ML19320B050

Increment of Analysis:Estimated Airborne Release of Pu from Exxon Nuclear Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at Richland,Wa as Result of Postulated Damage from Severe Wind & Earthquake Hazard

ML19320B050
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	02/29/1980
From:	Ayer J, Mishima J, Schwendiman L Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION
To:
Shared Package
ML19320B049	List: ML19320B048 ML19320B050
References
PNL-3340, UC-11, NUDOCS 8007090186
Download: ML19320B050 (43)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:..,. FNL-3340', .UC-11 ) e 1 An Increment of Analysis ESTIMATED AIRBORNE RELEASE OF PLUT0NIUM FROM THE EXXON NUCLEAR MIXED OXIDE FUEL PLANT AT RICHLAND, WASHINGTON AS A RESULT OF POSTULATED DAMAGE FROM SEVERE WIND AND EARTHQUAKE HAZARD J. Mishima L. C. Schwenqliman J. E. Ayertaj E. L. Owzarski, Editor February 1980 Prepared for Division of Environmental Impact Studies Argonne National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC06-76-RLO-1830 Pacific Northwest Laboratory Richland, Washington.99352 l (a) Advanced Fuel and Spent Fuel Licensing Branch l Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission s '80070sol%

ABSTRACT The potential airborne releases of plutonium from postulated damage sus-tained by the Exxon Nuclear Company's Mixed Oxide Fabrication Plant at Richland, Washington, as a result cf various levels of wind and earthquake hazard, are estimated. The releases are based on damage scenarios that range up to 250 mph for wind hazard and in excess of 1.0 g ground acceleration for seismic hazard, which were developed by other specialists. The approaches and factors used to estimate the releases (inventories of dispersible materials at risk, damage levels and ratios, fractional airborne releases of dispersible materials under stress, atmosphere exchange rates, and source term ranges) are discussed. Release estimates. range from less than 10-7 g to greater than 14 g of plutonium over a four-day period. f iii l l l

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS The potential mass of airborne releases of plutonium (source term) that could a result from wind and seismic damage is estimated for the Exxon Nuclear Company's Mixed Oxide Fabrication Plant in Richland, Washington. The postu-lated source terms will be useful as the basis for estimating potential dose to the " maximum" individual by inhalation and to the total population living within a prescribed radius of the site. The respirable fraction of airborne particles is thus the principal concern. ' The estimated source terms are based upon the damage ratio, i.e., the fraction of enclosures crushed or punctured during events of varying severity and the potential airborne releases if all enclosures suffer particular levels of damage. In an attempt to provide a realistic range of potential source terms that include most of the normal processing conditions, a "best estimate" bounded by upper and lower limits is provided. The range of source terms is calculated by combining a high, best estimate, and low damage ratio based upon a fraction of enclosures suffering crush or perforation, with the airborne release from enclosures based upon an upper limit, average, and lower limit inventory of dispersible materials at risk. Two throughput levels are con-sidered. Factors used to evaluate the fractional airborne release of mate-rials and the exchange rates between enclosed and exterior atmospheres are discussed. The postulated damage and source terms are discussed for wind and earth-quake hacard scenarios in order of increasing severity. The largest postulated airborne releases from the building are for the maximum wind hazard (maximum velocity of 250 mph) and for seismic hazard greater than 1.0 g ground acceleration. Both ha:ard scenarios postulate vir-tually complete destruction of the facility. Wind hazard at higher air velo-cities and earthquakes with higher ground accelerations should not result in significantly greater source terms. The source terms are expresseo as the l v l

mass of plutonium airborne particles 10 am Aerodynamic Equivalent Diameter ") I (AED) or less released with time (up to 4 days). From 0.5% to 91% of the s )

ource term is generated from 2 hours to 4 days after the event. The overall source terms for the damage scenarios evaluated are shown in Table 1 in order of increasing severity of wind and earthquake hazard.

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CONTENTS

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS v INTRODUCTION 1 BUILDING AND PROCESS DESCRIPTION 3 BUILDING DESCRIPTION 3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION. 5 ~ ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS 8 AREAS OF CONCERN 8 DAMAGE SCENARIOS 13 WIND HAZARD 13 EARTHQUAKE HAZARD 15 APPROACH AND FACTORS USED IN ESTIMATING SOURCE TERMS 17 FRACTIONAL AIRBORNE RELEASE OF PARTICULATE MATERIAL 17 ATMOSPHERIC EXCHANGE RATE 19 SOURCE TERM RANGES 21 SOURCE TERM ESTIMATES 23 SOURCE TERM ESTIMATES FROM WIND HAZARD 23 SOURCE TERM ESTIMATES FROM EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE. 32 REFERENCES 35 4 ix

FIGURES w 1 Exxon MOFP Building Arrangement for 36 kg per Day Design Throughput. 4 2 Exxon MOFP Building Arrangement for 72 kg per Day Design Throughput. 7 3 Schematic Representation of the M0FP Fabrication Area Ventilation System 9 4 Range and Type of Damage Postulated in the M0P Area at a Nominal Wind Speed of 95 mph. 24 5 Range and Type of Dama;e Postulated in the CL-MS-PRF Area at a Nominal Wind Speed of 150 mph 27 6 Type and Range of Damage Postulated in M0FP at Nominal Wind Speed of 190 mph 29 7 Type and Range of Damage Postulated for the M0FP at Nominal Wind Speed of 250 mph 31 8 Type and Range of Damage Postulated for the M0FP at Ground Shaking in Excess of 1.0 g 33 ) f x ~

