ML19321A964
| ML19321A964 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/11/1980 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19321A965 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8007240449 | |
| Download: ML19321A964 (77) | |
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6 NUCLEAR PIGULATORY COMMISSIO f
I ll In the Mattar of:
i PUBLIC MEETING REPORT ON NUCLEA9 "ATA LINK k._
1 hru 74 g
July 11, 1980 pg, E:
Washington, D. C.
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
'POORQUAUTYPAGES
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A.1DERSOX REPOt TING f.
400 virginik Ave., S.W. Washing:=
D. C. 20024 L
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Telephone : (202) 554-23 5 8 007240 W9
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 PUBLIC MEETING g
5 REPORT ON NUCLEAR DATA LINK N
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission y
Room 1130 g
10 1717 H S treet, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
j 11 Friday, July 11, 1980 D
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E The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 11:05 a.m.
g 13 BEFORE:
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JOHN F.
AHEARNE, Chairman of the Commission 2
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VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner g
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JOSEPH HENDRIE, Commissioner d
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PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner G,
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NRC STAFF PRESENT:
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MARTIN MALSCH, Deputy General Counsel 20 WILLIAM J.
DIRCKS, Exec. Director for Operations 21 R. MATTSON 22
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B.
WEISS 23 V.
STELLO 24 E.
HANRAHAN 25 g
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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This is an unofficial transcript of a nee:ing of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Co-dssion held on Julv 11, 1980 in the Co-dssien's offices at 1717 E Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.
The =eeting was open to public attendance and observation.
- This transcript has not been revdeved, corrected, or edited, and i
=ay centain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general inferr..:ional purposes.
As provided by 10 CI2 9.103, 1: is not par
,f the for=al or infor=al record of decision of the nat:ers discussed.
Expressions of opinien in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final deter =inations or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper =ay be filed vi-2 the Co ission in any proceeding as the resul: of or addressed to any staienen er argunent contained herein, except as the Co dssien nay authorize.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The meeting will come ro order.
3 Mr. Gilinsky will join us later and also Mr. Bradford.
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4 come to discuss a Nuclear Data Link.
Some six weeks ago, the e
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Commission received a briefing on this subject, and at that time 3
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a memo was sent to the staff acFang them to report back to us n
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in four to six weeks, and we are now approximately six weeks or N
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seven weeks since that time and we now are prepared to hear some sn 9
more on it.
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Mr. Dircks?
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3 MR. DIRCKS:
We're back here in response to your letter m
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to talk about the Data Link and its relationship, I think, to the E
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iss2es that the Commission is particularly interested in.
That is, J
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the requirements that we were placing on the various licensees to
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I don't think, 20 in my own mind at least, we've solved all the kinks in the Data 21 Link.
We've got more work to do, not only in the concepts, but 22
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we have some work to do in the area of what is a system that 23 !
will serve our needs at an appropriate cost.
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I think the main thrust that I ' d like to s ee the 25 il meeting take today is for us to deal with that question of the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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requirements that we would be placing on the licensees with the 2 q) various console data daat we want to accumulate at the emergency 3
of fsite center.
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4 Roger Mattson will pick up on that point.
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the program to go forward, and we 'll f all back and concentrate R
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I assume, then, that you ' re prepared, J
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since that's what you'd like a decision on out of us, that you' re o
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13 MR. DIRCKS:
We'll give it a try and see how we come
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$j 15 Vic, do you have anything you might want to say?
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Otherwise, we'll get into the details.
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17 MR. STELLO:
I hope what I say is fairly consistent 5c'. 18 with what you've said, I'm not sure.
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20 to move forward with the next stage in that process which would 2I be to prepare specifications to go out for proposal to start to 22
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23 I believe we need to move to the point where we have a j
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link operation.
It's getting to be a year and a half since the 2
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to remind me of the value and the need for a data link.
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capability.
And I feel a sense of urgency about trying to move n
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tions, but I believe that they can be worked out as the process F
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for developing those specifications is developed by the staff.
