 0> fo EES 10 O 1.9

• o,,

lo (~ ,*9 G 2\\ 2,s,, % 3o 12 ? l," . is e o WSW 2o ESE ? %o / ~ n2, f E v e SW 9 27s SE 40 g g n-2.645 SSW SSE 50 S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMIN ARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT l C1 2010 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION ( ) WITHIN 50 MILES OF THE SITE l FIGURE 2.1-21'T)

rm ( )

s. j -

y NNW NNE i2.483 Y 8 o a3 v NW s o85 NE 'e, 8 $~ D J,g g s. 4.615 o WNW / ENE 0 h sh E A 0 ]$ 6 Jg 14,440 o '300 'h h %.0& $y%b 49,9 O 9 o 's, #@c ~f @O E.695 420 q%O W 2.833 3.sio 4.23o 3726s 1 343 i70 1.23s 13.200 16.283 12.473 E %b 350 2 \\,Y h8ka

1. 3 855

• b O

1. 9s J

1 2.0 10 a, -o o \\s' [ 2,333 g zo r2.@ +?" 'd 4r s as WSW 20 ESE o E 9 2.360 o g ?,$

• e,

w$ R eg g SW 9.620 g 40 s ,~,- 2.560 SSW SSE 3o S Revised by Amendment 13 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMIN ARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 2020 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION \\s WITHIN 50 MILES OF THE SITE FIGURE 2.1-22(T)

YCNP-13 g Table l'.2-1(T) m k \\- V. Q llA"AIU ul:: MATKH I Al.:: ilAlulED A::T TMilfl10;;;EM HlVEli 111l.M Pl's 9 ~ Calendar Year l'f/7 9 Estimated Number of Commodity-Net Tons Barges Toxic Itating* CilH1ICALS -Caustic soda; alcohols; benzene-and toluene 131,639 101 Toxic. Crude' products from coal tar, petroleum, and natural gas 149,h01~ 115 Slightly toxic Basic chemicals and products, nec;" and miscellaneous chemical-products" 896,041 689 b Nitrogenous, phosphatic, and potassic chemical. fertilizers '141,052 109 b l' [] Total 1,318,133 1,014 > Q'. PETROLIM1 PH0iUCT3 Gasoline, jet fuel, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil, and 11bricating oils and greases 1,049,073 617 Slightly toxic l Naphtha, mineral spirits, nec; and crude petroleum 13 173 9 Slightly toxic Asphalt, tar and pitches h31,255 ~ 173 Practically nontoxic Total 1,493,501 799 l GRAND TOTA'L 2,811,634 1,813 l "U.S. Coast Guard, Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular flo. 10-6h. a'

Not further identified.

b ~. Unknown 1 nec - Not:-elsewhere classified. "(m l' SOURCE: %,). - Corps of Engineers, Department of Argy. Added by Aironia:nt 13 { i \\ c. l 9 .. - ~

YCNP-11 /' Monthly.and annual temperature means and extremes for Yellow 's Creek- (33-feet), Corinth (concurrent year),17 and Corinth (1893-1960)to are presented in Tables 2. 3-13 (T), 2.3-14 (T), and 2.3-15 (T), respectively, and in ~igure 2.3-9 (T). Comparison of 1 Yellow Creek data with that vt Corinth f or the same period of record indicates that nrinthly raan daily maxima were cooler at Yellow Creek than at Cocinth, with the dif ference varying from 2.90F in November to 7.20F in July. Similarly Yellow Creek monthly mean daily minima were warmer than Corinth (except in Ja nua ry-- 0. 50 cooler), with the differences varying from 0.30F in May to 3.20F in October. The diurnal variation was therefore 'less at Yellow Creek than at Corinth, with the average differences varying from 2.60F in January to 9. 30F in October. Extreme monthly maxima were also cooler at Yellow Creek and extreme minima were generally warmer. These apparently moderated temperatures may be attributed to several causes: Yellow Creek temperatures are probably moderated by the water influence f rom the embayment; the Yellow Creek sensor is higher than that at Corinth (33 feet vs approximately 4 feet); and the Yellow Creek sensor is probably better shielded and aspirated than that at Corinth. The Corinth temperature data for the period July 1974-June 1975 also compared with the long-term record for Corinth. Overall, the July 1974-June 1975 period appears to have been relatively normal, with the annual mean and /h mean maximum temperatures within 10F of the normals and the 4 (m / annual mean minima only 1.50F cooler than normal. The winter months were comparatively mild with January averaging 3.30F warmer than normal. The fall was quite cool, with September temperatures averaging 5.80F below normal and October's mean daily minimum of 6.50F below normal, which combined with a mean daily maximum of 1.00F above normal gave October a monthly average diurnal variation 7.50F greater than is normally experienced at-Corinth. This tends to explain the unusually high frequency of stability Class G in October (33%), and contributes to conservatism in X /Q calculations for which ground level release is assumed. 2 Humidity Comparisons of one year (May 1976 - April 1977) of site-specific humidity data with concurrent and long-term (1968-1975) data from Memphis and 'Huntsville are documented in TVA's response to NRC Question 372.08.3* Supporting data from that response are given in Tables 2.3-16 (T) (mean monthly dewpoint and dry-bulb tem pe rat ures) and 2. 3-17 (T) (relative frequency of saturation deficits -less than - 1 gm/kg). The data given in Table 2. 3-17(T) 11 show that the-Yellow Creek site was more humid (a greater frequency of low saturation deficits) than either Huntsville or Memphis; this difference is attributed in part to differences in - site characteristics that af fect the rates of evaporation and fx evapotranspiration.- U) --i 2.3-9

YCNP,13 Precipitation 13 Precipitation was not measured at the Yellow Creek temporary meteorological facility. The availability ot a long period of precipitation record for a location within 7 miles of the Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant site (Pickwick Landing Dam - 39 years) 10 provided representative long-term data for site evaluation purposes. Precipitation monitoring at the permanent meteorological facility was begun on March 30, 1977. Monthly and annual rainfall data (means and extremes) from TVA's facility at Pickwick Ianding Dam are presented in Table 2.3-18 (T). t ' Winter j is normally the wettest season, and fall usually experiences the least precipitation. Monthly and annual snowfall means and extremes tor Memphis are shown in Table 2.3-19(T).6 Mean return periods for rainfall intensities over various time periods are presented in Table 2. 3-20 (T). 2 0,21 Monthly and annual joint frequency distributions of wind direction and wind speed during ) precipitation conditions are included in Table 2.3-21 (T) An annual precipitation wind rose appears as Figure 2. 3 - 10 (T). Wind directional patterns during precipitation are more similar to overall wind direction patterns than might be expected. Generally, more northerly and less southerly flow is associated with precipitation than is otherwise the case. Wind speeds during precipitation are considerably faster than during non-precipitation conditions. Foq h Table 2. 3-22 (T) presents the mean number of days per month during I which heavy fog (visibility 5 1/4 mile) occurred at Memphis during a 24-year period 6 and at Huntsville during a 7-year period. A more extensive discussion of the fog climatology of Memphis, based on a 17-year period of record (1948-1964), is included in the Environmental Report. During that period, heavy fog occurred on an average of about 10 days per year for a total of about 26 hours per year with its longeet duration being 12 hours. Both the mean and median duration of heavy tog were approximately two hours. Atmospheric stability Monthly and annual frequency distributions of atmospheric stability class for Yellow Creek (150-33 ft. T), Memphis (concurrent year, Pasquill-Tu rner), and Memphis (1590-1954, Pasquill-Turner) are presented in Tables 2.3-23 (T),

2. 3-24 (T),

I and '. 3-25 (T), respectively. I comparison of Yellow Creek stability class distributions with those for Memphis for the same period of record indicates a consistently and significantly higher frequency of stable conditions (inversions) at Yellow Creek than at Memphis. Whether this is due to differences in classification technique, local influences, or synoptic weather has not been determined. O 2.3-10

YCNP t^\\ (_) 2.5.4.5.1 Earthfill The term earthfill refers to soil which is obtained from onsite borrow areas and compacted in multiple lifts to form a fill meeting specified standards. Where the term earthfill is followed by a bracket, () or [ ], the characters found iaside the bracket indicate the level to which the earthfill is compacted. The level of compaction associated with each character is shown in Table 2.5-5(T). 2.5.4.5.1.1 Investigation The soil to be used in the placement of earthfill will te obtained from excavations required for plant structures and from excavations required to establish plant grade. Field exploration was conducted from spring 1975 to the fall of 1975. Fifty auger borings were made to obtain samples for laboratory testing. The borings were drilled to bedrock (area G) or to the proposed final grade elevation of the area being investigated (areas A, E, and F). The soil recovered from the auger borings for compaction and chear testing was placed in plastic bags. Representative samples of each bag sample were sealed in glass jars immediately upon removal from the auger boring for laboratory index tests. Graphic logs of all torrow borings are shown on Figures 2.5-2 (T) through 2.5-5 (T) and 2.5-22 (T) through (s)

2. 5-2 5 (T).

Figure 2. 5-21 (T) shows the location of all borrow borings made during the field investigation program. Auger borings for borrow sampling are identified with a prefix of "PAH." The borings in area A indicate, as described in subparagraph 2.5.4.2.1.2, the majority of the soils available are alluvium deposits from the Eutaw Formation. The borings in areas E, F, and G indicate similar material to that found in area A. The soils obtained from the borrow investigation were tested by family type groups. Soil classes were selected for each area upon completion of the compaction tests. Seven soil classes were designated from the borrow materials (74 percent of the total) that had little or no gravel [see Table 2.5-4 (T) ]. The borrow soil class that each borrow soil sample represents is shown on the graphic logs [ Figures 2.5-2 (T) through 2.5-5 (T) and 2.5-22!.T) through 2.5-25 (T) ). The roman numeral that represents the torrow soil class is shown on the graphic logs at the location of each borrow sample for that class. To determine the borrow soil characteristics and to aid in establishing the soil classes in the borrow areas the following index tests were performed on each typical terrow soil: 1. Atteberg Limits (ASTM D 423 and D 424) 2. Grain size (ASTM D 422) f}

3. -Classification (ASTM D 2487)

U 2.5-11 l

YCNP-13 In order to establish design properties and compaction control for earthfill (A) soil materials to be used in foundation, settlement, and stability analyses of Category I features, the following tests were performed on each soil class in addition to those tests listed above. 1. Specific gravity (ASTM D 854) 2. Moisture - Density (ASTM D 698) 3. Moisture - Penetration (Standardized TVA Procedure) 4. Unconsolidated - Undrained (Q) Shear Strength ( ASTM 2850) 5. Consolidated - Undrained (R) Shear Strength (Standardized TVA Procedure) 6. Consolidated - Drained (S) Shear Strength (ASTM 3080) 7. Dynamic Response (Resonant Column Tests) 8. Consolidation (ASTM D 2435) 9. Permeability

10. Clay Dispersion Tests a.

Sodium Adsorption Ratio Chemical Test b. Pinhole Dispersion Test one unconsolidated-undrained (Q) triaxial compression test, one consolidated-undrained (R) triaxial compression test, and one consolidated-drained (S) shear test were perfcrmed on each torrow soil class with test specimens compacted to 95 percent standard compaction. Three different confining pressures were used in each of these tests. The Q test specimens were remolded at 2 percent above optimum moisture content. The R test specimens were saturated prior to shear and pore water pressures were measured during' shear. S shear tests were conducted in either a direct shear test apparatus or a 4-inch diameter triaxial shear apparatus. The direct shear apparatus was used on all samples where maximum particle size limitation did not require the 4-inch diameter triaxial shear apparatus. S test specimens were submerged prior to conducting the direct shear tests. The dynamic response of the borrow soils was determined from the resonant column test using R type loading conditions with confining pressures varying from 0.25 to 5 tons per square foot. Additional testing for earthfill (A1) is discussed in Subsection 2.5.5. 13 0 2.5-12 4

4 i 4 YCh?-13 2.5.4.5.1.2 Test Results and Selection of Desian Properties i-Laboratory soils tests were made during the summer of 1975 and into early 1976. 4 2 i \\- i 1 1 i. J d, r i i l':' d i I i-i j i - i l 5 I i i i P i 1 4 i l l i 1 8 2.5-12a ..--.... u.- _,_.,..--._.~ _ _.,.. _ _ _.. _. _

YCNP-9 s ('# ) Approximately 26 percent of the borrow available at the site has some significant percentage of gravel size (chert) material. The gravelly borrow is primarily derived from the Fort Payne Cherty Residuum and will not be used as earthfill around any Categcry I structures. The residuum will be readily identifiable from the fine grained alluvium soils that overlay the residuum. The balance of the borrow (74 percent) has lesser percentages of gravel and is suitable for possible use in Category I earthfills. Material specifications of these soils are discussed in Subparagraph 2.5.4.5.J.3. Test results for earthfill suitable for Category I structures are summarized in Table 2.5-4 (T). The properties of the earthfill to be used for design are found in Table 2.5-2(T). Earthfill for Category I structures has to serve two purposes. The first is for earthfill to satisfy the requirements for use as a liner for the spray ponds and the second is for earthfill to satisfy the requirements for use as backfill around Category I structures. Each soil class was tested for its dispersion characteristics and none were found to te susceptible to the problem of clay dispersion [ see Table 2. 5-7 (T) ]. Borrow classes I through VII will furnish suitstle borrow for the spray pond liner and as backfill around Category I structures. All classes were selected for use as borrow, because the alluvium, which is the major source of borrow, is deposited in (s_/) relatively thin layers that are not continuous over large areas. Thus it is impractical to isolate any particular borrow class in order to take advantage of its strength, permeability, or any other particular soil characteristic. Also due to this layering there will be some mixing of the soil classes during excavation, which would eliminate large pockets of any particular soil class. The liquefaction pctential of borrow clac9es is evaluated in Paragraph 2.5.4.8. The strengths selected for design, shown on Table 2.5-2 (T), reflect a low average of the borrow classes. Figures 2.5-26 (T) through 2.5-28 (T) show the graphical plots of the strength tests for the borrow classes. Class I was not plotted on the graphical plots, since this borrow class provided less than one percent of the total borrow material available at the site. The permeability of the borrow adopted for design using a weighted - average of all borrow classes is shown on Table 2.5-2 (T). 2.5.4.5.1.3 Materials specifications The following material specifications have been tentatively adopted for fill which is to be placed for various Category I i features. All materials shall be suitable for compaction to a 9 dense, stable mass. h !,,) \\.. 2.5-13

v YCNP-13 1. Material for EECE spray pond liner shall consist of svila classifying as ML-CL (Class I), SC (Classes II, IV-VI), SM (Class III), and CH (Class VII) and shall be compacted to a minimum of 95 percent of maximum dry density. Moisture content of the material being compacted shall be controlled within two (2) percent, above or below, of optimum moisture. Materials with classifications other than those listed above shall not be used for EHCW spray pond liner. 2. Material for backfill around Category I structures shall consist of soils classifying as ML-CL (Class I), SC (Classes II, IV-VI), SM (Class III) and CH (Class VII) and shall be compacted to a minimum of 95 percent of maximum dry density for earthfill (A) and 100 percent of maximum dry density for 13 earthfill (a1). Moisture content of the material teing compacted shall be controlled within two (2) percent, above or below, of optimum moisture. Material with classifications other than those listed above shall not be used as backfill around Category I structures. 3. Material for the Slick Fock Branch embankment shall consist l of soils classifying as ML-CL (Class I), SC (Classes II, IV-VI), SM (Class III) and CH (Class VII) and shall be compacted to a minimum of 95 percent of maximum dry density. 9 Moisture content of the material being compacted shall te controlled within two (2) percent, chove or below, of optimum moisture. Material with classifications other than those listed above will not be used as fill for the Slick Ecck Branch emtankment. 2.5.4.5.1.4 Fieldwork The extent of Category I earthfill is shown in plan view on Figure 2. 5-18 (T). Note that material specifications and compaction requirements for fill material vary with location. Typical sections are shown on Figures 2.5-16 (T) and 2. 5-18A (T). The estimated quantity of each type of material is listed below. 9 Earthfill (A) (Liner) 300,000 Cubic Yards Earthfill (A) (Backfill) 230,000 Cubic Yards Earthfill (A1) 20,000 Cubic Yards 13 Earthfill (A) (Slick Rock 200,000 Cubic Yards Branch Embankment) The required quantities of suitable material for earthfill is available from the earth-cuts associated with plant area excavation and grading. Earthfill borrow areas will be worked in a manner which ensures a suitable material for compaction. Any conditioning which the soil requires will normally be accomplished in the borrow areas prior to hauling it to the earthfill site. This conditioning includes control of moisture content and removal of deletericus materials. All borrcw areas will be maintained such that adequate drainage of ground water and surface runoff is provided. Drainage will be accomplished by 2.5-14

YCNP-13 ) sloping excavations, crowning, channels, dikes, sumps and pumping, as necessary. Compaction of large areas of earthfill will ncrmally be accomplished using tamping rollers. Soils in areas of limited access will be compacted with small power tampers or rollers. Compaction and all other earthwork will te suspended during periods of inclement weather. Compaction requirements f or Earthfill (A) and (A1), will require 9 13 that soils te placed in compacted layers not more than 6-inches thick. O e 2.5-14a

YCNP-13 ) In summary,-the actual physical differences between the two I schemes are minimal except for the shape, surface area, and l excavation slope of the ponds. As such, it is appropriate to update or ccnvert the square pond analyses to accommodate the circular arrangement by reanalyzing only the more critical cases. 2.5.5.1.2 Slick Rock Branch Slope t The Slick Rock Branch slope is located to the west of the general ! plant area between stations 12+00 and 17+00 and ranges E and H, see Figure 2.5-30 (T). The slope will be created by the filling of Slick Rock Eranch and the construction of a 4.5 horizontal to' 1 vertical clope extending from the perimeter plant road at elevation 520 west to the intake pumping station at elevation 424. A typical section is shown in Figure 2.5-18A(T). The Slick Rock Branch is presently a canyon with gentle side l slopes ( see Figures 2.5-58 (T) and -61(T) ]. Examinations of the ? subsurface exploration data for the general plant area and the - additional bedrock probing data for the Slick Rock Branch area indicated that the Branch is underlain by hard massive silty limestone to siltstone_ (hard bedrock) of the Fort Payne Formation except in the southeast and northeast corners where a layer of the residuum with a thickness increasing from 0 to 40 ft toward the corners of the branch overlies the bedror. Contours of the top of the bedrock and residuum in the brar a area are shown in j Figure 2.5-60(T). i 9 The Slick Rock Branch Slope will be constructed by placing the compacted earthfill in the Slick Rock Branch. The limited amount of alluvium soils present in the branch will be stripped from the bottom and slide slopes. Also, the delta deposits where the branch empties into the embayment will be removed. The slope will be constructed of earthfill (A) and (A-1). The earthfill 13 will be compacted to 95 percent of maximu dry density 4 t earthfill(A) ] above elevation 493 and to 100 percent of waximum i dry density [ earthfill (A-1) ] below elevation 493. Typical . longitudinal (A-A) and transverse (E-B) sections of the slope are '; shown in Figure 2.5-61(T). The transverse section shown is through the crest of the slope and the longitudinal section is through the thickest layer of the compacted earthfill. The thickness of the earthfill through Section A-A decreases frcm approximately 72 ft. near the crest of the slope to 25 ft. at d the toe of the slope. As shown in Figure 2. 5-61 (T), the Ciesel Generator Euilding and the Control Building of Unit 1 are located on Section A-A beyond j a distance of approximately 120. f t. from the crest of the slope, i The Contrcl Building will be situated on bedrock and the Diesel 8 Generator Building will be founded on a compacted fill extending to bedrock. The intake pumping station to be founded on bedrock {}( will be situated approximately -200 f t. beyond the toe of the slope. s m, 2.5-23d

YCNP-13 After long-term operation, the water table in the general plant area is assumed to rise to elevation 519.0 feet (see section

2. 5. 4. 6).

Plant grade is elevation 420.0 feet. As a result, the ground water levels are postulated to be at elevation 519 in the plant area and near the crest of the slope and at elevation 424 in the embayment beyond the intake pumping station. For this study, it is conservatively assumed the slope will be fully saturated and the ground water level will be at elevation 424 at the toe of the slope and will gradually drop to elevation 424 beyond the pumping station in the erbayment. The assumed ground water condition is shown in Figure 2.5-61 (T). The existing site and subsurface conditions have been defined by geologic and soils investigations and are described in Sections 13 2.5.1.2 and 2. 5. 4. 2, respectively. The in situ soil static engineering properties are given in Section 2.5.4.2.1.2 and the dynamic properties are given in Sections 2. 5. 4. 4. 2 and 2.5.4.7. The compacted earthfill static engineering properties are given in Section 2.5.4.5.1.2 and Table 2. 5-2 (T). The dynamic laboratory testing is discussed in Section 2.5.4.7. The dynamic properties used for the earthfill are given in Section 2.5.5.2.2.1.3.1.1 and 2.5.5.2.2.2.2.1. The bedrock static r 'erties are given in Section 2.5.1.2.2, f h 2.5.1.2.7, and 2.5.1. and the dynamic properties are given in, Section 2.5.1.2.11. I l O 2.5-23e

YCNP-13 r\\ (,) 2.5.5.2 Design criteria and Analysis The design criteria discussed below is applicable to either the circular or square spray pond arrangement. The analyses and the analysis results reported below, in Section 2.5.5.2.2.1, are for the square spray pond scheme except as noted for the circular schere. However, since all the cases %<ich were reanalyzed were required due to changes in the excavatfor slope (3:1 vs 2:1), rather than due to changes in the pond's geometric shape (square vs circular) these sections are indicated by reference to the excavation slope rather than to the square or circular scheme notation. 2.5.5.2.1 Design Criteria The pond slopes are designed to remain stable under the loading conditions with the corresponding minimum factors of safety shown in Table 2.5-10(T). The Slick Fock Branch slope will be designed to remain stable under the loading conditions with the corresponding minimum factors of safety shown in Table 2.5-10(T), except for the sudden drawdown cases which are not applicable. 2.5.5.2.2 Analysis s (N / \\' The analyses of the spray pond and Slick Pock Branch slopes are discussed separately. The spray pond slopes are discussed in Section 2.5.5.2.2.1 and the Slick Rock Branch slope in Section 2.5.5.2.2.2. 2.5.5.2.2.1 Spray Pond Slope Stability Analysis The stability analysis and evaluation of the spray pond slopes and foundation were performed for the six design cases given in Table 2. 5-10 (T). For the two static cases (Ccnstruction and Normal Pool) conventional methods of slope stability analyses for analyzing potential failure surfaces were used. For the remaining cases, 'oth dynamic finite element analyses and conventional ps 3 static slope stability analyses were used. Briefly, the analyses consist of the following: a. Slope Stability Analyses for Static Cases (Construction and Normal Pool) : These analyses were made using conventional methods of slope stability analysis of potential failure surfaces including circular arcs and wedges. Strength parameters for these analyses were defined by laboratory tests. b. Definition of Dynamic Material Properties: Strain-dependent jT dynamic materia} properties (shear moduli and damping (_,) ratics), for usy in subsequent dynamic analyses, were defined i 2.5-24

YCNP iO) approximately 70 percent exceed 100 blows per foot. Eased on the above information, it is felt the residuum is at least comparable to a very dense cemented sand with a relative-density of 90 percent or higher. Current research on dense cohensionless soils indicates only limited cyclic shear strains can develop regardless of the magnitude of the cyclic stresses or the number of stress cycles applied. For freshly deposited sand tested in the laboratory having relative densities of 80 to 90 percent, the limiting strain ranges between approximately 5 to 10 percent " ". For older in situ soil deposits values of limiting cyclic shear strain have been estimated by Seed". For soils having a relative density of 80 percent the limiting strain is unlikely to g exceed 5 percent and would decrease to virtually zero percent strain for soils at 100 percent relative density. Compariron of Induced Cyclic Stresses and Cyclic Strength Characteristics Figure 2.5-56 (T) presents a comparison of the SSE inluced shear stresses (based on 25 cycles) and the cyclic strength characteristics (based on a0 = 0.5ar at 300 cyclers of the e compacted earthfill. For the dike and' perimeter s_ pes, the cyclic strength characteristics are based on anisotropic (K = 2.0) test results to account for the initial static shear f~'/) stresses present in these areas. For the bottom of the pond, the cyclic strength characteristics are based on isotropic (K = 1. 0) x_ test results since no initial shear stresses are present in these areas. As shown in the figure the induced stresses are less than the " cyclic strengths." It should be remembered the strengths shown do not represent failure by any definition, they represent only the stress required to cause CG = 0.5 DE at 300 cycles. The actual stress required to cause 5 percent strain (a commonly accepted criterion) in 25 cycles would be considerably higher than the values shown. Thus, it is concluded the compacted earthfill has a more than adequate factor of safety based en this approach for the SSE loading conditions. Since the cyclic strengths of the soils are the same for either ~ SSE or OBE conditions, and since the CBE induced stresses are taken as 60 percent ~of the SSE induced stresses, cyclic strength comparisons are not made for the OBE case. The corresponding OBE results may be obtained by a simple ratio of the SSE results. Thus, the compacted earthfill is also judged to have a more than a dequate factor of safety for the OBE loading conditions. Since the residuum is concluded not to develop significant cyclic strains (less than 5 percent) or to reduce strength during either SSE or OBE, it is concluded the residuum also has a more than adequate factor of ' safety for both the SSE and OBE loading conditions. 2.5-37 k

YCNP-13 Further, the comparisons described above are appl. cable to both conditions of normal pool and sudden drawdown tecAuse: (a) the effective stresses in the compacted earthfill wculd not change immediately following a sudden drawdown, therefore the cyclic ctrengths would not change; and (b) the dynamic properties cf the compacted earthfill or residuum would not be significantly offected by a sudden drawdown, thus the stresses induced by the CBE or SSE would not change significantly. Based on the above discussion and the loading conditions given in Table 2. 5-10 (T) the spray pond slopes are determined to te stable under all prescribed seismic loading conditions. 2.5.5.2.2.1.4 Discussion of 2:1 vs 3:1 Excavation Slope The stability analysis results presented in Sections 2.5.5.2.2.1.2 and 2.5.5.2.2.1.3 are for an excavation slope of 3:1. Selected critical cases were reanalyzed for a 2:1 excavation slope. These selected cases are: 1. Static slip circle analyses for the construction and normal 9 pool loading cases. 2. Dynamic finite element analyses of the dike section with the lower variation set of material properties. 3. Pseudostatic slip circle analysis for the SSE+ Drawdown l loading case. In these three cases the factor of safety is greater for the 2:1 cxcavation slope than for the 3:1 excavation slope. Since these are the more critical cases and since the factors of safety j actually increase, it is concluded the cases not reanalyzed also l possess adequate factors of safety. [ 2.5.5.2.2.2 Slick Fock Branch Slore Stability Analysis The stability analysis and evaluation of the Slick Fock Eranch slope and foundation were performed for the four applicable design cases given in Table 2.5-10(T). For the two static cases (Construction and Long-Term) conventional methods of slope stability analyses for analyzing potential failure surfaces were 13 used. For the seismic cases (SSE and OEE), dynamic finite element analyses were used. The post-earthquake stability was also investigated using conventional method of slope stability analysis. 2.5.2.2.2.1 Static Slope Stability Evaluation The static stability of the Slick Fock Branch Slope was evaluated for the construction and long-term conditions. The analyses were made for cross section A-A in Figure 2-5-61 (T). Section A-A was selected because it is a section through the thickest layer of g 2.5-38

YCNP-13 /~N ('~) the compacted earthfill and would be the most critical section for the entire slope. For the long-term condition, the ground water tables shown in Figure 2. 5-6 (T) were postulated to te at elevation 519 and 424 in the plant area and at the toe of the slope, respectively. For the postulated ground water tables, the slope was assured saturated, and the piezometric head in the slope was conservatively assumed in the analyses to be at the surface of the alope. Thus, the pore pressure at any point within the slope was calculated as a product of the unit weight of water and the height of a water column directly above the point of interest. For the construction condition, no ground water tables were assumed. As shown in Figure 2.5-58 (T), a two-lane perimeter plant road (10 ft wide per lane) is located near the crest of the slope. To incorporate the live loads on the perimeter plant road, the AASHO's truck loading designated as H-20-S16 was used. The centerline of this lane surcharge was located at a distance of 10 ft frcm the crest of the slope. Procedure The computer program STABR44, was utilized in all static slope 13 stability analyses. The program uses the modified Bishop's ()/ method

• and searches for the critical sliding cricle for

(_, specified condtions. The required input parameters are the geometry, the material properties including unit weight and strength parameters, and the applicable pore pressure distribution. Soil Parameters The unit weight and strength parameters and permeability used are summarized in Table 2. 5-15(T). For the ccmpacted earthfill, the strength parameters were based on test data on samples prepared at 95 percent standard compaction. For the compacted earthfill placed at 100 percent standard compaction, the etatic strength parameters were conservatively assumed to be the saae as these of the compacted carthfill placed at 95 percent standard compaction. For the construction condition, total stress analyses were performed using moist unit weights and total stress strength parameters obrained from Q tests. For the long-term condition, ef fective stress analyses were performedusing saturated unit weights telow the water table and moist unit weights above the water table and using effective stress strength parameters obrained from S tests. Analysis Results i f-~) The result of the static stability analyses for the construction and long-term conditions are summarixed in Figure 2. 5-62 (T). ( 2.5-39