INTRODUCTION A potential radiological hazard to the general population could result from the impact of natural phenomena upon licensed commercial mixed oxide fab-rication plants. This report presents estimates of the potential release of plutonium from the Exxon Nuclear Company's Mixed Oxide Fabrication Plant (MOFP) at Richland, Washington, as a result of wind and earthquake hazards. The plutonium release estimates were developed by identifying damages sustained by hazard situations of varying severity. The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (a) staff gathered facility and hazard probability information from several sources. The Engineering Decision Analysis Company (EDAC) pro-vided the description and condition of the facility (EDAC 1978). Features whose failure might have a significant effect on the release of radioactive material were identified (Mishima, Schwendiman, and Ayer 1978). The proba-bility of various levels of wind hazard at the site was assessed by Fujita (1977), while Teknekron Energy Resource Analysis Corporation (TERA) provided the same services for the earthquake hazard (1978). Mehta, Mcdonald and Smith (1979) provided the potential responses of the structure and contained equip-ment to various degrees of wind hazard, and EDAC (1979) provided the analysis for the response to seismic events. These last two analyses provided the " damage scenarios" upon which the estimates of the potential airborne releases i of the contained radioactive material from the facility (source terms) were based. For each damage scenario developed, the amount of plutonium released e was estimated at five time intervals after the accident for the two levels of processing throughput. The estimates are given as a range of values: upper limit, an average estimate, and a lower limit. This report is a portion of an interdisciplinary study sponsored by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and coordinated by the Division of Environmental Impact Studies of the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). The estimated airborne releases of contained radioactive material (a) Pacific Northwest Laboratory is operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Battelle Memorial Institute. 1 4 ,,i,.

presented here form the basis for calculating dose, which is one component of the overall risk analysis, NRC'S objective in the entire study. The primary s concern in the calculation of downwind dose for this study is inhalation (McPherson and Watson 1978, p.3), and in this increment the primary emphasis is the release of plutonium particulate material of a size range that can be carried downwind and inhaled. Particles 10 pm Aerodynamic Equivalent Diameter (AED)(a) or less are conservatively assume ~d to be the respirable fraction. Such an assumption overstates the potential effect by a factor of 1.5 to greater than an order of magnitude, depending upon the lung deposition model chosen (Mercer 1977, Figure 1). The behavior of the structure and equipment in accident situations is not precisely understood. With such uncertainties, the estimates of airborng releases tend to be conservative, that is, estimates are probably greater than the releases that would actually be experienced. ,) f-(a) Aerodynamic Equivalent Diameter: particles exhibiting the aerodynamic behavior of a unit density sphere of the stated size. 2 6

BUILDING AND PROCESS DESCRIPTION To develop estimates of potential releases from the Exxon M0FP, we begin by identifying the facility features and plant-operations that may have an effect on the quantity of material released. The information was gathered from documents issued by EDAC and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC). Included in this information are engineered safeguards that may detect and prevent certain conditions such as fires, or that may mitigate some airborne releases. The locations where powdered plutonium may be accumulated, the quantity present, and the dimensions of the volumes into which the plutonium may be injected are used to estimate the amount of particulate materials that may b'e released during severe wind or seismic events. BUILDING DESCRIPTION (EDAC 1978) The Exxon MOFP is a combination pre-cast / cast-in-place concrete building 100 ft in the east-west direction, 114 ft in the north-south direction, with 28-ft high walls. Figure 1 is an isometric sketch of the facility as it is currently arranged. The mixed oxide fuel is prepared in the east portion of the high-bay area, which has plan dimensions of 76 f t in the north-south direction and 100 ft in the east-west direction. The exterior walls are pre-cast, tilt-up reinforced concrete panels, 6 in. thick by 9 ft wide by 28.2 ft high, joined to 13-in. by 14-in. cast-in-place columns. A cast-in-place roof edge beam 12 in by 14 in. (called a parapet beam) joins the columns and panels around the entire periphery of the building. The roof is metal decking with built-up roofing. Support is pro-vided by a long-span open web joist, supported by the north, center, and south walls, that spans the high-bay and office areas. The storage vault is located in the northeast corner of the facility and is cast in place. The exterior walls are 18 in, thick and the interior walls are 24 in. thick. The roof is an 8-in. thick reinforced concrete slab with wide flange steel beams. 3

= VAULT -.s. l .f [ss

1. \\

(- <.s k[ / g I n % n, g { M b e N M' s " MIXED OXIDE PROCESSING" AREA k " POISON ROD I3 FA8RICATION" AREA E iD POS IEW OF INTERIOR N MASS SPECTROMETER ,y' I FIGURE 1. Exxon M0FP Building Arrangement for 36 kg per Day Design Throughput i

