ML19320C379
| ML19320C379 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1980 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Keith K AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007160731 | |
| Download: ML19320C379 (12) | |
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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
- j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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EAY 1 5 Iw o i
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Ms. Kristina M. Keith 3016 Renault Street San Diego, California 92122
Dear Ms. Keith:
This is in reply to your letter of March 17, 1980, to President Carter. Enclosed is an excerpt on nuclear power from the "Second National Energy Plan, " transmitted to the Congress by the President on May 7, 1979. This includes a discussion of breeder reactors under the heading of "New Technologies". Also enclosed is a statement of December 7,1979, by the President on the Kemeny Commissicr. Report on Three Mile Island.
Sincerely, l
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As stated i
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS P00R QUAL.lTY PAGES
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House Document No.96-121 96th Congrek.1st Session SECOND NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN MESSAGE TROM THE PBNDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING TIIE SECOND NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, PURSUANT TO SECTION 801 OF THE DEPART 31ENT OF ENERGY ORGANIZATION ACT ExCERFT
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itAv 7,1979.-3fessage and accompanying papers referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed U.S. OOVERN1!ENT PRINTING OFFICE l
45-004 0 WASHINGTON : 1979 i
e 148 g49 a
3.
Nuclear Power rical demand until new sources such as solar were developed.
This C8u88 ser cus en tro tal. occupational s a f e ty, and social Although nuclear power has its origine in nuclear weapon research g
F 8 8 38 Acant rise in coal conducted during World War 11 nuclear-generated electricity was not prices.
At that time, important in the civ111an economy unt11 the early 1960s.
af ter government and industry had jointly funded and operated several STgATEGY Fog BIUCLEAR F0WER demonstration plants, electric utilities began to place ordere for The first of these began First the Administration seeks to re-estab.lsh the 11 h large numbers of commercial nuclear reactora.
operation in the early 1970s. Orders f or new nuclear plants exceeded (LWR) with the once-through fuel c c1 orders f or coal-fired plants through the late 1960s and early 1970s.
thereby ensure that nuclear power will be a e1snificant source of From 1971 through 1978. ut!!1 ties placed ordere for 105 aucteer plants.
g, g
g gy 1978. 33 of these orders had been cancelled. In all of 1978. only development of nuclear power as a y tent at b kup techno r
nest century. To implement this strategy, the Administration is two new plants were ordered.
pursuing two courses:
this sharp decline reflects the downward revisions of elect-In part, ricity growth f orecasts.
Equally important, however, public concerns o To establish the safety of muel have increased over a series of unresolved questions about nuclear technical and institutional issues a 1spediog nuclear growth; power--epecifically, the management of nuclear wastes, the safety of
,g reactor operatione, health and environmental risks, and proliferation Permitting delays arising fton the public contro-To develop new technologies that yarmit espnded use of nuclear 0
of susclear weapons.
versies over these critical issues coincided with a substantial Some nuclear projects experienced large decline in labor productivity.
cost overruns and of ten required what some utility executives viewed as I,faht Water geactore--The Technical And institutional Issues excessive management attention.
The recent accident at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsy a a e
suee at be resolved--reactor safety, nuclear weste t.
a g
nuclear siting and licensing. Until reactor esfet a nd gut as t reinforced safety and other public concerns.
its energy options af ter Three Mile island, the role of nuclear power ment issues are resolved. utilities will healtate to c t o must receive a considered and objective assessment.
The future c
,,cg,,, p 88t8-Improved siting and licensing procedures are needed e g
nuclear power v111 change-f or the better. if safety and other losues ease the transition through thle period of uncertainty by changing th requirement s for planning additional plante.
Other Federal programs i
are successfully resolved.
are designed to improve uranium utilisation so that e 1sti
}
The U.S. now obtaine 13 percent of its electricity f rom nuclear power
- resources can fuel a larger number of Ilght water reactors'le befo i
Any precipitate action to close a large number of reactors in operation once-through fuel rycle. This will extend the time avalleb In the on8 breeder reactors need to be commercialised.
now could seriously aggravate U.S. 011 toport dependence.
nuclear energy can help ensure a balanced energy supply system.
In the absence of a nuclear power. alternative domestic energy supp1Y Reactor Safetv--In response to the Three Nile Island accident th term.
sources (especially coal) would be herder pressed, and their cost' Frealdent has established a fully independent Presidential Commission including nuclear emperte. The Commission will investigstes pushed higher.