YCNP-13 Figure 2. 5-6 2 (T) shows the location of the critical circles and the minimum factors of safety for each analysis case. 8 Dased on a comparison of the calculated factors of safety presented in Figure 2.5-62 (T) and the required minimum values listed in Table 2.5-10 (T), the Slick Rock Branch slope is determined to be stable under all prescribed static loading conditions. i 2.5.5.2.2.2.2 Seismic Stability Evaluation The procedure utilized in evaluating the seisaic stability of the! Slick Fock Eranch Slope during the postulated earthquakes involved the following sequence of operations: 1. Development of input base motions consistent with the seismic input defined for the plant site. 2. Determination of the induced shear stresses in the slope during the postulated base motions by means of a dynamic finite element analysis and representation of these induced' stresses by means of equivalent series or uniform peak stresses. 3. Determinatica of the static stresses existing in the slope prior to the occurrence of the earthquakes by means of a static finite element analysis. 13 4. Assessment of the cyclic strength characteristics of the material comprising the slope, for the state of static stresses determined in (3) above. 5. Comparison of the cyclic strength characteristics with the equivalent uniform shear stresses induced by the earthquake motions to evaluate the stability of the slope during the postulated earthquakes. 2.5.5.2.2.2.2.1 Dynamic Material Proporties Dynamic material properties must be assigned to the compacted earthfill and granular fill materials. The properties of greatest significance are shear modulus and damping ratio including their variations with strain. Other properties required for the response computations are total unit weight and Poisson's ratio. Compacted Earthfill The compacted earthfill will consist of all borrow materials (Classes I through VII) placed at 95 percent standard compaction in the slope and in the plant area, except that below elevation 493 in the plant area (behind the crest of the slope) the compacted earthfill will be placed at 100 percent standard compaction. Laboratory resonant column data were obtained from 2.5-40

YCNP-13 () tests on samples placed at 95 percent standard compaction. The dynamic properties of the compacted earthfill placed at 100 l percent standa d compaction may be slightly different from those of the compacted earthfill placed at 95 percent standard compaction. As subsequently described, the response analyses were perforned for parametric variations of dynamic material properties. Thus, the sensitivity to the response due to differences in dynamic properties cf the compacted earthfill i placed at 95 to 100 percent standard compaction is accounted for l in the parametric variations of dynamic properties. i The dynamic properties of the compacted earthfill are presented j in Section 2.5.5.2.2.1.3.1.1. These properties are summarized in i Table 2. 5-16 (T). I Residuum i l The dynamic properties of the residuum are presented in Section 2.5.5.2.1.3.1.1. I Granular Fill The granular fill material will be a well-graded material, consisting of crushed stone, or sand and gravel, with the grain + size distribution given in Section 2.5.4.5.2. The granular till 13 will be placed to an average reltive density of 85 percent or (~') greater, with a minimum relative density of 80 percent as \\_ / determined by ASTM standard D 2049.. The shear modulus of the granular fill material assigned in the response analyses was based on the general characteristics of the j material and published data 20 ** of similar materials. The adopted relationship between the shear modulus at very low strains, G , and the ef fective mean normal stress,5%(, is f max expressed ty: I G,x = 110,000(&')1/2 l y where both Gmx and 9; are in psf. Values ofCTk are computed with Ko estimated to be 0.4 and the ef fective vertical stress, CU, computed from the effective overburden pressure and increase in stress due to effective wilghts of the Diesel Generator Building. The variation of shear modulus with strain utilized in response computations is shown in Figure 2. 5-63 (T). The relationship was based on the average relationship for granular soils published by Seed and Idriss *". I The variation of damping ration with strain used in the response 4 computations is shown in Figure 2.5-63(T),. The relationship was based on the average relationship for granular soils 80 b) i; V r t 2.5-41

1 YCNP-13 s Values of total unit weight,g, and Poisson's ratio,il. assigned to the granular fill for analyses are surmarixed in Table 2.5-16(T). Parametric Study l In order to evaluate the sensitivity of the response to variations in dynanic properties the values of shear noduli fcr the compacted earthfill and the granular fill material were increased by 50 percent (called upper-bound variation) and decreased by 40 percent (called lower-bound variation). The basic set of properties should provide the most likely response e' the slope. The upper-bound variation results in a stiffer tem than expected; the lower-bound variation results in a more tiexible system than expected. The parametric variations are summarized in Table 2. 5-16 (T). 2.5.5.2.2.2.2.2 Input Motion The free field artificial accelerograms are discussed in Section 3.7. The response spectra for the artificial accelerograms H1, H2, and V are shown in Figures 3.7-1 (T) through -15 (T). For this study the OEE is taken as one half of the SSE. For the basic response analyses of the Slick Rock Branch Slope, horizontal component H1 and vertical component V were used. As described 13 subsequently, the horizontal compcnent H1 yellds slightly higher response than that of H2 in one-dimensional column studies. At the Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant site, the design response spectra and associated artificial accelerograns are defined at finished grade (elevation 520) in the free field. However, for the dynamic finite element analyses, input motions at the base of the model (at bedrock) are required. Therefore, it is necessary to obtain base motions that are compatible with the artificial accelerograms defined at finished grade. For this study, +*J e compatibic tase motions were obtained by free-field deconvolution analyses using the computer code SHAKES s. The deconvolution analyses were made using a soil column representative of the compacted earthfill layer (65 ft thick) in the plant area behind the crest of the slope. The acceleration time histories and response spectra (5-percent damping) of the input base moticns, corresponding to accelerograms H1 and V, are shown in Figures

2. 5-6 4 (T) and -65 (T) for the analysis using the basic set of dynamic properties and in Figures 2.5-66(T) and -67 (T) for the upper-bound variation cf properties.

2.5.5.2.2.2.2.3 Finite Element Analysis The finite element representation used in the analysis is shotsn in Figure 2. 5-68 (T). The finite element mcdel corresponds to cross section A-A shown in Figures 2.5-59 (T) -61 (T). For this study, the intake pumping station located approximately 200 ft beyond the tce or the slope was not modeled. However, the lateral boundaries of the model were extended at suf ficient 2.5-42

YCNP-13 /N I () distances away from the slope so that acc<2 rate response of the slope can be obtained. the model shown in Figure 2.5-68 (T) incorporates the Diesel Generator Building and its granular fill foundation base. The effects of the Control Building were accounted for in the model by assigning a column of elements as j concrete (approximately 25 ft thick and extending to the bedrock) immediately adjacent to the Diesel Generator Building (see Figure i 2.5-68(T)). An additional model which is not presented was also analyzed. This model represents a section not passing through the Diesel Generator Euilding and its granular fill foundation base. The dynamic finite element analyses were made for the horizontal l component (H 1) and vertical component (V) of base motions applied simultaneously. The analyses were conducted for the SSE using i the computer code QUAD-411 The analyses were performed for the basic set and for the upper-bound variation of material properties. For the OBE, response values were estimated based on the results of the SSE analyses as well as the results of one-dimensional column studies subsequently described. The output of the dynamic analyses included values of peak acceleration at each nodal point, peak dynamic stresses in each l element, and time histories of acceleration at selected locations. Computed horizontal and vertical acceleration time 13 histories at the crest of the slope for the basic set of f~'} properties are shown in Figures 2.5-69(T) and -70 (T). l \\_- l Generally, the dynamic stresses and peak accelerations obtained in the analyses were rather insensitive to variations in dynamic l material properties. The analysis using the basic set of material properties yellds slightly higher values of peak shear stress beyond the toe or the slope than those obtained using the upper-bound properties (averaging 10 percent higher).

However, l

the analysis using the upper-bound properties yeilds slightly higher values or peak shear stress in the deeper parts of the l fill than those obtained using the basic set cf properties j (averaging 7 percent higher). Based on the results of one-dimensional column studies subsequently described, the analysis using lower-bound prcperties is expected to yield slightly lower 7 response than that using the basic set of properties. i i 2.5.5.2.2.2.2.4 one-Dimensional Column Analyses t i One-dimensional dynamic response computations were performed to I supplement the results of the dynamic finite element studies and to determine free-field response of the compacted earthfill in the plant area away from the slope as subsequently described l (Section 2. 5. 5. 2. 2. 3). The analyses were conducted for a one-dimensional column of the compacted earthfill in the free-field. The analyses were made using the computer code SHAKEAR. The purposes of the one-dimensional column studies were: (a) to i s. obtain the ratio of response values of CEE and SSE; (t) to assess -v) the effects on response of using horizontal component H2 instead t ( 2.5-43

YCNP-13 of H1; and (c) to assess the effects on response dce to variations in dynamic material properties. Details of the free-field column studies are presented in Section 2.5.5.2.2.3. The overall results of the one-dirensional studies were the following: l 1. Values of induced shear stress during the OBE are approxinately 50 percent of the values during the SSE. 2. The ef fect of using horizontal component H2 instead of E1 was i insignificant. Values of induced shear stress are practically identical from the ground surface to a depth of approximately 20 ft for both components. Below a depth of 20 ft, component H1 gives slightly higher response. 3. The computed response varied slightly with variations in dynamic properties. Values of induced shear stress are essentially the same from the ground surface to a depth of approximatley 20 ft. Below a depth of 20 ft, values of induced shear stress obtained using the icwer-bound variation are slightly lower than those obtained using the basic set of properties; values of induced shear stress obtained using the upper-bound variation are slightly higher than those obtained 13 using the basic set of properties. 2.5.5.2.2.2.2.5 Static Stress Analysis As part of the seismic stability evaluation of the Slick Rock Branch Slope, an analysis was made to determine the static state of stress in the slope prior to the earthquake excitation. These static stresses were then utilized in conjunction with the cyclic strength of the compacted earthfill at various locations in the slope. The static stresses within the slope were determined using nonlinear static finite element procedures described in references 9 and 35. Obese procedures permit the simulation of the construction sequence of the slope and incorporate a nonlinear representation of the stress-strain characteristics of the compacted earthfill. The effects of seepage within the slope was also accounted for in the analysis. The analysis was performed using the computer code ISBILD3e. The nonlinear material properties used in the analysis are selected based on consclidation test results for the Classes I, II, and III borrow soiln and data for similar materialsze 35 43 The nonlinear material properties are summarized in Table 2.5-17(T). Typical results of the static stress analysis are shown in Figure 2.5-71(T). 2.5.5.2.2.2.2.6 Cyclic Shear Stresses Induced by SSE and OEE The cyclic shear st resses induced in the compacted earthfill slope by the SSE and OBE were obtained using the results of the dynamic finite elenent analyses and one-dimensional eclumn 2.5-44

YCNP-13 .fm ) studies. The cyclic shear stress at any point consists of a time history of stresses having varying peak amplitudes. These irregular stress time histories are to be compared with the cyclic strength characteristics which are based on laboratory tests conducted using cyclic stresses of uniform peak amplitudes. Therefore, it is necessary to convert the induced stress tire histories to equivalent series having uniform peak stresses. Values of equivalent uniform cyclic shear stresses were obtained by multiplying the raximum shear stresses froa the analyses by a factor of 0.65. This factor is in accord with the method proposed by Seed et ala' for obtaining an equivalent series of uniform stress applications. The number of cycles of equivalent uniform stress applications was selected based on the characteristics of the design earthquake. As described in Section 2.5.5.2.2.1.3.3, 25 cycles were conservatively selected for the SSE and OBE. [ For the SSE, the induced equivalent uniform cyclic shear stresses were obtained using the peak shear stresses from the dynamic i finite element analyses and the procedure described above. For 3 the OBE, one-dimensional column studies were used to estimate the. reduction in stresses as compared to the SSE. As described j previously, the results of these studies show that stresses during the CBE will be approximately 50 percent of the SSE stresses. 1 [~) The equivalent uniform stresses induced by the SSE on selected 13 \\__/ horizontal planes in the compacted earthfill slope for the rodel i illustrated in Figure 2. 5-68 (T) are shown in Figure 2.5-72 (T). l The stresses shown in the figure are for the basic set of i material properties. The dynamic analysis using the model which I represents a section not passing through the Diesel Generator i Building and its granular fill foundation base resulted in in the area (' slightly higher stresses (averaging 7 percent higher) immediately adjacent to the granular fill behind the crest of the ; slope. In other areas, the induced stresses are essentially I identical for both models. 2.5.5.2.2.2.2.7 cvelic Strength Characteristics A criterion of 5 percent strain is generally used for evaluating i the stability of embankments subjected to earthquake shaking. This criterion has been established on the basis of correlaticns between the results of seismic stability evaluations and the performance of earth dams which have been subject to significant earthquake loading 25 26 These case histories show that if the computed strains in the. embankment are smaller than 5 percent, the earthquake has no significant effect on the stability and 'ntegrity of the dam. However, it should not be concluded that the stability and integrity of the embankment is impaired if the computed strains exceed 5 percent at some locations within the embankment. The effect of computed strains exceeding 5 percent (~ depends on the zone. of the embanknent in which they may cccur, (,S and on the relative extent and location within a specific zcne. J 2.5-45

YCNP-13 Compacted Earthfill The ccupacted earthfill at the site will consist of all borrow materiali (Classes I through VII) placed at 95 percent standard compaction except in the plant area (behind the crest of slope) below elevation 493 where the earthfill will be placed at 100 percent standard compaction as subsequently described. Among these borrow materials, Class III material (silty sand) is considered to be relatively more susceptible to cyclic straining d ue to earthquake loading than the other classes of borrow materials which are more clayey and plastic ** *. A series of cyclic triaxial tests was conducted on the Class III material. The reaults of these tests, summarized in Table 2.5-18 (T), were used to develop the cyclic strength characteristics of the compacted er:thfill. A total of 18 cyclic tests has been conducted on both isotropically consolidated, (K " C sc = 1. 0 ) and anisotropically c con co.l i d a t e d (Rc =2.0) specimens. The lateral consolidation pressuren,C5c, employed in these tests ranged from 500 psf to 8000 pet, representative of the anticipated effective vertical strennen in the slope. The five tests at0ic =500 psf and 1000 psf were conducted in connection with the ERCK spray pond ( stability evaluation (Section 2. 5. 5. 2. 2.1) and were described in : Section 2.5.5.2.2.1.3.3. All test specimens except Test No. 10 in Table 2. 5-18 (T) were prepared at 95 percent standard I 13 compaction. Test No. 10 was prepared at 100 percent standard compaction. l The results of the cyclic triaxial tests are summarized in Table i

2. 5-18 (T) and Figures 2. 5-73 (T) and -74 (T).

Figure 2. 5-73 (T) shown the relationship between peak cyclic deviator stress and the nmter of loading cycles to induce 15 percent axial strain for isotropically consolidated (Ec =

1. 0) samples.

Figure 2.5-7 4 (T) shows the relationship between peak cyclic deviator stress and tb, number of loading cycles to induce 5 percent axial strain for anistropically consolidated (Ec = 2.0) samples. It is noted in Table 2. 5-18 (T) that for isotropically consolidated (Kc 1.0) = samples, the number of loading cycles to reach initial liquefaction (excess pore water pressure, , equal to lateral consolidation pressure,Czi ) is approximately equal to or greater than that causing 15 percent strain for all except two tests. For the anisotropically consolidated (K = 2.0) sanples, the number of loading cycles to reach initial liquefaction is much greater than that causing 5 percent strain. The cyclic strength characteristics of the Class III material placed at 95 percent standard compaction are summarized in Figure

2. 5-7 5 (T).

The cyclic strength of the earthfill placed at 100 percent standard compaction was estimated to te 40 percent higher than that of the earthfill placed at 95 percent standard compaction based on limited test data. Additional cyclic triaxial tests are being performed on specimens of the Class III material placed at 100 percent standard compaction to supplement 2.5-46

YCN P-13 (O ' ') the test data presented herein. A limited number of cyclic triaxial tests are also being conducted on Class II borrow i material, which represents the largest volume of all materials, to verify that the other classes of borrow materials are less susceptible to cyclic straining than the Class III material. Residuum The nature of the residuum in the plant area and the cyclic strength characteristics of the material were described in detail in Section 2.5.5.2.2.1.3.3. As described there, the residuum at the plant area is a geologically old, dense, and rocky material. Based on recent researchas 3' of the cyclic strength characteristics or dense cohesionless soil deposits, it is concluded that the residuum would not have a potential for significant cyclic strains during seismic loading. Granular Fill The granular fill material will consist of crushed stone, or sand and gravel. The granular fill will be compacted to an average relative density of 85 percent or greater, with a minimum relative density of 80 percent as determined by ASTM standard D 2049. Based on recent researchte 39 on the cyclic strength characteristics of cohesionless soils, dense soils have a limiting cyclic strain which probably cannot be exceeded /~' regardless of the size or duration of the carthquake. For (_)T freshly - deposit sand tested in the laboratory having relative densities of 80 to 90 percent, the limiting strain would range between approximately 5 and 10 percent . Soils characteristics other than relative density have also been found to significantly influence the potential for cyclic straining and sof tening during earthquakes. The strain potential of an in situ 13 granular fill (gravelly soil) would be lower than that of a freshly - deposited sand for the follcwing three reasons: 1. Time effects - The cyclic strength characteristics are sigr;ificantly improved by aging of the compacted fill as comrared to a freshly deposited sand , 2. Lateral earth pressure effects - Higher lateral earth pressures induced during compaction would significantly increase their resistance to cyclic deformationste 27 so 3: 3. Grain size characteristics - Gravelly soils appear to be more resistant to development of large strains than fine sands ** Based on the considerations discussed above, it is concluded that the dense granular fill would not have a potential for significant cyclic strains during seismic loading. /~'\\ i 2.5.5.2.2.2.2.8 Results of seismic Stability Analysis v 2.5-47

YCNP-13 The stability of the Slick Rock Branch Slope during the SSE was l evaluated using the procedure described previously. The induced l equivalent uniform shear stresses,2,, f,, required to cause 5 l at any location within the i slope were compared to the stresses,7 percent strain in 25 cycles at that location, based on cyclic triaxial test data on the Class III borrow material. I Comparisons of the cyclis shear stresses induced by the SSE with the cyclic shear stresses required to cause 5 percent strain, based on the cyclic strength characteristics of the Class III borrow material placed at 95 percent standard compaction, are l presented in Figures 2.5-76 (T) and -72(T). These figures show values of local factors of safety,2', /f;, against 5 percent strain along selected horizontal plans and vertical sections through the slope. These values were obtained based on the i induced shear stresses computed in the analysis of the model i shown in Figure 2.5-68 (T) using the basic set of dynamic material properties. Very similar results are obtained for the case using the upper-bound variation of properties. The results shown in Figures 2. 5-76 (T) and -77(T) indicate that the compacted earthfill placed at 95 percent standard compaction on the slope has an adequate factor of safety during the SSE. , 13 Figures 2.5-76 (T) and -77 (T) show the strain potential in a localized zone located beyond the toe of the slope and below I approximately elevation 414 may exceed 5 percent strain. However, post-earthquake stability evaluations described in S ection 2.5.5.2.2.2.3 indicate the overall stability of the entire slope would not be affected by potential cyclic strain in this localized zone. Comparisons of the induced cyclic shear stresses with the cyclic _ shear strength are not inade for the CBE case. However, since the' OBE induced stresses are approximately equal to 50 percent cf the SSE values and the cyclic strengths of the earthfill are the same for either the SSE or OBE conditions, the compacted earthfill would also have an ample factor safety for the OBE loading condition. Analysis section A-A shown in Figure 2.5-68 (T) incorporates the Diesel Generator Building and its granular fill foundation base. Thus, the ef fects of the granular fill on the response of the i slope were accounted for in the dynamic analyses. In addition, based on the cyclic strength characteristics of the compacted granular fill (average relative density of 85 percent or greater), the granular fill would not have potential for developing significant cyclic strains or reduction in strength during the SSE or OBE. Thus, the presence of the granular fill would not af fect the overall stability of the slope during the SSE or OPE. The preceding comparisons were made for Section A-A through the deepest layer of the compacted earthfill. This section is considered to be the most critical section for both static and 2.5-48

YCNP-13 7 T seismic loading conditions as described previcusly. As described j elsewhere, the residuum at the site is a geologically old, dense I, and rocky ' material, and it would not have potential for ' developing significant cyclic strains or reduction in strength during the SSE or CEE. Thus, any sections through the residuum should have an ample factor of safety during the SSE or OBE. 2.5.5.2.2.2.3 Post-Earthquake Stability Evaluation As described 'in Section 2.5.5.2.2.2.2.8 comparisons of the cyclic shear stress induced by the SSE with the cyclic strength characteristics of the compacted earthfill indicate a possibility of a localized zone with 5 percent strain potential located beyond a distance of approximately 50 ft from the toe of the slope and below approximately elevation 414. The location of the localized zone is shown in Figure 2.5-78 (T). The effects of the localized zone with 5 percent strain potential on the stability of the slope were assessed by performing total stress stability I analyses using the ground water levels for the long-ters condition and reducing the consolidated-undrained soil strength parameters of the compacted earthfill in this zone to 20 percent of the original static strength. The reduction in the strength values was conservatively estimated based on published data. The results of stability analyses show that the locaticn of the critical circle and the minimum factor of safety are the same as 13 ,' O. those with no reduction in soil strength, indicating the the oveall stability of the slope is not affected by the localized zone of 5 percent strain potential located beyond the toe of the slope. A reduction in the factor of safety due to the reduction i of static shear strength (post-earthquake conditions) was also calculated for a selected potential sliding surface passing through the localized zone of 5 percent strain potential shown in Figure 2. 5-7 8 (T). The analysis results show'that the factor of safety decreases from 6.5 (pre-earthquake condition) to 4.6 (post-earthquake condition). 2.5.5.2.2.3 Free-Field Response Analysis A ' number of free-field one-dimensional column studies of a compacted earthfill profile were conducted for the Slick Rock Branch slope stability evaluation to supplement the results of . the dynamic finite element studies and to determine f ree-field response for assessing liquefaction potential in the plant area away from the slope. The purpose of these studies were: (a) to obtain the raio of response values of CBE and SSE; (b) to assess the effects on response of using horizontal component H2 instead of H1; and (c) to assess the effects on response due to variations in dynamic material properties. Analysis Procedure l.(T One-dimensional _ column studies were made using the computer l (,/ program SHARE 18 The SilAKE analyses are performed to ottain l. '2.5-49 I i

YCNP-13 f utrain-compa tible (equivalent linear) soil properties for each u011 layer. For cases involving vertical excitation, the constrained modulus is selected and iterations are not required. Input motions for SilAKE analyses consists of three artificial accelerograms (hcrizontal components 111 and 112 and vertical component V) applied at the finished grade (elevation 520). For each input motion, analyses were made for the basic set and the upper-hound and lower-bound variations of dynamic material p roperties. A total of six response analyses were made for the SSE. Unsulty of Response Analyses Desponne analyses were conducted to evaluate the response of the compacted earthfill profile due to the SSE and OEE. For the SSE, input motions of both horizontal components 111 and 112 were used. For the OEE, the horizontal component til was used. The resFonse analysis for the OBE indicates that the induced shear stresses are ansproxinately 50 percent of those due to the SSE. The results of the response evaluations for the SSE are presented in Fiqure 2. 5-79 (T). The results indicate that the values of the induced stresses due to 111 and 112 for the same set of dynamic properties are essentially identical from the ground surface to a depth of 20 ft. Below a depth of 20 ft, the component H1 yields 13 slightly higher stresses. Also shown in Figure 2. 5-79 (T) are the effects of the soild response dee to variations in dynanic properties. The upper-bound variation in dynamic properties results in higher stresses and the lower-bound variation in lower stresses as compared to those ottained using the basic set of properties. Evaluat_lon of Results As described above, the use of dif ferent input motions and parametric variations in dynamic material properties results in a slight variation in induced shear stresses. Conservative values of shear stress (equal to the mean plus one standard deviation of the six values) were selected and used in the evaluation. The selected values of induced shear stress are shown in Figure 2.5-80(T). The cyclic strength characteristics of the compacted earthfill are described in Section 2.5.5.2.2.2.2.7. These data, relating the cyclic uhear stresses required to cause 5 percent strain in 25 cycles to the ef fective overburden pressure for the compacted earthfill placed at 95 and 100 percent standard compaction, are used in the evaluations of the compacted earthfill in the plant a rea. Using the cyclic strength characteristics of the compacted earthfill and the variation of the ef fective overturden pressure 2.5-50

YCNP-13 l' ) with depth, values of cyclic shear stress required to cause 5 \\_/ percent strain are computed and plotted in Figure 2.5-80(T) for 95 and 100 percent standard compaction. The ratio between the available shear strength,',%, and the induced stresses,'f4, which defines a factor of safety against excessive cyclic straining is also shown in Figure 2.5-80 (T). Comparisons of the induced shear stresses with the cyclic strength of the compacted earthfill shown in Figure 2.5-80(T) indicate that the compacted earthfill placed at 95 percent standard compaction should have an adequate 13 factor of safety against excessive cyclic straining frem the ground surface (elevation 520) to a depth of 27 ft (elevation 493). Eelow a depth of 27 ft, the compacted earthfill placed at 100 percent standard compaction should have an adequate factor of, safety against excessive cyclic straining. 2.5.5.3 Loos of Borinos See Paragraph 2.5.4.3. 2.5.5.4 Comcaction specifications See Paragraph 2.5.4.5. o a 2.5-51 l

YCN P-13 2.5.6 Embankments and Dag 13 There are no embankmnets or dams at this site. l l O 1 l O 2.5-52

YCNP (m) 2.5.7 Peferences 1. Mooney, H. M., 1973, The Handbook of Engineering Seismology: Bison Instruments, Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota, 105 p. 2. Foundation Engineering, G. A. Leonards, McGraw-Hill Pook Ccmpany., 1962 3. TVA Feport 68-7, Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant, Foundation Investigation, Test Trenches to Inspect, log, and Sample the Residuum of the Upper Fort Payne Formation, TVA, DED, CEB. 4. Early Site Review Report, Yellow Creek Site, Tennessee Valley Authority Fevision 1, December 1975. 5.

Arai, H., and Umehara, Y.,

1966, " Vibration of Dry Sand Layers," Proc. Japan Earthquake Engineering Symposium, Tokyo. 6. Bishop, A. W., 1955, "The Use of the Slip Circle in the Stability Analysis of Slopes," Geotechnique, Vol. 5, No. 1. 7. Brooker, E. W., and Ireland, H. O., 1965, " Earth Pressures at Rest Related to Stress History," Canadian Geotechnical Journal, Ontario, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1-15. 8. Clough, R. W., and Chopra, A. A., 1966, " Earthquake Stress [\\) Analysis in Earth Dams," JEMD, ASCE, 92, No. EM2, Proc. Paper i \\m / 4793, April, pp. 197-212. 9. De Alba, P., Chan, and Seed, H. Bolton, 1975, " Determination of soil Liquefaction Characteristics by Large-Scale Latoratory Tests," Earthquake Engineering Research Center, Report No. EERC 75-14, University of California, Berkeley, May.

10. Hardin, B.

O., and Drnevich, V. P., 1972, " Shear Modulus a9 Damping in Soils: Design Equations and Curves," JSMFD, ALLE, 98, No. SM7, Proc. Paper 9006, July, pp. 667-692.

11. Idriss, I.

M., Lysmer, J.,

Hwang, R.,

Seed, H.

E.,

1973, "QUAC-4--A Computer Program for Evaluating the Seismic Response of Soil Structures by Variable Damping Finite Element Procedures," Report No. EERC 73-16, Earthquake Engineering Research Center, University of California, Berkeley.

12. Idriss, I.

M., and Seed, H. B., 1967, " Response of Earth Banks during Earthquakes," ASCE, Journal of Soil Mechanics and Foundations Division, 93, No. SM3, Proc. Paper 5232, May, pp. 61-82.

13. Idriss, I.

M., Seed, H. B., and Serf f, N., 1974, " Seismic '~] Response by Variable Damping Finf te Elements," ASCE, Journal (O 2.5-53

YCNP of Geotechnical Engineering Division, 100, No. GT1, January, pp. 1-13.

14. l.o w,

.l., and Moragiath, L., 1959, aStability of Iart h Ears upon Drawdown," Proceedings, 1st Pan-American Conference on Soil Mechanica Foundatn Engineering, Mexico, 1959,

15. Schnabel, P.

D.,

Lysmer, J.,

and Seed, H. E., 1972, " SHAKE -- A Computer Program for Earthquake Response Analysis of Horizontally Layered Sites," Report No. EERC 72-12, Edrthquake Engineering Research Center, University of California, Berkeley.

16. Seed, H. Bolton, 1976, "Some AGFects of Sand Liquefaction under cyclic Loading," Proc., Conference on Behavior of Offshore Structures, Boss '76, Trondheim, Norway, August.

17. Seed, H.

Bolton, 1976, Personal Communication.

18. Seed, H. Bolton, Arango, L., and Chan, C.

K.,

1975,

1. Evaluation of Soil Liquefaction Potential during Earthquakes," Earthquake Engineering Research Center Report No. EERC 75-28, Univerbity of California, Berkeley, October.

19. Seed, H.

Bolton, Idriss, I. M.,

Makdisi, F.,

and Banerjee, N., 1975, " Representation of Irregular Stress Time Histories by Equivalent Uniform Stress Series in Liquefaction Analyses," Earthquake Engineering Research Center, Repcrt No. EEhc 75-29, University of California, Berkeley, October.

20. Seed, H.

Bolton, and Idriss, I. M., 1970, " Soil Moduli and Damping Factors for Dynamic Response Analyses," Earthquake Erigineering Roscarch Center, Report No. EERC 70-10, University of California, Berkeley, December.

21. Seed, H.

Eolton, Lee, K. L., and Idries, I. M.,

1969,

" Analysis of Sheffield Dam Failure," Journal of Soil Mechanics and Foundations Division, ASCE, 95, No. SM6, Froc. Paper 6906, Novemter.

22. Seed, H. Bolton, Lee, K.

L., Idriss, I. M., and Mahdisi, F., 1973, " Analysis of the Slides in the San Fernando Dams during the Earthquake of February 9, 1971," Report, Earthquake Engineering Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, March.

23. Seed, H. Bolton, and Martin, G.

R., 1966, "The Seismic Cdefficient in Earth Dam Design," ASCE, Journal of Soil Mechanics and Foundations Division, Vol. SM3, May, pp. 25-58.