s. PROCESS DESCRIPTION (USAEC 1974, pp. III-3 and 4) The MOFP manufactures light water reactor mixed oxide (MO) fuel assem-blies with a nominal composition of 4% Pu0 in UO. The Pu0 content has 2 2 2 been as high as 5.5% but routinely is near 3%. The possession limit is 100 kg Pu. The current design production rate is 1/4 metric ton per day with a cur-rent actual processing rate of 1/20 metric ton per day. The SNM license for the M0FP includes a limit of 10 kg of unencapsulated plutonium. The plutonium, for license purposes, is considered dispersible until it is ' loaded into fuel rods. Operating data indicate that, at maximum plant throughput, the 10 kg limit is approached and inventories in the various process stations are approximately as shown in Table 2 under case 1. Table 2 also indicates the form of the material present. Experience with plant operations indicates that a maximum of 36 kg of l mixed oxide fuel can be processed per 24 hour day using the current equipment arrangement. It is the throughpdt, not the quantity of plutonium, that con-trols plant capacity. Thus case 2 in Table 2 (72 kg/ day throughput) is double i case 1 ( 36 kg/ day throughput) and assumes use of two mirror-image, parallel glove box lines. The arrangement is shown in Figure 2. lhe Pu0 is trucked to the facility in 5 kg packages in approved con-2 tainers and stored before use in a safe configuration in the vault. The 1 Pu0 from the vault and UO from the Uranium 0xide Fuel Plant next door 2 2 are blended in glove box (glbx) 2a, which is located in the M0 processing area (the east end of the high-bay section; see Figure 1). The M0 is slugged in glbx 2b and pelletized in glbx 2c. The green pellets are placed in boats in gibx 3a and sintere'd in the sintering furnace (glbx 3c) at 1650 to 1700 F in a 15% hydrogen-85% nitrogen gas mixture. This gas is mixed outside the building and piped into the building through the south wall. The sintered pellets are brought to final dimensions by a dry, centerless grinder equipped with a vaccum system to trap the airborne particulate mate-rial generated in glbx 4a. Inspection, rod loading, and cleaning are per-formed in gibx 4b and 4c. Rods are welded shut in the special helivn-filled 5

.-= ~ TABLE 2. Exxon Nuclear Mixed Oxide Plant Material At Risk And Duty Cycle (a) Inventory, g Py,, Glove Box Process Step Material (Form) Case 1 Case 2 W 2a Blend, Mix, Granulate Pu0 2,150f f4,300f 2b Blend, Mix, Granulate M0 2c Pelletize M0 (Green Pellets) 400 800 3a Feed Sintering Furnace M0 (Green Pellets) 200 400 3b Exit Sintering Furnace MO (Sintered Pellets) 200 400 3c Sintering Furnace M0 (Sintered Pelletis) 3,750 7,500 4a . Grind /0utgas Pellets M0 (1% Grinder Swarf) J I MO(99%SinteredPellets) 1750J jl,500 m 4b Rod Loading M0 (Sintered Pellets) 2,150 4,300 Vault Storage All forms including 90,000 180,000 rods and bundles (a) The duty cycle in the existing plant requires operation 24 hours / day, 7 days / week to obtain a throughput of 36 kg/ day of mixed oxide. During such a campaign the inventories on Table 2 would be approximated. Experience with this and similar plants indicates that a yearly plant availability of about 65 percent is achievable; the remainder of the year is devoted to maintenance, cleanouts, and inventories. (b) Half of each amount in ide,c. cal stations, except for vault when total 180 kg out-of-process inventory i ia a single hardened vault. 1 e O

\\ VAULY t E- :: 1 ..-~ g M '"\\ j, f I ,I f x s C i. f ' ~ = s s 3 s y, 1 6 (- (., s .s,3 w, y " MIXED OXtDE PROCES$$NG" "MS-CL-PRF" AREA E TD P S SEW OFINTERtOR / 1 FIGURE 2. Exxon M0FP Building Arrangement for 72 kg per Day Design Throughput.

glove box in the northeast corner of the M0 area; decontimination of the welded areas occurs in the open-faced enclosure along the north wall. There is no dry or wet scrap recycle. EMilNEERED SAFEGUARDS (USAEC 1974) Directional airflow is utilized in the facility to aid in the control of airborne particulate material (see Figure 3). Ambient air, filtered through high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, enters the M0 processing area via distributors located in the ceiling and exhausts through HEPA filter-sealed floor registers at a rate of at least ten air changes per hour. HEPA-filtered air is supplied to all glove boxes that use an air 5tmosphere and is exhausted via HEPA filters. Exhaust from the glove boxes is again filtered before it is combined with room exhaust. These combined gases are filtered again by two banks of HEPA filters located in another area before exiting from the plant. Approximately half of the room air from the processing areas is recycled. Gas from the sintering furnaces is discharged to the building exhaust system through a duct equipped with an explosive gas detector. Explosive gas detectors are also situated around the sintering furnace to detect uncon-trolled leaks of the cover gas. The exhaust ducts feeding the final filter bank are equipped with heat detectors; if the gas temperature exceeds 160*F, a spray is activated in the duct upstream of the final filter banks. Rate-of-rise heat detectors are located in all processing hoods and on the ceiling of the processing area. The detectors in the ceiling activate an alarm. The detectors in gibx lines 2, 3, and 4 also activate Halon extin-guishment systems. AREAS OF CONCERN (MISHIMA, SCHWENDIMAN, AND AYER 1978a) The amount of plutonium available for release in the event of severe winds and earthquakes depends not only upon the plutonium normally available as a part of process operations but also on the amounts accumulated on surface areas of process hoods and exhaust filters. 8 =- ,-W-v +

~ ,L5GEND @ HEPA FILTERS GLOVEBOX ROUGHING PROCESS FILTERS ENCLOSURES GLOVEBOX LINE 9 SAMPLIP'3 POINTS g {"2 SECONDARY I HEPA FILTER dL 15,600 CFM i l l i m 4 FINAL HEPA FILTER -4 [ m. --e. g f f- { b i

.h VAVA V////A V/////4 ho

/ ? o r l ~ f44:&/A7/4V4 RO IM PRIMARY HEPA FILTERS IN FLOOR REGISTERS FIGURE 3. Schematic Representation of the M0FP Fabrication Area Ventilation System 4 9D