- In the past coal. 011. gas, ur.antum, and hydropower hava cosq)eted with o the circumstances that led to the accident and the events that each other for shares of the electricity market, gegional factors followed; In the price of electricity has been stable.
determined the mia, and the future, however, coal is expected to replace large quantitles of o the technical questions that the accident raises aboct the oil and gas in electricity a nd many industrial uses.
Coal use s operation of esfety and back-up systems for this plant and plast double or triple by the end of the century and contirmse to design; and expected to Il nuclear power were not evall-y grow at 3 percent a year thereafter.
V-15 able, coal would have to supply most of the mid and long term elect-Y-14 t
t t
l
-l 150 151
.i A number of potential sites to a variety of geolotic environ-e o the nature and adequacy of the response to the accident by all
- levels of government.
mente should be identified and early action should be taken to resolve.whether to use them at an appropriate time.
A single The Freefdent has asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commisoton (NRC), en national repository for wastes should be evogded.
Near-tera independent regulat ory body, to accelerate its schedule for putting strategy should seek to have at least two (and possibly three) i permanent resident NRC inspectore at every reactor site.
Under repositories la operation within this century; insofar as a progras started in 1973. the NRC now has permanent inspectors at 20 technicel and other consideratione permit, these repositories reactor etten covering 26 individual reactor unite. The Freefdent has should be in differest regions of the country. Under such a also instructed the Department of Energy to work closely with the NRC regional approach, the geologic, hydrologic, and other technical to determine what additional safety precautions may be neces sa ry,
characteristics of the altas and safety considerations will constitute the primary beste for selection.
Nuclear Waste Manaaement--Radioactive wastes are generated in a wide Construction and operetton of each repository should proceed in variety of activities-research. medicine. defense-related nuclear o
operatione, and in the operation of commercial nuclear power reactore.
steps. Initial emplacement of weste, at least la the first over the last decade, the public has become increasingly concerned over repoettory, should be pleoned on a technically conservstive whether these voetes can be saf ely managed. This concern has been tied aate.
The westes should be retrievable for some lef tist period 1
cf time.
I to the question of whether nuclear power generetton should be allowed The manner and circumstances la which vaste would be to expand.
retrieved end the technical aspects of weste packestag, contata-ment and handling must be further defined.
Recognialns the urgent need to find an ef fective solution to the A second mejor waste management concern to the disposition of estetin probles, the April 1977 National Energy Plan pledged to develop a national nuclear waste management policy and program. To acquire the future uranium mill traillage. In the esse of existing ettes tha a
pose excesolve health riske. the Department of Emergy is develo views of pertinent Federal ageactee and State and local intereste. the prograne to atabilise tallings at the ette or remove thee to o e Freefdent established an Interagency Review Croup (IRC) and asked it to ocatione.
la addition, new technologies to stabillae tatti design a strategy f or dealtag with the waste management problem.
currently being developed to meet the most stringent. criteria.
The primary objective of waste management planning and leptementation to to aneure that " existing and future nuclear weste from military and Away roe-reactor (AFR) storage of spent commercial reactor fuel is se as a t emporary bridge between storage of opent fuel at th civilian activittee (including spent fuel) should be isolated free the bloophere and pose ao significant threat to public health and safety.=
a tor ette and perpanent repoettories. Possible approaches include The IRC developed the concept of an "interia strategic planning sting storage f acility (either in rowell. South beste" to use during the interim. etace the required environmental and Carolina; Morris. 1111 note; or West Valley New York);
constru i safety studies had not yet been cosyteted and final decietone could
'I * *e" I yw him the U.g.8 or construction of a new f acility not be reached.
The 13G found the most urgent need was for a safe, permanent respos.
The Administration takes the roottion that some AFR itory for high-level military and civilian wastes (including spent needed by 198) for domestic spect fuel. Because of h d 3
fuel).
Such en effort will require detailed studies of repository of some esisting storage factitty to preferred wishes to assure foreign usere that the it will b l
sites in a wide variety of geologic environmente and diverse media, Italted amounts of foreign opent fuel to the using a erstems approach. Pending completion of the deciaton procese
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under the National Environmental Policy Act, the IRG has recommended proliferettan obj ec tives.
Environmental 1'E**t
******** ** AIE the f ollowing actions free the interim planningt V-16 1/
These existing storage f acilittee were built by industry as a part of commercial reprocessi. plante. Since reprocessing to not permitted, these f acilities are not being fully utilized by their industrial owners.