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development of those specifications and the RFP itself before l
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I think that would not be the problem, but I think 13 E
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at some point it would be appropriate for the Commission to u
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decide itself if the concept of a data link is appropriate.
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think it would be useful to do dnat today.
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MR. DIRCKS:
I agree with that point.
I think we 've
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like, and that's the part we have to work on.
21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I'm not sure.
Where do you each
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come out on this question of -- Bill, do you recommend that we 23 reach a decision on whether or not to authorize the de:velopment 24
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specifications.
We've talked about concepts for so long and 2
needs.
Now we have to see what the specifications turn out.
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
All right.
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4 MR. STELLO:
With that, if we could have the first slide 5
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with, and that's the role of the NRC in emergencies to assure both 6
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I have nothing more to add to this subject.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Gee, I would have thought you'd 3
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follow it with a slide stating what -- on June 2nd, the memo that
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I sent to Mr. Dircks saying what the Commission interpretation is 5
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MR. STELLO:
I could do that very simply.
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line is 9 8%, below the line is 2%, I choose not to argue it.
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I might parenthetically note that we had a Mitre study looking n
20 at this question and I'll be sending the results of that down to 21 the Commission shortly.
They've tried to make an independent
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assessment of roles.
23 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Fine.
And I would just like to I
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point out that there was a Corlission decision and we reached a 25 conclusion daat we would want the vast amount of the weight given f;
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MR. STELLO: And I wanted to have the slide to serve to 3j remind us all that we've done that.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, the slide doesn' t quite do that.
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That's why I'm inclir.ed to bring it to your attention.
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Yes, I should have thought to put that in.
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Ninety-eight percent above and two percent belo'.
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MR. DIRCKS:
And what was the bottom line on the Mitre d
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The bottom line conclusion is that their E
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But their job was not to make a rece menda-
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Bernie, with that, why don'; you continue?
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I think Roger was going te start now.
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The first package of slides which you
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5 20 I'd like to just quickly summarize where we' re at with 21 the document that's come to be known as NUREG-0696, a draf t set 22
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of functional specifications. for the Safety Barameter Display
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System, the Technica1 Support Center and uhe Emergency Operations 24 Facility, the Nuclear Data Link and REG GUIDE 1.97 all rolled 25' into one set of specs.
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This first slide summarizes the four f acilities, if 2
you will, the SPDS being part of the control rcom.
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starting with operations responsibility in the control room, a 5
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the EOF and coordination of governmental actions at a plant,
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and finally, an oversight function, a character that you were d"
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" Minimum Data Requirements" near the middle of the page.
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have made a decision in the last few weeks in working with these
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functional specs that they will have total compatibility with 3
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REG GUIDE 1.97.
One way of saying what we mean by total compati-
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bility is that if you integrate the minimum data 9quirements of
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tained in Regulatory Guide 1.9 7.
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It may mean that we add or subtract a few parameters
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MR. MATTSON:
Yes, and the revised version has just 3
gone to the ACRS f rom the Of fice of S tandards Development with 4
the qualifier in the transmittal letter that it is still subject s
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We'll be discussing it with the 8
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ACRS in Augus t; we anticipate that a number of people will probably R
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want to come to that ACRS meeting and offer comments on the N
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quality of the data list now that they are being informed how 40 9
it's going to be used.
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h Il this as well as Bill, is we hope,to put these draft functional n
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Roger, this chart that you have up E
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document that was sent up in this paper, which is off of M
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In particular, the previous one had some additional 21 requirements on the minimum data requirements for the TSC and 22 th e EOF.
Now, the fact that that doesn' t show up now, does that
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23 mean you've backed off of those?
24 MR. MATTSON:
No, it means that those data requirements 25 will be fcided into 1.97.
And, in fact, the meteorology and ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
1 radiation parameters were just recently sont ou't to Standards 2
for their review for inclusion in the revised Reg Guide.