Furthermore, the radiological significance and ease with which a material form can be made airborne nelp prioritize the concern over materials. The radiological significance of plutonium is greater than that of uranium used in the procecs. The downwind dose is dependent upon the injection into and the airborne transport of radioactive particulate material by the ambient atmos-phere. Given the same level of force, more preformed particles of the size range that can remain suspended and be transported (powder) will be made air-borne than will solids (pellets). This is because, in the latter case, some of the force is required to subdivide the solid and appreciable forces may be required to reduce a significant fraction of the solid to the size range of the powder. Thus plutonium powders are of the greatest concern followed by M0 pow-Jer. The Pu02 p wder in glbx 2a is the greatest concern followed by M0 pow-der in glbx 2b and 4 (centerless grinder swarf). The remaining M0 is present as pellets or encapsula ed pellets. Neither form appears to be susceptible to the generation of significet quantities of particles in the size range that can be inhaled under the level and type of stresses considered in this study. Two other sources of fine particulate materials are surface contamination and airborne materials collected in filters. Even in glove boxes handling pellets, the long-term buildup of the compounds handled in the glove box may result in the accumulation of significant quantities of material. Although there are indications that a significant portion of the material accum lated over long periods of time is tightly bound to surfaces, a conservative value e of 7.5 g of powder /m2 (this amount corresponds to a coating of powder vis-ible to the unaided eye) is used (Mishima, Schwendiman, and Ayer 1979, p. 44). Pu0, MO, or unencapsulated pellets are handled in all of the boxes 2 listed in Table 2. Five glove boxes (2a, 2b, 2c, 4a, and 4b) are each approximately 36 in. hig'n by 72 in. long. by 36 in. deep (EDAC 1978, p. 5-14, 2 Figure 5-6) and are estimated to have a total of 16.7 m of contaminated interior surface area. Pu0 is processed in glbx 2a and M0 is processed in 2 10

i i the other four glove boxes. The estimated Fu inventory involved with surface -contamination for tha 5 boxes is estimated to be: 2 in glbx 2a--16.7 m x 7.5 g Pu0 /m x 0.88 = 110 g Pu 2 2 2 in glbx 2b, 2c, 4a, and 4b--16.7 m x 7.5 g M0/m x 0.44 x 0.88 = 4.4 g Pu. The furnace inlet and exit boxes (glbx 3a and 3b) have the approximate dimen-sions of 48 in. high by 48 in. long by 30 in deep (EDAC 1978, p. 5-11, Fig-2 ure 5-3) and an estimated 13.4 m of contaminated surface area. M0 is the material handled in these enclosures and the Pu inventory due to surface con-tamination is 3.5 g Pu per box. The boat return conveyor is housed in an enclosure approximately 24 in. wide by 168 in. long by 24 in. high. Although no M0 material is handled, some material may be available as dust from pellets. This enclosure is assumed to be contaminated to the same level as the other process enclosures. The esti-2 mated total internal contaminated surface area is 20.7 m and the Pu inven-tory due to surface contamination is 5.5 g at a production rate of 36 kg M0/ day. At a production rate of 72 kg M0/ day, the Pu inventory for surface contamination in the glove box is 11 9 An inventory of 1 g Pu is assumed for exhaust HEPA filters on glove boxes, 100 mg Pu per filter for the first stage of the final HEPA filter banks, and a loading of 0.05 mg per filter for the final stage (Mishima, Schwendiman, and Ayer 1979, p. 35). Each glove box listed in Table 2 is assumed to have a filter loaded with 1 g Pu. The filtration system is com-plex. The system normally operates with partial recycle but has full single pass capability. All Exhaust emitted to the ambient atmosphere passes through 3 stages of filtration. Although the exact number has not been ascertained, it is assumed that there are sufficient filters (30) to treat all exhausts at the rated flow of the filters. The total Pu inventory on filters at a produc- ~ tion rate of 36 kg M0/ day is 11 g; at a production rate of 72 kg M0/ day the Pu inventory is 19 g Pu. Other items not directly involved with containment of radioactive mate-rials are also of concern since they may generate situations that can lead to 11

the loss of containment of radioactive materials. Cylinders filled with gases under high pressure may become missiles if the valve is catastrophically lost. The 15% H -85% N could be flammable if mixed with air and would 2 2 fuel a pre-exsisting fire. High flash point hydraulic fluid reserviors are found at two locations in the current M0 processing area: along the west wall of the area near glbx 2c and under the northeast corner of glbx 4a. d i e f 12

= DAMAGE SCENARIOS The responses of the MOFP building and equipment to severe wind or seis-mic events were developed by Mehta, Mcdonald, and Smith (1979; for wind) and EDAC (1979; for earthquake). The wind-induced damage ranges from the failure of a door in the M0P area, with little significant damage to glove boxes and filters or other processing areas, to collapse of the walls in the high bay area and roof, crushing essentially all the equipment in the processing areas. The earthquake damage is postulated to range from insignificant to collapse of the high bay area crushing up to seven-eighths of the glove boxes and filters. Estimates of specific hazard conditions and postulated damage are described below. WIND "%ZARD (MEHTA, MCDONALD, and SMITH 1979, pp 30-33) The results of winds ranging from 95 mph (42.5 m/s) to 250 mph (112 m/s) are postulated to range from loss of a standard door in a processing area to collapse of interior and exterior walls and the roof. Nominal Wind Speed 95 mph (42.5 m/s), 6 x 10-3/yr probability of e occurrence Mixed 0xide Preparation (M0P) Area: Standard-size door in east wall fails outwards. Exterior filters on glbx 4a are damaged. There is no significant damage to remaining glove boxes or i filters. Cold Lab-Mass Spectrometry Poison Rod Fabrication (CL-MS-PRF) Area: No significant damage. Vault: No significant damage. Nominal Wind Speed 150 mph (67 m/s), 3 x 10-6/yr probability of e occurrence MOP Area: Same amount of damage occurs as for 95 mph wind. 13