V-17
e 153 to essentist that questione about safety and envireemental protec-and gee charges for such It domestic fuel storage, goregg, goe t storageIn addition, an enetronmental tion and the time!!nees with which the process is carried out be
.g hts year.
' storage should be compon three po ential AgF sites is now bei prepared.
reviewed thoroughly and necessary changea made.
The Administrattoe g,p,,..t espects to work with the Congrees to find the appropriate nest steps to g
impact statement eittd legieI*gton to Congrees The Administration has improve the siting and licensing process to assure both greater safety '
this ATR pf's's**
and efficiency. The Secretary of Energy v111 submit nuclear siting and --
Energy De t nt,se,uaed west. - n.se-nt pc "ene la the licensing legislation to Congasse.
. 1-2.
Uranium Resources and Their Use Concern over whether. the U.S. urentum resource ' sse la adequate haa
.yggtg v.2 led to pressures to accelerate the breeder prraram and to commit to i
a reprocessing. gecause of the large uncertainties la present knowledge, F M IuG FOR NUCLEAR WAstt MANM a systematic appreisal of domestie uranium resources is being conducted ggg1gon of Dollare) through the National Uranfue genource Evaluettom progree (NURE).
It le designed to lay an adequate foundetton for future fuel cycle yy 1979 decisions and domestic and foreign utility planning.
199 191 To recover the manimum energy from the domestic resource base, the 372 Commercial 257 21 Department of Energy has developed programs to:
Defense 11 Spent Fuel Disposal
/
o Stimulate private industry R&D to leprove light water reactor Amay ff** Ie*C80' 0
-Storage operating ef ficiency.
892 459 o Construct en energy efficient gas centrifuge enrichment plant Total designed to produce 8.8 milltoa " separative work unite" (SW).
The first 2.2 million SW are now the Administration planned to be in operation
._puclear Sitina end Licentian teatelati M -Lastto reduce the uncertainties is the nuclear pouerAdditional 1.1 million SWU modules can be added up yea around 1988.
ten the 10 to 12 year to deatsn capacity se demand grove. The added capacity peralte proposeo tting anJ licensing Process and to
- ne Admin-Operation of the enrichment enterprise in a way that plant period it now ta es to plan, destga and build a y nnecessary and uranium resources by recovering a graster portion of the fles11e conserves intration will continue to work with Congresa to re ggho t ospro-uranium footope.
in the alting and licensing proces, duplicative steps o Develop advanced lootope, separation technology (AIST).
Die mising safety environ-technology. If successfully developed, would permit economic The key provisione of the bill included early ette selection.
te construction production of nuclear fuel from depleted uranius "taile."
and " banking" of a ette al og standar-thereby increasing by about 20 percent the enriched uranium sental and safet re'te I't also provided f or early ap r and recoverable from known reserves.
process pr.
dised p an eels" and app 1 cation r a construction pe a EEam10e advacCed Converter reactor Concepts in Cooperation
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combining the gg1 transferred each og the res ein t a d cielonmaking process.
with f oreign developers as an alternative way to inctcate license. T and called f or more public involvement urentum conversion efficiency.
The Department's funding for these activities As summertaed in Table V-3.
J authorization request accomp anying proposed leg 1 elation V-19 1/ Specialfor away froe reactor storage facilities.
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i TABLE V-5 This Administration. however, believes that rapid steps toward breeder com ercialisation are not needed now.
The timing of the breeder i
- FUNDING FOR IMPROVED URANIUM UTILIZATON program depends on the economic need f or the technology and on nonpro-(Million Dollars) literation issues.
It is also link ed to resolution of the reactor safety and weste management problems affecting the whole nuclear f
,.y 3979 Irf 1980 option. The leading breeder candidate (!! quid metal fast breeder), it commercialized, would necessa rily lead to reprocessing and to wide-spread use of plutonium.
The President, in the content of his non-tonal Uranium Resource 69 34 pr literation po!!cy, directed deferral of such activities and cancel-Evatustion (NURE) 24 25 lation of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project while alterna-t I
Light Water gesctor tive f uel cycles are esamined.
Eifaciency 409 While Preliminary results of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cao Centrifuge Operations Evaluation (INFCE) do not suggest the likelihood of risk-proof breeder e
& Support (including alternatives. Improvements over current and propos ed practices are 1,
construction) being developed. The INFCE is consideting various technical approachee p
55 to improving the proliferation resistance of breeder and converter Advanced Isotope separation reactor fuel cycles.