24. Seed,,H. Bolton, and Peacock, K.

H., 1970, " Applicability of Laboratory Test Procedures for Measuring Soil Liquef action Characteristics under Cyclic Loading," Earthquake Engineering 2.5-54

YCNP-13 \\ [! Research Center, Report No. EEFC 70-8, University of \\- California, Berkeley, November.

25. Silver, M.

L., and Seed, H. Dolton, 1969, "The Echavior of Sands under Seismic Loading Conditions," Earthquake Engineering Research Center, Report No. EERC 69-16, University of California, Berkeley.

26. University of California, 1973, " Computer Program for Slope Stability Analysis (STAER)," Civil Engineering Department, University of California, Berkeley.

27. Castro, G.

(1975) " Liquefaction and Cyclic Mobi.e.ty of Saturated Sands," Journal of the Geotechnical Engineering l Division, ASCE, Vol. 101, No. GT6, June. l

28. Duncan, J.

M. (2977) personal communicaticn. l

29. Duncan, J.

M., and Change, C. Y. (1970) " Nonlinear Analysis l of Stress and Strain in Soils," JSMFD, ASCE, 96, No. SMS, Proc. Paper 7513, September, pp. 1629-1653.

30. Finn, W.

D. L., Bransby, P. L., and Pickering, D. J. (1970) "Effect of Strain History on Liquefaction of Sands," Journal of the Soils Mechanics and Foundations Division, ASCE, Vol. l 13 96, No. SM6, pp. 1917-1934, November. l O'

31. Ishibashi, I., and Serif, M. A.

(1974) " Soil Liquefaction by Torshional Simple Shear Device," Journal of the Geotechnical Engineering Division, ASCE, Vol. 100, No. GT8, pp. 871-888.

32. Janbu, N.

(1963) " Soil Compressibility as Determined by Oedometer and Triaxial Tests," European Conference on Soil Mechanics and Foundation-Engineering, Wiescaden, Vol. I, pp. I 19-25. l

33. Kondner, R. L.

(1963) " Hyperbolic Stress-Strain Response: l Cohesive Soils," JSMFD, ASCE, 89, No. SM1, Proc. Paper 3429, January, pp. 115. I

34. Kondner, R.

L., and Zelasko, J. S. (1963) "A Hyperbolic Stress-Strain Formulation for Sands," Proc. 2nd Pan Am Conference on Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering, Vol. I.

35. Kulhawy, F.

H., Duncan, J. M., and Seed, H. Bolton (1969) " Finite Element Analyses of Stresses and Movements in Enbankments during Construction," Report No. TE 69-4, off. of Res. Serv., Univ. of Calif., Berkeley.

36. Lee, K.,L., and Fitton, J.

A. (1969) " Factors Affecting the Dynamic' Strength of Soil," vibration Effects of Earthquakes f-~g on Soils and Foundations, ASTM, STP 450. 2.5-55 ---~

YCNP-13 I l 37. K. L., and Walters, H. B. (1973) " Earthquake Induced Cracking of Dry Canyon Dam," Fif th Eorld Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Rome, Italy. l l

30. Ozawa, Y.,

and Duncan, J. M. (1973) "ISBILD: A Computer l Program for Analyses of Static Stresses and Movements in l Embankments," Report No. TE73-4, Office of Research Services, l University of California, Berkeley.

39. Seed, H.

B. (1976) " Evaluation of Soil Liquefaction Effects on Level Ground During Earthquakes," Proc. Symposium on Soil l 1,19uef action, ASCE National Convention, Philadelphia, Cctober 2.

40. Seed, H.

B., Makdisi, F. I., and De Alta, P. (1977) "The Performance of Earth Dams During Earthquakes," Report No. UCD/EERC 77/20, University of California at Berkeley, August.

41. Seed, H.

B., and Peacock, W. H. (1971) " Test Procedures for Meanuring Soil Liquefaction Characteristics," Journal cf the Soil Mechanics and Foundations Division, ASCE, Vol. 97, No. SM8, pp. 1099-1119.

42. Thiers, G. R. and Seed, H. B.

(1969) " Strength and Stress-Strain Characteristics of Clays Subjected to Seismic Loading Conditions," Vibration Effects of Earthquakes on Scils and 13 Foundations, ASTM STP450, American Society for Testing and Materials.

43. Wohg, Fai S. and Duncan, J. M.

(1974) " Hyperbolic Stress-Strain Parameters for Nonlinear Finite Element Analyses of Stresses and Movements in Soil Masses," Geotechnical Engineering Report No. TE-74-3 to National Science Foundation, Of fice_ of Research Services, University of California, Berkeley, July.

44. Kong, R. T. (1970) " Deformation Characteristics of Gravels and Gravelly soils under Cyclic Loading Conditions," Ph.

D. Thesis, University of California at Berkeley. l O i 2.5-56

TCNP-13 1 TABLE 2.5 5(T) v LEVELS OF COMPACTION FOR EARTHFILL Earthfill Density Moisture Uses A 955 2% Fills for Category I structures i Beckfill for Category I stnictures t. Fill for nonqualified structures Al 100% +2% Fill for Category I structures B 90% 13% Backfill for nonqualified structures C As compacted No Spoil deposit.s by hauling equipment control i Notes: 1. Density is based on percent of maximum Standard Proctor Density as determined by ASTM D698. y l 2. Moisture control is bcsed on a percentage above or below optimum moisture content. j J Revised by Amendment 13 O - + > ~ w , -. ~ .,.~r

YCNP-11 Table 2.5-lO(T) REQUIRED MINIMUM FACTORS OF SAFETY Water Elevation Surface Strength Factor Loading of Elevation Value of Condition Water Table in Pond from Test Safety For ERCW Spray Pond Slopes Construction Empty Q 1.25 Normal Pool 518.O* 519 0 S 1 50 SSE and Normal Pool 518.O* 519 0 R 1.10 SSE Drawdown 518.O* 506.0 R 1.00 OBE and Normal Pool 518.O* 519 0 R 1.25 OBE Drawdown 518.O* 506.0 R 1.10 For Slick Rock Branch Slope Q l.25 Construction At Bedrock S 1 50 Long Term 519 0** R 1.10 SSE 519. P R 1.25 OBE 519.O**

• Elevation of water table outside the spray ponds is assumed to be 518 except in the dike area where 519 is assumed.
  • Elevation of water table in the main plant area is 519, elevation 424 at the toe of the slope and gradually decreasing to elevation

- k14 beyond the pumping station in the embayment. Revised by Anendment 13 t']

O YCNP-13 Table 2 5-15(T) SOIL PARAMETERS OF COMPACTED EARTHF USED IN STATIC SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSES ") (Section 2 5 5.2.2.2 - Slick Rock Branch Slope) } Unit Weight (pcf) Permeability (cm/sec) -{ Moist 125.0 l Saturated 130.0 Submerged 67.6 4.7 x 10 O Strength Parameters C C' Type of Test (*) (psf) (*) (psf) Q or UU 13 1600 R or CU 14 400 S or CD 30 200 (a) Soil parameters are average values for the compacted earthfill placed at 95 percent standard compaction. For the compacted earthfill placed at 100 percent standard compaction, the unit weights should increase approximately 5 percent and values of the strength parameters should also increase slightly. However, the permeability would decrease slightly. (b) Weighted average for all borrow materials (Classes I through VII). Added by Amendment 13

O O O YCNP -13 Table 2 5-16(T) SOIL PARAMETERS USED IN DYNAMIC FINITE EIAv2Nr ANALYSES (Section 2 5 5.2.2.2 - Slick Rock Branch Slope) Maximum Shear ( } Variation M dulus of Shear Parametric Variations Saturated Poisson's D@g 8 "8 Unit Weight (a) Ratio Ratio Material (pcf) o max n max 2 max s max s ^ Compacted Earthfill 130 1.5 0.48 346(") 0.30(*) (d) (f) 519( ) 208(*) Granular Fill 143 0.4 0.40 llo 0.50 (e) (g) 165 66 (a) K = Ratio of horizontal effective stress to vertical effective stress (Tr )" with Tr, in psf, and G (b) G =K in ksf (c) Applicable for Tr, >. 2000 psf For ir $ 2000 psf, basic set of properties, K = 840, n = 0.18 Upper-bound variation, K = 1260, n = 0.18 Lower-bound variation, K = 504, n = 0.18 (d) As shown in Figures 2.5-38(T) and -39(T) (e) As shown in Figure 2.5-63(T) (f) As shown in Figures 2.5-40(T) and -41(T) (g) As shown in Figure 2 5-63(T) Added by Amendment 13 i

C ycNP-13 ( Table 2.5-17(T) 1 SOIL PARAMETERS USED IN NONLINEAR STATIC FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS, (Section 2 5 5.2.2.2 - SlickRockBranchSlope) Soil Parameter Symbol Moist Earthfill Saturated Earthfill Unit Weight Y (pct) 125* 67.6** Cohesion c (ksf) 0.2 0.2 Friction Angle p(des) 30 30 Modulus Number K 200 200 Modulus Exponent n 0.7 0.7 Failure Ratio R 0.7 0.7 f O G O.35 0.35 Poisson's Rati F OJ OJ Parameters d 5 5

• Moist unit weight
  • Buoyant unit weight where: Primary Loading Modulus, E,

Initial Tangent Modulus, t R (1-sin %)(c -7 E, and Unloadind-Reloading f y 3 E t 2c cosp + 2 3 81"9 i n E =E =Kp, g Tangent Poisson's Ratio,#, Initial Poisson's Ratio,//, t /d 6 t" d(c v ) 2 i p = 0 - F log 3 R (T -7 )(1-sinp)* 1 n-f 3 Kp 1 2e cosp + 213 '1"N; Added by Amendmont 13

t YCNP-13 (N. l Table 2.5-18(T) RE3t1T3 or CTRES-COffrRoLLED CYCLIC TRIAIIAL TESTS or CLASS III COMPACTED EARTIFILL y Mer of cycles, N to Cam Consolidation Dry Unit Confining U"I"

Weight, Pressure, Deviator I

1. 8"
2. e K

Initial 22.$ 1% tion Test Compaction d 3 =

1. c
2. SP'I 3

d L1quefac+ ton Strain Strain 8 train No. ($) (pcf) (psf) 1 95 106.2 2000 1.0 1920 du/a, = 0.57 at. Loco cycles 3 4 95 106.4 2000 1.0 3350 2 3280 53 3110 12 3230 9 7 95 106.4 2000 1.0 2590 22 2500 29 2200 57 24ho 34 2 95 106.2 4000 1.0 3620 19 352o 24 3320 38 352o 24 5 95 106.4 4000 1.0 3670 24 357o 29 3370 43 3570 29 O. 3 95 106.2 8000 1.0 7360

1. 4 7140 2.7 6900 53 7140 3

6 9$ 106.2 8000 1.0 6220 ' 35 6160 5 59 4 9 6160 4 8 95 106.4 8000 1.0 4540 135 kh80 141 h420 151 4550 132 9 95 106.4 2000 2.0 r/o d u/r, = 0.5 at 1000 cycles 3 13 95 106.3 2000 2.0 3554 51 3519 73 3459 88 > 111 11 95 106.4 4000 2.0 5680 h 5600 7 5k80 11 5520 10 ~ 12 95 106.3 A000 2.0 5050 35 503o 56 5010 yr r226 10 100 112.3 Looo 1.0 '496o 19 4880 32 ' Ol 4720 100 ->100 Added by Amendment 13 w e w-e +v + w e<-

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• • • • I' 1

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'/' ~ -( ' f:;g: - p-YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT / SYMBOLS: PRELIMINARY SAFETY / A soil borings ANALYSIS REPORT 0, 400 Feet

1. Soil borirNs with pierometers installed.

FIGURE 2.5-58(T) O Soil borings, delayed due to possible Added by Amendment 13 j q archeological interference. I ( ) O Soil probings i N/ <> Test trenches GENERAL SITE PLAN AND TOPOGRAPHY OF PLANT AREA

b 7% I (>' g .I I \\ 1-m \\ ?w \\ Finished Grade El.620 '8 \\' N N 4 ~ N N N ~a - s 'N k Hs i ' w ~. 'N ,e m ~4a0, ' N 'w % J) %s ( s ~~~ N .- '44 %s N s M 60- ~. ' 450 ' 440 - %~ \\ ~' ~430 ' 424 \\ \\ \\ [ YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT \\N / PRELIMIN ARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 2.5-59(T) Added by Amendment 13 0 so 100 ,.s, i ) (j l.EGENO: -- 500 - ---- Final contours on the Wp PLAN OF Slim ROCK BRANCH SLOPE

i 'NN ~" l' N-S Bas.s. ione j,, "A f/l / ( Is 'w I \\g k .\\ \\ s g\\ \\,\\ \\ \\ \\ g I\\ N., N \\ s Q. \\\\ \\ \\ '\\ \\(., \\ 6 \\ \\ \\ g\\ \\, s \\b \\ \\ \\\\ \\\\ g\\ \\ \\ \\ \\\\ g g g )f \\ I 's \\ )/l, I 'l ' l*h s \\

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t ~ t D i 500 Cr paced Earthfdl 9 eso 400 8EDROCK I a 1 i i i 1 -3o0 -20 -200 -iso -100 -so o DISTANCE FROM E-W BASELil SOCliOG i O Deewi Generator Budding A f nised Grade Fi g El. 620.o a l / _ /wmed Grant Waw Aw u sin C- .2, u.pn, y N 4s ~' y4gn h = g E~mrau, { p Smoe eeo M 300 I a e i i i e i i e i i i -400 -aso -300 -2so -200 -iso -100 -so o so 100 iso 200 DISTANCE FROM TOP OF SLOPE - FEET Section "A-A" h '. a i l i I I i

i Fwwshed Grot. EI. 520 520 {/ '.?, p 8EDROCK 460

• a$

W 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 sE - FEET B-B" 520 500 480 n. 4eo d. N rm. o c,.o. in [El. 424 Pumpmg Staten - + _ _ _ _. - - _ - - - - - - - - -._ 8,, 1 ,,s y,,, 420 E mb.ym.nt _ g 8EOROCK [g I I E I I l I 1 1 l g 250 300 35C 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800 850 900 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAft PLANT LONGITUDINAL ("A-A") AND TRANSVERSE ("B-B") SECTIONS THROUGH SLICK ROCK BRANCH SLOPE Added by Amendment 13 FIGURE 2.5-61 (T)

./ \\ AN A LYSIS CASE SOIL STRENGTH C2RCLE F ACTOR OF_ SAFETY CONSTRUCTION O or UU A 2.93 LON G-TE rid S or CD 8 1 Tl / \\\\\\ \\\\ x \\ \\ \\ \\\\ 9%$ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\\\ \\ \\\\ \\\\\\ \\\\\\\\\\\\ -M \\ \\\\ M \\\\\\ M \\ \\ v i ~ \\ - E -,. - C 3-- - - - + - - - _ _ _ 1 1" ~ ~ - ~_" ~ ~_ v W.S. El. 414 D 400 8EDROCK ago M M 3% M 4% M M 6% M M M M M YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT RESULTS OF STATIC STABILITY Added by Amendment 13 AN ALYSIS, SLICK ROCK BRANCH SLOPE FIGURE 2.5-62 (T)

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O m n N.,lI Q] \\ \\' / 5000 i iiiiiiiiiiiiei*i iii i,iiiiiiiiii i III!!IIfllIll ! 'IIt il4 l 1 !!!1IJ} } f i, i A Q = 0.0 Extrapolated Test Results (Cyclic ! p i shear stresses required to cause .l '.. w i .l: it g e Q - 0.34 ao,-oc in 300 cycies) i 3 i! I !b N 4000 l E 1 i ii , l '4-y-- 1 l i i^ ! i*

'i fitt

---1 ,,l e i t-i wE y i r 1 I g, __;_L i j d i p o 1 i >= M. i 3000 O3 Ey 4 f, j 3 0 i i wN I i o= i L'.. Ez i ~..__-f--- 4 j ",4 0 - 0.34 i i Ul',! 8z ---+-T- 'i g' e y2 2000 ,', II i i i p --4,,-g#' b i T i yE ___.__t_- .Pt-.__ g p i i, ,i e.g I ~T' t ~ Z'~.b m .____g+l e r Q = 0.0 _- _p ~ z 7.. =4 / l. > t-i --*4-l t i I i A-

• "~~

f, cf,,~~-[ =** M s r "l ~~ i ( ~ o !r g=> y 4_ _ j g my; i li jh f [M a ,ooo .p

.y 4VT" '

"~~~~~ i l V t-b-c='=' W- "t-j

p n

i r- - r-i c===> L_ ~! , i "[ ! t j j _..__.__p __ , 1_; r i t j i 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 f EFFECTIVE NORMAL STRESS, d' - P'I N YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMIN ARY SAFETY VARIATION OF CYCLtc SHEAR STRESS REQUIRED TO CAUSE 5% STRAIN ANALYSIS REPORT IN 25 CYCLES WITH EFFECTIVE NORMAL STRESS FOR COMPACTED FIGURE 2.5-75(T) EARTHFILL PLACED AT 95 % STANDAR D COMPACTION Added by Amendment 13

Q x 0.ewt Generator } Build ng k_ ) Fmished Grade El. 520.0 4 f Assumed Grousd Water f ., / S"'f'ce El. 519 0 SM Control m. ,,,g a ~ El. 465 I 460 Id_i.t./ ree _4 j Ihfi!I n f {440 I i { ushed Stone BEOROCK l 400 380 l i e i i r i i i i i i L 4 -350 -300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 87.) DISTANCE FROM TOP OF SLOPE - FEET l 4.0 (*) p i., > 3.0 h Along El. 495 I 2.0 O l / d- - - - ~ -~ 1 ,~ 4~ g 1.0 8a 0 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 DISTANCE FROM TOP OF SLOPE - FEET LOCAL FACTORS OF S COMFACTED EARTHFILI COMPACTION) WITH RE STRAIN ALONG SELEC OF DYNAMIC MATERIA s p ,,,/

I g $20 s00 480 g 460 /l;'"4$7 * eudMi ie I -~~ei. 430 s --_--------i i w s. ei.,,, 420 N__ _. EI. 410 - e ,,,,,,,m,_ BEDROCK 380 i k E b g g i i I 330 430 sso 800 es0 im 7s0 800 aso $00 I Along fl. 430.5 h 4~, - - c : ; %.- - --*M*%. Aiong 430 250 300 350 400 4s0 600 550 600 650 700 750 AFETY (BASED ON CYCLIC STRENGTH OF Added by Amendment 13 _ PLACED AT 95 PERCENT STANDARD SPECT TO DEVELOPMENT OF 5 PERCENT TED HORIZONTAL PLANES, SSE, BASIC SET YELLOW Cr.EEK NUCLEAR PLANT L PROPERTIES FIGURE 2.5-76 (T)

Diesel Generr. tor Buildirig Finished Grade nu \\ g QO El. 520.0 [] Assumed Ground Water O \\ U i f Surface El. 519.0 J i j i 520

w.y,s..,____&___

500 l ,4,5 - 4 'i l l C' b 480 w I M Compacted l Earthfill' o w'~~- y g 440 Crushed Stone A' i Base I w B' I l BEDROCK w C 400 380 l l 1 I t t t t 1 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 DISTANCE FROM TOP OF SLOPE - FEET Section A*- A' Section p 520 520 y 480 480 460 460 e 1 k 3 440 440 d 420 420 400 400 q 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 0 0.5 1.0 1.s Section D'- D' Section $20 520 500 500 c E 400 480 1 2 9 460 4GO E 440 440 ~ N Y v' 420 420 l t / 400 400 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 0 0.5 1.0 1q LOCAL FACTOR Od LOCAL FACTOR OF SAFETY, T, /Td

520 500 480 D-460 l l 42 l . _ st_ 420 l D' 8EDROCK 380 l t i I I I l i 1 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 B '- B' Section C'-C' 52 i LOCAL FACTOR OF SAFETY 500 (BASED ON CYCLIC STRENGTH OF h COMPACTED EARTHFILL PLACED AT 48 7 95 PERCENT STANDARD COMPACTION) WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT OF 480 5 PERCENT STRAIN ALONG SELECTED [ VERTICAL PLANES, SSE, BASIC SET OF 420 DYNAMIC MATERIAL PROPERTIES 2.0 2.5 3.0 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 E '- E ' Section F'-F' 520 Added by Amendm nt 13 500 480 YELLOW CRELK NUCLEAR PLANT 460 440 FIGURE 2.5-77 (T) 420 w 400 2.0 2.5 3.0 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 SAF ETY, Tg/Td LOCAL FACTOR OF SAFETY, T,/Tg

ggg P 'd Omsel Generator Buildmg A 6 Firushed Grade El. 520.0 Assumed Ground Water / Surface El. 519.0 Con,d.,,, 9__ trol fsy 520 u j' N j" (est_ .EO 380 I t r i i i i i i i e i i 400 -350 -300 - 250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 DISTANCE FROM TOP OF SLOPE - FEET U i i ( l t

(\\ ^ / \\ ANALYSIS CASE SOIL STRENGTH FACTOR OF SAFETY / \\ PRE-EARTHOUAKE R or CU 4.62 POST-EARTHOUAKE R or m tm 4.06 /

= =

\\ / \\ / \\ / \\ / \\ i " / \\ ~ * ~ ~ / \\ 'r f_-_ _ltg "" x ~4;.. g _ m \\ - a =< 8EDROCK Zone A 380 l t t t I t I t I I I 1 i i 250 300 350 400 450 500 560 600 650 700 750 800 850 900 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT l POST-EARTHQUAKE STATIC STABILITY AN ALYSIS Added by Amendment 13 FIGURE 2.5-78 (T)

/O Y

• 'd INDUCED SHEAR STRESS, T, (psd d

, 519) 520 - v O o,-- 1 I l l 9 H1, UPPER-BOUND VARIATION A H1. BASIC SET OF DYNAMIC PROPERTIES 610 - 10 E H1, LOWER-BOUND VARIATION O H2, UPPER-BOUND VARIATION A H2, BASIC SET OF DYNAMIC PRC+ ERTIES D H2, LOWER-BOUND VARIATION gp 500 - 20 \\ Earthfill g\\ e 4 93 - 30 )\\ 2 2 h4 z' g \\\\ b k

• 480 -

40 g \\g g g 0 n\\d h g \\\\ \\ 470 - 50 g\\\\ \\ \\ k\\ \\\\\\ \\ \\ We \\ 460 - 60 )\\\\\\ \\ l b WO N me vien.nu.e Bedrock I I I 70 l EFFECTS OF PARAMETRIC VARIATIONS IN DYNAMIC PROPERTIES AND IMPUT MOTION (HI VSH2) ON INDUCED SHEAR STRESS IN I COMPACTED EARTHFILL, SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT ( PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT { FIGURE 2.5-79(T) l f%f Added by Amendment 13 l As' l /

O O O Assumed G.T. SHEAR STRESS. T. (psf) LOCAL FACTOR OF SAFETY, T/Td (El.519) 0 500 1000 1500 2000 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 520 0 g g y 3 g \\ / \\ / 510 - 10 ESTIMATED T, FOR 100%- 10 g \\ STANDARD COMPACTION /s.---95% STANDARD / COMPACTION g g 500 - 20 \\ \\ 20 / c,,,,c,, g Earthfill \\ 1 \\ i 490 - 3 30 3 30 \\ 2' \\ 9 \\ 100% STANDARD E 3' \\ f COMPACTION h40 'g h40 ,8 480 - \\ t f FOR 95% 470 - 50 - T, STANDARD I ~ ~ COMPACTION \\ r \\ INDUCED STRESS T d 5 g_ g I M \\ \\ Bedrock I I I I I I 70 70

---

Stress required to cause 5 percent strain in 25 cycles in compacted earthfill placed at 95 percent standard compaction.

~ --- Estimated stress required to cause 5 percent strain in 25 cycles in compactM earthfill placed at 100 percent standasJ compaction. YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT PRELIMIN ARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT COMPARISON OF FREE-FIELD INDUCED SHEAR STRESS WITH CYCUC Add b er. 13 STRENGTH CHARACTERtSTICS OF COMPACTED EARTHFILL, SSE

YCEP-13 \\'" The codes and standards applied to TVA's Cuality Grcups A.. E, C, and D are the same as given in Regulatory Guide 1.26, Table 1, for components to which they apply.. The codes and standards applied to the mechanical components in TVA Quality Groups A. E, C, D, and E are listed in Tatle 3.2-3 (T). Components such as a steel liner in a ccncrete tank not listed in Table 3. 2-3 (T) will te designated as having a Cuality Group commensurate with their safety functions and will te 3esigned to applicable industry ccdes and standards. CE uses the Safety Class ncrenclature descrited in CESSAF Section 3.2 instead of the cuality Grcup nomenclature used by TVA. Secticns of the PSAR written by CE therefcre use the CESSAR terminology, and sections written by TVA use the Cuality Grcup terminology. Tatle 3.2-4 (T) contains a ccaparison of the TWA Quality Grcups, CESSAR designations, ANSI Safety Classes, and Regulatory Guide 1.26 Cuality Groups. Note that CESSAF Class 4 and ANSI Class NNS include ERC and TVA Culaity Grcup C plus acn-safety related Classes that TVA separates intC Cuality Grcups E, 10 Fe and S. Justificaticn: These systens are within TVA's scere and are nct covered by N CESSAF. [d Deleticn: The Refueling Kater Tank wi:t1 not te safety Class 2 as listed in CESSAB Tatle 3.2-1. Justificaticn: The safety class terrinolcgy does nct apply The tank will te a steel-lined concrete tank 4.s described in Secticn 3.8. Exception: Fracture toughness test methods and acceptance and exemptica criteria for materials in pressure retaining parts cf ASME Class 2 and 3 CESSAR system components will te in ccnfctmance hitt Articles NC-2300 and EC-2300 cf the ASME code Section III edition and addenda in ef fect at the tire cf order of the specific ccmponent. 13 Justificaticn: For CESSAE components purchased for YCNE, this is required for compliance with 10 CER Section 50.55a. (T l G 3.2-3

YCNP-13 O The equivalent uniform pressure in pst acting on a structure is defined as p=q C, and is assumed to be constant with height. The maximum dynamic wind pressure is given by q = 0.00256V2 where V is the maximum wind speed (rotational velocity plus translational velocity) in mph. For tornado loadings the gust factor is taken as unity. The pressure coefficient, C,, and pressure distribution on flat surfaces and round structures are determined by the recommendations of ASCE Paper No. 3269, " Wind Forces on Structures," and ANSI A58.1-1972, Paragraph 6 as outlined in Section 3.3.1.2. The method used to transform the impactive load due to a tornado-generated missile into an effective load on a structure is described in Section 3.5.4. l 13 The following loading combinations should be investigated to determine the most adverse total tornado effect on the structure. A. W. =W. B. E, =W, C. W. = W. ("} D. W, = W. + 0.5W, E. W. =W. +W. F. W. = W. + 0.5W, + W. Where W is the total tornado load, W. is the tornado wind load, W is the effective tornado differential pressure load, and W. is the tornado missile load. 3.3.2.3 Structures Designed for Tornado Loads The following structures are designed to esist wind and tornado loads. A. Reactor Building 1. Enclosure Structure 1 2. Auxiliary Area Structure B. Control Building C. Fuel Euilding D. Diesel Generator Euilding l [ E. Waste Management Euilding O 3.3-3 l

YCNP-13 O F. ERCE Pumping Station 1 G. Refueling Water Tanks H. Emergency Feedwater Storage Tanks I. Intake Pumping Station (Non-Category I Safety-Related structure as defined in Section 3.8.4.1.11) 13 J. Pipe Tunnel between Fuel Building and Waste Management Building 3.3.2.4 Ef fect of Failure of Structures or Components Not Designed for Tornado Loads Structures not designed to resist tornado loads are located a distance apart from Category I structures (as discussed in subsection 3.8.6) such that the ability of the Category I ctructure'or system to perform its intended design function wilf not be impaired by failure of the structure not designed to resist tornado loads. 3.3.3 Interface Requirements The location, arrangement, and installation of systems and components required for safe plant shutdown will be such that the offects of winds, tornadoes, and tcrnado missiles will not prevent these systems and components from performing their chutdown functions. The severity of the winds and tornadoes to be considered, as well as the combination of the effects of these natural phenomena with normal and accident conditions will meet the requirements of Criterion 2 of 10CFR50, Appendix A. 3.3.4

References:

1. ASCE Paper No. 3269 2. ANSI A58.1-1972, section 6 3. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.76 Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants 4. Hoecker, W. H., Jr., "%ind Speed and Air Flow Patterns in the Dallas Tornado of April 2, 1957," Monthly Heather Review, Vol. 88, No. 5, May 1960, pp. 167-180. 5. Hoecker, W. H., J r., "Three Dimensional Pressure Pattern of the Dallas Tornado and Some Resultant Implicatiotas," Monthly Weather Review,. December 1961, pp. 533-542. O 3.3-4

YCNP-13 CT Y \\' I 3.5 MISSILE PROTECTION (CESSAR) Addition: This section describes the missile protection design bases for Beismic Category I structures and Components. Missiles considered are those that could result from: a plant related failure / incident including failures within and outside of Containment; environmental generated missiles; and site proximity missiles. Included in this section are descriptions of the structures, shields, and barriers that will be designed to withstand missile effects, and the procedures by which each barrier will be designed to resist missile impact. Although the plant will be subject to the impact of a limited number of postulated missiles, where practical, seismic Category I structures and components will be arranged to minimize the probability of impact in the event of a missile related incident. To further reduce the probability of unacceptable consequences related to missile impact, key backup and/or redundant components and systems will be physically separated so that a single missile is incapable of negating the redundant f unction s. This is discussed in Section 3.12 on Physical 7 separation. / (_,,-} In addition, essentially all seismic Category I components will be housed in seismic Category I structures. are discussed in Section 3.8. of piping runs) a case by case evaluaticn will be performed to ensure no loss of functionality due to missile impact does not lead to an unsafe condition. Non-Category I safety-related structures and components that are required to be designed for raissile protection are described in Section 3.8.4.1.11. This section also defines the types of 13 missiles to be considered for each of these structures and components. The following criteria have been adopted for assessing the plant's capability to withstand the statistically significant missiles postulated in Section 3.S.2: 13 A. No loss of Containment function as a result of missiles generated internal to Containrent. B. No direct loss of teactor coolant as a result of missiles generated external to the Reactor Building. C. Reasonable assurance that the plant can be maintained in a safe shutdown condition. 3.5-1

YCNP-13 O D. Of f aite exposure within 10CFR100 guidelines for missile damage resulting in radionuclide release. 7 Justification: This information is outside the scope of CESSAR.

