ML19321A980
| ML19321A980 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/16/1976 |
| From: | Ebersole J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Bender M Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.120, RTR-REGGD-1.120 ACRS-M-0020, ACRS-M-20, NUDOCS 8007240475 | |
| Download: ML19321A980 (2) | |
Text
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([)Q7fleg August 16, 1976
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li. Bender, Chairran Fire Protection h'orking Group CCt;lE:iTS Oil FIRE PROTECTIO;i REG. GUICE 1.120 (JCE) l 1.
tiot methodical in check-off sense.
i 2.
Too much automation of systems r.'ay pres _nt hazards. greater than i
fire (i.e., watting of " redundant" equipment and circuitry).
3.
Flooding and colaspse of trays during course of fire-fighting
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may be serious. Uater resistance of aged dry cables normally in dry candition unknown.
l 4.
Operator comitnent to fire fighting versus safe shutdown i
not clear.
I I'
4.
Under some conditions " external" hose stations would be prefer-able to "go in" to fire areas from external points.
6.
Separattomditnin containment not as specifically treated is in spreading roca, control room, tunnels, et cetera.
i 7.
Dry-pipe system within containment probably preferable over others. Spurious cold water deluge tray impose significant themal stresses on hot pressuri::cd systems.
8.
Tio precise knowledea a p" ears to be re7uired of what ray be~
chalhnned qt; a_giYe'n~firTor fir,cgo3c, tion effc7t.
9.
Preliminary annunciation of occurrence of automatic sprinkling function wculd appear desirable.
- 10. tio discussion of r.arits of passive informatinn c.mter or auxiliary control center characteristics if us2d. : o a;' par 2nt cr2dit given to or sugrcstien to use auxiliary control roon (backup control).
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- 11. Gecause of inevitable severe consequances of class u or 9 conditions to contiguous or noarby nuclear units the idea of separato spreading roor.s for each unit cannot be used to diminish mquiremnts on ca_ch spreading room.
Basis for this must be to avoid com.counding the safe shutdo.n problem as mgards personnel coranitmen t.
- 12. Treatment of duct work, damper systems,is adequato, but air and gas transport control is not odcquato.
- 13. tiot clear that only 'one division" may be sprinkled or inundatad at one time, nor are requircennts for tests (in context of I
causing circuit faults).
Define boundarios of " wetting down"
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c1carly in terms of divisions of cabling and equipment.
l-14.
Idea of " Fire Manager" is respondent to current emphasis in l
fires.
May result in diminishing " system" responsibility.
1 15.
For the less probable LOCA, redundancy of mitigating system is required (diversity if possible).
For the core likely case l.
of fire this is done by invoking direct manual involver.2nt by operato re.
Is additional " automatic" redundancy not justifiable consideri ; disastrous fire potential in contrast to "LCCA" poten ti t.i.
16.
Fear of taking effectiva fire extinguishing acticn (based on ignorance circuits) is one of the r.'ain reasons unich inhibits prompt and effective steps to minimize fire effects.
To counter-act this fear, operator cognizance is required of where elemnts of critical shutdown systers an: physically located; including wiring between operating points, not just at operating points.
Guide doas not addmss this.
SEE ALSO ITE'1 C.
17.
Fire Barriers may impose substantial de-rating requirements on cables.
J. C. Ebersole, f*cnber Fire Prctaction '.lorking Group
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