It is also studying the appropriate timing for A "[es cooled Thermal Reactors) y their development and commercial use.
ed Converter Program
(
Over the past derade, economic arguments have been used to justify the 2
g pace of the breeder program.
Such justifications hinge on a few key Total factors--the overall demand for electricity, the uranium resource base.
from Enrichment
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49) reactor efficiency, and the relative capital costs of light water reactors and breeders. If the demand for electricity grows rapidly. If ions Escluding domestic uranium resources are Italted. a nd if breeders cost little a
Centrifuge Plant but more than light water reactors, then rapid commercia!!auton would be including Sales og economically attractive. Such perceptions prevetted in the late 1960s Enrichment Services
- and early 1970s when electricity generattoa. particu'arly nuclear electricity was grosing rapidly.
New Technoloates Since the 1973-74 ott embargo, several circhastances have changed.
n renewable or Projections of electricity growth rates have dropped f rom F percent a in the long term. the US will self I"cg. gagly The breeder reactor is year to around 3 to 4 percent for the long ters. Light water reactor of energy.
essentially ineshaustib e e oP *"
a it hu the capability to produce grouth has sloweJ because of the problema noted earlier, indicating
( burnable,t The breeder reactor that uranium resources wt!! !ast longer.
Finally, early optimiette one long-term energy 1 than it consumes
- g o 1d also ge****** guel f or light estimates of breeder reactor capital costs ranging from 0.9 to 1.3 more fissile would act only sustain gg a
times those of itsht water reactors have been replaced by esticates of water reactors.
1 25 to 1.75.
i of a d site for an option that ou Interest la the breeder reactor er of natural fissile These changed f actors have been reflected in a recent analysis of the would not disappear with t e hen urly estimates promised eyes pace of breeder de velopme nt.
Typical of this analysis is the case uranium.
The interut intensifte from the breeder than from the light water summarized in Figure V-2.
Nuclear electricity demand is described by lower cost electricity the amount of installed nuclear capacity in 2000 and in 2020; utanium a pr arama for early commercialisation.
reactors. and resulted resources are descrit ed in terms of price; and breeder capital costs are described in relation to LWR capital costs.
Ff,ure V-2 shous t hat
"h *"onably attainable improvements in current LWit f uel ef f iciency, V-20 breeders would not be needed untti after 2b20 in most cases.
The exceptions are when uranium costs are high nuclear demand is high, and V-21
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breeder capital costs are low. Only under the moet estreme cases would "O
the breeder be economically justified in the 2000-2010 period. Success-cb $
ful development of advanced tootope separation technologies would ease the pressure for an early breeder even further. la auch a case, the g
"CO4 need for an early breeder occurs only f or 400 CWe en line in 2000, for breefer capital costs of 1 25 times ttose light water reactor, sn'd for aaO high uranium prices.
g in light of this economic analysis, the four poselble 3D&D program E
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stratestes will be considered below
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4 o 1.c e Breeder.
This strategy assumes that the resource base is adequate for a long period of once-through light water reactor O
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Q operations, that the nuclear growth rate will be low, or
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E that breeder economics -et11 be unf avorable. Consequently.
gg g,o breeder deve.'opment would be pursued at a low level and commer-
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sible.
A dectolon on a demonstration plant would be deferred
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Light
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ment, advanced isotope separation, uranium resource evaluation, 9
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8 and centrifuge facility weployment and deve lopment would be j
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emphasized.
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t-o Hedaed Breeder.
This strategy assumes that the resource base, g et g h$
nuclear growth, and breeder economico do not require rapid 8F c
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g commercialisation of the breeder.
However, because of uncer-gg tainty, tha strategy would maintain suf ficient fleatbility and g Wg g3 options so that program shifts could be made ese11y and effec-s w
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tively whenever information or events dictate.
The programe 30J fg j
for ligtt water reactors, a.:vanced converter reactors, advanced 3
o 1sotope separettom, uranium resous ce evaluation, and centrifuge LL T Z
'g facilities would be eaghasised, but less strongly than in the
- kir, late breeder.
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Breeder development would continue at a moderate level with 4
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emphaeta on engineering and component development. A decision en a
O on a demonstration plant could be taken in 1981, but also could r
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7, be def erred untti 1986-1990.