• Statistically significant is defined as unacceptable missile related consequences (i.e.,

in excess of 10CFR100 guidelines) greater than 10-7 per year that can result in unacceptable plant consequences. / O l O 3.5-2 ,e

YCNP-13 [ ] %J 3.5.1 Missile Barriers and Loadings (CESSAR) Addition: Structures, shields, and barriers that will te designed to withstand missile effects are tabulated in this subsection. The specific selection of missiles and their characteristics are covered separately in Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, respectively. 13 A. The structures for which the exterior walls and roofs will be designed to resist externally generated missiles are listed below: 1. Reactor Building Enclosure Structure 2. Easte Management Building 3. Fuel Building 4. Control Building (including Main Steam Valve Vault and 7 Tunnel) 5. Diesel Generator Building 6. ERCW Pumping Station \\O 7. Refueling Water Tanks and Associated Pipe Tunnels 8. Emergency Feedwater Storage Tanks and Associated Pipe Tunnels 13 9. Intake Pumping Station 10. Pipe Tunnel Eetween Fuel Building and Waste Management Euilding B. Internal structures which will be designed to withstand internally generated missiles are listed below: 1. Reactor cavity shield walls 2. Crane wall ( 3. Steam generator compartment walls 4. Reactor vessel missile shield j 5. Pressurizer missile shield r 3.5-3

YCNP-13 0 6. Pool walls and transfer canal 7 7, Train separation barrier 8. Local shields and barriers will be provided where protection is necessary for internally generated missiles such as valve bonnets and valve stems. These shields and barriers will be identified in the FSAR. Justification: This information is outside the scope of CESSAB. 3.5.2 Missile Selection (CESSAR) Addition: Missiles selected for the structures given in Section 3.5.1-A are 13 those postulated to result from external missile sources outside of the Reactor Building (plant related, envircnmental load 7 generated, and site proximity missiles). Missiles selected for those structures, shields and barriers within the Reactor Building tabulated in Section 3.5.1-B are, of course, associated 13 with postulated missile sources within the Reactor Building. 3.5.2.1 External Missiles As previously discussed external missiles are considered to be the result of plant equipment failures (outside the Reactor Build ing), environmental loads, and site proximity incidents. These three potential external missile sources are separately addressed in the paragraphs to follow. 3.5.2.1.1 External Missiles from Plant Equipment Failures The only identifiable source of significant external missiles from plant equipment failures is that due to a gross structural failure of the turbine. Turbine missiles are not considered 7 based on the discussion presented in Section 10.2.3. 3.5.2 1.2 Environmental Load Generated Missiles 3 Environmental loads can result from basically four sources: seismic activity; high water level; winds; and, tornados. Since all seismic Category I structures and components will be designed to resist seismic activity, there will not be Seismic Category I structure related missiles as a result of seismic activity. Missiles related to high water level are not considered because, 7 of the maximum water elevation with respect to plant grade given in Section 3.4. of the two remaining environmental loads, only tornados need be considered since the maximum absolute velocity of the design tornado is greater than three times that of the 3.5-4

YCNP-13 '~ maximum wind velocities as indicated in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.1, l13 respectively. Seismic Category I and certain non-Category I safety-related

13 structures and components are designed to resist the design tornado; hence, missiles resulting f rom effects of tornados on such structures are included.

As discussed in Paragraph 3.3.2.3, tornado winds could damage nonCategory I Structures thereby producing missiles. However, integrity of the Containment and 7 capability of the essential heat-removal systems are not impaired nor is there a risk that offsite exposures would exceed the 10CFR100 guidelines since such nonCategory I structures are arranged with sufficient distance between them and the seiswic Category I structures. Missile type characteristics and parameters for the above objects are described in Paragraph 3.5.3.1. 3.5.2.1.3 Site Proximity Missiles The only identifiable source of potential missiles in the general site proximity are aircraft. Aircraft are not considered based on the discussion presented in Section 2.2.3. Justification: This information is outside the scope of CESSAP. 3.5.3 Selected Missiles (CESSAB) Addition: The characteristics required to determine penetraticn and/or damage potential of the missiles listed in subsection 3.5.2 are described herein. The missile characteristics are presented in the same two groups; external and internal missiles. 3.5.3.1 Characteristics of External Missiles As indicated in Paragraph 3.5.2, the only postulated external missiles are tornado generated; and for the purposes of barrier design and damage assessment, seven types of objects were selected to be representative of tornado generated missiles. 3.5.3.1.1 Fotential Missiles Potential missiles and their properties are listed in Table 3.5-1 (T). 3.5-5

YCNP -13 0 3.5.3.1.2 Analytical Methods and Procedures Analytical procedures for selection of tornadc missiles and velocities are discussed in TVA-TR74-1*. 3.5.3.1.3 Design Velocities for Tornado Missile Barriers The justification and analytical procedures for determining tornado missile velocities for design of missile barriers are described in "The Generation of Missiles by Tornados," TVA-TR74-la. The velocities to be used for missile design barriers are shown in Table 3.5-1(T) ; the vertical velocities will be used for design of flat roofs and the horizontal velocities for design of all barrier surfaces that are not horizontal. Justificaticn: This information is outside the scope of CESSAR. 3.5.4 Barrier Desian Procedures The procedures by which each barrier will be designed to resist the missiles previously described and the methods to be employed to assess related damage are described in this subsection. Since the procedures for barrier design and damage assessment depend on the basic material of construction (i.e., concrete or steel), the corresponding procedures are presented separately. No composite sections will be used to resist missile impact. 3.5.4.1 Missile Barrier Design Interf ace Requirements A. For systems and parts of systems located inside Containment (Reactor Coolant System and connecti0g systems, Engineered Safety Features Systems), appropriate missile barrier design procedures will be used to insure that the impact of any l potential missile will not lead to a Loss-of-Coolant Accident or preclude systems from carrying out their specified safety functions. B. For systems and equipment outside Containrent, listed in Section 3.5.1 above, appropriate design procedures (for example, proper turbine orientation, natural separation, or missile barriers) will be used to insure that the irpact of any potential missile does not prevent the system or equiprent from carrying out its specified safety functions. C. For all systems and equipment, appropriate design procedures will be used to insure that the impact of any potential missile does not prevent the conduct of a safe plant shutdown, or prevent the plant from remaining in a safe shutdown condition. 3.5-6

YCNP-13 (V r

3. 5. 4. 2 Concrete Barriers and Targets The concrete missile barrier protection design and damage assessment includes an estimate of missile penetration based on the Modified National Defense Research Committee formula.

'Ihe procedure considers: the local effects of penetration and/or scabbing; and the response of the target. The penetration depth for reinforced concrete is calculated by the following: 1 __ I/2 -4KNwd (IOOOd v For -p 5 2.0, X = A 1 1.s For p M.0,X= KNw( loOOdj + Where X = penetration depth (inches) n d = missile diameter (inches) w = missile weight (pounds) 7 N = shape factor, taken as 0.72 for flat-nosed missiles K= 180 Al fc (f'c in psi) V = velocity (ft/sec) The minimum thickness to prevent scabbing is calculated by the following: I t/d<3 AND ( / 2 7.911g*e-5.06*- For >t =d d s a x/d 50.65 e g j l i x/d >0.65 OR For e >ts= 2.12 +1.36 - d 3sts/de<18, d e Where t = slab thickness (inches) [ t = minimum thickness required to prevent scatting g \\s 3.5-1

YCNP-13 0 de = e uivalent diameter of missile (inj e ; for a pipe, de = 7 x where A = area of metal in cross section of pipe. 7T Minimum exterior wall and roof thickness will ccmply with Table

3. 5-2 (T).

For the strength of concrete required for tornado 9 12 missile protection, see section 3.8.3.6.1. The structural response of concrete barriers to missile impact will be evaluated' for ikpactive loads consistent with the requiremens in the propored Appendix C of the ACI 349 Code (see Section 3.8.3. 2). The minimum concrete thicknesses required for tornado generated 12 missile protection and based on the missile spectrum in Fevision 1 of BRP 3.5.1.4 and are given in Table 3.5-2 (T). l l O O 3.5-7a

YCNP-13 G 3.5.4.3 steel Earriers and Targets For steel barriers and targets only perforation of the barrier or target is a consideration. The Stanford Formula will be used to determine the required thickness of the steel barrier or 1 perforation of the target *: Stanford Formula (References 1 and 5) j P= 85.3 (1 +5 ( X2 )V2_1

• The formula has been rewritten slightly and the alength of a standard width" was taken to be four inches.

In the Stanford Formula the missile is assumed to be cylindrical where the length of the missile = L. This formula is valid within the following ranges: 10 < L/C < 50 O.1 < P/D < 0.8 0.002 < P/L < 0.05 5 < L'/C < 8 8 < L'/F < 100 () 70 < V < 400 3.5.5 Missile Barrier Features 3.5.5.1 Euildings and Structures The Reactor Building Enclosure Structure will constitute the barrier which protects the Containment from external missiles. The crane wall, steam generator compartment walls, reactor vessel missile shield, pool walls and local barrier shields will protect the Containment from internally generated rissiles. These barrier features are discussed in Section 3.8 an3 also shown in 7 Figures 3.8-9 (T) through 3. 8-18 (T) with exception of the local barrier shields which will be described in the FSAR. Waste Management Euilding, Fuel Building, Contrcl Building, Diesel Generator Building, ERCW Pumping Station, Refueling Eater Tanks, Emergency Feedwater Storage Tanks, the pipe tunnel between 13 the Fuel Building and tne Waste Management Building, and Intake Pumping Station are discussed in Section 3.8. A tabulation of Reactor Building specific internal 9tructural components assumed to be missile barriers is given ir

ection 3. 5.1. B.

7 O .V ~ 3.5-8 a.-

YCNP-13 0 3.5.6 References 1. R. W. White and N. B. Botsford, Containment of Fragmets f rom a Runaway Reactor, Report SRIA-113, Stanford Fesearch Institute, September 15, 1963. 2. F. J. Samuely and C. W. Hamann, " Civil Protection," The Architectural Press, London, 1939. 3. A. Amirikian, " Design of Protective Structures," Report N P-37 2 6, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Department of the Navy, August, 1950. 4. C. R. Russell, " Reactor Safeguards," MacMillan, New York, 1962. 5. "U.S. Reactor Containment Technology," ORNL-NSIC-5, Vol. 1, Chapter 6, 1965. 6. "The Generation of Missiles by Tornadoes," TVA-TR74-1, November 1974. O O 3.5-9

YCNP-l3 TABLE 3.5-1 (T) Tornado Missiles, Properties and velocities -~ V Horizontal Missile Weight Velocity Description (lb) Cross section Length (ft) (ft/sec) Wooden Plank 115 4" x 12" 12 272 Steel Rod 9 1" dia 3 167 6" Schedule 287 6" dia 15 171 40 Pipe 12" Schedule 750 12" dia 15 154 40 Pipe Utility Pole 1124 13-1/2" dia 35 180 12 Automobile 4000 6.5'x4.3' 16.5 194 tbtes: 1. These missiles are considered to be capable of striking in all directions and at all elevations. 2. Vertical velocities of 70% of the postulated 'h [d horizontal velocities are acceptable except for the la steel rod which shall have a vertical velocity equal to its horizontal velocity (167 fps). O l l

YCNP-12 TABI.E 3.5 - 2(T) Hinimum Wall and Roof Thickness Requirements To Resist the Effects of Tornado Miss!le Impact 28-Day Concrete Wall Roof Tornado Intensity Strength Thickness Thickness Region (PSI) (Inches) (Inches) Region I 3000 23 18 4000 20 16 5000 18 14 O l l l l O Added by Amendment 12

YCNP-11 3.8.3.6.2 Suality Control 3.8.3.6.2.1 Concrete Quality control procedures are followed to provide assurance that the requirements of Subparagraph 3.8.3.6.1 are satisfied. Concrete quality control begins with selection and testing of the ingredients of the mix and continues through proportioning, batching, mixing, transporting, placing, and curing. Cuality control extends from testing of specimens sampled f rom basic shapes to subsequent fabrication and installation and joining procedures. See Chapter 17 for details under Quality Assurance. 3.8.3.6.2.1.1 Exception TVA takes exception to ACI 349-76 section 1.2.1, " Copies of 11 structural drawings, typical details and specifications for all reinforced concrete ccnstruction shall be signed by a licensed engineer. 3.8.3.6.2.2 Structural Steel Quality Control for structural steel will be in accordance with the AISI Specification listed in paragraph 3. 8.3. 2. See Chapter -17 for details under Quality Assurance. 3.8.3.6.3 Special Construction Techniques The interior structure will be built using normal construction techniques. 3.8.3.7 Testing and Inservice Surveillance Requirements There will be no special testing or inservice surveillance requirements. 3.8.4 other Category I Structures The Category I structures other than the Containment vessels and the internal structures of the Containment are listed below. A. Reactor Building 1. Enclosure Structure 2. Auxiliary Area Structure B. Control Building C. Fuel Building O 3.8-29

YCNP-13 O' D. Diesel Generator Buildings E. Waste Management Building F. EPCW Pumping Station G. EBCE Spray Ponds H. Ref ueling Water Tanks I. Emerg'ency Feedwater Tanks J. Pipe Tunnel between the Fuel Building and the Waste Management Building 13 K. Perscnnel tunnels between Peactor Buildings and Waste Management Building 3.8.4.1 ' Description of the Structures 3.8.4.1.I' Reactor Building 3.8.4.1.1.1 Enclosure Structure The Enclosure Structure will consist of a spherical dome placed on top of a cylindrical wall, each having an inside face radius of 105 feet and a 3-foot thickness. The boundary between this Enclosure Structure and the Auxiliary Area structure will be empirically defined as the top surface elevation of the topnost slab of the Auxiliary Area structure. The steel Containment vessel will be totally enclosed by the combined Enclosure Structure-Auxiliary Area structure. The steel containment vessel will be concentric with the dome of the Enclosure Structure. The general layout and configuration of the Enclosure Structure is shown in Figures 3.8-9(T) through 3. 8-18 (T). It will be a conventionally reinforced concrete structure. A slight negative pressure will be maintained in the air space between the Enclosure Structure and the steel Containment Vessel to prevent radiological leakage to the atmosphere. The Enclosure Structure will not be pressurized during the design basis accident. 3.8.4.1.1.2 Auxiliary Area Structure The Auxiliary Area structure will be a reinforced concrete box type structure which will support the steel Containment vessel, the Contalnnent internal structure and the Enclosure Structure. This structure will be circular in plan. The box type configuration will include a' solid concrete central pedestal, a number of concentric circumferential walls, plus an irregular or unsymmetric arrangement of radial walls. Floor slabs will cccur at several elevations. Much of the top surface of this structure will be formed to a spherical shape to receive and support the 3.8-30 l

_~ i 1 s. - t YCNP-13 l l .!9 ] . steel Containment vessel and the-Containment internal structure. l The general-layout and configuration is shown in Figures 3.8-9(T) through 3.8 18(T). 3_ i t. 4 t 4 i 1 I I d i i i I i. i l t 4 i I i-i 1 4 i t i I, I l i 1 l 3.8-30a . a.., m,,,- .c.,__.222.___._____,.._____._.,__

YCNP-13 /'N (v) media will be evaluated. The configuration of these tanks is shown in F,igure 3.8-30(T). 3.8.4.1.9 Emergency Feedwater Tanks The Emergency Feedwater Tanks, as described in Paragraph 10.7.4.2, will be steel-lined, reinforced concrete, cylindrical tanks with domed roofs supported on compacted granular fill. These tanks will be separated from other structures, but seismic interaction through the foundation media vill be evaluated. The configuration of these tanks is shown in Figure 3.8-31(T). 3.8.4.1.10 Pipe Tunnels Between the Fuel Euildings and Easte Management Building The tunnels housing the piping systems between the Fuel Buildings and the Easte Management Building will te cast-in-place reinforced concrete structures founded in rock. The only access to the tunnels will be from inside the buildings. 3.8.4.1.11 Non-Category I Safety-Related Structures 3.8.4.1.11.1 Intake Pumping Station r~ (,g ) The Intake Pumping Station is classified as a non-Category I safety-related structure since it is not required to remain functional in a seismic event. The safety-related function of this structure is to protect to cooling tower makeup pumps and l 13 associated components from the ef fects of tornados and tornado generated missiles as described in Section 3.3.2 and 3.5.3. The j makeup pumps and associated components provide a source of water I to the ERCW in the event that the ERCH spray ponds are disabled by a tornado. l The Intake Pumping Station will be a reinforced concrete box type structure with its foundation extending to bedrock. There will be several opening in the roof of the structure which willl be covered by either reinforced concrete hatches, or panels composed of structural steel shapes oriented to protect the interior of the structure from tornado generated missiles and allow venting of the interior of the structure. The general layout of the Intake Pumping Station is shown in Figures 1.2-52 (T) to 1.2-54(T). 3.8.4.1.11.2 Personnel Tunnels Between the Reactor Buildings and Easte Management Euilding The personnel tunnels between the Beactor Buildings and the Waste Management Building are classified as non-Category I safety-related structures under Regulatory Position C.2 of Regulatory O) t \\_ / I l 3.8-33 l l l

YCNP-13 Guide 1.29. This requirement is imposed to prevent groundwater leakage into the Peactor Buildings in the event of an SSE. l 13 The tunnels are cast-in-place reinforced concrete structures founded on rock. They provide access between the Beactor Buildings and the Easte Management Building. 3 3.8.4.2 Applicable Codes, S ta nd a rd s, and Specifications 3.8.4.2.1 Cat ego ry I Structures Refer to Paragraph 3.8.3.2. 3.8.4.2.2 Non-Category I Saf ety-Felated Structures 3.8.4.2.2.1 Intake Pumping Station 13 All codes, standards, and specifications listed in Paragraph 3.8.3.2 will be used in the design and const.ruction of this structure, except ACI 318-71 will be used instead of ACI 349-76 since the Intake Pumping Station is not a Category I structure. 3.8.4.2.2.2 Perscnnel Tunnels Eetween the Reactor Buildings and Waste Management Buildinq Refer to Paragraph 3.8.3.2. 3.8.4.3 Loads and Load Combinations 3.8.4.3.1 Loads, Definitions, and Nomenclature All the major loads to be encountered or to be postulated in a nuclear power plant are listed below. All the loads listed, however, are not necessarily applicable to all the structures and their elements. Loads and the applicable load combinations for which each structure has to be designed will depend on the conditions to which that particular structure may be subjected. Normal loads, which are those loads to be encountered during normal plant operation and shutdown, include: D - Dead loads or their related internal moments and forces, including any permanent equipment loads and hydrostatic loads. L - Live loads or their related internal moments and forces, including any movable equipment loads and other Acads which vary with intensity and occurrence, such as soil pressure. 3 To - Thermal effects and loads during normal operating or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady state condition. 3.8-33a

YCNP-13 O Ro - Pipe reactions during normal operating cr shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady-state condition. Severe environmental loads include: 3 E - Loads generated by the Operating Basis Earthquake. W - Loads generated by the design wind specified for the plant. O i O e '3.8-33b ,,a -4

YCNP-11 Extreme environmental loads include: E' Loads generated by the safe shutdown earthquake. Wt - Loads generated by the design tornado specified for the plant. Tornado loads include leads due to the tornado wind pressure, the tornado-created differential pressure, and tc tornado generated missiles. Abnormal Loads. Those loads generated by a postulated high-energy pipe break accident. 3 Pa Pressure equivalent static load within or across a compartment generated by the postulated break, and including an appropriate dynamic load factor to account for the dynamic nature of the load. Ta - Thermal loads under thermal conditions generated by the postulated break and including Tc. Pipe reactions under thermal conditions generated by Ra the postulated break and including Ro. Yr - Equivalent static load on the structure generated by the reaction on the broken high-energy pipe during the postulated break, and including an appropriate dynamic load factor to account for the dynamic nature of the load. Yj - Jet impingement equivalent static load on a structure generated by the postulated break and including an appropriate dynamic load factor to account for the dynamic nature of the load. Ym - Missile impact equivalent static load on a structure generated by or during the postulated break, as from pipe whipping, and including an appropriate dynamic load factor to account for the dynamic nature of the load. The strength or lead capacity requirements nomenclature includes: S For structural steel, S is the required section strength based on the elastic design methods and the allowable stresses defined in part I of the AISC " Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural 3 Steel for Buildings," February 12, 1969. O For concrete structures, U is the section strength required to resist design loads based on the strength 11 design methods described in ACI 349-76. The 33 percent increase in allowable stresses for concrete and steel due to seismic or wind loadings is not permitted. 3.8-34

YCNP-13 ,~ .( ) v 3.8.4.3.4 ERCH Spray Ponds The loading conditions utilized in the stability analysis of the pond slopes are descril 3 in Paragraph 2.5.5.2. The loads used in the design of other cructural featuras are as described in 3.8.4.3.1. 3.8.4.3.5 Intake Pumcing Station i gj Loads and loading combinations shall be in accordance with ACI 13 318-71 plus load combinations (5) in section 3.8.4.3.2 and (5) in Section 3.8.4.3.3. 3.8.4.4 Design and Analysin Procedures 3.8.4.4.1 Reactor Building 3.8.4.4.1.1 Enclosure Structure The Enclosure Structure will be analyzed for the loads and load combinations as om.iined in Section 3.8.4.3 and in accordance 13 with the codes and specifications outlined in Section 3.8.4.2. This structure will te analyzed by the use of one or more of many acceptable finite element computer programs. These programs have T the capability to analyze the entire structure under any loading /(_,/ c ond ition. Manual calculations will re used to verify the computer results. Computer prograns available for use are described in Appendix 3.8-A. 3.8. 4. 4.1. 2 Tuxiliary Area Structure The Auxiliary Area of the Reactor Euilding will be analyzed in accordance with the loads and loading combinations outlined in Section 3.8.4.3, and in accordance with the specification for 13 steel and concrete outlined in Section 3.8.4.2. Several different decign and analysis techniques, both manual and computer, will be uced to analyze this structure. Among these will be plate, beam, and finite element analysis. These techniques will be coordinated into a joint effort that will produce a structure of the necessary strength to withstand the expected loads. The foundation of the Auxiliary Area Structure will be resting on sound rock and in the analysis of the Auxiliary Area the rock properties will be input into a finite element model to determine the overall structural response between the structure and its supporting subgrade. Load transfer, bcth shear and bearing, will be carried to the foundation by the central massive column and concentric circular walls within the structure. Computer programs available for use in the analysis of the Auxiliary Area Structure are described in Appendix 3.8-A. . O) sx_ - 3.8-37

~ \\ YCNP-13 3.8.4.4.2 Control Building The Control nutiding will be designed in accordance with the loadu and load combinations outlined in section 3.8.4.3 and in accordance with the concrete and structural steel specifications 13 outlined in Section 3.8.4 2. Load transfer to the rock subgrade of the control Building will be through the interior and e i O 3.8-37a

YCNP-S \\ exterior walls and columns which are also utilized as supports for the various floor slabs. Computer programs used are described in Appendix 3.8-A. 3.8.4.4.3 Fuel Building The Fuel Building will be analyzed as a reinforced concrete and structural steel structure with the loads and load combinations outlined in Paragraph 3.8.4.3 and in accordance with concrete and structural steel specifications outlined in Paragraph 3.8.4.2. The building will censist of structural exterior and interior walls, floor and roof slabs, all of reinforced concrete, plus interior top story columns of structural steel with structural steel roof slab framing. Horizontal seismic forces will be resisted by shear walls with floor and roof slabs acting as diaphragms. Computer programs available for use are described in Appendix 3.8-A. 3.8.4.4.4 Diesel Generator Buildings The Diesel Generator Building will be designed in accordance with [D Paragraphs 3.8.4.3 and 3.8.4.2. Design loads are carried to the (s,) foundation through the exterior walls and interior columns, with the walls carrying all the seismic shear forces. Due to the massive base mat of the Diesel Generator Building, all walls and columns framing into the mat will essentially be fixed at their point of connection. The analysis of the Diesel Generator Euilding will be done by combining manual and computer techniques. Computer programs available for use are described in Appendix 3.8-A. The fuel storage tanks are encased in the Diesel Generator Building base slab which serves as the concrete encasement. This concrete encasement, alone will be designed to sustain the loading combinations specified in Faragraphs 3.8.4.3 and 3.8.4.2. This will provide a level of quality equivalent to that of a similar component constructed to ASME Bciler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class 3. Since the steel liner serves no function during these loadings except to maintain leaktightness it will be designed in accordance with ASME Bciler and Pressure 5 Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division I. Ee emphasize that the design will ensure strain compatibility between the reinforced concrete encasement and the steel liner. The liner shall be ASTM A 36 steel with a system of internal stiffeners as required to maintain stability. Each liner shall be designed to prevent buckling of the steel shell due to gS external loads such as hydrostatic pressure f rom underground ( ) water, shrinkage of the concrete encasement during construction, 3.8-38

YCNP-5 t and expansion or contraction due to temperature differentials. Joint welding procedures to be used in fabrication of the steel liner will be qualified, in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure vessel Code, Section IX, prior to use by TVA or the fabricator. There will be 100 percent magnetic particle examination of all 5 welde exposed to the contents of the lined vessel using properly qualified or experienced personnel and in accordance with ASME, Section VIII. TVA will require certification that all steel conforms tc the appropriate ASTM specification. Also, each steel liner will be subjected to a standard hydrostatic test in accordance with ASME, Section VIII. In addition, in the unlikely event that a leak were to develop, a low-level annunciator in the control room will indicate low fuel oil level in the 7-day tanks. 3.8.4.4.5 Easte Management Building The Waste Management Building will be founded on rock and will be analyzed as,. multistory reinforced concrete structure. The building will consist of structural exterior and interior walls, floor and roof slabs, and columns. Horizontal seismic forces will be resisted by shear walls with the floor and roof slabs acting as diaphragms. The Easte Management Building will be analyzed and designed in compliance with Paragraphs 3.8.4.2 and 3. 8.4. 3. Computer programs available for use are described in Appendix 3.8-A. O 3.8-38a

YCNP-il {Q 3.8.4.4.6 ERCW Pumping Stations The ERCW pumping stations will be designed in accordance with Paragraphs 3.8.4.3 and 3.8.4.2 of this document. These structures will be analyzed as box-type structures with the roof slab, floor slabs, and walls resisting vertical and horizontal loads. Horizontal and vertical loads will be transmitted to the foundation by shear walls and the diaphragm action of roof and floor slats. Computer programs that will be utilized in this work are described in Appendix 3.8-A. 3.8.4.4.7 E3CW Spray Ponds The stability analysis of critical earth slopes are presented in Paragraph 2.5.5.2. The spray nozzles will be supported by steel riser pipes which will transmit all loads to the foundation. The ponds will be designed to resist the adverse effects of wave action within the pond, for extremes in local precipitation, and minimize seepage through the liner. ,O (~') The freeboard will exceed the maximum wave runup on the side slopes. A blanket of rip-rap will protect the slope from erosion caused by water level fluctuations. The runof f associated with the Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) will be carried away from the ponds by the site drainage system. This runoff will include overflow from the spray ponds after the allowance for the freeboard is exceeded. The permeability of the liner will be such that the assumed seepage losses will not be exceeded. 3.8.4.4.8 Refueling Water Tanks The design of the Refueling Water Tanks concrete domed roof and walls will conform to the provisions of the ACI 349-76 Code. The sole function of the stainless steel liners will be to provide a corrosion resistant and watertight nembrane for the coverete tanks. The liners will he designed in accordance with t he AISI " Specification for the Design of Cold-Formed Stainless Steel Structural Members", 1974 Edition. The roof of the tanks will be designed and analyzed as a thin shell supported by the cylindrical tank wall. The cylindrical concrete walls will be designed to resist the internal hydrostatic and gas pressures required by the system. These pressures will be resisted by longitudinal and meridional forces in the cylindrical wall. -[-~T Vertical loads will be transmitted directly tc a reinforced V 3.8-39

YCNP-13 O concrete mat foundation supporting the tank. The discontinuity effect of the cylindrical walls at the mat foundation will te incorporated in the design of both structural elemants. Horizontal loads will be transmitted to the foundation by shear in the cylindrical tank wall. The design of the wall will incorporate the effect of h'dtodynamic forces induced by seismic e xc itat. ion. The fabrication and erection of the stainless steel liners will' conform to the requirements of ASME S0ction VIII, Division 1. Joint welding procedures will ccnform to the requirements of ASME Section IX, Division 1. Nondestructive examinations will be performed in accordance with ASME Section V, Civision 1. Computer programs that will be used in the analysis of the tank's structural system are described in Appendix 3.8-A. 3.8.4.4.9 Emergency Feedwater Tanks The design, fabrication, and erection of the Emergency Feedwater Tanks will be identical to that described in Section 3.8.4.4.8 with the exception that the watertight membrane will be a carbon 1 steel liner designed in accordance with the AISC specifications. 3.8.4.4.10 Pipe Tunnel Between Fuel Building and Waste Management Building The tunnels housing the piping systems between the Fuel Euildings and the Waste Management Building will be analyzed for the loads and load combinations as outlined in Section 3.8.4.3 and in accordance with the codes and st7cifications outlined in Section 3.8.4.2. 13 3.8.4.4.11 Intake Pumping Station The Intake Pumping Station will be designed in accordance with Section 3.8.4.2 and 3.8.4.3.5. This structure will be analyzed as a box-type structure with horizontal and vertical forces being resisted by floor slabs, roof slab, walls and columns. Horizontal and vertical forces will be transmitted to bedrock by shear walls, foundation bearing walls, columns, and the diaphram cation of the roof and floor slabs. The analysis of the Intake Pumping Station will be done by combining manual and computer techniques. Computer programs available for use are described in Appendix 3.8-A. O 3.8-40