The l problem with 0696 is that it's changing, and I, in fact, want to 3
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list a few things that we' re going to consider changing before f
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we put it out for public comment, beyond the version that you E
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see here.
I think the date of this one is the 8th or something, e
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there were two editions of the thing that day even.
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narrowing the uncertainty, but there's still a lot of flux on d
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0696.
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Commissioner Gilinsky and I both E
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Is this the
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You could
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Okay. Fing.
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The next slide just quickly summarizes e
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19 for all of us so that we know we' re t alking about the same thing, M
20 the kinds of communication and data links that we envision, and 21 that these draf t specifications envision between and among these 22 various facilities.
I won' t dwell on it unless it raises particu-23,
lar ques tions.
I might note.that the SPDS is assumed to be a 24 set of parameters located in all of those places, which primarily b
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1 for use by the operators, but the same information that's in front r
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Except that the SPDS doesn't show e
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up in the NRC Operations Center.
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MR. MATTSON:
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Data Link than it is for how these things integrate.
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Nuclcer Data Link; where the processing of the data for the link E
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is to occur.
That will have an important feedback on the costs.
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processing would occur in Bethesda with the data being supplied in 17 some unique format by each of the operating f acilities.
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much and precisely whether it cos ts less, to have the processing 20 done uniquely and in some standardized way at each site, and 21 then just sent to us and we would read what they read when they
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read it.
That you can discuss in a few minutes with Vic and 23 Bernie about the Nuclear Data Link.
I'll point out that when we
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2 !i to perform the Tech Support Center, EOF and SPDS functions would 3 lj want to know whether he has to save space and weight to do the 4 l processing for the NDL at his site.
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of the uncertainty in some of the other areas as quickly as we R
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It would be nice if we could draw down that uncertainty can.
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today, but if we can't we can send the functional specs out with a
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And we can probably still meet that date
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some of these f acilities.
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And ' underlying this is an assumption e
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The way the Guide reads now, it says m
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Any plant in operation now or to be licensed before June w*
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21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
My question, Roger, is when do you 22 assume that the revisions to Reg Guide 1.9 7 will be final?
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Oh.
Simultaneously with the final version 24 of the functional specs ; within the next three months or so.
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I don' t propose to say anything else about the general
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picture of the schedule.
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But it is our 21 generally held belief that most of the process computers currently 22 in operation are not good enough.
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to propose for our review.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I guess you've lost me.
I don't 4
follow why that leads you to the conclusion daat requiring a a
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my judgment that one way to make sure that the issue receives the
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But you have to be able to describe A
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Because just having a 2j dedicated computer doesn' t solve your problem; you're going to i
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I don't disagree with you.
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At the stage of the draf t that you have now,
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Before you leave that last point,
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21 MR. MATTSON: That's right.
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letters from people in the industry saying let's not let the 16 Nuclear Data Link be the tail that wags the dog and that sort of y"' 17 thing. We concur in that, we need to move on with the SPDS.
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a lot, I think, in drawing down uncertainty.
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You vanted to talk about the EOF.
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You' re going to put 0696 -- you plan 25 on putting 0696 out for comment, right?
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It's not at this point, is it?
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20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I think the distinction, at least 21 that's beginning to gel in my mind, is what is the primary purpose, what kind of an accident does one have in mind, or I
accidents, and looking at why do you have this facility.
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And the company and what state
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Tech Support Center or -- ?
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That's in the Technical Support n
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The engineers that we would have in close-in support and assistanca r
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In part.
The way you describe 12 it, it sounds as if an NRC decision to recommend some sort of
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The deficiency in having a f allback posi-g 5
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MR. MATTSON:
We can ask if the emergency preparedness 23 l people from NRR want to add anything that I'm leaving out.
2 MR. PERXINS:
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that we put in NUREG-0654, the joint criteria.
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I think Ken's suggestionis a good one.
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Fair enough.