Plans for both a 20-year and a h
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30-year commerclettsstion program could be developed.
Repro-C I
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h cessing t echnology would be developed, but commercio11 ation 3
, deterred. This program attempts to mintalze risk at a moderata E
B g-cost.
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gew o Early Breeder. This strategy assumes that the uranius ore base g5 g,.2 is limited, that the nuclear grouth rate will be high, and/or gg; in g
"S that breeder econoelce will be very f avorable. It tapties s2 II da ji v-28 eaa V-22 I
158 159 1
l to the breeder. with complettom of a con-(;. Policy for Coal and Nuctear Power an early comatteent ceptost design study by 1981 coentement to a demonstration facility by 1932, and inittel commercial deployment 20 years The Nation's mid-term energy situatt would be given high teining and espanding the use of coal thereafter.
Reprocessing development priority through. commercialis ation.
Progrees for 11the vnter sources are commercially available tod I' "*
reactor improvement, advanced converter reactor development.
maskets grow and their critical environmental and social problems are adva nced isotope separation. and u ranium resource evaluation overcome would be ds-eaphasised.
This strategy world require a rela-tively high cost, high rtok program.
The markets for coat and nuclear power are 1 1 gre th in demand for electricit Ith
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I*'8' This strategy soeuses that nuclear power will industrial facilities.
he Fuel U o
Expanded Nuclear.
role la our energy future. with installed Energy the regulatory tools to stiansla *
- use of coal and nuclear a predominant
' play equal to the highest values assumed in the energy resources.
capacities at least analyela.
Aggressive progrees would be indicated for light and breeders--with cosalt The primary constrainta on thle movement water reactors, advanced convertere, I**
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commercialise them at the ear 11est possible dares*
free the regulatory and technical rob!
ments to breeder, this would call for a demonstration plant power.
Development of methods to use For the decision in 1981 and planning f or both a 20-year and a 30-year coal into clean f uele. and improve breed deployment schedule.
Reprocessing, th rou gh the commercial-for the long tera as coal and cons.ntional 8t* *a austed.
it will be different to make this to -
The program would be very laation stage, would be accelerated.the greatest assurance of maintaining without increased use of 41tect coal burn a a
11 costly but would provide Ef forts to develop long. term options must be bal d with progrees to and deploying the nuclear option.
assure that direct use of coal J
available la The Administration favors the hedaed straten.
The breeder program the aid tete. tonaistent with p bite e ety an maxima environnestal itself includes the liquid metal fast breeder (thTBR) as the primary protection.
option, but would also support two ot he rs--t he light water breeder reactor (LWBR) and the gas cooled fast reactor (CCFR). Each has y.25 particular strengths and weaknessee and provides a hedge against failure of one particular approach.
The Adminis t ration's dectaton no'. to build the Clinch Rive r Breeder Reactor, a large 1.MFBR demonstration plant, needs to be viewed in light of the analysis that has taken place over the past decade.
Furthermore, for a variety of technical and econcett reasons. the to no longer considered to be adequate in stre er Clinch River Flant Those elements of the Clinch design for a comme rcial demonstration.
The River project which can be used intelligently will be cospleted.
systeam design will be completed together with certain components which have value f or test purposes.
the Administration proposee sub-In place of the Citnch River plant.
conceptual deafgn study as the central f ocus of the stitution of a The results of this study together with recommendations regarding the future course of this program v111 be presented to the 1.HFBR program.
Congrees in March 1981.
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V-24
FOR IM*tEDIATE RELEASE DECEMBER 7,1979 OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE KEMENY CO!2tISSION REPORT ON THREE MILE ISLAND Room 450, Old Executive Office Building (AT 2:45 P.M. EST)
THE PRESIDENT:
The purpose of this brief statment this afternoon is to outline to you and to the public, both in this country and in other nations of the world, my own assessment of the Kemeny Report recommendations on the Three Mile Island accident and I would like to add, of course, in the presentation some thoughts and actions of my own.
I have reviewed the report of the Commission, which I established to investigate the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant.
The Commission, headed by Dr. John Kemeny, found very serious shortcomings in the way that both the Government and the utility industry regulate and manage nuclear power.
The steps that I am taking today will help to assure that nuclear power plants are operated safely. Safety, as it always has been and will remain, is my top priority. As I have said before, in this country nuclear power is an energy source of last resort.