CL-MS-PRF Area: Double door in south wall fails. Portion of west interior wall fails crushing one third of the equipment (upper and lower bound are one-half and one-fifth respectively) within 15 ft of the wall. Vault: No significant damage Nominal Wind Speed 190 mph (85 m/s), 6 x 10-8/yr probability of e occurrence M0P Area: A 20-ft section of south wall at southeast corner fails and a 20-ft section of roof collapses as a unit. Three- ^ quarters of the glove boxes (upper and lower bound are one and one-half respectively) under the collapsed sec: ion of the roof i are crushed. Half of the glove boxes (upper and lower bocnds are three-quarters and one-fifth respectively) in the remaining area are perforated. Cl-MS-PRF Area: Portions of the east and west interior walls collapse crushing one half of the glove boxes within 15 ft of the walls (upper and lower bounds are three-quarters and one-half respectively). Vault-No significant damage. Nominal Wind Speed 250 mph (112 m/s), 3 x 10-9/yr probability of e occurrence i MOP AREA: Portions of outside walls collapse. Interior wall between M0P and CL-MS-PRF areas collapses. Roof collapses down-ward as a single. unit crushing all glove boxes and filters. CL-MS-PRF Area: The south wall collapses. The roof collapses as 2 7 a single unit crushing all glove boxes and filters in area. ~ Vault: No significant damage occurs. 14

EARTHQUAKE HAZARD (EDAC 1979, p. 5-2) The results of earthquakes ranging from 0.3 to greater than 1.0 g ground acceleration range from minimal to roof and wall collapse. Ground Shaking of 0.3 to 1.00 g,1 x 10-5/ yr probability of e occurrence Damage does not lead to loss of component; therefore, no unfiltered release of contained radioactive material occurs, G ;;nd. Shaking of 1.0 g and Greater, less than 10-5/yr probability o 1 S; w p rence Bef - ), south wall fails and roof collapses as a single unit. Approximately tt.ree-quarters of the glove boxes and filters (upper and lower bounds are seven-eighths and one-half respectively) are crushed. The vault remains intact in excess of 1.87 g. 4 a I 15

APPROACH AND FACTORS USED IN ESTIMATING SOURCE TERMS Source terms are estimated to provide data for the calculation of poten-tial radiation dose to the general population from the M0FP. A principal con-cern is that fraction of the airborne particulate material that can be transported downwind, inhaled by humans, and deposited in the deep lung (alve-olar region). In addition, the remaining fraction of airborne particulate i material (on the order of 100 to 200 um AED) that is redistributed beyond the area of the-facility is also considered in this study since it poses a poten-tial surface-contamination and long-term resuspension problem. Answers to several questions are required to arrive at a source term estimate. How much material can be affected by the event? What is the size distribution of the airborne material? What is ti:e oehavior of the airborne material in the time span required for release? What are the release rates and characteristics of the airborne material released to the ambient atmos-phere?' The factors and considerations used to answer these questions fall into two broad categories: fractional airborne release of materials and, if the material is injected into a constrained volume, the exchange rate. The factors involved in these categories are discussed below. A description of the upper and lower bounds placed upon the estimates is also presented. FRACTIONAL AIRBORNE RELEASE OF PARTICULATE MATERIAL The various factors applied to estimate the airborne release of plutonium as a result of the damage scenarios are listed in Table 3. Some considera-tions that influence the applicability of these factors for the six damage situat' ions described are noted in the following paragraphs. e Crush of a Glove Box Containing Powders: Crush is defined as a com-plete loss of containment such as rupture of the metal shell or loss of one or more of the large viewing windows. The glove box is s"b-jected to stress that results in damage and provides the force to inject the powder into the air. Bouncing the powder into the air does not appear 'o provide as much dispersion of the powder as c 17

TABLE 3. Fractional Airborne Release Factors Used To Estimate Consequences of Damage Due to Wind and Earthquake Hazard From Exxon M0FP s Event Factor 3 Crush of glote box containing powder solume of glove box x 300 mg powder /m Crush of glove box containing surface 10-2/m of contamination airborne contamination. Crush of fully loaded glove box filter 10'I of contamination airborne 3 Perforation of glove box containing Volume of glove box x 300 mg powder /m powder. Perforation of glove box contain-10-4/m of contamination airborne ing surface contamination Perforation of fully loaded filter 10-2 of contamination airbe.ne Aerodynamic entrainment of powders, 10-10/s air velocity less than 5 mph Aerodynamic entrainment of powders, 10-8/s air velocity greater than 5 mph tumbling. An airborne mass concentration indicated by experimental data for powder remaining airborne in a volume atter tumbling is used. (Mishima, Schwendiman, and Ayer 1978b, p. 30). e Crush of HEPA Filter. Filters attached to glove boxes are enclosed 4 in a metal container whose strength appears comparable to the glove box itself. Bui Ming filters are also enclosed in metal housings. Thus it is assumed that the filters suffer the same level of damage as the glove boxes to which they are attached. The filt u frame and media are much more fragile than the metal housing but the pluto-nium-bearing material accumulated in the media (along with other components such as condensed organic vapors and lint) may not readily be dislodged. A conservative value of 10% of the accumu-lated material released is assumed in the absence of experimental data. (Mishima, Schwendiman, ard Ayer 1979, p. 46). e Crush of A Glove Box Containing Surface Contamination. Surface con-tamination can range from powder adhering to surfaces to material r 18