YCNP-13 n %J 3.8.4.4.12 Personnel Tunnels Between the Reactor Buildings and the Waste Management Building The personnel tunnels between the Reactor Buildings and the Waste Management Building will be designed and analyzed by the applicable portions of Section 3.8.4.2 and 3.8.4.3 in order to be 13 ir. compliance with Regulatory Position C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29. 3.8.4.5 Structural Acceptance criteria All structures will be designed in accordance with AISC Code 1969 Edition and the ACI 349-76 and using the loading combinations 11 13 given in Section 3. 8. 4. 3. 3.8.4.6 Materials, cuality Control, and Special Construction Techniques 13 Refer to Section 3.8.3.6. 3.8.4.6.1 Materials 13 Refer to Section 3.8.3.6.1. s 3.8.4.6.2 Cuality Control (] 13 Refer to Section 3.8.3.6.2. 3.8.4.6.3 Special Construction Techniques The Category I structures other than the Containment Vessels will be constructed using normal construction methods and techniques. 13 For the Containment Vessels, see Section 3.8.2.6. 3.8.4.7 Testing and Inservice Surveillance Requirements Refer to Paragraph 3.8.3.7. . (~N, b' l 3.8-41 l

l 1 YCNP O 3.8.5 Fo0NCATIONS 3.8.5.1 Description of Fcundations and Supports 3.8.5.1.1 Supports (CESSAR) 3.8.5.1.2 poactor Buildinq - Internal St ructuro Foundation The foundation for the internal structure of the Beactor Building will te tanically a thin shell concrete sphere of approxiwately 205 feet in diameter as shown it. Figures 3.8-9 (T) through 3. 8 18(T). Support for the foundation of the internal structure will be the Auxiliary Area Structure of the Reactor Building. Support is provided by two major components within the Auxiliary Area. A massive concrete column, approximately 65 in diameter, at the center of the utilding directly will support the reactor cavity and steam generator columns and a circular wall directly telow the crane wall an shown in Figures 3.8-9 (T) through 3.8-18 (T). Stability of the internal structures foundation will te derived from frictional contact between the foundation and the Containment Vessel, which will be sandwiched between the foundation and its support. There is no positive means of connection between the foundation and its support. 3.8.5.1.3 poactor Build ing - Primary Containrent Foundation Refer to Subsection 3.8.2. 3.8.5.1.4 Beactor Building Auxiliary Area and Enclosure Structure Foundation The foundation for the Auxiliary Area of the Beactor Euilding and the Enclosure Structure are interconnected structures and consist of a circular footing, approximately 65 feet in diameter at the center of the Auxiliary Area and several ring footings of radii 50, 65, 80, and 105 feet. These footings will all be supported on sound rock as shown in Figures 3.8-9(T) through 3. 8-18 (T). A base slab will interconnect the footings. This slab will also be founded on sound rock. The entire foundation will te keyed into approximately 10 feet of rock. Shear forces created by the action of an carttquake on the Reactor Building, Enclosure Structure, and the Reactor Building Auxiliary Area will be carried to rock by keying action of the structure in the rock. The Reactor Building Auxiliary Area and Enclosure Structure foundation will be independent of any other structures or 3.8-42

YCNP-13 (-N./ interaction of the tank foundation with other foundations in the area will te evaluated. 3.8.5.1.12 Emergency Feedwater Tank Foundation 1 The Emergency Feedwater Tank foundation is identical to that describcd in Section 3.8.5.1.11. 3.8.5.1.13 Pipe Tunnel Between Fuel Building and Waste Management Building Foundation The foundations of the tunnels housing the piping systems between 13 the Fuel Buildings and the Waste Nanagement Building will be reinforced concrete slabs resting on sound rock. 3.8.5.1.14 Personnel Tunnels Between the Peactor Buildings and Waste Management Building The foundations of the personnel tunnels between the Peactor Buildings and Waste Management Euilding will te reinforced concrete slabs resting on sound rock. 3.8.5.2 Applicable Codes, Standards, and Specifications (S Refer to Section 3.8.4.2. 3.8.5.3 Loads and Loading Combinations for Foundations 3.8.5.3.1 Loads, Cofinitions, and Nomenclature In addition, to the loads identified in Section 3.8.4.3.1, the 13 following loads will be considered: H Lateral carth pressures or their related moments and forces. F' Euoyant forces or related moments of the probable maximum flood (PMF). Fb Euoyant forces or related moments due to normal ground water. 3.8.5.3.2 Load Combinations In addition, to the loads combinations identified in 13 Section 3.8.4.3.2, the following load combinations will be considered when checking foundations against sliding and overturning due to earthquakes, winds, and tornadoes, and against flotation due-to floods. See Section 3.7.2.16 for special 13 foundation analysis procedures used to check for overturning due 9 fs. to the combined effects of hydrostatic uplift forces and -(v) earthquake forces. 3.8-45

YCNP-13 O A. C+H+E 3 B. D+H+W C. D + H + E' D. D + H + Wt E. D + E' (For discussion of this loading combination see Section 3.8.5.5) 13 F. C+F b 3.8.5.4 Design and Analysis Procedures 3.8.5.4.1 Supports (CESSAR) 3.8.5.4.2 3eactor Building Internal Structure Foundation O O 3.8-45a

YCNP-13 / N U The foundation of the internal structure will be designed for normal and accident conditions as outlined in Paragraph 3.8.5.3 and in accordance with Paragraph 3.8.5.2. Load transfer from the foundation to its supporting structure will be through shear and axial load transfer only. Since there is no positive u.,nnection between the foundation and its support, moment transfer will not be considered, support for the foundation will be assumed to be provided by two components of the Auxiliary Area of the Reactor Building. These two components are the massive column at the center of the Auxiliary Area and the circular wall directly below the crane wall. Although monent transfer from the foundation to its supports will not be considered, bending within the foundation will be considered. Computer and manual techniques will be used to analyze this structure. Computer programs to be used are listed in Appendix 3.8-A. 3.0.5.4.3 Reactor Building Containment Vessel Refer to Subsection 3.8. 2. 3.8.5.4.4 Reactor Building Auxiliary Area and Enclosure (s) _ structure Foundation Design of this foundation will be in accordance with the loads and load combinations discussed in Paragraph 3.8.5.3 and in accordance with Paragraph 3.8.5.2. The concentric ring footings and central circular footing will te designed to their vertical reactions directly to the rock subgrade. No tensile stresses will be considered to act over the interface tetween the foundation and the rock base. Overturning moments from earthquake motions will be converted into compressive reactions and distributed over the foundation. 4 A computer finite element analysis will be run to determine the overall structural response of the foundation and the supporting rock. Computer programs to be used are described in Appendix 3.8-A. 3.8.5.4.5 Control Building Foundation The Control Building foundation will be analyzed for the loads and load combinations as described in Paragraphs 3.8.5.3 and 3.8.5.2. Both computer and manual techniques will be used to analyze this structure. Computer programs to be used are described in Appendix 3.8-A. l ^_/ l l l 3.8-46 i< )

YCNP-ll OV 3.8.5.4.6 Waste Management Building Foundation The Waste Management Building foundation will be analyzed for the loads and load combinations as described in Paragraph 3.8.5.3. The interf ace between the foundation and the rock subgrade will carry only compressive and shear stresses. Manual and computer 9 calculaticns will be used to analyze this foundation. Computer programs available for use are described in Appendix 3.8-A. 3.8.5.4.7 Diesel Generator Building Foundation The Diesel Generator Building foundation will be analyzed as a simple rectangular footing on an elastic subgrade. Subgrade properties for crushed stone are discussed in subsection 2.5.4. Small settlements of the Diesel Generator Building will we tolerated and facilities connecting to the building will be designed to withstand the estimated settlements. Discussion of settlements is in Paragraph 2.5.4.10. Stress analysis for the Diesel Generator Building foundation will incorporate both computer and manual techniques. Computer programs to be used are described in Appendix 3.8-A. O) \\, 3.9.5.4.8 Fuel Building Foundation The foundation of the Fuel Building will be designed to withstand both normal and accident load conditions as outlined in Paragraph 3.8.5.3. I1 The interface between the foundation and the rock subgrade will be assumed to carry only compressive and shear stresses. 9 Overturning moments from an earthquake will be handled in a manner similar to Subparagraph 3.8. 5. 4. 4. Manual and computer calculations will be used to anatyze this foundation. Computer programs available for use are described in Appendix 3.8-A. 1 3.8.5.4.9 ERCW Pumping Station Foundation The ERCW pumping station foundat.lon will be designed in accordance with the provisions of ACI 349-76. The reinforced 11 concrete mat will be designed to transmit all loads and bending moments to the foundation media by bearing and friction. The mat foundation will be analyzed as supported on an elastic media. Dead load bearing stresses will be kept low and uniform throughout the mat to minimize differential settlement. The 'b V 3.8-47

YCNP-13 O effects of settlement will be considered in the design of all electrical conduits and mechanical piping interfacing with the structure. Computer programs that will be utilized in this work are described in Appendix 3.8-A. 3.8.5.4.10 ERCW Spray Pond Foundations The ERCW pond spray nozzle riser and header foundations will te designed in accordance with the provisions of ACI 349-76. 11 These foundations will be designed as spread footings transmitting all loads and bending moments in bearing to the supporting media. 3.8.5.4.11 Refueling Water Tank Foundation The Refueling Water Tank foundation will te designed in accordance with the provisions of ACI 349-76. The reinforced 11 concrete mat will be designed and analyzed as being supported on an elastic foundation. All loads and bending mcments will he transmitted to the supporting media by bearing and friction. Only that portion of the base area in compression with the foundation media will be assumed to transmit horizontal loads by friction. Dead load hearing stress will te kept low to minimize differential settlement. settlement analyses as described in Section 2.5.4.10 will be performed to evaluate this problem. All 13 mechanical and electrical features interfacing with the tank structure will be designed to incorporate the effects of settlement of the structure. Computer programs that will be utilized in this work are described in Appendix 3.8-A. 3.8.5.4.12 Emeroency Feedwater Tank Foundation 1 The Emergency Feedwater Tank Foundation will te designed and analyzed identical to the Refueling Eater Tank foundation described in Section 3.8.5.4.11. 3.8.5.4.13 Pipe Tunnel Between Fuel Building and Waste Management Building Fcundation The foundations of the tunnels housing the piping systems between the Fuel Euildings and the Waste Management Building will be analyzed for the loads or load combinations as descrited in i 13 Section 3.8.5.3 and in accordance with the codes and specifications outlined in Section 3.8. 5. 2. 3.8-48

YCNP-13 D (G 3.8.5.4.14 Personnel Tunnels Between the Peactor Buildings and Waste Management Euilding The foundations of the personnel tunnels between the Peactor Buildings and Waste Management Building will te designed and analyzed by the applicable portions of Section 3.8.5.2 and 3.8.5.3 in order to be in compliance with Begulatory Position C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29. 3.8.5.5 Structural Acceptance Criteria All foundations will be designed in accordance with the provisions of the ACI 349-76 code and AISC code 1969 edition 11 using the loading combinations and stress limitations of Section 13 1 3.8.4.3. In addition, for the load combinations of Section 3.8.5.3.2, the following factors of safety will be used. i bd n l \\_/ 3.8-48a i

YCNP-5 m iV) 6.2.4.5 Materials (CESSAR) 6.2.4.6 Possible Leakage Paths The possible leakage paths of the plant are separated into four distinct types. Each of these leakage types are defined in 6.2.4.6.1. The leakage paths are defined on several bases: 1. For consideration of possible leakage paths the plant consists of four major areas; (a) Containment, (b) Auxiliary Area, (c) Annulus, and (d) Outside (consisting of all other buildings and the atmosphere). 2. The annulus pressure is kept at a level less than the Containment, Auxiliary Building, and outside. 3. Leakage through the containment steel plates or through the full penetration welds in the containment vessels and penetration flued heads are not considered possible. 4. Leakage through the Shield Building embedments are not considered possible. 5 The more probable sources of Containment and Shield Building leakage, such as elastomer seals, bellows, and through lines are (7 w) considered as possible leak path types. 6.2.4.6.1 Types of Leakage Paths Four types of leakage have been considered and each is described below. Type A - Leakage Path - This leakage path is from the Containment to the annulus. This type of leakage includes the following: 1. Through line leakage for containment mechanical penetrations where the line or penetrat i.on terminates in the annulus or where the line is provided with a leakoff into the annulus. 2. Leakage past double, testable, 0-ring or bellows seals which are part of penetration assemblies and form part of the primary containment boundary and are located in the annulus. Type B - Leakage Path - This leakage is f rom outside into the a nnulus. This type of leakage includes the following: 1. Through line leakage in which the line is not a closed

• l system outside the Shield Building and is provided with a leakoff into the annulus.

O., j l V'

• A system is closed to an area if there is no access path available from that system to the area.

6.2-46b

YCNP-13 O Type C - Leakage Path - This leakage is from Containment to the Auxiliary Area. This type of leakage includes the following: 1. Leakage past double, testable, 0-ring or bellows seals which are part of the penetration assemblies and form part of the primary containment boundary and are located in the Auxiliary Area. 2. Through line leakage in which the line is noclosed system in the Auxiliary Area. For closed systems the through line leakage will remain within the system. Piping containing a fluid which flows toward containment will provide a barrier against through line leakage out of containment by that path. Type D - Leakage Path - This leakage path is from the Containment in which the leakage bypasses a cleanup system and leaks directly to the outside. The design features of the plant eliminates the 5 majority of the type D leakage paths. This is done by the following methods: 1. The Auxiliary Area is maintained at a negative pressure relative to the outside atmosphere for the duration of an accident. section 6.6 describes the implementing system and its operation. 2. Leakof f lines to the secondary containment and a third outboard valve receiving an isolation signal are used in certain lines to prevent bypass leakage (such as the purge 13 line). 3. A water seal with a pressure at least 1.10 times the peak containment accident pressure is used to prevent bypans leakage in certain lines. The seals are available f or at. least 30 days after a design basis event. I 4. Primary containment leakage through existing primary to secondary Steam Generator leaks and then through the secondary side to the atmosphere in post LOCA conditions is prevented by filling the secondary side of the Steam 9 Generator with water. This establishes and maintains a wateri cover over the Steam Generator tubes and provides pressure on the tubes. The water is provided by the Emerger.cy Feedwater system which is discussed Subsection 10.4.7. A listing of containment mechanical penetrations is given in Table 6. 2-46 (T). In this table is given the penetration number and its description, and the possible leakage paths which exist for that penetration. The listing is based on current plant 5 design and information. Certain leakage paths may be different for the final plant design. I 6.2-46c

YCNP-12 O k ) '~' a. The Iodine-131 activity in the RCS will be determined by analysis immediately prior to a planned containment purge. I less than 2.95ju.Ci/gm, analyses will be performed l If this analysis indicates an Iodine-131 activity b. I over a sufficient tine period to demonstrate that the RCS Iodine-131 concentration is not increasing as a result of a spike condition. I 2 1 c. Containment purge may be initiated when it is determined that the RCS Iodine-131 concentration will not exceed 2.95 AL Ci/gm during the planned purge. l There are no restrictions on containment purge with the reactor - at either cold shutdown or the refueling shutdown condition as i defined in Section 16.1. The limiting Iodine-131 concentration of 2.95,Lt Ci/gm is identical to the present design basis concentration and was used in the release analysis for the postulated event. At the FSAR stage, TVA will re-evaluate these administrative controls with regard to the limiting Iodine-131 concentrations specified. l B. Major assumptions used in the dose analysis were: ,s ( ) Ns/ 1. The square-edge orifice equation was used to determine the flow through the open purge lines. 2. A flow coefficient of 0.8 was conservatively chosen to account for entrance and exit losses. No credit was taken in the flow calculation for the presence of the debris screens, the isolation valves, or the pipe to provide for a reduction in the mass loss. 3. The containment atmosphere was assumed to be at 24.1 psia and saturated with steam (Steam density = 0.0592 lbm/ft3) during closure of the purge valves. Only steam was assumed lost through the purge valves as this results in the maximum radioactivity release. 4. The containment pressure was assumed to be 24.1 psia throughout the accident. (24.1 is the time average containment pressure for the first 5 seconds of the accident). The pressure was held constant at this value until the isolation valves closed to maximize the containment atmosphere lost. 5. The flow area used for calculating the loss of containment atmosphere was based on all purge lines (4 '.ines of 48" diameter and 2 lines of 8" diameter) being 'N fully open. The area discussed above was used for the V 6.2-46f

e YCN P-12 O first five seconds of the mass loss analysis. The purge valves are completely closed 5 seconds after the start of the LOCA at which time the mass loss from the containment through the purge valve was terminated. The purge valve closure time is four seconds. One seconQ was allowed for instrumentation response delays. NOTE Present design plans specify only two 8" lines will be open during any mode of operation other than cold shutdown or refueling modes of operation. The configuration indicated above will produce an enveloping dose estimate, and therefore, the analysis has not been, 12 redone. 6. Using these assumptions, the mass of steam assumed to leave the containment is 14,640 lbm. C. Smaller break sizes were considered in determining the offsite dose. The large LOCA was chosen for the analysis since damage to the fuel and release of radioactive material is highest for this break when compared to other break sizes as described in PSAR Section 11.5.2.1.6 and Table 11. 5-1 (T). 12 Each of the purge exhaust ducts will be provided with redundant, trained, Class IE radiogas monitors. These monitors will isolate the purge supply and exhaust ducts on receipt of a high radiation signal. Since these monitor setpoints will be based on routine release requirements, the setpoint will be reached once the activity from any size LOCA arrives at the detector. The maximum amount of mass will be lost for the largest LOCA since it will provide the largest differential pressure across the valves before the valves,can close. l D. In order to address the minimum back pressure for LOCA l analysis, the loss of noncondensables from the containment l prior to purge valve closure during a LOCA has been included l in the analysis of the ECCS performance to show acceptable l post-LOCA core cooling. See Section 6.3. E. Section 9.4.6.3 of the Yellow Creek PSAR states that debris screens are provided on the purge lines to assure closure.of the isolation valves during a LOCA. The screens can withstand the containment design pressure with 100 percent blockage without failure. 12 F. The secondary containment annulus will not be affected by a LOCA during purge. The use of ducting qualified to 50 psig in the annulus guarantees that: 1. The annulus pressure will not change, and 6.2-46g + +

,f } fm. ?%) YCMP-13 TABLE 6.2-16(T) (CONTD.) II. Containment Fnaineered Safety Features Same as Containment Design Basis Accident operation in Table 6.2-7(T). ITI. Heat Sink Geometric Data A. Containment Vessel Same as Table 6.2-4(T). D. Annulus Thickness Surface Area Heat Sink (inches) (square feet) 36-Inch Concrete 36.02 120,630 -Oraanic Coating 0.02 Concrete 36.0 IV. Heat Sink Thermodynamic Table Same as Table 6.2-6 (T) V. Feat Transfer Coefficients A. Containment vapor to steel vessel Blowdown 4x Modified Tagami Post-blowdown 4x Modified Tagami; Exponential decay (0.025/sec.) to 1.2 Uchida B. Containment vessel to annulus air 0.2 ( T)l/3 C. Annulus air to annulus concrete 0.2 ( T)1/3 D. Containment Emissivity Not Applicable i VI. Containment Leakace Rates l Into annulus from Containment Vessel, %/ day at 45.25 psig 0.2 Into annulus from outside environment, 1 scfm at -0.5 in water guage 250 Out of annulus to outside environment 0 Revised by Amendment 13

TABLE 6.2-17(T) Subcompartment Nodal Description Peactor. Cavity Analysis l 45 - Node Model

Height, Volg, Node Description ft.

ft. 1 Above hot leg centerline 12.7 254.3 l 2 Above shield between hot leg and adjacent cold leg 14.2 161.2 3 Above shield between het leg and adjacent cold leg 14.2 161.2 4 Above cold leg centerline 12.7 228.0 5 Above cold leg centerline 12.7 228.0 1 6 Above shield between two adjacent cold legs 14.2 179.1 7 Above shield between two adjacent cold legs 14.2 179.1 8 Above cold leg centerline 12.7 228.0 9 Above cold leg centerline 12.7 228.0 10 Above shield between hot leg and adjacent cold leg 14.2 161.2 11 Above shield between hot leg and adjacent cold leg 14.2 161.2 12 Above hot leg centerline 12.7 254.3 13 Directly below node 1 from hot leg centerline to shield 3.5 47.4 14 Directly below node 13 between shield vertical face and reactor vessel 2.0 2.31 15 Directly below node 2 between shield vertical face and reactor vessel 4.0 2.08 16 Directly below node 3 between shield vertical face and reactor vessel 4.0 2.08 17 Directly below node 4 from cold leg centerline to flange top 3.25 39.2 18 Directly below node 5 from cold leg centerline to flange top 3.25 39.2 19 Directly below node 6 between vertical shield face and reactor vessel 4.0 2.7 20 Directly below node 7 between vertical shield face and reactor vessel 4.0 2.7 08 20-76 O O O

p y O b C . YCNP-13 TABLE 6. 2-41 (T) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE ARR ANGEMENTS Loc Penet Valve Line Rel Flow Valve Valve Posit Pos Actuation System / Dsgn. Fld. No. Service Type /Oty Size Cont Dir Arr. Nor Shtdn Acc Ind Sig Ty pe Fiq No. Basic Cont 13 (7) (1) ' (2) (3) (4) (9) (11) ( ? 1) 1,4 Main Steam Sa f ety-5 28 Out Out 12 C C C No Main No C S Gate-1 Out C C C Yes -- A,R,M 5 team Globe-1 Out C C C Yes R,M /10. 3-1 (T) Globe-1 Out LC LC IC No M Globe-1 Out C C C Yes MSIS A,R,M Gate-1 Out O O C Yes MSIS A,R,M 2,3 Main Sa f et y-5 28 Out Out 20 C C C No Main Yes C S St eam Gate-1 Out C C C Yes -- A,R,M Steam Gate-1 Out O O O Yes R,M /10. 3-1 (T) . Gate-1 Out O O C Yes MSIS ,A,R,M I 5,7 Main Feedwater Globe-1 24 Out In 13 LC LC LC No M Feedwater No C H Economiz er Gate-1 Out O C C Yes MSIS A,R,M /10. 4-3 (T) 6,8 -Main Feedwater Gate-2 6 Out In 14 C C O Yes EFAS A,R,M Feedwater Yes C W Downcomer Globe-1 Out LC LC LC No M Gate-1 Out O O C Yes MSIS A,R,M /10. 4-3 (T)

10. 4-4 (T) l C*11,12 HPSI Check-1 3

In In 1 C C O No SIS Yes Globe-1 Out C C O Yes --- R,M 13, HPSI Globe-2 3 Out In 25 C C O Yes SIAS A,R,M SIS Yes 14,15 Check-1 In C C O No 16 17,18 LPSI Globe-1 12 Out In 1 C 0 0 Yes SIAS A,R,M SIS Yes 19,20 Check-1 In C 0 0 No 6* 21,22 CSS Ball-1 10 Out In 1 C C O Yes CSAS A,R,M SIS / Yes E.3 W Check-1 In C C O No

6. 3-1 B (T) --

4 23,24 Cont Sump But fly-1 24 Out Out 21 C C C/O Yes RAS A,R SIS / Yes E.2 A suction

6. 3-1 A (T) 6*

27,28 SCS Suction Globe-1 16 In Out 29 LC O LC Yes -- R,M SIS No 1 $bmW 1

\\ .[ \\, x) v} G t YCNP-13 TABLE 6. 2-41 (T) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION-VALVE ARRANGEMENTS Loc Penet Valve Line Rel Flow Valve Valve Posit Pos Actua tion System / Dsgn. F1d. No. . Service Type /Oty Size Cont. Dir Arr Nor Shton Acc Ind LAs Type. Fin No. Basic Cont 3 Gate-1 Out LC O LC Yes -- R,M = Relief-1 In C C C No Globe-1 Out LC LC LC Yes -- R,M 29 SIT Drain Globe-1 2 In In/ 26 C C C Yes SIAS A,R,M SIS No Out Globe-1 Out LC LC LC No M Relief-1 In C C C No so i l 30,32 CCS to High Globe-1 4 Out In 4 0 0 C Yes CIAS A,R,M CCS/ No C W 1 ' Press and Check-1 In No

9. 2-13 (T)

Seal coolers 31,33 CCS From Butfly-1 4 In Out 2 O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M CCS/ No C W High Press, Butfly-1 Out O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M

9. 2-13 (T) and Seal Coolers 34 CCS TO Chec k-1 6

In In 23 O O C No CCS/ No C W RCP Coolers Gate-1 Out O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M

9. 2-14 (T) 35 CCS From Gate-1 6

In Out 6 0 0 C Yes CIAS A,R,M CCS/ No C W RCP Coolers Gat e-1 Out O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M 9.2-14 (T) 40 Letdown Line Globe-1 2 In Out 28 O C C Yes SIAS A,R,M CVCS No I CIAS I Globe-1 Out O C C Yes CIAS A,R,M s* 41 Charging Line Check-1 2 In In 22 O C/O C No CVCS/ No E.4 W Globe-1 Out O C/O C/O Yes --- R,M 9.3-4-1 42,55, RCS Sampling Globe-1 3/8 In Out 9 0 0 C Yes CIAS A,R,M SS/ No A W 56 Lines Globe-1 Cut O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M

9. 3-2 (T)

G6 43 RCP Seal Globe-1 3/4 In Out 9 O O C Yes 'CIAS A,R,M CVCS No Water Return Globe-1 Out O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M RCP Line j 44 RDT Discharge Gate-1 3 In out 24 C C C Yes CIAS A,R,M CVCS No l Line Gate-1 Out C C C Yes CIAS A,R,M ) Mnett

fS ' ,] n r J ts /J'. o 1 YCNP-13 TABLE 6.2-41 rr) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE ARRANGEMENTS Loc-Penet Valve Line Rel Flow Valve Valve Posit Pos Actuation System / Dsgn. Fld. No. eervice Type /Ot y Size Cont Dir Arr Nor Shtdn Acc Ind Sig Type Fiq No. Basic Cont 3 45 ':4akeup Water . Check-1 1-1/2 In In 27 No CVCS No ' Supply to RDT Gate-1 Out C C C Yes CIAS A,R,M S* 46,47 Steam Generator Globe-1 6 Out Out 19 0 0 C Yes MSIS A,R,M BLWDWN/ No C W Blowdown CIAS

10. 4-10 (T) 48,49 SG Blowdwn Globe-1 1/4 In Out 9

O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M SSCS/ No C W SIAS

9. 3-3 A (T)

Sampling Globe-1 1/4 Out O O C Yes CIAS A,R.M SIAS 50 PCPS Diaph-1 4 In Out 3 LC O LC No M PCPS/ No B W Suction Diaph-1 Out LC O LC No M 9.1-4 (T) 51 PCPS Return Diaph-1 4 In In 5 LC O LC No M PCPS/ No B W Diaph-1 Out LC 0 LC No M 9.1-4 (T) 52 Cont Diaph-1 1 In Out 24 0 0 C Yes CIAS A,R,M GWMS/ No B A Vent Header Diaph-1 Out O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M

11. 3-1 (T)

Ge 53 Fuel Transfer D1be seal 36 Tube Blnd Flange In None C O C No Refueling No go-57,58 Cont. Purge Butfly-1 36 In In 7 C 0 C Yes CIAS A,R CECS/ No B A Inlet HCR

9. 4-6 (T)

Butfly-2 Out C 0 C Yes CIAS A,R HCR 59.60 Cont. Purge Butfly-1 36 In Out 8 C 0 C Yes CIAS A,R CEC 1/ No B A/ Exhaust HCR

9. (- 6 (T)

Butfly-2 Out C 0 C Yes CIAS A,R HCR 63 Cont. Vacuum Butfly-1 8 In In/ 10 C C C Yes CIAS A,R CECS/ No B A & Press Relief Out

9. 4-6 (T)

Butfly-1 Out C C C Yes CIAS A,R 64,65 ERCW to Cont. Butfly-1 12 Out In 11 O O C Yes CIAS A,R ERCW/ No E.4 W Sheet 3 4

YCNP-13 p t i N.J 6.2.4.7 Containment Purge Durinq Normal Operation The Containment Purge System of the Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant is 12 designed to meet all of the objectives given in BTP CSB 6-4. Since purging the Containment will be required during full power opera tion (as recognized and permitted by BrP CSB 6-4) the Containment Purge System has been designed to provide a small 12 13 purge system for use during all modes of normal operation except cold shutdown or refueling modes, and a large purge system for use during cold shutdown and refueling modes of operation. Two of the primary design bases utilized for this system are that: A. The emergency core cooling system effectiveness shall not be degraded by a DBA LOCA occuring during the small purging operation and B. There shall be no unacceptable radiological consequences from such an event. The system described in Section 9.4.6 has the features needed to meet these requirements. The following discussion indicates the design provisions made to meet these criteria and the analysis performed to demonstrate same. N ) A. Analyses were performed for the TVA purge system which show that the increase in the offsite dose due to the escape of containment fluid prior to isolation valve closure in the 12 event of a LOCA would be small, and that the resulting overall dose will be within the guidelines of 10CFR100. The offsite dose increase, assuming radioisotope concentrations in the primary coolant appropriate to the failure of fuel pins contributing 1% of the reactor power ("1% failed f uel," Table 11.1-2 (T} ), would be 0.06 rem total body (gamma) dose, 0.15 rem (beta and gamma) dose and 29.6 rem thyroid (inhalation) dose. Iodine spiking was not considered in this analysis. It is our position that the inclusion of the iodine spike contribution in the source term calculation is unnecessary. Since the time at which personnel access to the Primary Containment during operation is typically flexible once a need has been identified, administrative control can once be used to adjust the time of a purge in such a manner that the purge does not coincide with an existing spike condition. These administrative controls include the following: ( 1 V 6.2-46d

