ML19320C846
| ML19320C846 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1980 |
| From: | Daltroff S PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8007180117 | |
| Download: ML19320C846 (3) | |
Text
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i PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHI A. PA.19101 SHIELDS L. DALTROFF stac'in1e en som June 13, 1980 Re: Docke,t Nos. 50-277 50-278 IE Bulletin 79-14 Mr. Boyce H.
Grier Office of Inspection & Enforcement Region I US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Mr. Grier:
This let
. In response to IE Bulletin 79-14 which concerns seismic
_alyses for as-built safety related piping systems.
This is a final report of the review for Peach Bcttom Unit 3.
Unit 2 is currently in a refueling outage which is scheduled for completion by the end of July, 1980.
A final report for Unit 2 will be submicted prior to the unit startup.
The inspection, measurement and evaluation for the Unit 3 as-built safety related piping and supports required by Bulletin 79-14 have been completed.
Approximately 18,000 feet of piping and 521 supports were included in the evaluation.
The evaluation determined 12,140 feet of piping and the associated supports show acceptable'conformance with the seismic analysis input information.
The remaining 5,860 feet of piping had differences between the as-built condition and the seismic analysis input information judged significant enough to require reanalysis.
The reanalysis identified only one pipe support that exceeded operability criteria.
However, the stresses in the associnted piping, assuming support failure, were still within operabilicy criteria limits.
The reanalysis also identified the need for the modification to, or addition of 19 other supports to l
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Mr. Boyco H. Grior Page 2 correct-overstressed conditions in either the piping or the supports.
In no case was there overstressing of the piping due to the operating basis earthquake loads and in no case were the operability criteria stress limits of the piping exceeded.
All overstressed piping conditions resulted from design basis earthquake loads.
Of the 20 support modifications and additions required, four have been completod.
Of the remaining 16, five are totally or partially inaccessible while at power.
The work for these supports will be completed during the next Unit 3 outage that provides access to the necessary areas and is of sufficient duration to complete the required work.
The modification and addition of the 11 accessible supports will be completed by September 30, 1980.
Supplement 2 to Bulletin 79-14 dated September 7,
- 1979, states under " Difficult Access" that " areas where inspections are required by the Bulletin but are considered impractical even with the reactor shutdown should be addressed on a case by case basis." On this basis the following two items were not completed because of the radiation fields in the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) isolation valve compartment, backwash receiving tank room, and RWCU pump rooms.
1.
The insulation on the RWCU piping in the B' CU porn rooms backwash receiving tank rooms and RWCU isolation valve compartment was not removed to verify attachment welds and clearances.
- However, because the visual examinution of the RWCU piping showed no evidence of nonconformances anci because the RWCU system does not perform a safet; function, the safety significance of not removing :he insulation to inspect velds and clearancas is minimal.
2.
One weld on an anchor at the interface of the residual heat removal and fuel pool cooling systems in the RWCU isolation valve compartment was not verified.
This weld was visually inspeqted and dye penetrant examined when originally installed and no modifications have been made to the anc)or since that time.
Therefore, it has been judgad that the successful dye penetrant examination of the anchor veld prevides adequate assurance of well integrity.
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Mr. Boyce H.
Grier Page 3 In conclusion, it has been determined from the results of the final evaluations that all' Unit 3 safety-related piping is operable in the present condition.
Very truly yours,
/ g RJ,-
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i ec: US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Washington, DC 20555 4
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