By this I meant that as we reach our goals on conservation, on the direct use of coal, on development of solar power and synthetic fuels, and enhanced production of American oil and natural gas, as we reach those goals, then we can minimize our reliance on nuclear power.
Many of our foreign allies must place much greater reliance than we do on nuclear power, because they do not have the vast natural resources that give us so many alternatives.
We must get on with the job of developing alternative energy resources and we must also pass, in order to do this, the legislation that I have proposed to the Congress, making an effor _ at every level of society to conserve energy.
To conserve energy.nd to develop energy resources in our country are the two basic answers for which we are seeking. But we cannot shut the door on nuclear power for the United States.
The recent events in Iran have shown us the clear, stark dangers that excessive dependence cn imported oil holds for our nation.
We must make every effort to lead this country to energy security.
Every domestic energy source, including nuclear power, is critical if we are to be free as a country from our present over-dependence on unstable and uncertain sources of high priced foreign oil.
We do not have the luxury of abandoning nuclear power or imposing a lengthy noratorium on its further use.
A nuclear power plant can displace 35,300 barrels of oil per day, or rougaly 13 million barrels of oil per year.
the safety of nuclear power production.We must take every possible step to increase I agree fully with the letter and the spirit and the intent of the Kemeny Cercission recommendations, some of which are within my own power to implement, others of which rely on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or the NRC, or the utility industry itself.
To get the Government's own house in order I will take NN
, several steps. First, I will send to the Congress a reorganization plan to strengthen the role of the Chairman of the NRC, to clarify assignment of authcrity and responsibility and provide this person with the power to act on a daily basis as a chief executive officer, with authority to j
put needed safety recuirements in place and to implement better.
1 procedures. The~ Chairman must be able to select key personnel and to act on behalf of the Cecaission during any emergency.
Second, I intend to appoint a new Chairperson of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, someone from outside that agency, in the spirit of the Kemony Commission recommendation. In the meantime, I have asked Commissioner Ahearne, now on the NRC, to serve as the Chairman, Mr. Ahearne will stress safety and the prompt implementation of the needed reforms.
In addition, I will establish an independent advisory committee to help keep me and the public of the United States informed of the progress of the NRC and the industry in achieving and in making clear the recommendations that nuclear power will be safer.
Third, I am transferring responsibility to the Federal Emergency Manager ent Agency, the FE IA, to head up all off-site emergency activities, and to complete a thorough review of emergency plans in all the states of our country with operating nuclear reactors by June, 19 80.
Fourth, I have directed the Nuclear Regulatory Com=ission and the other agencies of the Government to accelerate our program to place a resident Federal inspector at every reactor site.
Fif th, I am asking all relevant Government agencies to implement virtually all of the other recommendations of the Kemeny commission. I believe there were 44 in all. A detailed factsneet is being issued to the public and a more extended briefing will be given to the press this afternoon.
with clear leadership and improved organization, the Executive Branch of Government and the NRC will be better able to act quickly on the crucial issues of improved training and standards, safety procedures, and the other Kemeny Commission recommendations.
But responsibility to make nuclear power safer does not stop with the Federal Government. In fact, the primary day by day responsibility for safety rests with utility company management and with suppliers of nuclear equipment. There is no substitute for technically qualified and committed people working on the construction, the operation, and the inspection of nuclear power plants.
Personal responsibility must be stressed. Some one person must always be designated as in charge, both at the corporate level and also at the power plant site. The industry owes it to the American people to strengthen its commitment to safety.
I call on the utilities to implement the following changes; first, building on the steps already taken, the industry must organize itself to develop enhanced standards for safe design, operation, and construction of plants: second, the nuclear industry must work together to develop and to maintain in operation a comprehensive training, examination, and evaluation program for operators and for supervisors.
This trainir:q program must pass muster with the NRC thrcugh accreditation of the training programs to be established.
Third, control rooms in nuclear power plants must be modernized, standardized, and simplified as much as possible, to permit MORE
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. better informed decision-making among regular operating hours and, of course, during emergencies.
I challenge our utility companies to bend every effort to improve the safety of nuclear power.
Finally, I would like to discuss how we manage this transition period during which the Kemeny recommendations are being zmolemented.
Taare are a number of new nuclear plants now awaiting.
operating licenses or construction permits. Under law, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is an independent agency. Licensing decisions rest with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and as the Kemeny Commission noted, it has the authority to proceed with licensing these plants on a case by case basis, which may be used as circumstances surrounding a plant or its application dictate.