mixed into the~ matrices of the surface. Mechanical entrainment appears to be an effective method for removir.g particles from sur-faces (Fish et al. 1976, pp. 75-82) and a resuspension factor deter-mined using a combiratio') of mechanical and aerodynamic suspension is applied (Mishima., Schwendiman, and Ayer 1979, p. 44). e Perforation of a Glove Sox Containin: 'owder. Perforation is defined as a partial loss of containment that allows air to circu-late through the glove box. Depending on the size of the opening and velocity of the air striking the opening, the particulate mate-rials airborne within the volume are released from tha glove box with time. Release of greater than 9% of the airborne particulate material within 30 min. is considered instantaneous. A mass air- ' borne concentration found approximately 1 min. after tumbling a fine 3 < powder and considered quasi-stable, 100 mg/m, is considered to represent the airborne particulate mata-ial in a portion of the glove box (Mishima, Schwendiman, and Ayer 1979, p. 39). Perforation of a Glove Box Containing Surface Contamination. The e stress imposed upon the glove box by perforation appears to be sub-stantially less than the stress imposed by crushing. A factor sub-stantially less, 10-4/m, is applied (Mishima, Schwendiman, and Ayer 1979, p. 44). Perforation of HEPA Filters. Perforation of the filters can occur e f not only through penetration of the filter but also through damage caused by displacement of the enclosure. A factor of 10-2 is applied for the instantaneous airborne release of accumulated mate-rial to reflect the reduced level of stress required for this level of damage (Mishima, Schwendiman, and Ayer 1979, p. 47). ATMOSPHERIC EXCHANGE RATE The two principal areas of concern for atmospheric exchange are the MGP area for the current design throughput (see Figure 1) and the M0P and l l l 19 l I

i \\ CL-MS-PRF~ areas'for twice the current design throughput (see Figure 2). Both areas are approximately 25 ft wide by 76 ft long by 28 ft high 3 3 (53,200 ft or'1507 m ). The airflow through the significant items during the six events is described below. i e Nominal Wind Speed 95 mph. Air enters the area through a 28 in. by 76 in. opening (standard size door). Air velocity striking glbx 4a is sufficient to damage the filters outside the glove box. The inlet and exhaust openings are at least 8 in, by 16 in. The nominal . calculated air velocity in the area is approximately 0.8 mph but it 1 l is assumed that air at 5 times the nominal velocity enters the glove 2 box through a 0.9-ft opening. Calculated airflow through the box under pessimistic conditions (air flows into one opening and out the other adjacent opening) is approximately 9 m per minute and the j 3 } volume of the glove box is displaced each 11 seconds. Under these i flow conditions, particulate materials airborne in the glove box are considered to be released to the room instantaneously. e Nominal Wind Speed 150 mph. In addition to the damage inflicted at 95 mph, the double doors in.the south wall are lost. The calculated i average air velocity through the MOP area is approximately 1 mph and airborne release from the damaged glove box 4a is essentially instantaneous, i i Air entering from the south wall causes a collapse of part of the j west interior wall of the CL-MS-PRF area. The calculated average 'l air velocity through the area is approximately 2.5 mph. e Nominal Wind Speed 195 mph. A 20-ft section of the south nll col-I l lapses and causes the' collapse of a 20-ft by 76-ft strip of the roof j over the MOP area. The existing wind field is assumed to flow I ._through the area. Particulate material from crushed and perforated j-boxes (although they may be partially buried) is assumed to be { instantaneously released. Portions of both walls of the CL-MS-PRF area are postulated to col- ' lapse allowing air at essentially the existing velocity to pass 20

through the area. Particulate material airborne in glove boxes (which may be under wind-generated debris) is conservatively assumed to be instantaneously released. e Nominal Wind Speed 250 moh. The roof over the entire high bay area (which includes the M0P and CL-MS-PRF area) and most of the support-ing walls collapse. Although much of the equipment in the facility may be buried by the debris, it is conservatively assumed that the material is exposed to the existing wind field. Ground' Shaking of 1.0 g or Greater (EDAC 1979, p. 5-2). Beyond e 1.37 g the south wall is unsupported and initiates collapse. It is assumed that all areas except the vault (which remains unaffected in excess of 1.85 g) suffer some degree of structural damage. An aver-age wind speed of 10 mph (4.5 m/s) is assumed for calculating the atmosphere exchange rates for the earthquake damage scenario. One of the mechanisns for crushing gloveboxes is rupture by impact of a f&lling roof section. If it is assumed that the volume of a glove box decreases at the same speed as the roof falls, air could be ejected at a velocity of 48 mph. The release of particulate material made airborne by the damage is thus considered to be instantaneous. SOURCE TERM RANGES In order to provide some quasi-realistic bounds to the quantity of pluto-nium estimated to be released from the damage scenarios, three estimates are j provided: upper bound, average, and lower bound. The assumptions under which the estimates are made are: e Upper Bound: The upoer bound damage occurs. The stated inventory that can be present is found at each location. 21 O

9 - All areas have a maximum loading, on the average, of surface contamination. All exhaust filters are fully loaded. e Average: . The best estimate damage occurs. The stated inventory at each location is reduced by the fraction of t'ime it is normally found at that location. All locations have a maximum loading, on the average, of surface contamination. All exhaust filters a e fully loaded. e Lower bound:- The lower bound damage occurs No process material is present and the maximum loading, on the average, of surface contamination is found at each location. All exhaust filters are clean. f 22 t e