YCNP-13 0 1. Power operation a. The Iodine-131 activity in the Beactor Coolant System will be determined by analysis immediately prior to a planned containment purge. b. If this analysis indicates an Iodine-131 activity less than 2.95gCi/gm, the Primary Containment may be purged for personnel access subject to the following restrictions. Containment purge will not be initiated if the Iodine-131 activity, as determined in a or b.i., equals or exceeds 2.95j;. y Ci/gm. i. If there has been a change in power level greater than 10% in the time period between the pre-purge analysis and initiation of containment purge, additional RCS Iodine-131 analyses will be performed again. Analyses 9 will be performed over a sufficient time period to demonstrate that the Iodine-131 13 concentration is no longer increasing as a result of a spike condition. ii. If a change in power level greater than 10% occurs during a containment purge, the purge system will be isolated within 15 minutes of the power change. Purging may not resume unless conditions a and b.i. are met. 2. Hot Standby and Hot Shutdown a. The Iodine-131 activity in the Reactor Coolant System will be determined by analysis immediately prior to a planned containment purge. 12 b. Analysis will be perf ormed over a sufficient time period to demonstrate that the RCS Iodine-131 ' concentration is not increasing as a result of a spike condition (i.e., spike condition resulting from previous power level changes). c. Containment purge may be initiated when it is determined that the RCS Iodine-131 concentration will not exceed 2.95 ja Ci/gm during the planned urge. p 3. Depressurization from llot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown O 6.2-46e

f l Q,) %] Nj' . YCNP TABLE 6.2-41 (T) CONTAIN:4ENT ISOLATION VALVE ARRANGEMENTS s' Loc Penet Valve .Line Pel. Flow Valve Valve Posit Pos Actuation-System / Dsg n. - Fld. No. Service Type /Oty size Cont Dir Arr Nor Shton Acc Ind Sig Type Fiq No. Basic Eggt 13 and CEDM Check-1 12 In In 0 0 C No

9. 2-4 (T)

Coolers i 66,67 EPCW from Cont. Butfly-1 12. Out out 11 O O C Yes CIAS A,R ERCW No E.4 W and CEDM Butfly-1 12 In Out 0 0 C Yes CIAS A,R

9. 2-4 (T)

Coolers 68 Service Check-1 2 In In 15 C .C C No Comp. No B A Air and Cont. Gate-1 Out LC LC LC No M Air / Leak Test

9. 3-1 (T) 69 Instrument Gate-1 2

In In 16 O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M Comp. No B A Air Gate-1 Out O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M Air /

9. 3-1 (T) 70 Nitrogen Check-1 2

In In 15 C C/O C No Later No B A Supply Gate-1 Out LC C/O LC Yes CIAS A R,M i 71,72 Cont Press Globe-1 3/8 In Stat-26 O O O Yes --- R,M Later Yes E.1 A Line to Trans ic for CIAS l i 73,74 Cont Press Globe-1 3/8 In Stat-26 0 0 0 Yes --- R,M Later Yes E.1 A Line to Trans ic for MCR Signal 75, Cont H Sample Globe-1 3/8 In Out 17 O O O YEs --- R,M Later Yes E.1 A 76te) Line to Analyzer 75, Cont H Sample Globe-1 3/ 8 In In 17 O O O Yes --- R,M Later Yes E.1 A 76(e) Line Return 77, Cont Process Plug-1 1-1/2 In Out 18 O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M Later No E.1 A 78(e) Rad Mont-Suction Plug-1 1-1/2 Out Out O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M Later 77, Cont Process Plug-1 1-1/2 In In 18 0 0 C Yes CIAS A,R,M Later No E.1 A 78(83 Rad Mont-Return Plug-1 1-1/2 Out In O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M 79 Cont. Cavity Gate-1 2 In Out 25 O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M Bldg. No B A Sump to AA Gate-1 Out O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M Drainage Trit. Sump 9.3-6 (T) Shoe t 4 i

,m -l. \\v' s YCNP-13 TABLE 6. 2-41 (T) I, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE ARRANGEMENTS I Loc 8 Penet Valve Line Rel Flow Valve Valve Posit Pos Actuation System / Osgn. F1d. No. Service Ty pe/Ot y Size Cont Dir Arr Nor Shton Acc Ind sig Type Fio No. Basic Cont 13 80 RB Air Coolers Gate-1 6' In out 25 O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M Bldg. No 3' W Drain to AA Gate-1 Out O O C Yes CIAS A,R,M Drainage Nontrit. Sump

9. 3-6 (T) 81 Equipment

. Double Later In None C O C No La ter No 3 A Hatch 0-Rings 82,84 Personnel Double Later In None C O C No Later No E W Hatch 0-Rings 83 Deml Water Chec k-1 2 In In 15 C C/O C No Demin. No 3 W to Refueling Gate-1 Out LC C/O LC No M Water Pool /Later New 1 Small. Purge -Butfly-1 8 In In 7 C/O C C-Yes CIAS A,R,M CECS/ No B A But fly-2 Out C/O C C Yes CIAS A,R,M

9. 4-6 (T)

New 2 Sr.all Purge Butfly-1 8 Ir Out 8 C/O C C. Yes CIAS A,R,M CECS/ No B A Butfly-2 Cat C/O C C Yes CIAS A,R,M

9. 4-6 (T)

&* Note: Those portions of the Table within the dollar-star will be referenced to CESSAR if they agree to those presented here. I am including them here for you to check and to use it as a complete list.S* 1 1 I k I Must 5 4

h' \\ \\j \\.l NOTES TO TABLE 6. 2-41 (T) [- Note 1. Valve arrangenents are shown on Figure. 6. 2-92 (T). 9 Note 2. Position indications are shown in the Main Control Room. Note 3 The parameters sensed and the valves. which actuate specific signals are given in Section 7. Note 4 Symbols o' open C closed A automatic P remote operation M manual local operation .t LC locked closed 't CIAS Containment Isolation Actuation Signal SIAS Safety Injection Actuation Signal RAS Recirculation Actuation Signal MSIS Main Steam Isolation Signal EFAS Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal CSAS Containment Spray Actuation Signal HCR High Containment Radiation Note 5 Closing time for all vavles receiving an emergency safeguards actuation signal (CI AS, SIAS, PAS, MSIS, EFAS, or CSAS) is twenty seconds or less. The Containment purge line isolation valves will close 5 seconds after indication of closure signal. Note 6 All Containment penetration piping and isolation valves will be at least Quality Group B. Note 7 Line Size. Inches represents nominal size of pipe penetrating Containment. Note 8 Penetrations shared by two lines. ) . Note 9 This column provides indication that one or more compo-nents of a particular penetration are part of an Engineered Safety Feature System. Note 10 This column provides the design basis for the isolation valve arrangement. The bases are as a follows: A. GDC 55 B. GDC 56 I C. GDC 57 D. RG'1.11 E. Other as outlined below: 1 Sheete i

m ~ t~ ( L(m)- . u./ u

1. - An automrtic or remote manual valve

_inside Containment and a closed system' y outside Containment which is capable. 1, of withstanding the containment design. pressure and temperature, is at-least Quality Group B, and Seismic Category I-is considered as an adequate containment isolation provision. Remote manual valves may only.be used on those lines required af ter a Design Basis Event. 3 2. A single isolation valve outside Con- - tainment is acceptable if: it enhances 'I the system's reliability, the system j is closed outside Containment, is at !~ least Quality Group B and Seismic I Category I, and the system outside is capable of withstanding the Containment design pressure and temperature. 3. Remote manual valves Are considered as adequate ' isolation provisions in fluid lines required after a Design Basis Event. f 4. Remote manual valves are considered as adequate isolation provisions in fluid i lines needed for safe shutdown of the unit. . Note 11 Fluid Contained presents the type of fluid in the line at the isolation valves during normal 5 operation. A - air or gas, W - water, s - steam. Shnw 7 i i b 1 1 1 4 1 I 4

m r i'-) \\'~') V YCNP-11 TABLE 6. 3-1 (T) Comparison of TVA and CESSAR Containment Parameters Expected TVA 1 '13. Containment Parameters CESSAR Initial Internal Conditions I '3 Minimum Containment ' Temperature

• F 50 50.

l12 Minimum Containment Pressure psia 14.4

14. 7 Maximum Relative Humidity - %-

90 100 Initial External Conditions Annulus Minimum Temperature

• F '

40 38 13 Heat Transf er Coefficient (steel to r annulus air) BTU /hr-ft

• F

2. 0 13.0 Containment vol ume Maximum Net F;ee Volume - 10* ft3 3.63 3.7 Active Heat Sinks

' A. Spray System Maximum Centainment Spray Flow gpm 8800 11000 Minimum Delay Time in Attaining Full Flow - sec 0.0 0.0 Minimum Ten.perature of Spray Water - l12 'F 82 60 B. Fan Cooling System Maximum Heat Removal Capacity (function of ambient temperature) - BTU /sec 22220 4 200*F No Fans Time Delay to Peach Full Capacity - sec 0.0 During LOCA Time Delay to stop Cooling (Zero l Heat Removal 17.42 112 Passive Heat Sinks - Thickness (in} / area (ft2) Dome and Shell Steel 1.5/103,672 1.65/130,000 i Internal Steel .375/162,000 .375/375,000 Internal Concrete (3 equivalent walls) 9.6/36,749 12/14,600 i 19.8/157,032 18/180,000 i 41.28/29,284 44.4/36,000 i Sump Floor 74.3/11,970 114.2/19,219 I Physical Properties t I

YCN P-13 f Table 6. 3-1 (T) (Continued) I Comparison of TVA and CESSAR Containment Parameters Expected TVA 13 y Containment Parameters CESSAR Thermal Conductivity (BTU /hr-f ta.oy) Steel-shell and dome

29. 1 26.0

-internal 29.1 27.0 Concrete

1. 5

1. 0 volumetric Specific Heat - BTU /f t3 *F Steel-shell and dome 56.35 56.35

-internal

56. 35 58.8 Concrete

36. 0 32.4 Notes:

1. These values are the same as used for TVA minimum 12 containment backpressure analysis. 9 O O

E: .j g iY.' 3 V /' I YCNP-13 ' 4 i TABLE 8.1-2 (T) . INTERFACE CRITERIA FOR ELECTRIC POWER SYSTD4 I i OFFSITE ONSITE A.C. ONSITE D.C. POWER POWER POWER )~ CR IT ER IA - TITLE SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM COffrENTS OF APPLICATION l TECHNICAL INFORMATION X X X 'A j 10 CFR PART 50 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Xl X X CODES AND STANDARDS X X X GENERAL EESIGN (SEE STANDARD REVIEW PLAN CRITERIA (GDC) TABLE 8-1 FOR SPECIFIC X X X APPENDIX A TO GCC 6 TITLE) .l 10 CFR PART 50 l IEEE STANDARDS IEEE STD 279-1971 X X-1 IEEE STD 305-1971 X X X IEEE STD 317-1972 X X l IEEE STD 323-1974 X X IEEE STD 334-1974 X .X c IEEE STD 336-1971 X X X 13' 1 i IEEE STD 338-1971 X X i IEEE STD 344-1975 x X . IEEE STD 379-1972 X X t IEEE STD 382-1972 X X IEEE STD 383-1974 X X IEEE STD 384-1974 X .X i IEEE STD 387-1972 X IEEE STD 450-1972 X 1 of 2 4 i < = - - - - i 1

f i YCNP-3 I TABLE 8.1-2 (T) (Cxr*dnual) i INTERFACE CRITERIA ICR ELE CRIC POWER SYSTEM CFFSITE CNSITE A.C. CNSITE D.C. POWER POWER POWER CRITERIA TITLE SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM REGUIATORY GUIDES .fEGL RG 1.6 X X RG 1.9 X RG 1.22 X X X RG 1.29 X X RG 1.30 X X X RG 1.32 X RG 1.40 X RG 1.41 X X X RG 1.47 X X X RG 1.53 X X RG 1.62 X RG 1.63 X X X RG 1.68 X X X RG 1.70 X X X RG 1.73 X X FG 1.75 x X BG 1.81 X X RG 1.89 X X BG 1.93 X X X RG 1.106 X X FG 1.108 X BRANCH TECENICAL FOSITIONS (BTPs) BTP EICSB 1 X X BTP EICSB 2 X BTP EICSB 6 X BTP EICSB 7 X X BTP EICSD 8 X X BTP EICSB 10 X X BTP EICSB 11 X BTP EICSB 17 X BTP EICSB 21 X X X BTP EICSB 27 X X X - Indicates compliance with the indicated criteria, Standard Guide or Branch Technical Position 2 of 2

/N YCNP 13 -of input parameters should yield reasonable estimates of the g drif t loss rate.

9. 2A. 2.1.1.1 Assumntions In calculating the individual drop trajectories for drif t loss calculations, the following assumptions are made:

1. Drops are spherical throughout their flight. 2. Neglect collisions between drops. 3. Nozzles, initial drop velocities, and drop size distribution are axisymmetric. 4. Neglect heat transfer and evaporation. S. Air velocity and air properties are uniform across the entire pond. (Neglect atmospheric turbulence and boundary -layer.) 6. Operation _ of all nozzles is uniform and steady-state. 7. The initia l d rop ve locity is such that the calculated height p i and diameter of the spray pattern (assuming zero drag) agree \\/ with measured values. 8. Drop size distribution is known. 9. Air buoyancy ef fects are negligible.

9. 2A. 2.1.1. 2 Method of Calculation A drop in flight is subject to gravity and drag forces.

The magnitude of the drag force is determined by using D r = - 3n! (RV) 2 C P D a 4D p 13 y -and 0.22 + 24 (1 + 0.15 R,0 6) C e Osn,s 3000 (Ret. 3) D H e where D is the magnitude of the drag force, m is the mass of the p d rop, D is t he drop diameter, RV is the velocity of the drop relative to the air, C is the drag coef ficient, Da and 0, are D the densities of air and water respectively, and R, is the Reynolds number based on drop diameter. The equations for the components of velocity and acceleration (due to drag and gravity) '/s have been written in finite dif ference form. Numerical (,) integration of these equations is used to determine the drop trajectory for a given set of input parameters (wind direction, drop size, etc.). 9.2A-3

YCNP-9 For a civen wind speed and direction, this method of determining the trajectory of an individual drop is used to determine the trajectories of a representative selection of classes of drops which have dif ferent dianeters and which leave the nozzle headed in different directions. The result is a locus of impact points for each drop diameter, measured relative to the nozzle location. These trajectories are assumed to be valid regardless of nozzle location within the spray system. The location ot each nozzle, the location of the pond perimeter, and the wind direction are evaluated to determine the distance from each nozzle to the pond perimeter measured in the downwind direction. For each nozzle loca tion, the loci of the impact points for each diameter class are compared to the distance to the pond perimeter to determine the percentage of drops of that diameter which cross the perimeter and are lost as drif t. The mass loss which this represents is then calculated. This is repea ted for the remaining drop diameters until all diameter classes have been analyzed. This gives the drif t loss rate for a single nozzle location. The drif t loss rates for all other nozzle locations are calculated in the sane manner. The sum of the drif t loss rates from all the nozzles in the pond is the total drif t loss rate for the pond. ll The preceding calculations, which result in a total drif t loss 9 rate for the pond, are for only one wind velocity vector at a time. The wind direction can te varied to confirm which direction represents the worst case. Wind speed can be varied to develop a curve of total drift loss rate as a function or wind speed for a particular spray system arrangement and wind direction. 9 9.2A.2.1.2 Application of Drift Loss Model to Proposed Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant Two assumptions are added here to the preceding list. First, the horizontal draf t induced by the spray is neglected for purposes of the drif t analysi s. Second, nozzle tilt from the vertical is neglected. This is clearly a second order correction to the average percentage drift loss, and is considered conservative. 9 For a circular arrangement the downwind nozzles are tilted radially inward and enjoy reduced drif t compared to a vertical nozzle. Although drift is increased for nozzles on the upwind side, the increase is negligible due to the considerable distance to the pond loundary.

9. 2A. 2.1. 2.1 Selection of Spray Ring Di amet er A drif t loss study was made to determine an appropriate spray ring diameter.

This study considered only the upper tier of nozzles and was based on an assumed pond diameter. Pecause of symmetry of the ponds, drif t loss is not a function of wind d ire ct ion, so only one direction was analyzed. 9.2A-4

rx YCNP-9 l J %.J As part of this study, curves were developed to show drif t loss f rom a single uppe r-tier nozzle versus distance f rom the nozzle, _ with wind speed as a narameter. These curves are shown in Figure

9. 2A-2 (T), and show that small changes in nozzle location can dramatically a f fect drif t loss.

The average drift loss for all nozzles was calculated f or several values of spray ring radius using several wind speeds to develop the curves shown in Figure

9. 2A-3 (T). - Figure 9.2A-3 (T) shows that with a wind speed of 20 fps (close to the average value for the worst 30 days for drift) drift is quite small for R >. 2 and A R > 50 feet.

The system parameters described in section 1.2 of this appendix were used for the drif t loss analysis of the proposed design. This design has R =.214 and A R = 60 feet, which according to Figure 9. 2 A-3 (T) should result in very low drif t loss. 9.2A.2.1.2.2 Calculated Drift Loss Several horizontal wind speeds were analyzed to develop a curve of drif t loss rate versus wind speed for the proposed design. Separate curves were developed for the upper-tier nozzles and for the lower-tier nozzles. The two curves were weighted according to the flow rate through each tier to develop the composite drift loss curve for all the nozzles. These curves are shown in Figure ,s ( )

9. 2A-4 (T).

'O The composite curve was used with the daily average wind speeds listed for the worst 30-consecutive-day period for drif t loss in Table 2. 3-5 (T) to determine the total drift loss for each spray pond during the 30-day period as indicated in Table 9.2A-3(T). 9.2A.2.2 Evaporation Loss

9. 2A. 2. 2.1 Method of calculation It is conservatively assumed that all system heat loads and all solar heat input to the ponds are dissipated to the atmosphere by evaporation.

The calculated evaporation loss does not depend upon atmospheric conditions. The total integrated heat load over the 30-day period for the two ponds consists of the integrated sensible and decay heat for the reactors, the integrated auxiliary equipment heat loads for both units, and the solar heat load on the ponds. 9.2A.2.2.2 Calculated Evaporation Loss g From Figure ' 9. 2 A-5 (T), the integrated decay, sensible, and auxiliary heat load for one unit for 30 days is 8.733 x 1010 Btu. For two units, this results in the forced evaporation indicated in Table 9.2A-3 (T). . (a. ) From Ref.'4, the daily solar radiation value corresponding to a ~~' cloudless day in mid-month for the month of June (the worst month) is 740 Langleys or 2720 Btu /sq ft/ day. Assuming that this 9.2A-5

YCNP -13 intensity of solar radiation exists and is applied to the initial water surf ace area for the entire 30-day period results in the solar evaporation loss as indicated in Table 9. 2 A-3 (T). 9.2A.2.3 Summary of Inventory Requirements l9 Table 9. 2A-3 (T) lists all of the estimated water losses and shows that an adequate contingency allowance is provided.

9. 2A. 3 Thermal Analysis 9.2A.3.1 Description of Thermal Model The thermal model calculates the instantaneous velocities and rates of heat and mass transfer for a representative selection of individual drops of water leaving a single nozzle.

Numerical integration is used to find the temperatures of these drops when they reach the surf ace of the pond. From these individual drop temperatures, the average cold water temperature for the entire flow from that nozzle is calculated. Numerical integration is 9 then used with time dependent heat load, meteorology, and flow rate, to determine the tran31ent pond temperature. All thermal analysis calculations are performed in a computer program which is called THERMAL. A more detailed description of the thermal model is given in the following paragraphs. l 9.2A.3.1.1 Assumptions The following assumptions are made: 1. Drops are spherical with constant dianeter and unif orm internal temperature distribution (radial temperature distribution is optional) throughout their flight. 9 2. Collisions between drops are neglected. 3. Nozzles, initial drop velocities, and drop size distribution are axisymmetric. 4. Air velocity (all components) and air properties are uniform across the entire spray region. (Neglect atmospheric turbulence, atmospheric boundary layer). Wet bulb 13 degradation is uniform. 5. The initial drop velocity is such that the calculated height and diameter of the spray pattern for a vertical nozzle (assuming zero drag) agree with measured values. 9 6. Drop size distribution is known. 7. Water in the pond is completely mixed. 9.2A-6

/~N YCN P-9 ( ) / N 5. Air enters and exits the control volume with velocities normal to the surfaces of the control volume. 6. Relative humidity within and at the exit of the control volume is 100 percent. 7. Air density within the control volume is the average of inlet and exit densities. 8. The rate of heat release from the spray system to the air is known. 9. Ambient wind is negligible (worst case condition). 10. Air pressure is one atmosphere for psychrometric calculations. 11. Bulk drag forces are known functions of velocity. The trajectories of individual droplets are calculated in the same manner as f or the d rif t analysis (Section 9. 2A-2.1.1) and the thermal analysis (Section 9.2A-3.1). The drag force on a droplet is integrated over the trajectory to determine the drag g ,s impulse on that droplet during its flight. The droplet size ( ) distribution for a nozzle is used to determine the rate of generation of droplets in each class per unit mass flow rate. s_- The resulting rates and the drag impulse per droplet are used in a summation over all droplet classes to determine the bulk drag force of the spray upon the air. The assumptions made in predicting bulk drag are the same as those in the drif t model (Section 9. 2 A-2,1.1) except that the components of air velocity which result from buoyancy and air entrainment are taken into consideration. The predictions of air flow and bulk drag forces are coupled through iteration. Once exit air properties have been determined, the exit wet bulb temperature replaces the f ree stream ambient wet bulb temperature. Thus, the ef fective average local wet bulb temperature is conservatively assumed to be the predicted exit wet bulb temperature. 9.2A.3.3 Verification of Thermal Model With Rancho Seco Performance Verification of the models previously discussed is accomplished by a f avorable comparison with experimental data taken at Rancho Seco Nuclear Plant. An understanding of the basic limitations of the conventional spray configuration is gained by this comparison and a basis for the selection of a superior design can be identified.- p v 9.2A-9

YCNP-13 9.2A.3.3.1 Degradation at Rancho seco Due to the configuration of nozzles here, outtlow condition 2 in figure 9. 2A-6 (T) is replaced by a solid boundary (representing a 9 line of symmetry). Buoyancy dominates the air flow in the absence of ne t horizontal bulk drag. Under the stated assumptions, conservation of momentum results in = ll Do _1\\ + D,, 13 I I (f ) p, "A 32.174 2 1 1 1 where V is exit air velocity in fps; H is control volume height and P are inlet and exit density respectively in ibm per in f t;p"is the vertical component of bulk drag f orce in Ibf 3 ft3; D (posit [ve upward) ; and A is exit area. This equation may also 3 be written as: 2 9 2D, [1+2V, (p + 0-a AH ( 32.174H (Eg 1) 1 3 Conservation of energy results in Vi O/(oA (h - h )) (Eq 2) = 3 where Q is the rate of heat release from the spray to the air in Btu /sec, and h and hi are inlet and exit air enthalpy respec-13 o tively in Btu per lbm. The value of h i corresponding to 01 is determined by use of the psychrometric relationships given in the ASHRAE Ilandbook of Fundamenta ls. Although these relationships are somewhat complex, their acceptance and understanding is sufficiently widespread that details will not be presented here. Equations 1 and 2 together with the psychrometric relationships are solved iteratively to determine P1, V, and the psychrometric i state of the exit air. An average updraf t velocity of V /2 is i assumed to act over the spray region for purposes of calculating y(V /2). The updraf t velocity is degradation, i.e., D =D 3 neglected in calcula[ing droplet heat, mass, and momentum 9 transfer. 9.2A.3.3.2 Comparison with Test Data The lumped parameter and internal resistance models have been compared to data recorded at Rancho Seco as reported in Susequehanna Steam Electric Station PSAR Amendment 12. Since heat transfer is minimal for quiescent ambient wind, a low wind speed case was selected f or comparison. Test conditions were as follows: wet bulb temperature 54.20F 9.2A-10

YCNP-13 r~N ( ) 9.4 AIR _ CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS sJ 9.4.1 Control Building 9.4.1.1 Design Bases The Control building Environmental Control System {CbECS) will be -designed to maintain the temperature and humidity in the Main Control Room and the various other rooms in the Control Building within acceptable limits for operation of plant controls, maintenance and testing of the controls and uninterrupted safe occupancy of the Main control Room during and af ter an accident. 2 This system will limit the exposure of Main Control Room per the requirements of General Design Criteria 19 of 10CFR50 Appendix A. The CBECS will provide the temperatures for the denoted area and plant condition for outside conditions of 100F to 970F as given in PSAR Table 3.11-2 (T). Penetrations associated with the CBECS from the Control Building l13 to the outside environment will be equipped with devices to prevent depressurization during a tornado. Double isolation dampers will be provided in each exhaust duct connection from the Main Control Room f}oor to the outdoors and will be provided in the normal air intakes. O (m,/ Essential air conditioning and ventilating equipment and systems 2 will be designed to withstand the Saf e Shutdown Earthquake. The Control Building will contain the Auxiliary Control Room. This station will be utilized for safe plant shutdown in the event the Main control Room should become uninhabitable. Redundancy and separations will be provided to assure habitability of this room. The portions of the CBECF serving the l 13 Auxiliary Control Room will be separate from those serving the Main Control Room. Heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and air cleanup systems are shown on Figure 9. 4-1 (T). For a description of the habitability system requirements refer to Section 6.4. For a description of the Main Control Room Emergency Filter System, refer to Section 6.6. 2 9.4.1.2

System Description

The mechanical equipment room of the Control Building will be divided into 2 separate zones. The zones will be separated by a concrete barrier which will provide missile and fire protection between zones. Each zone will contain 100 percent of the p a 9.4-1 L

YCNP-9 ventilation equipment necessary to maintain the one trained zone plus selected common area environments within design limits. The Control Building Environmental Control System will consist of the following subsystems: A. Air Intake Structures: 1. Normal Intakes, 2. Emergency Intakes, B. Air-conditioning systems: 1. Main Control Room, 2. Saf ety-Related Equipment Rooms, 2 3. Non-Safety-Related Equipment Rooms, C. Building air pressurizing and ventilation subsystem, D. Main Control room habitability subsystem (see Section 6.6), E. Battery Room Ventilation Subsystem, and F. Vital Instruments and Control Equipment Rooms and Emergency Ventilation Subsystem. 9.4.1.2.1 Air Intake Structures Each zone will be equipped with two outside air intakes. One intake will be used during normal operation to supply the required ventilation air. The remaining intake will be used for emergency conditions and will only supply the necessary make-up air 'to the Main Control Room during control room isolation. The intakes will be as widely separated as possible. Each intake will be equipped with temperature and radiation monitors, and chlorine and smoke detectors that will indicate and annunciate in the Main Control Room. When high temperature, high radiation, chlorine, or smoke is detected in either of the normal air intakes, the Main Control Room will be automatically isolated as outlined below. 2 There will be two isolation modes for the Control Building, as f ollows: A. Isolation due to smoke, temperature, or radioactivity. 'During this mode of isolation the normal intakes and exhausts will be isolated and a predesignated emergency air intake 'will be utilized to provide the necessary makeup air f or pressure maintenance in the Main Control Room. The O 9.4-2 i

YCNP-11 (m) Redundant full-capacity equipment trains shall be separated by being installed in individual fire-resistant and missile proof compartmen ts. A filter bank will be provided in the inlet air plenum to each air handling unit. Each filter bank will contain filter cells rated at approximately 85 percent ef ficiency, based on ASHRAE atmospheric Just spot method. Each filter bank will be provided with a static pressure dif ferential indicating gauge. 9.4.1.3.2 Pressurizing System The building pressurizing air supply system is not requited for safe plant operation since its only function is to provide air exchanges. 9.4.1.3.3 Main Control Room Pressurizing system The Main Control Room prescurizing air supply fans will be Quality Group C and Seismic Category I and will be connected to 2 separate trains of the emergency power system. These pressurizing fans will be the same as those serving the Main Control Room (air handling units).