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H 17 Ey MR. FOUCHARD :
I don't disagree with'you for a moment.
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Everybody including people who I
19 think they might someday write a book on Four Mile Island are 20 going to insist on rushing to the scene.
21 MR. FOUCHARD:
I don' t disagree with you, but the other
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Now, as I say, that works', as you draw the lines it's 2
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3 MR. BUDNITZ:
Mr. Chairman, in listening to this I'm 4
puzzled about something.
It may have been addressed but I'm not s
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That is, what accidents are we talking about?
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We're talking about accidents d
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And the control room operators are going to be in danger.
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Bob, I agree with you.
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23 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
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The Tech Support Center is outside.
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But if you get me out -b3 10 miles, around 24 that area, it could have made a very, very significant -- or it k
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It's a little longer, but by the f
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Fine, fine.
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We' re going to be doing some work on that.
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The ACRS had a similar point, I 23 thought, and one of our directions in that May 21st memo was to 24
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The ACRS said that they suggest an 3
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That sounds reasonable, except 19 5
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I mean, I'm 21 just surprised --
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It's easier to talk to people af ter we 23 have something down on a piece of paper.
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Okay.
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Last time we talked about those four ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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May I have the next slide?
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21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
And that we' ve asked L.2em to provide
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No, not the way it's drawn here.
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This is just a stream of data that comes 21 through a processor, and then they can manipulate that data.
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Minimum set.
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That data acquisition system box up there is for all three external locations?
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Do we want all 8 of those tempereture indications?
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But for an estimate I think we ' re s till 4
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What is Modem?
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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MR. FEIT:
I'm Ron Feit, I work with Sam Bassett and 2
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22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Thank you.
23 MR. WEISS:
The next slide.
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Where is the mockup being done?
23 MR. WEISS:
I believe that will be done at Sandia.
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That would be the ongoing costs.
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Yes, but these aren't really E
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operating system until 19 84.
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Right.
I think the figure for 19 84 is h'
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I'm a little uncertain as to what H
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21 MR. WEISS:
Those were 2Gdizional costs.
We separated r
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them out.
They're not part of the initial implementation; 23 they 're part of the ongoing costs in running a system.
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And then' 19 83 looks very high, based 25 upon your previous schedule.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
l 66 1
MR. DIRCKS:
I daink these cost numbers are here just 2
for a frame of reference.
They certainly don' t represent any 3 l hard data.
That's why we're suggesting we put something down on 4
paper in terms of definite specifications.
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MR. WEISS:
Okay, the next slide.
We 're back to what 0
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8 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
To develop the RFP.
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To develop an RFP and to approve the zoy 10 concept, that we're going to move ahead towards some implementatio n.
E 11 MR. DIRCKS:
I think on that point what we 're seeking a
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Okay.
Would you plan to come back
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Oh, y es.
EC2 I8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
The more I sit and listen and Eh 19 g
the more I look into this document and between the conversations, n
20 the more I'd like to see a clearer statement of who does what 21 where.
It jus t strikes me as the fundamental starting point of 22 every thing.
As you said, you think you're clear on it but I'm 23 not sure there 's agreement on your side of the table on it.
24 l MR. MATTSON:
There certainly is a diversity of view k
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25 out there in licenseeland as to exactly how prescriptive they'd 3
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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like us to be here.
Some licensees want some people in one place 2
and others want people in another place and they ought to be 3
I given a chance to s tate their views.
4 The trouble, if y ou get down to listing the job titles e
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of the people you want in each of these places, you've made a N
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We can certainly do better than we have in dbscribing R*
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How would you feel about having d
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I'd like to see that other 3
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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE :
I'd certainly approve in 17
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principle the NDL concept. You've convinced me *on this diagram d
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we've talked about.
I'd like to see the draf t report going out 20 for comment to loosen up some on that EOF distance question, and 21 in turn, what that means is you're going to have to look at those
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I would think just ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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good standard commercial construction sort of thing would do.