SOURCE TERM ESTIMATES i In the previous sections of this document, inventories of dispersible materials in various areas, damage levels, fractional airborne releases, and atmospheric exchange rates required to estimate the source terms for the pos-tulated damage scenarios were described. These components are combined in this section with the specific conditions postulated for each hazard to arrive at three source term estimates for each scenario--an upper limit, a best esti-mate, and a lower limit. The estimates are divided into the mass of airborne plutonium particulate material in the respirable size fraction released during five time intervals covering a four-day period. The quantity designated as instantaneous is the mass released from the facility within a few minutes following the hazardous event. The mass estimated in the remaining four time periods comes from two sources--the delayed release of material airborne in enclosures and the resus-pension of dispersible materials exposed to the ambient wind field. Drawings are used to illustrate the type and range of damage that could result in key areas from the scenarios described. The illustrations are not an attempt to show what actually happens--the data available and the state-of-the-art are not sufficient to predict the precise levels of damage that would be inflicted upon each item. Certain details of the facility have been omitted for clarity in the drawings. The discussion is divided into wind and earthquake hazard in order of i increasing severity. f SOURCE TERM ESTIMATES FROM WIND HAZARD Nominal Wind Speed 95 mph, 6 x 10-3/yr probability of occurrence._ e The only significant structural damage inflicted upon the M0P at this wind speed is the loss of the standard-sized door in the east - exterior wall of the area. Air circulating in the vicinity of glbx a damages the exterior filters. The situation is illustrated in Figure 4. l l 23

P - f- ,/ aN-: m '** " >>>> > >>>>>>>,gif DE [c10 0 o 1 ) Il t I ( \\\\, ( \\ 0 \\ \\ dk,.j j \\ 8 \\ }, 1 , h'.. ,c % .f 'iM, =

1. .- $3..%

4 a }k /' /, .g , %y, o - i; .( + p .s __,l 4:.. p$ . ;,? ,r ) .g?"r.l" c ye .e f j #* gw / e. .~ ?h- ,. w: / n GURE 4-Range and W "f Damage Postulated in the MOP Area at a Nominal wind speed of 95 mph l

The exhaust filter is assumed to be damaged (perforated) and instan-taneously releases 1% of the collected particulate material to the area. The remainder of the material accumulated on the filter is entrained at the rate of 10-10/s. Air enters the glove box through the 8-in. by 16-in. openings for the inlet and exhaust air. The calculated velocity of air circulat-ing through the glove box is less than 0.1 mph. Most of the inven-tory at this location is in the form of sintered M0 pellets, which are not considered dispersible. The powder present is grindings in a vacuum cleaner receptacle and is assumed to be unaffected by the occurrence. 2 The interior contaminated surface area in the glove box is 16.7 m 2 and is assumed to be contaminated to a level of 7.5 g powder /m, The total calculated mass of the contamination is 125 g containing 4.4 g Pu. It is assumed that the disturbance to the glove box is equal that incurred during perforation; a resuspension factor of 10-4/m is applied and 4 x 10-5 g Pu are made airborne in the glove box. Afrborne material is released instantaneously to the area. The remaining Pu is assumed to be entrained at rate of 10-10/s by the air circulating through the glove box and released into the air. All released material is assumed to be in the respir-able size range. t Air enters the M0P area at the rate of approximately 14,600 cfm and does not appear to overload the exhaust system. Thus the particu-late material released to the ambient atmosphere around the facility is assumed to pass through a functional exhaust system and is reduced by a factor of 2.5 x 10-7 i The estimated releases from the facility (see Table 1) range from 10-9 to 10-12 g Pu over the four-day period and are reported as less than 10-7 g Pu. Nominal Wind Speed 150 mph, 3 x 10-6/yr probability of occurrence. e In addition to the-damage described for a nominal windspeed of l 25 _.7, m '-*w

of 95 mph, the double doors in the south exterior wall fail and approximately-462,000 cfm of air enters the corridor west of the a CL-MS-PRF area. A' portion of the interior wall is postulated to collapse, crushing one-third of the glove boxes (upper and lower bounds for damage are one-half and one-fifth respectively) within 15 ft of the wall. The calculated average air velocity in the area is approximately 2.5 mph. The situation is illustrated in Figure 5. Since significant damage is postulated for the CL-MS-PRF, the throughput is important because the CL-MS-PRF area is not used for M0 processing under the current process scheme. Furthermore it is postulated that the addition of 480,000 cfm of air exceeds the capa-city of the exhaust system. It is thus assumed for the sake of con-servatism that particulate material released to either area is released to the ambient atmosphere cround the facility unfiltered. The release of particulate material from the M0P area is the same as j at 95 mph except that it is not passed through the exhaust system. l The instantaneous release is based upon the release of 1% of the material accumulated on the filter from glbx 4a and the surface con-3 tamination shaken from interior surfaces during the incident. The time-dependent release is a result of the aerodynamic suspension of particulate materials--accumulated on tFe surface and contaminated surfaces inside glbx 4a--exposed by the incident. f At a design throughput of 72 kg M0/ day, the CL-MS-PRF is assumed to be a single' area with an equipment arrangement that is a mirror image of the MOP area. Equipment holding dispersible forms of plu-tonium that could be affected by the collapse of the west interior wall includes: gibx 4'a, which contains 7.5 g Pu in 213 g MO (swarf) grindings, MO accumulated on the exhaust filter and present as surface ] contamination. - glbx 4'b, which contains M0 accumulated on the exhaust filter and as surface contamination. L' 26 )