9. 4.1. 3. 4 Battery Room Ventilation system

(/ The battery rooms ventilation system will be Quality Group C and Seismic Category I and will be connected to the emergency power system. Hydrogen buildup, therefore, will be controlled during any design basis accident and resultant loss of offsite power. 9.4.1.3.5 Main control Room Exhaust system 11 The Main Control Room exhaust fans will not be connected to emergency power. These fans will only be required during normal operation to provide suf ficient air exchanges in the Main Control Room. Two isolation dampers will be mounted in series in the Main 2 Control Room exhaust duct. These dampers will be designed to low-leakage, Quality Group C, seismic Category I requirements. Each pair of dampers will be served from separate trains of emergency power and each damper will fail in the closed position. 9.4.1.3.6 Hugidity Control Humidifiers, mounted in each normal air supply duct, will ( automatically supply moisture to the conditioned air stream in response to a' humidistat for each system. The Control Room 2 system -humidistat will be mounted in the Main Control Room. The humidifiers _ are not required for safety and will not be connected 11 ( to emergency diesel power. 'b l 9.4-7 i M

YCNP-13 O 13 9.4.1.3.7 Chlorine Detection and Isolation 9 Several features will be incorporated into the Main Control Room ventilation system to minimize the hazard to control room personnel f rom an accidental release of toxic chlorine. Tnese features will include: a. Air intakes will be located about 30 feet above the ground, 9 thus minimizing the concentration of heavier-than-air gases such as chlorine at the normal air intakes. b. The normal air intakes and emergency air intakes will be automatically isolated upon detecti 7n of high chlorine concentrations. (Emergency air pre surization will not be started when there is high chlorine concentration outdoors.) l c. The air distribution system for the Main Control Room will have redundant air cleanup equipment for processing recirculated air. This feature will provide a capability for removing any chlorine which might enter the Main control Room. No chlorine will be stored onsite. Chlorination requirements will be satisfied as needed through the use of a hypochlerite system. This system will not produce free chlorine in the gaseous state. Chlorine detectors capable of sensing 1 ppm of chlorine will be located in the air intakes. These detectors will initiate automatic isolation. No other toxic gases will be located within the site boundary. As indicated in Section 2.2, chlorine is not presently identified as being transported past the site. Nevertheless, a postulated chlorine barge accident was analyzed to determine the ef fect on Main Control Room habitability. The analysis utilized the approach outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.78. A 7 second isolation time period, representing actual equipment capabilities, was used in this analysis. 9 The major assumptions included Pasquill stability Class G and adverse wind speed and direction. No credit was taken for the air cleanup capability provided by the Main Control Room air cleanup units which will automatically start and process recirculated habitability zone air upon MCRH zone isolation. The chlorine barge was assumed to contain two 550 ton compartments,the contents of one compartment being released in O 9.4-8

YCEP -ll OV A plant fire protecticn training prcgraa will te develcred and documented. This training will prcvide as a siniaua a course in firefighting and fire prevention fcr all plant fire trigade personnel, approved fire preventicn and protection training as designated by the plant manager for all cther plant espicyees, and refrester training for the tasic fire protection course at an interval nct to exceed every twc years. E.6. (e). (3) TvA Ccar11ance Where apprcpriate agreements have teen reached with offsite firefighting organizations, the plant emergency plan will document the procedures fcr their nctification and will indicate that the line of supervision and authority fcr the effsite firefighting team remains with the plant sanager. B. 6. (e). (4) TWA Ccabliance 7be plant fire brigade will ccnsist of a fire trigade leader who will te a licensed Senior Reactor Creratcr, all unit cperatcra except those assigned to unit centrol teards, all assistant unit [A- ') operators on duty, one health physics technician per stift, and one chemical laboratory technician per shift. B.7 gUALITY Ass 0EAECE TVA Ccapliance As indicated in the response to item A.1, Eersonnel, TVA has delegated the responsibilities asscciated with the varicus aspects of fire prevention and protecticn to crganizaticos which have perscnnel qualified to handle those functicne. The responsibility fcr the operaticnal aspects cf fire prctection has been delegated to the civisicn cf Foher Production in TNAs s Office of Ecwer. The Cffice of Poker utilizes TVA's establisted Quality Assurance Program designed to meet the requirerents of Appendix E to 10CEE Fart 50. This prcgran applies, fcr the operational phase cf TWA's nuclear power plants, to the activities affecting the quality of those critical structures, systeas,and components (CSSC) whose satisfactory perfcznance is required for safe plant operations; to prevent accidents that could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public; and to mitigate the consequences of such accidents in the unlikely event that they should cccur. Those fire prctecticn features prctectint critical structures cr areas will te included in the CSEC list an' as such will fall under TVA's cperaticEal On yN program. The operaticnal CA prograu will te descrited in the YCN b 9.5A-13 l

YC5P-13 O FEAF. This operational CA progran descriptico will te sirilar to Secticn 17.2 cf TNA Tcpical Report TVA-7575-1. Responsibility for the design and ccnstruction aspects cf fire protecticn has been delegated to the office cf Engineering Eesign and Ccnstructicn (CEEC). CEEC has docurented prccedures and specifications which gcvern its activities and which apply tc all systems fcr which CEEC has responsibility. These procedures are aimed at ensuring that the design and ccostructicn cf 79A facilities result in a reliable and quality prcduct. As applied to YCN fire protection these docurents will require, in part, that the actions required in E.1. (a) thrcugh E.1. (j) telch te accouplisted. E.7. (a) TvA Ccarliance All fire prctection related design criteria and procurerent documents are reviewed by appropriate qualified individuals tc 13 ensure that applicable regulatory and design requirerents are properly and adequately specified and, as appropriate, quality standards such as fire prctectica ccdes cr independent latcratcry testing are included. All changes to these dccurents and deviations therefron, including requests for field changes, are 13 reviewed in a similar ranner. The abcve includes appropriate design reviews to vriify u6raraticn and isclaticn requireretts as they relate to fire prctectica. E.7. (t) Tvn Ccarliance The design, installation, and tests associated with fire protection relatet systems are acccuplisted in accordance with written and approsed instructions, precedures, and drawings. 13 These documents are reviewed by qualified personnel tc ensure that applicable regulatory and design requirenents are preserly and Edequately specified. This documentation includes any 13 specialized train:ing requirenents for installation. B.7. (c) TVA Ccarliance The procurement of fire procection Iclated material and equipment require either an inspection at the manufacturer's facility cr a receiving inspection to verify ccnicreance to procurerent requirerents. O 9.5A-14

YCEF-13 B.7.(d) TVA Ccarliance The installation of fire protecticn related systems are verified by independent inspection to ensure that it meets the specified requirerents and ccnfcts to installation drawings and precedures. The inspections are ccnducted in accordance witt documented procedures. The procedures ccntrciling inspection activity require that inspecticn prccedures or instructicns shall te available with necessary drawings and specificaticns for use prior to performing inspection operations. Further, the 13 procedures, instructicns, ar.d/or drawings, including revisicas, supporting the inspection activities shall tu documented. The results cf these inspections shall te recorded. B. 7. (e) TVA Ccnr11ance Fire protection systcas are tested under TVA's preoperational test program. This prcgram requires that tests te ccnducted in accordance with written test instructions which are reviewed tc ensure that applicatie regulatory and design requirerents are ('N properly and adequately specified. The acceptance criterias are (,) evaluated and docurented and all exceptions are documented and contrclied. B.7. (f) TVA Ccmfliance Items that have satisfactorily ccarleted tests or inspecticns will te identified by appropriate scans. B.7. (g) TUA Ccarliance Ncn-ccnforning items are identified and ccntrclied to prevent inadvertent use or installation. This includes decurentaticn cf the disposition cf the nonccnformance. The Tternal Ecwer 13 Engineering Design Prcject reviews all nonccnicrrance rescrts and may request review by cthar branches within CIL as apprcpriate. The TPE Eesign Project Manager cpproves the disscsitico cf the noncenfornance. B.7. (t) TVA CSEEliance (\\ U 9.SA-15

YCbF-13 significant and repetitive conditicna adverse to fire protecticn such as ncnconforrances with installaticn drasings and deviaticos from specificatione are centro 11ed and appropriate corrective 13 actions are taken and documented. Conditions invc1ving fire incidents and the ccrrective acticos taken will te prcaptly reported tc ccgnigant levels of raragenent fcr review and assessment. B.7. (i) TVA Ccngliance Records kill be maintained for fire prctection systess tc document conformance to the prescribed criteria. These reccrds will include reviews cf criteria, procurenent dccurents and drawings, inspections, test results, non-ccnferaances, and modificaticn records. B. 7. (j) Independent audits by CA perscnnel will te conducted actually in accordance with written procedures to ensure ccnfornance tc procedural requirenents applicable tc fire prctecticn related systems. 7te audits will te docusented along with the ccrrective action taken and reviewed by the appropriate level cf aanagerent to ensure that the prcgram is effective. ll C. FIBE CETECTION ANE SUFFRESSICh Col. FIBE EETECTICN C.1.(a) TVA Ccmpliance Fire detection systems will ccsply with the appropriate requirements of NFPA 72D, " Standard for Installaticn, Maintenance, and Ese cf Proprietary Protective Signaling Systens." C.I.(t) TVA Ccarliance The fire detection system will give audible and visual alarus and annunciaticn in the centrcl roce. Local auditle alarus will also scund near the locaticn of the fire. O 9.5A-16 i

YCNp \\m / mix and storage tank. This demineralizer will then become the standby ion exchanger. Once the resin transfer sequence is complete the resin regeneration will be manually initiated. After manual initiation each step in the regeneration will be accomplished automatically. For the chemical resin regeneration mode of operation, the exhausted resin will be separated into an anion and cation layer by a backwash flow. The lighter anion resin will be subsequently removed to the anion regeneration tank. Each resin will then be backwashed and air scrubbed prior to being exposed to the regenerant chemicals. The cation and anion resins will be regenerated with a solution of 4 wt% sulfuric acid and NaOH respectively. After the acid and caustic introduction, the resin will be rinsed and then transferred to the resin mix and storage tank for a final rinse and air mixing. When the system is in the' backwash and air scrub mode, the resin will be separated as previously discussed. After the anion resins are sluiced to the anion regeneration tank, each type of resin will be backwashed and air scrubbed. Subsequently the resin will be transferred to the resin mix and storage tank for air mixing. Resin regeneration will be controlled by an automatic sequencer. /~' Throughout each step of the regeneration procedure, the proper ( )S motor operated valves will be opened and the necessary motor driven equipment energized to complete the operation. Each operation in the sequence will be terminated on a time or conductivity basis. At the completion of each step, the valves and components not used in the succeeding operations will be closed or de-energized. To insure proper system operation, the following checks will be provided: A. Valve position and motor driven equipment status will be checked at operation initiation for correct orientation. B. Valve position and motor driven equipment status will be checked at the completion of each operation for proper orientation: C. During the acid and caustic introduction, continuous monitoring will be performed to insure maximum safety of these operations. Should any malfunction occur, the associated chemical block valve will be closed, the regenerant pump will be stopped, and the malfunction annunciated. D. If any other malfunctions are detected during the cycle operation, the automatic cycle will stop and the malfunction will be annunciated. <x <j 10.4-19

YCNP-13 Provisions shall be made for the Solid Waste Management System to accept approximately one-fif th of the total resin charge each year as the dcminerlizer resin becomes fouled or chemically degraded. 10.4.6.3.3 Reqenerant Waste Treatment Subsystem (RWTS) Wastes produced by the resin regeneration procedure described in subparagraph 10.4.6.3.2 will be minimized through the use of regenerant waste treatment. The treatment equipment will be designed to process by filtration all low suspended solid wastes resulting from resin transfer and regeneration operations. This processed water will then be available for further use in subsequent regenerations. Waste water resulting from resin transf er and resin backwash operations will contain a relatively high concentration of suspended materials. This high suspended solids waste water will be processed through filters. The resulting clean water will be restored to the low crud-low conductivity tank for reuse in subsequent regenerations. The RWTS will be used to recover up to one-half of the dilute acid and caustic used during regeneration. As a result of the rapid conversion of ion exchange sites the final one-half of the total acid and caustic volume will be involved in very little regeneration. Consequently the ef fluent concentration is still 4 wt%. This acid and caustic will be drained to the acid and caustic reclaim tanks and resued in subsequent resin regnerations. During periods of no primary to secondary leakage, the regenerant waste will be monitored and discharged to the plant discharge system. If primary to secondary leakage exists, then the waste will be sent to the Miscellaneous Liquid Waste Management System for processing. 10.4.6.4 Safety Evaluation The Condensate Cleanup System serves no teactor safety related l f unction s. The system will normally be operating whenever the Steam Generators are in operation, and when the Condensate and Feedwater systems are is being started up. All major system components can be isolated if a malfunction occurs. To insure safe operation relief valve protection will be provided as necessary. Alarms warn of component malfunctions and 13 monitoring instruments throughout the system provide an indication of proper performance. O 10.4-20

YCNP-11 A Gases from the gas surge header flow into the-gas surge tank s-(GST) where they are collected. The gases remain in the gas surge tank until the pressure builds to a point which actuates a single waste gas compressor (WGC). The waste gas compressor feeds a preselected gas decay tank (GDT) until the pressure in the gas surge tank drops to a point where the waste gas compreasor stops. A second waste gas compressor will start if the pressure in the gas surge tank builds due to a surge of the inputs. This automatic operation of the waste gas compressors will continue until a gas decay tank is observed to approach its upper operating pressure. At this point another gas decay tank will be manually lined up to receive the waste gas compressor's discharge. The just filled tank is analyzed by the gas analyzer for hydrogen and oxygen content. Grab samples can also be taken for radioactivity analysis. Af ter a gas decay tank has been sampled and analyzed it is then lined up to the gas recombiner system for procecsing. The gas flows through a regulator valve into the gas recombiner system. The processing is essentially a controlled reaction between hydrogen and oxygen to produce water. The influent hydrogen gas is diluted with nitrogen to maintain a 3-6 percent hydrogen mixture. This mixture is then pre-heated and oxygen is added to produce a stoichiometric mixture of hydrogen and oxygen. The addition of oxygen is controlled by analysis of either the } influent or ef fluent hydrogen content. The entire gas stream is s_/ then passed over a catalyst. The gas stream is then a mixture of nitrogen, steam and noble gases. The steam is condensed and separated out as water. The gas effluent is essentially nitrogen and noble gases. The gas recombiner system ef fluent is then returned to the gas surge header where it re-enters the system again through the gas surge tank and waste gas compressors. The gas recombiner will process until the gas decay tank pressure reaches a predetermined low level. The gas decay tank which is currently lined up to the waste gas compressors will collect the normal influents plus the hydrogen free gas recombiner ef fluent. When this gas decay tank is filled the process is repeated. By operating the GWMS in this manner the gas can be stored for 90 days The only process flow bypass line that exists in the GWMS leads Jrcm the gas surge tank directly to the gas discherge header and bypasses the waste gas compressor and gas decay tanks. This flow . path is used mainly to purge air from components af ter maintenance operations, at which time the vented gas contains essentially no radioactivity. The valve on this bypass line is locked closed to facilitate administrative control.

Moreover,

'the bypass flow passes through the radiation monitor in the. gas V) ( 11.3-5

YCNP-13 discharge header. Steam dumps occur during accident conditions only and are described in Chapter 15. 11.3.3 Radioactive Releases The expected gaseous releases during normal operations, including anticipated operational occurrences from plant sources (Release Points), per nuclide, are shown in Tables 11. 3-5 (T) and 11.3-11 (T). The guidance provided by Draft Regulatory Guide 1.BB was generally used. The release bases include the following: A. The plant is assumed to be operated continuously with the primary coolant activities given in Table 11.1-3 (T). B. Secondary coolant activities of Table 11.1-8 (T) are assumed; C. Noble gases leaking from the Reactor Coolant Syetem to the Steam Generators are released through the main condenser evacuation system (45 SCFM) and main steam leakage (1700 j lbm/ hour). An iodine partition factor (PF)

• of 0.15 for volatile species at the main condenser is assumed; D.

PF of 1 is assumed for release of iodine, noble gases and particulates via main steam leakage; } E. Daily leakage from the Reactor Coolant System inside the Containment is 1% of the noble gas inventory and 0.001% of the iodine inventory in the primary coolant; 13 11 1

• PF in defined as the ratio of activity in gas to activity in liquid and gas (at equilibrium).

11,3-6

YCNP-13 7-I ) N/ F. The Containment is purged at 60,000 scfm 4 times a year (24 hours per purge) to allow for personnel access. A continuous ' Containment purge of 10 scfm is assumed. 11 G. 0.75 percent of the iodine and 0.01 percent of the particulates leaking into the Auxiliary Area, Waste Management Building, and Fuel Building are assumed to be released to the atmosphere. All noble gases in the leakage are assumed to leave the liquid. Total leakage is assumed to be 160 pounds per day per unit of reactor coolant; H. The following ventilation exhaust filtration schemes were assumed: 13 Containment purge - HEPA filters and deep bed charcoal Auxiliary Area - No filtration Waste Management Building - No filtration Gas decay tank discharge - HEPA filters and charcoal Fuel Building - No filtrations for lower levels. HEPA filters 3 and deep bed charcoal for fuel handling zone. Turbine Building - No filtration Condensor vacuum pump exhaust - HEpA filters and single charcoal I. Decontamination. Factors (DF's) for single charcoal systems are 1 fo r cases, 10 for halogen, and 100 for particulate. DF's for the purge exhaust deep bed charcoal system are 1 for gases, 20 for halogen, and 100 for particulates. 13 J. Feedwater and coLJensate leakage inside the turbine building is assumed to be 5 opm; K. Gaseous Waste Management System releases of Table 11.3-5(T) are: assumed: The Unit 1 Reactor Buildina vent constitutes the single release point for gaseous discharge to the environment from the GWMS. Table ll.3-7(T) gives flows, temperatures and pressures from the two gaseous processing paths into the plant vent. The inputs to the plant vent from the GNMS are indicated on Figure ll.3-1(T). Releases from other dystems that have the potential for discharge of radioactive noble gases, iodines and particulates include: .( I f -V 11.3-7

YCNP-11 O a. Condenser vacuum pump exhaust; b. Waste Management Building ventilation exhaunt; c. Containment purge exhaunt; d. Auxiliary Area ventilation exhaunt; e. Turbine Building ventilation exhaunt. f. Fuel building ventilation exhaust. These releanes are f rom systems which are designed to perform functiens other than gaseous wante processing. However, in doing oo, they provide a potential pathway for radionuclide release to the environs and therefore warrant inclusion in gaseous release evaluations. For a discussion of these systema nee sectione 9.4 and 10.4. Release points are shown on Figures

1. 2-5 9 (T).

These releases will be vented to the atmosphere via either the Unit 1 or 2 Reactor Building Vent or Unit 1 or 2 Turbine Building Vent. The design information for these vents are given in Table 11.3-10 (T). O l O 11.3-8

YCNP-13 mU TABLE 17.1 A-3 (T) (Shect 3) SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES, AND COMPONENTS COVERED BY THE QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM T - TVA N - NSSS Vendor Preliminary Design and Final

• 73 Structures Procurement Design 480-308Y/120 V Standby AC Lighting Syster T

T 125 V Emergency DC Lighting System T T 125 V Class IE DC Vital Power Distribution T T System Non-nuclear Instrumentation System T T 161-kV Switchyard System T T 500-kV Switchyard System T T Reactor Building T T Control Building T T Fuel Building T T Waste Management Building T T ERCW Pumping Station T T Diesel Generator Building (Including Fuel T T Tanks) Refueling Water Tank T T Emergency Feedwater Tanks T T ERCW Spray Ponds T T Miscellaneous Yard Piping and Electrical T T Tunnels Pipe Tunnel Between Fuel Building and Waste T T Management Euilding Intake Pumping Station 5 T T () 13 Personnel Tunnels Between the Reactor Buildings N_/ and Waste Management Euildings 1

YCNP-13 O TL ILE 17.1 A-3 (T) (Sheet 4) SYSTEMS, STPUCTURES, AND COMPONENTS COVERED BY THE QUALITY ASSURANCE FFOGFAM T - TVA N - NSSS Vendor Preliminary Design and Final

• St ruct urqs Procurement resion 13 1.

Only portions of these systems are included in the Quality Assurance Program. 2. These systems are in the NSSS vendor's (CE) scope of supply, however, TVA designs and procures a certain pipe and valves. 3. Only a portion of this system is in the NSSS vendor's scope of supply; the remainder is in TVA's scope. 4. The component supplier may te required to provide final design documentation. If so, TVA will provide the cuality Assurance review of this docunentation. 5. This is a non-Category I, safety-related structure. 13 1 1 0

YCNP-1 fm( ) 0110.9~ Question: The following safety-interf ace information is required for review: (1) Provide a commitment in the PSAR to incorporate in the BOP design the postulated pipe break locations, orientations, configurations and resulting loads which are supplied by the CESSAR designer and which interface with the BCP design of safety related piping systems. (2) Provide a commitment in the PSAR to supply to the CESSAR designer the BOP postulated pipe break locations, orientations, configurations, and resulting loads for piping outside the CESSAR scope which interface with the CESSAR scope of design. (3) Provide a commitment in the PSAR to incorporate in the EOP design the design [/) envelope supplied by the CESSAR designer for N-safety related components and supports which interface with the BOP. The design envelope includes design loading ccmtinations associated with a categorization of the appropriate plant and component operating condition. (4) Provide a commitment in the PSAR to incorporate the information supplied by the CESSAR designer concerning the analytical criteria, procedures and results, and verify the design for all BOF safety related systems, components and supports which interface with inelastically analyzed CESSAR equipment. (5) Provide a commitment in the PSAR to incorporate the CESSAR preoperational piping vibration test parameters in the Ealance of Plant preoperational piping test prcgram for -Q110.9-1 (-)-) f

YCNP-1 all BOP safety related piping systems which interface with the CESSAB scope of design. If the TVA defines the test program, provide a commitment that the TVA will assume the responsibility to coordinate and conduct the tests. (6) Provide a commitment in the PSAF to perform the flow indeced vibration tenta of r.w. cent inter.nals as leocriced in Pegulatory Guide 1.20.

Response

TVA is making the Rilau:.ng commituanta in ::eapons9 to thiu question: (1) TVA will inchrporate in the 20P design the postulated }lipe brea:t locations, orientations, configurationa and resulting loads which are supplied by the CESSAH deuigner et d stich interface with the 90P design of 'afety related piping systems. (2) TVA ulll s!,pply to the CEF3Ai1 designer the DOP postulen 1 pipe creak :tocationa, orientatior@, configuraticnu, and resulting loads for p\\ ping outside the CESSAR scope which interface with the CESSAR scope of design. (3) Tha deoign ud Ealance of .':.uit rmail inccrporace t N C E W init Gealgn leading combinaticau 't ecociated with the approprf. ate plant ur.d ca:pervat carat ing cua6 Ationu for all ine2rfLuirt.s:.Iety related ecagonents and supports as e at forth in Subsection 3.9.2 of the CESSAR anl referenced by the same subcoctica n.: 2:e in an 53AR. (4) Tne system or subsystem anaivuis is ncrrally perforLied on an elastic bacie.- In th a cases, if any, where inelastic methods are used to analyze CESSAR equipment, the informaticn supplied by the CESSAB designer concerning the analytical criteria, procedures, and results shall te incorporated in and/or used to verify the design for all EOF safety related systems, compcnents, and supports Q110.9-2 O

YCNP-12 O structures will provide no significant increase in missile l protection but will substantially increase the prcblers associated with hydration heat and subsequent cracking. Such 8 early strength requirements are not recommended practice by any ACI committee for such massive concrete structures. Finally, TVA's 4000 psi, 90-day fly ash concrete will have higher final inplace strengths than a 5000 psi, 28-day cement only type concrete. Since the NRC did not accept the use of concrete design strengths beyond a designated age of 28 days for tornado-missile protection, TVA will use concrete with a specified strength at 28 days for all tornado missile-proof 12 walls and roofs as indicated in Subsection 3.8.3.6.1.1 of the PSAR. The minimum concrete thicknesses required for tornado-generated missile protection are based on the missile spectrum in revision 1 of SRP 3.5.1.4 and are given in Table

3. 5-2 (T) of the PSAR.

O I t Q130.30-5 l l

YCNP-12 9 REFERENCES 1. ACI committee 207 Report, "Effect of Restraint, Vclume Change and Reinforcement on Cracking of Massive Concrete", ACI 9 Journal, Vol. 70, No. 7, pgs, 445-470. ) l O l Ol Q130.30-6

YCNP-13 kJ TABLE 17.1 A-3 (T) (Sheet 1) SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES, AND COMPONENTS COVEREC BY THE QUALITY ASSURANCE PFOGRAM T - TVA N - NSSS Vendor Preliminary Design and Final

• Structures Procurement Design 13 Emergency Feedwater System T

T Fuel' Oil Storage and Transfer System T T Component Cooling Systema N N Essential Raw Cooling Kater System T T Record Storage System * (QA Record Area) T T Reactor Coolant Systema N N tN Shutdown Cooling / Safety Injection System 2 N N Fuel Handling and Reactor Services System -3 N/T N/T s Containment Isolation, Penetration, T T and Leakage Test System

• Pool Cooling and Purification Systema e N

N (Pool Cooling Subsystem) Containment Combustible Gas Control System T T Containment Environmental Monitoring System

• T T

Containment Spray System /I Removal System 2 N N Chemical and Volume Centrol Systemae N N (Boron Addition Subsystem) HP Fire Protection System

• T T

Diesel Generators Starting Air System T T Essential Air System T T Standby Diesel Generator and Control System T T [ )) Auxiliary Area Environmental Control System T T l Control Building Environmental Control System T T l l

YCNP-13 O' TABLE 17.1 A-3 (T) (Sheet 2) SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES, AND COMPONENTS COVERED BY THE QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM T - TVA N - NSSS Vendor Preliminary Design and Final

• Etructures Procurement Design 13 Diesel Generator Building Environmental T

T Control System ERCW Pumping Station Environmental Control T T System Fuel Euilding Environmental Control System! T T Emergency Gas Treatment System T T Containment Environmental Control System T T Gaseous Easte Management System 2 N N Liquid Waste Management Systema N N Solid Maste Management System 2 N N Main Steam and Reheat Subsystem! T/N T/N (Isolation and Relief System) Feedwater System 1 (EFES Injection Portion) T T Plant Protection System N N Solid State Component Control System N N Radiation Monitoring System 1 3 T/N T/N Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System N N 6.9-kV Class IE AC Auxiliary Power T T Distribution System l 480-Volt Class IE AC Auxiliary Power T T Distribution System 12-Volt Class IE AC Vital Power Distribution T T System l 120-Volt Class IE AC Vital Power T T Distribution System

YCNP-13 ( ) at an age of two years. Applying this data to the curve on Figure 0130.30-1 indicates that the average compressive g strength of TVA's 4000 pai, 90-day strength concrete at an age of two years would be 6200 psi. TVA has also conducted the same type of tests at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant on fly ash . concrete with similar results. TVA also references a report by ACI Committee 207 entitled "Ef fect of Restraint, Volume Change, and Reinforcement on Cracking of Massive Concrete" - ACI Journal, Vol. 70, No. 7, July 1973, pgs. 445-470 (Reference [1]) which notes strength comparisons of concrete cylinder compressive tests for 28-day strengths versus 90- and 180-day strengths for fly ash and non fly ash concrete (See Figure 4.2, Reference [1]). Figure 4.2 (Reference [1]) indicates consistently higher strengths with age for fly ash concrete than concrete that contains cement only. For example, Figure 4.2 (Reference [1]) shows that a 3000 psi, 28-day mix with cement only attains a compressive strength of approximately 3000 psi at 180 days, while a 3000 psi, 28-day mix with fly ash attains a compressive strength of approximately 5300 psi at 180 days. Another important point to note f rom Figure 4.2 (Reference [ 1 ]) is that a 4000 psi cement only, 28-day mix attains a strength of only 4800 psi at 180 days and a 5000 psi cement only, 28-day mix attains a strength of only 5800 psi at 180 f-s ( ) days. Note also that fly ash concrete has approximately 13 three times the percentage gain in strength from 90 to 180 days as cement only concrete. Finally, it is important to note that a 3000 psi, 28-day mix with fly ash will have a final higher inplace strength than a 5000 psi, 28-day cement j only mix. This can be seen by inspection of the concrete j strength curves of Figure 4.2(Reference [1]) which show that i the cement only mixes (5000 psi cement only) gain only about i 100 pai from 90 to 180 days. This mix would likely gain less than 200 psi from 180 days to 2 years for a maximum inplace strength of approximately 6000 psi. TVAs s 4000 pai, 90-day fly ash concrete which would have a minimum inplace strength of 6200 psi has a greater final inplace strength than the 5000 psi, 28-day cement only concrete. Thus, very little additional cylinder strength is gained with age when using normal cement only types of concrete. Therefore, concrete with cement only would not be expected to have nearly as high an inplace final strength as fly ash concrete. TVA also notes the concrete thicknesses for missile a protection that NFC listed in the table in question 130.13 appear to contain conservatism over that which has been indicated from the results of the Sandia missile tests. For instance, the 3000 psi design strength for region I has a 9 minimum wall thickness of 27 inches listed; however, the Sandia tests indicated that with a 3000 psi, 28-day design (} mix, a 24-inch wall thickness was more than adequate to stop kj' Q130.30-3

YCN P-9 9 the 12-inch pipe missile with no spalling. Since the average strength of the test panels at Sandia was 3800 psi (3000 psi do31gn strength), it appears that the NRC table in question 130.'i3 already has several inches of concrete thickness above that uhich is required from the Sandia test results. Another conservatism which TVA is committed to is using the Inissile spectrum of revision 0 of the NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP) section 3.5.1.4, (11/24/75). TVA notes that the missile spectrum in revision 1 of this SRF has significantly loccr velocities than the revision 0 missile spectrum. Thdrefore, the required thickness of concrete to prevent missile penetration and spalling for the critical 12-inch pipe missile should be several inches less than is currently required by the NFC in question 130.13. TVA maintains strict control on the quality of the concrete l produced. TVA Construction Specification G2 requires 3-day ctrength tests that are correlated with the 28-day strength tents so that required strengths can be predicted early during the concrete placement. An investigation is initiated-if recults are below a specified limit so as to prevent incorporation of very lou strength concrete in a structure. The nuaber and frequency of testing cylinders to verify strengths at one year would be the same as that required to verify 90-day strengths. .o An additional conservatism built into TVA's concrete production, as specified in TVA Construction Specification G2, is that TVA uses a drop table for coepacting concrete cylinder specimens. The important point here is the fact that compaction of cylinders with the drop table gives consistently lower cylinder test strengths with approximately one-half of the within-test variation in comparison with the standard ASTM C31 method of preparing test specimens. TVA's test cylinders will give test strengths which more closely correlate uith the inplace concrete strength than either rodded cylinders or vibrated cylinders whether vibrated internally or externally. TVA has accumulated extensive test data through many years of coacreto production and testing. This data was used to devalop the average concrete strength versus age curve as shown on Figure 130.30-1 as well as similar curves for cther strengths of concrete. Thereforo, in summary, the considerations and conservatisms listed above in response to this question gives reasonable tssurance that the 4000 psi 90-day design strength concrete centaining fly ash will produce inplace strengths well in oncess of the 5000 psi requirenents for missile protection. The utilization of earlier age strength requirements in these ) 0130.30-4

YCNP-12 V 130.30 Cuestion: In your response toQuestion 130.13 you stated that the thickness of walls and roofs that provide protection from tornado missiles will be equal to or greater than the rinimum thickness required for 5000 psi concrete. In Section 3.8.3.6.1.1. of the PSAR you state "the minirum compressive strength required for all structural concrete is 3000 pai". If you are using 3000 psi concrete, the thicknesses required should be for 300) psi concrete. This will imply a wall of 27 inches and a roof of 24 inches thick as presented in the table in Question 130.13. State clearly your intentions to comply with the requirements of this table.. The requirements of the table were not extrapolations of the Calspan test for the 8 inch pipe but were limited by the 12 inch pipe test by EPRI/SANDIA. In the event the tornado missile velocity spectrum is modified a new table of minimum thickness requirements will be issued.