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2 So if you'll loosen up on diat EOF distance language 3
and the associated provisions for shielding, habitability and so 4
on, I guess it could go out.
I had hoped we would be able to 5
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the Safety Parameter Display Sys tem specification in h'ere.
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MR. MATTSON:
Maybe you misunderstand it.
There's not n
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A board is too big.
2I COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Yes, but we 've talked about 22
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gathering into one place and in a human engineered display, some 23 essential things for the safety state vector in the plant.
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the rods are either in or out, one thing for neutron level but t
2 it's ranked here as one of five apparently co-ecual sets of data 3
to be in the display, and I wonder if that's necessary.
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ment integrity.
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n 20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I suggest that you do that.
21 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Well, if we' re going to publish
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the report for comment, there's not going to be much time for 23 tha t.
But I'm willing to go ahead because I think in this case, 24
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as in every other, the best is the enemy of the good.
And if we 25 perfect.this damn draf t forever we'll never get-it out.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Af ter having quoted that aphorism, e
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Go to it.
We'll never get e
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comments on it and so on.
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You prefer them to hold until you 4o 9
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I assume that Roger was talkin, 3
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I'm not sure what you' re suggesting.
Do ea 13
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Vic is pointing out tha t his problem
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Is that correct?
n 20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That's how I f eel.
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I don' t understand why you're relating 22
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23 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I differ only because we were 24
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talking here about the Data Link development, which comes back 25 !
here.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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MR. SITLLO:
We're only talking about the specifications e
2 for our center, and we've discussed ad naussum I think what we do 3
in-there, so I hope that's pretty clear.
That's all we're 4
talking about.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I would go ahead and let them start 8
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on the specifications.
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me raise one more question s
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Maybe I ought to explain what was behind
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They speak to part of the original concern that you
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21 My view is that when the principal managers come, 22
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The implementation of writing the procedures to do this is 25 I the kind of activity that I have in mind for the Tech Support ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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Center.
That's where the plant people can gather and decide e
2 exactly how they're going to implement this philosophy now that 3
was developed by this management team, the company, into specific 4
procedures.
That's the reason I felt that the manager team, the 5
onsite team, and I'd like to remark Ebat O'Reilly's las t two aj 6
experiences, and he was right in the equivalent of the Tech n*"
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So the need to be very dc 9
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
And there is a Tech Support Center
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MR. STELLO:
Yes, there is.
For a longer term,
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But that's the other center.
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We're talking about the Tech Support Center.
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MR. STELLO:
Right now that's all we have.
We have a
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they can meet, as a temporary basis. We have these things today.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Was that the equivalent to 21 Tent City or Trailer City, or is that what was going on --
I 22
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In my view, that was the equivalent to 23 l a little room over in the turbine building that we finally got
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73 I
the procedures and doing the things for operating the plant, in 2
a special room near the control room.
That's my view of a Tech 3
Support Center.
4 MR. MATTSON:
And that's what it says.
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MR. STELLO:
So I don't know how to help you to under-0 3
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The understanding of the management team when it hits A!
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some -- more like the words you were using earlier.
n 20 MR. MATTSON:
We ' re going to do that, and we will put 21 those in what we send out.
22
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Right.
You might talk to Mr.
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We've i
24 (7
agreed to go ahead -- for you to go ahead and develop the specifi-25 cations for RFP' type development.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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Fine, the meeting is adjourned.
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2 (Thereupon, at 1:07 p.m.,
the meeting in the above-3 entitled matter was adjourned.)
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO'C4ISSION This is to certify hat the attached proceedings before the J
in the matter cf:
PUBLIC MEETING
- REPORT ON NUCLEAR DATA LINK Date of Proceeding:
July 11, 1980 Docket Nu=ber:
Place of Proceeding:
Washington, D. C.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Commission.,
Suzanne Babineau Official Reporter (Typed)
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. G-1 an
'OfficMal Repo{rter (Signature) r em D
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