The NRC has indicated, however, that it will pause in issuing any new licenses and construction permits in order to devote its full attention to putting its own house in order and tightening up safety requirements.
I endorse this approach which the NRC has adopted, but I urge the NRC to complete its work as quickly as possible and in no event later than six months from today. Once we have instituted the necessary reforms to assure safety, 'we must resume the i
licensing process promptly so that the new plants we need to reduce our dependence on foreign oil can be built and operated.
j The steps I am announcing today will help to insure the safety of nuclear plants.
Nuclear power does have a future in the United States.
It is an option that we must keep open. I will join with the utilities and their suppliers, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and also the state and local governments to assure that the future is a safe'one.
Now Dr. Frank Press, Stu Eizenstat, and John Deutsch will be glad to answer your questions about these decisions and about nuclear power and the future of it in our country. Frank?
END
( AT 3:00 P.M. EST) 2 o
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3016 Renault Street gg f.
San Diego, California 92122 March 17,1980 President Jimmy Carter The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20500
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Dear President Carter:
Attached is a reprint of an editorial as it appeared in the San Diego Union Sunday, March 9,1980.
Do you have an intelligent rebuttal?
Sincerely,
_l urh IX b
Kristina M. Keith Attachment i
4 a
9
De San DiegolInion Editorials PAGE C 2 SUNDAY MORNING, MARCH 9,1980 Keep The Options Open The Nuclear Regulatory Com-The conference recommended of making do with nuclear tech-mission has ended its moratori, that development of breeder nology at hand rather than um on new nuclear power plants technology actually be speeded catching the wave of the future.
with the licensing of Sequoyah up, and not only because the Six months ago DOE officials Unit No. I near Chattanooga. A breeder vastly increases the en-were conceding that safety ques-pending reorganization of the ergy to be derived from the tions involving water-cooled NRC and a new emphasis on world's finite supplies of urani. reactors like that at Three Mile operator training r4nd the moni - um. The breeder is also seen as Island strengthened the case for toring of safety systems by the offering more operating safety, the high-temperature gas-cooled utility mdustry have relieved less environmentalimpact and a reactor (HTGR) developed by much of the anxiety about nucle-reduced waste handling problem General Atomic Co. in San ar power that arose after the compared with today's genera.
Diego. As the designers of the Three Mile Island accident a tion of power reactors.
HTGR point out,it cannot have a year ago this month.
loss of coolant accident or threat-Yet an ambivalence remains France has made the breeder en a core meltdown. With urani-in the Carter administration's the centerpiece of its aggressive um and thorium as its fuel, it nuclear policy. On the one hand, nuclear program. With their ura-minimizes the problem with plu-it recognizes that nuclear power nium supplies, reprocessing tonium that worries Mr. Carter.
is a must because of the rising technology and a family of And the HTGR is more adapt-price of oil from abroad and the breeders, the French expect to able to varied industrial uses vulnerability of our oil supplies go into the 1990s with an energy-than water-cooled reactors..
from the Persian Gulf. On the
- resource equal to all of Saudi Comes the 1981 DOE budget, Other hand, the administration Arabia's oil. This prospect is however, and the federal contri-continues to put a damper on stimulating breeder develop. bution to the joint government-further development of nuclear ment in West Germany and Eng-industr.y HTGR program has power technology out of fear that land, whose people see new com-been dropped, along with funds it will lead to greater prolifera-petition arising from French in. for the more advanced gas-tion of nuclear weapons.
dustries enjoying a relatively cooled breeder reactor.
President Carter's effort to cheap and abundant supply of have it both ways is putting the electricity.
The inexorable rise in oil pric-United States increasingly out of es and the uncertainty of over-step with its partners ir. intema-The advance of Europeinto the seas supplies cal!s for an energy tional energy agencies. His at-second-generation of-nuclear poliersupporting the full range tempt since 1977 to curtail nucle-Power does not impress the of non-petroleum options for ar fuel. reprocessing and the de.
Carter administration, which meeting the nation's basic elec-
.velopment of breeder reactors is continues to downplay fuel repro-trical needs. Where the nuclear getting nowhere. In fact, it was cessing and breeder develop-option is concerned, the adminis-dramatically rebuffed only last ment in the 1981 budget for the tration is narrowing the alterna-month by a 66-nation nuclear fuel Department of Energy. That.tives at a time when they clearly confe(ence in Vienna.
. budget carries a disturbing tone should be broadened.