Response

Revised Section 3.8.3.6.1.1 of the PSAR discussion on ((} concrete strength states that the 3000 psi concrete strength mj used in design will be a minimum value and does not apply to all concrete. TVA will comply with the required minimum wall and roof thicknesses based on 5000 psi concrete as stated in the table in Question 130.13. Concrete with a specified strength of 4000 psi at 90 days will be used on all tornado missile-proof walls and roofs. TVA has determined through an extensive research and testing program which resulted in information, as noted in PSAR Section 3.8.3.6.1.1, that with the addition of fly-ash the actual compressive strength after one year is much higher than the 90-day specified strength (see Figure Q130.30-1). As noted on Figure Q130.30-1, the 4000 psi concrete at 90 days will have compressive strength excceding 5000 psi af ter one year. Based on the test results reflected by the curve in Figure Q130.30-1, minimum wall and roof thicknesses used by TVA will be those as stated in the table in Question 130.13 for 5000 psi concrete. For walls and roofs with the minimum thickness of 21 inches and 18 inches respectively, TVA will perform concrete cylinder tests to verify the minimum required strength of 5000 psi at cne year. Tables Q130.30-1 through 5 and Figure Q130.30-2 represent tests performed at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant for concrete cylinders and cored specimens at various ages up to two years e~y for inplace fly ash concrete. The cored specimens were taken fij Q130.30-1

1 YCNP-13 e f rom a section of a cast inplace concrete wall 6 feet long, 6 f eet high, and 3 feet thick which was backfilled with scil on one face after formstripping and exposed to weathering cn the other face. This type of cast inplace section was chosen to represent the massive type walls generally used in nuclear plant construction. The solid line curves on Figure C130.30-2 are results of cylinder tests for fly ash concrete designated as follows: Mix 1 - 2000 psi, 90-day design strength (Table C130.30-1) Mix 2 - 3000 psi, 90-day design strength (Table C130.30-2) Mix 3 - 3000 psi, 28-day design strength (Table 0130.30-3) Mix 4 - 4000 pai, 28-day design strength (Table Q130.30-4) Mix 5 - 5000 pai, 28-day design strength (Table C130.30-5) The dashed line curves represent resultn cf compressive tests 9 on cored specimens from the same mixes as indicated above. Cores were taken within 6 inches of each face. Expc0ure had no significant effect on the strength of cores. The key point revealed by the test date and the curves on Figure C130.30-2 is that both the 4000 psi, 28-day and the i 5000 psi 28-day mix (mix 4 and 5 respectively) designs give lower core strengths versus cylinder strengths while the 2000 psi, 90-day, 3000 psi 90-day and the 3000 psi, 28-day strength mix designs (mix 1, 2, and 3 respectively) gave higher strength incores than cylinders. Reduction in ccre strengths of mixes 4 and 5 are primarily associated with increased hydration temperatures as measured in those placements. Peak hydration temperatures of mix 5 reached 136*F in 36 hours despite 100 pounds of ice in the mixing uater and placing water and placing temperatures of 718F. l Thinner sections would give less beat of hydration and consequent higher relative core strengths. TVA notes at this point that mix 3, 3000 psi design strength at 28 days is basically the same mix as the 4000 psi, 90-day mix that TVA proposes to use for missile protection. Note also that mix 3 was a higher strength batch than is normally expected fcr this type mix. The normal average strength for this six would be as indicated on the curve depicted in Figure 0130.30-1; however, the key point is still the fact that this mix, which TVA proposes for missile protection, will prcduce l core strengths at one and two years age that are equal to 13 continuously cured cylinder strengths, even under hot weather i placing conditions. Thus TVA has a high degree of assurance that the 4000 psi, 90-day strength design mix (which is the same as the 3000 pai, 28-day strength design) will achieve compressive strengths in excess of 5000 psi at one year. In fact, extrapolation of the slope of the curves on Figure C130.30-2 indicate that an additional 600 psi strength will be achieved Q130.30-2

) YCNP-13 0 362.1 Question: (2. 5) The ERCW pipelines are not discussed in Chapter 2.5. Please provide plans showing the location of ERCW pipelines and cross sections showing their elevations, relations to soil and/or rock strata, relation to groundwater, and excavation and backfill design.

Response

Studies of the ERCW piping alignment are not complete .at this time. However the ERCW piping system outside of containment will be evaluated in accordance with the guidelines presented in section 3.7.3.12. Plans and sections with all pertinent information will be 13 submitted in the FSAR. OG 4 Q362.1-1 OV i ( ..e

YCNP-4 0 362.2 Question: The in situ soil dynamic studies as described in subsection 2.5.4.4.2 are inadequate to obtain reliable elastic moduli and the values shown in Table 2.5-3 (T) are not acceptable for use in dynamic analysis. The survey was carried out in such a way that variations in velocity with depth could not be detected, and the analysis of the data did not account for refraction of the signals in the water-filled borehole. An analysis including refraction effects would yield smaller elastic moduli and higher values for Poisson's Ratio. Provide a commitment and a plan to determine the dynamic characteristics of the in situ soils by methods that are capable of distinguishing major strata and accounting for or eliminating effects of refraction. Pesponse: Soil dynamic investigations performed at Yellow Creek were considered state-of-the-art for the overburden complexity present at the site. High-velocity layers (lenses) create a refracting problem. This problem is not eliminated, and, in fact, may be enhanced by cross-hole techniques. Inasmuch as confidence intervals of approximately 50 percent are applied to the moduli values obtained by this survey, the error incorporated by using a hydrophone is more than compensated for. Therefore, no commitment is deemed necessary. l l i Q362.2-1 0

YCNP-2 O') 130.13 Cuestion: You indicate that the Modified Petry formula will be used to determine requied wall thicknesses to prevent tornado missile penetration and wall spalling. Currently in progress are tests sponsored by EPRI and other completed tests which show that the Modified Petry formula is not applicable to the tornado missiles postulated for nuclear pcwer plants. Your plant should meet or exceed the following requirerents. As an interim measure the minimum concrete wall and roof thicknesses for tornado missile protection will be as follows: Wall Thickness Roof Thickness Concrete ' Strength (psi) (inches) (inches) 3000 27 24 Region I 4000 24 21 5000 21 18 3000 24 21 \\ Region II 4000 21 18 5000 19 16 3000 21 18 Region III 4000 18 16 5000 16 14 These thicknesses are tor protection against local ef fects only. Designers must establish independently the thickness requirements for overall structural response.. These values are based on the CALSPAN/BECHTEL model tests and limited confirmation of the tests by the EPRI/SANDIA full scale tests. (Confirmation is limited only by the few tests performed to date). Thickness requirements may change if tornado wind velocities are modified or if additional test information forthcoming from EPRI/SANDIA indicates a need for change. <;) e,30.13-,

YCNP-13 O

Response

We have reviewed the full scale missile teste sponsored by EPRI/SANDIA and Calspan. In regard to the Ca19 pan test evaluation, the logic of extrapolating results from tests made with an 8-inch, 210 pound pipe (maximuz weight) to predict the effects of a 12-inch-diameter, 743-pound pipe is open to question. Interim measures should be based on the results of the EPRI/SANDIA tests. In the event the tornado missile velocities are modified, the 9 National Defense Pescarch Committee (NDFC) formula will be used to predict penetration depth and minimum thickness. The NDRC formula is in reasonable agreement with the EPRI/SANCIA test results. The attached graph (figure 0130.13-1) shows the variation of required concrete thickness to resist the 12-inch, 743-pound pipe missile with missile velocity. The curves shown on the graph are based on the NDUC equation and correlate quite well with results of the recent EPRI/SANDIA tests. These curves are consistent with the draf t commentary of Appendix C of ACI 349. The draft commentary states that there is no need to add 20 percent to concrete thichness values (in addition to t'ie thickness required to prevent 9 scabbing) when these values have been established based on testing programs and acceptance of regulatory agencies. Therefore, TVA will not use the 20 percent increase in concrete thickness above that required to prevent scabbing. The thickness of the concrete walls and roof s of Category I 13 structures that provide missile protection has been determined by other design considerations in additico to tornado missile penetrations. Walls and roof thicknesses in our present design for the Propoeed Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant have thicknesses equal to or greater than the minimum thickness for 5000 psi concrete listed in the interim measure requirement for region I-. Minimum wall and tool thickness will be 21 inches and 18 inches, respectively. Overall structural response will be considered independently. O Q130.13-2

YCNP-1 which interface with the inelastically analyzed CESSAR equipment. (5) Systems transient information will be provided TVA by the NSSS Vendor to be used in the preparation of preoperational piping vibration test parameters for all safety related ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 piping systems in CESSAR design scope and in the Balance of Plant safety related piping systers which interface with CESSAR scope of design. TVA will define the test program and will assume the responsibility to coordinate and conduct the tests to the extent set forth in Chapter 14 of the PSAR. (6) CESSAR Section 3.9.1.3.6 commits to Regulatory Guide 1.20. O l Q110.9-3 O

YCNP-13 0 110. 10 Quention: (3. 9. 2.11) In Section 3.9.2.11.2 the statement abo ' the pump and valve operability anourance prograrr. for TVA ecope of nupply is not acceptable. Provide in the PSAR your commitment to follow the entire CESSAF program or provide your own program in acccrdance with the acceptance criteria outlined in the 10-1. Reeronse: See responne to Question 110.13. 13 O l Q110.10-1 0

YCEP-12 0 372.32 Suesticn: If the persanent onsite reteorclogical facility referenced cn page 2.3-18 is tc he installed at a location different frca that of the tenscrary facility, from which one year cf data here prcvided in the oSAE, establish a ccaritrent tc present ccncurrent data frcs toth facilities. Include the prccedures for correlating the data, the planned duraticn cf the study, and an apprcximate schedule fcr presiding the data. The presentatica of these data shculd include a discussicn of any significant indicated differcrces and the ispact en any ccnclusicna drawn frca cr calculaticns based on tre cne year cf data preserted in the ESAE. Eesconse: In the initial response to this questica, TVA committed tc perform a ccuparative aralysis cf concurrent data frca the tempcrary and permanent meteorclogical facilities ccnvering a seasurement period of at least three sonths. retailed prccedures (, for the ccaparative analysis were ret included in the initial response. Instead TVA indicated ttat procedures would be deseloped and a final ressccse (report) provided to satisfy the fc11 cuing ctjectives: The procedures mould te designed tc detect significant differences in the data, if any exist, and tc establish protable causes fcr such differences. The manner in which any such differences sight alter 12 the results of impact analysis presented in the FSAR would te addressed. A. Description of Metecrological Facilities The 1ccation cf the permanent and tesporary metecrological facilities are stewn ir figure 2.3-16 (T). The temporary facility consists of a 46-seter tower with wind senscrs at 10 and 46 meters, tesserature sensors at 10 and 43 meters, and a dewpoint senscr at the 10-seter level. Q312.32-1 'D * * ~nL 1 [ Y @ Dl P ~D ~3 U^ A a

YCEP-13 this facility is Iccated cn the west side cf the Yellcw Creek estayaent and is apprcxinately 2.2 ku west-southwest cf the proposed reactcr site, which is on the east side cf the estayaent, Exposure of the teaporary tower is generally gcod l except for a line cf cinifers (estinated average height approximately 15 neters) situated alcng the rcad 100 to 15C meters ncrth cf the tcher, and twc nearty deciduous trees 1ccated ocrthwest and south-southwest of tre tower; the tcw deciduous trees are estinated tc te alcut 10 seters tall and are about 75 neters frCa the tower. The tase elevaticn of the teapcrazy facility is 154 meters (505 feet) atcve sean sea 13 level (ms1). Terrain at the site alcres east-scutheast tc an elevation cf 126 seters (414 feet) us1) at the Yellow Creek estayment alcut 600 meters (2,000 feet) east-soutteast cf tre f tower. i The permanent metecrological facility ccnsists of 12 a 110-seter tower with wind ard dry-ttlt teurerature sensors located at 10, 60, and 110 meters, a dewpoint senscr at the 10-neter level; and solar radiaticn, atacspheric pressure, and precipitation senscrs located away frca the tcher at heights cf atout 1 meter. The permanent meteorological tower is 1ccated at the center cf a flat-topped hill on the east side of the Yellcw Creek estayment, approximately 1 km ncrthwest cf the proposed reactcr site and atcut 1.8 ka northeast of the tempoary facility. 1te base elevation of the permanent tower is 168 seters (550 feet) mal. 1errain at the peraanent site is relatively flat (cicpes of less than 7' percent) out tc about 100 aceters frca the tcher.. EeyCnd 100 neters the slope has teen rinlaized by optinua retention cf existing vegetaticn. 7te Yellcw Creek catayaent at its c1csest FCint is alcut 300 neters (1,000 feet) scuthwest cf the tower. Exposure cf the perranent faCillt) is considered to be excellent. ~?

f;j C372.32-2 O

w

YCNP-13 ,A Stability Class (' A E C E E E G Temporary 15 5 5 22 27 10 16 Ferranent 13 8 7 21 28 12 11 There is fairly gccd agreenent in the frequencies of the various statility classes tetween the tsc facilities. The small ctserved differences are not telieved to be significant.2 E. Ccalarisons of Calculated Eelative concentrations E.1 Shcrt-Term (accident) (U/O's Tatle C372.32-7 (T) presents estinates cf the 5th and 50th percentiles and of the average short-ters (accider.t);r/O's for both the permanent-and temporary sites. These.T/Q's are tased cn the centerline equation (for the one-tour and eight-hour tire periods), and cn the sectcr i average equation (fcr the 16-tcur and three-day tire periods) for a ground-level release, ard l12 13 have teen adjusted for tuilding wake effects.. I Wind data used were Lased cn seasurerents at the I~ \\ms') 10-reter levels of the permanent and terscrary meteorological tcwers. 3 In all cases the.0/O's based cn the teNpCrary l tower data were scre consersative (tigter) than those tased on the pernanent tcher data. The ratic cf the tenpcrary tc persanent 20 ranges d frce a low of atout 1.1 to a tigh of atcut 1. 8. It is apparent that the principal differences between the two sets of calculated values are the result of the lower wind speeds at the tenpcrary facility. aHigher frequencies of the twc extreme stability classes 4 (A and G) at the terpcrary facility can te attributed tC the lower teight of the upper level tengerature sensor on the tempcrary tower. Q372.32-5 / s do ._.I

YCN P-13 E.2 Lcng-1erm#./C's Table C371.32-8 (7) presents estimates cf tLe long-term (4-acnth average) J'/C's, ty sectcz, fcr various distances icr both the permanent and teaporary sites. These d'/C's are based cn tne centerline equaticn for a ground-level release and have teen adjusted fcr tu11 ding wake effects; wind data used were based cn seasurenents at the 10-seter levels of the Fernanent and tenscrary metecrological towers. In almost all instances the d'f e s tased cn the terscrary tower data were more ccoservative (higher)_ than these tased en the peraanent facility data. The largest differences in the /C's for the two facilities cccurred in the estimates for the ESE sector, where the2(/C's based on the tenpcrary tcwor data were an crder of magnitude larger, tat all dchnwir.d dietarces, 12 than those based cr, the permanent tcwer data. The sectors with tre highest d'/C'E were EEE and UNk fcr the temporary and persanent facklities, respectively.. The accend tigtest relative concentrations occurred in che h sectcr at tcth facilities. l These differences in the estinates cf the icng-term relative concentrations are telleVed to te the result prinarily of dif ferencer 1r wiad speed and wind direction, and nct stability, which appears to te fairly siallar at the two sites. Generally, lower wind steedE are telieVed to te primarily responsible fcr the generally higher d'/Q estinates in all directicn sectcra, at the temporary facility. The bish d*/C's in the ESE sector at the tenpcrazy facility are 13 attritutable to the relatively tigh frequency of kNE winds (airflow to thc ESE) during statie, low wind speed conditens. This is primarily a nighttine phenonenen which affects the tearcrazy site but does nct appear to affect the permanent site. High M*/C estimates in the Ehk and N j sectors at both f acilities appear tc te related to the high frequency of scutterly winds ctserved during the compariscn pericd. Ecr exaarle, scuth l C312.32-6 O m ,1$ h o n o o ni o

YCEF-13 O and scuth-southeasterly winds cccurred alcut 33 percent of the time at the perranent facility and alcut 25 percent cf the tire at the tesporary facility. E. _Ccarariscns of Eusidity Cata E.1 saturation deficits The astient saturation deficit is an atsclute measure of how such moisture sust te added to the air to bring it tc saturation. It is, therefcre, 13 a useful indicator of the pctential fcr tott natural and cooling systes (pends and wet tchers) induced fcg. Saturation deficits were calculated from the 10-meter dry-tult and despcint tesperatures seasured at toth reteorcicgical facilities. Eased on the terscrazy tcter data about 21 percent cf all the hcurs during the ccuparison pericd experienced saturatica deficits less than or equal to 0.5 g/kg; the ccrzespcnding statistic tased on tha perranent tower data was about 15 percent. The higher turidity (f requencYl12 of Icw saturaticn deficits) at the terscrazy sitej is nct telieved to be significart and say te l (} attributed to higher rates of \\m / evaporatranspiraticn frca a scre nature grass l cover at the terscrary site and to direct evaporation from a nearty farn pcod. j i Tempcrary tower tunidity data were used in i evaluating envizcosental impacts related tC the i operation of cooling tchers at the Yellcw Creek Nuclear Plant. It is expected that the results f of these evaluaticns, which are presented in the + Envircnmental Fepcrt, are ccnservative (aay result in higher frequencie.s cf visible pluses) because of the higter frequency cf low a7tient saturation deficits at the tempcrary facility as ccupared to the perranent facility. E.2 Wet-tult temperatures Wet-tult temperature statistics, taced cn data for the four ausser months (June thrcugh Septerter), were very similar fcr tre tuc C372.32-7 i om ww a asw i

YCNP-12 0' facilities. At both sites the saxinus cteerved wet-tult temperature was 7881; Sth and 50tt percentile wet-tult temperatures were 76*E and 71*F, respectively, at toth sites. 7. Rgresentativeness of the Cata_Ccurariscn Eericd Ten years of Buntsville, Alatara, Lccal Climatological Cata (1966-1975) were exarired in evaluating the representativeness of the April-July 1977 data cargariscn pericc. Cesartures or the 1977 sean scnthly wind speeds from the corresponding ncznals based cn the 1966-1975 data were -1.7, -1.1, +0.4, and +1.2 apt for April, May, June, and July 1 Sir, respectitely; the ccrresponding departures cf the sean 1977 acnthly terperatures frca normal were +1/90F, +1.98f, +0.30F, and +3.2*E for the sase scngts. These departures of the 1577 mongtly statistics from the icnger ters seans are not unexpected and are ccnsistent with normal year to year variatility. Consequently, the data ccagariscn period is telieved to te reascnatly 12 representative of the Icnger term meteorcicgical ccnditens. G. Ccnclusions Ccaparisons were rade of the relative concentrations (5/C's) Lased cn retecrcicgical data from the tempcrazy and persanent meteorological facilities. Ir almost all instances the 5/C's tased on the terscrazy tcher data were more conservative (tigher) than ttcse based on the permanent f acility data. It is based on the permanent facility data. It is telieved that the tigher 5/C's for the terscrazy facility are primarily a result cf gerezally lower wind speeds ctserved at the temporary site. 1 The tesporary site is apparently affected by a local low-level airficw pattern which results in j a relatively high frequency of winds (generally frca the ENE) toward the Yellcw Creek estaysent, 9 j RBBRBd h e! C372.32-8 l l

YCNP-13 \\- during stable light wind speed conditicms.3 This wind pattern results in significantly higber (an order of magnitude) average */C's in the dcunwind (EEE) sector at the temporary site than in the ESE sector at the perNanent site. Upper-level wind directions at the twc facilities, in general; ccupare quite favcratly. Frequencies of the various stability categcries also compare quite faccratly as de the wet-tult temperature statistics for the two facilities. Iow saturation deficits, Ecwever, appear te te scre frequent at the teaporary site than at the persanent site. The exposure of the perranent setecrolcgical tower is judged to te excellent, whereas there are identifiatle exposure problers asscciated with the tempcrary tcwer. In addition, the pernanent facility is located cn the saae side of the entaynent as the propcsed reactcr and apparently is not affected by 1ccal f1cs patterns observed at the teaporary facility. Consequently, it is believed that the metecrological data from the persanent facility netter represent airflow at pctential effluent 12 ~, k'_,} release points and, therefore, prcvide a acre representative basis for evaluating site and regional dispersion characteristics than dc the data from the tempcrary facility. The accident X/C's presented in the FEAF and used for evaluating the-radic1cgical ccnsequences of postulated accidents were tased cn data frca the tenporary facility and, therefore, are judged to be conservative. Eesults tased on these 5/C's 13 and presented in the ESAF would not te changed as, a consequence of any cf the ccnclusicns cf this study. 37his 1ccal flow pattern would not he expected to affect the proposed reactor site which is on the sane side Cf the estaysent as the persanent facility. Q372.32-9 i

YCNP-9 O ' V Fesponse: Table 17.1 A-4 (T) has been revised to address the 7 latest revisions of Regulatory Guides 1.38, 1.39, 1.64, and 1.123. Regulatory Guide 1.88, Revision 2 has not been addressed. l Table 17.1A-4 has been included on. Topical Peport TVA-TR75-1 and has been deleted from the PSAR. The topical report was accepted by the NRC in a letter 8 from C. J. Heltemes, Jr. to J. E. Gilleland dated September 1, 1977. O Q421.SA-2

YCNP-13 0 421.6 Suestion: (17.1A) 'Ibe CA prcgram should include provisicna fcr fire protecticn and rust te described in the ESAE. Page 9.5.1-37 of the May 1, 1976 revisicn of Secticn 5.5.1 of NUREG 75/047, " Standard Eeview flan for the Eevich of Safety Analysis Repcrts for Euclear Fcher Flatts, LER Editicn" provides the ERC pcsitica relative tc the CA progras for fire prctecticn. Our acceptance criteria, which have not yet received final EEC approval, are attached and fcrwarded fcr ycur guidance. Besconse: Refer to Aggendix 9.5A. 33 O $$ NN l l l l G421.6-1 O i

YCEP-13 O 421.7 Euestice The response to 421.6 on fire protecticn indicates that 3VA8s Cffice nf Pcher, during the cEeraticos phase, plan to utilize the CA Erogras designed tC sett Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. This is acceptatle icz operaticns. However, the respcnse tc 421.6 prcvides a list of actions to te taken during the design and construction phase. The list cnly iterates the list cf criteria in Section 3 of the Regulatory Ecsiticn of Fegulatcry Guide 1.120 (For cassent - June, 1976 - page 1.120-10). To evaluate how the prcgras is conducted the staff needs a description for each critericn similar to the detail prcvided in Attachment 420-1 of the NFC letter to TVA (Mr. Varga to Mr. Goodwin) dated Septester 24, l$76. Also, The CA prcgram fcr fire prctecticn stculd te under the sanagesent centrol of the CA organization. This centrcl ccnsists cf (1) formulating a fire protecticn CA progras that inccrporates suitable requirements and is acceptable tc CEEC managesent responsible for fire prctection or verifying that an existing program inccrpcrates suitatle requirements and is acceptable to CEEC maanagement and (2) verifying the eifectiveness c5 the CA prcgras fcr fire protection through review, surveillance, and audit. Fevise the response to 421.6 tc clarify that TVA's CA program for fire protection is under the sanagement control of CEDC CA during the design and ccnstructicn phace, cr provide an alternative pcsition for the staff's evaluation. Fesrcnse: Appendix 9.5A reflects a more detailed statesent of 13 what existing procedures and prcgrass withic CEEC nch require for fire prctection related systems. Since the QA prcoram for the creraticnal-phase ic decisned- . _. _ _ _ - ~. - t'o meet the requirements of Appendix E tc 10 CEE Part 50, statements invc1ving operational aspects cf fire protection such as pericdic testing and saintenacce have been cmitted frcs Appendix 9.5A. 421.7-1 I /N i b

YCEE-13 j The CA prcgram for fire protection has teer reviewed by apprcpriate TVA management including the CA crganizatica to verify that the prcgram inccrpcrates suitable requirements and is acceptatle. As indicated in Appendix B.7(j) the apprcpriate CA perscnnel are 33 responsible for verifying the effectiveness cf tre program through pericdic audits. l 421.7-2 O es deem ameneem se e eh en e W ew%eme-

YCNP-13 O 421.9 Suesticn: The last sentence of the sixth paragraph of the response tc item 421.6 states, "The cperaticnal QA progras for the Yellcw Creek huclear Plant is described in the Yellch Creek freliminary Eafety Analysis Eeport (ESAR), Chapter 17." This does not appear to te correct. Clarify.. Bessonse: TVA is nct required to provide the operaticnal QA progran description in the Preliairary Eafety Analysis Eepcrt (PSAR). TVA will prcvide a descriptica cf the operaticnal QA program for the Yellcw Creek huclear Plant in the Yellow Creek Final Safety Analysis Esport (ESAE). This operational CA prograr description mill te similar tc section 17.2 of TWA Topical Eeport - TVA-TR75-1. This has teen included in Appendix 9.5A. 13 O pggg 0800 C421.9-1

YCNP-13 O 421.10 CUESTICE: The last sentence cf the seventh paragrapt of the response to ites 421.6 states, "As applied tc fire protecticn these procedures generally require that among other things the fcllowing te dCDe* The word, " generally," causes concern tecause it implies there are cases when the prccedures do nct require the listed acticns. Delete the word or descrite in detail when the listed acticas will nct te applied tc fire protecticn. BESECNSE Appendix S.SA has been revised to zerove the wcrd 13 " generally." G421.10-1 O

YCNP-13 OG 421.11 Question: Please clarify the following items for quality assurance related to fire protection during the design and construction phase of the Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant (The numbers correspond to the paragraph in part 9.5A of the PSAE): B. 7. (d) Describe measures which assure that inspection personnel will use pre-established checklists while performing the inspections. B. 7. (g) Please identify the organization (s) responsible for approving nonconformance dispositions. B.7. (h) Please clarify that significant or repetitive conditions adverse to fire protection, i including fire incidents, and the corrective e action taken will be promptly reported to cognizant levels of mananement for review and assessment.

Response

() 1. See revised Appendix 9. 5A, B.7 (d). 2. See revised Appendix 9.5A, B.7. (g). 3. See revised Appendix 9. 5A, B. 7 (h). TVA has established procedures for reporting fires and fire-related incidents at all TVA power generating stations. These procedures provide a comprehensive and effective method of obtaining and distributing the necessary fire history records and loss data needed as background information in determining the l effectiveness of existing fire protection and prevention measures. The procedures apply to all TVA power generating facilities including those under construction and apply to any reportable fire i 13 or fire-related incident occuring on TVA power l plant premises including the inadvertant or j i spurrions operation of fixed suppression systems. l Theproceduresrequirethatreportsbesubmittedtof appropriate interested division level management i including ENV PL fHazard Control Branch), EN EES, P PROD, and CONST and to the Chairman of the Fire Protection and Prevention Panel. ENV PL (Hazards Control Branch) maintains a permanent file of all reports. b u,i i 421.ri-1 i ~ l

YCNP-13 O A safety engineer qualified in areas normally associated with the duties assigned to a fire l safety specialist is assigned to each nuclear power plant. His duties include inspection of fire 1 protection systems and the identification of conditions or incidents which are adverse to fire safety. The safety engineer reports directly to the P PROD plant superintendent and the plant superintendent has the authority and means to involve other divisions as required to af fect corrective actione aimed at eliminating significant,13 l repetative conditions which are adverse to fire l protection. l P PROD Safety Engineering Services Staff j representatives perform annual surveys of operating i l plants. An integral part of this survey includes j the determination of the operational status and review of significant or repetative conditons which ! may have been adverse to fire protection. l O l l l l O 421.11-2

YCNP - 13 422.1 guestion:- Your description in Section A.1 of your " Fire Protection Program Evaluation" does not provide adequate information on your fire protection organization for us to complete our review. Therefore, please provide the following information: (1) Describe the upper level management position that has overall responsibility for the formulation and implementation of the fire protection program.

Response

In the TVA organization structure, the General M7'tager has overall responsibility for the formulation, implementation, and assessment of the effectiveness of the fire protection program. In accordance with the TVA policy of management accountability, the General Manager has delegated these fire protection program responsibilities through the respective managers of of fices to the Director of Engineering Design, the n\\~' Director of Construction, and the Director of Power Production within their respective areas. To fulfill these responsibilities, these directors maintain qualified staffs to ensure that all aspects of the fire protection program are, at a minimum, consistent with applicable regulatory requirements. To ensure that an integrated program is maintained, TVA has established a fire protection panel composed of key management representatives from each of these three divisions for review and coordination of program policies and application in interface areas. Q422.1-1 f) ~ (,,/ -}}