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~_ The instantaneous release estimated is the total of the 10% released from each crushed filter (2), the 10-2/m of the surface contamina-q tion made airborne during the crushing of glove boxes, and powder suspended by the event. The time-dependent. airborne release of particulate material is estimated from the material exposed to the wind field in both areas-- powder, particulates accumulated on filters, and surface contamina-tion. The calculated windspeed in both areas is less than 5 mph and a rate of 10-10/s is used. The releases range from 2 x 10-4 to 0.1 g Pu for'the four-day period and were shown in Table 1. Nominal Wind Speed 190 mph. 6 x 10-8/yr probability of occurrence. e A 20 ft section of the south wall ncar the southeast corner col-lapses, causing the collapse of the roof section supporting the wall. Three-quarters of the glove boxes under the roof section (upper. and lower damage bounds are all to one-half respectively) are postulated to be crushed and half of the remaining glove boxes (upper and lower damage bounds are three-quarters to one-third respectively) are assumed to be perforated. All the glove boxes in the MOP, and thus the inventory listed in . Table 2 for 36 kg/ day throughput plus all the material postulated to be present on filters or as surface contamination, are involved. The instantaneous release is the summation of the powder made air-borne in glove boxes by the incident, the material released during the : rush or perforation of filters, and the contamination dislodged from surfaces. For the sake of conservatism, it is assumed that all . particulate material released from filters or from surfaces is in the respirable range. The powder made is assumed to have the same size distribution as other process powders and only 10% is in the respirable range. Two values for the int +antaneous release were shown in Table 1: the mass in the respirable fraction and the total mass released (in parentheses). 28 4

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The time-dependent release is stimated from the total mass of plu-tonium exposed by the incident multiplied by a suspension rate. The wind field in the area exceeds 5 mph.nd a rate of 10-8/s is applied. The types and range of damage are illustrated in Figure 6 and the estimated airborne releases from the facility at this wind speed were listed in Table 1. At the higher design throughput (72 kg/ day), the CL-MS-PRF also con-tains plutonium and damage to that area will contribute to the air-borne release from the facility. Both interior walls (east and west) are postulated to collaps' into the area crushing half of the glove boxes in the area. The upper and lower damage bounds are three-quarters and one-third respectively. The plutonium inventory present in the area is half the quantities listed in Table 2 under case 2. The factors governing the instantaneous and time-dependent airborne releases from the facility are the same as outlined for the M0P area. The combined estimated airborne release (MOP plus CL-MS-PRF area) was shown in Table 1 under case 2. e Nominal Wind Speed 250 mph, 3 x it.,-/yr probability of occurrence. Loss of portions of the south and interior walls causes the roof over the entire high bay area to fall. It is postulated that all the glove boxes in both areas are crushed. The situation is illustrated in Figure 7. The instantaneous release is estimated from the quantity of powder (Pu0 or M0) and surface contam.ination made airborne by the crush-2 ing of glove boxes and the quantity of accumulated particulate mate-rial released by the crushing of the glove box and building HEPA filters. These materials are not directly exposed to the existing wind field since the areas are buried under the debris from the col-lapsing walls and roof. In the absence of a method of predicting the air velocity under the debris, the higher resuspension rates are 30

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applied. The estimated airborne release from the facility for, the two levels of processing was listed in Table 1. SOURCE TERM ESTIMATES FR(N EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE Ground Shaking of less than 0.3 g,10-5/yr probability of occur-e rence at 0.3 g. There is no significcnt effect on the facility. Ground Shaking of 0.3 to 1.0 g, 10-Sor less/yr probability of e occurrence. No significant structural damage resulting in the air-torne release of plutonium is postulated. Concrete damage, yielding of some steel connections, and minor slippage of wall foundation joints may occur. Ground Shaking of 1.0 and Greater, much less tuan 10-5 g/yr proba-e 4 bility of occurrence. As the ground shaking increases beyond 1.0 g, wall slippage increases and, at a level of 1.37 g, roof truss con-nections begin to fail. Somewhere beyond this level, the south wall initiates the collapse of the entire high t ty area..It is estimated that three-quarters of all glove boxes (upper and lower damage bounds are seven-eighths and one-half respectively) are crushed. 4 The situation is illustrated in Figure 8. The basis for estimating tne airborne releases caused by earthquake damage is the same as outlined for a wind speed of 250 mph. In both sce-narios, there is complete collapse of the high bay area where all the e process plutonium is held. The estimated airborne releases from the facility for the two levels of processing are listed in Table 1. 32

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69

REFERENCES Engineering Decision Analysis Company, Inc. (EDAC). 1978. Structural -Condition Documentation for the Exxon Nuclear Company Mixed Oxide Fuel Fab-rication Plants at Richland, Washington. Task 1--Structural Condition. Engineering Decision Analysis Company, Inc., for the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Livermore, California. Engineering Decision Analysis Company, Inc. (EDAC) 1979. Structural Condition Documentation and Structural Capacity Evaluation of Exxon Nuclear Company Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant at Richland, Washington for Earthquake and Flood. Task II--Structural Capacity Evaluation. Vol. I Seismic Evalua-tion. Engineering Decision Analysis Company, Inc., for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Livermore, California 1 Fish, B. R., R. L. Walker, G. W. Royster, Jr, and J. L. Thompson. 1976. "Redispersion of Settled Particles," in Surface Contamination. (B. R. Fish, Ed.), Pergamon Press, New York, pp. 75-81. Fujita, T. T. 1977. P.eview of Severe Weather Meteorology at Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc., Richland, Washington. A report submitted to Argonne National Laboratory under Contract 31.109 38 3731, The University of Chicago, Chicago Illinois. McPherson, R. B., and E. C. Watson. 1979. Environmental Consequences of Postulated Plutonium Releases From the Babcock and Wilcox Plant, Leechburg, Pennsylvania, as a Result of Severe National Phenomena. PNL-2833, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington. Mehta, K. C., D. A. Smith, and J. R. Mcdonald. 1979. Response of Structures to Extreme Wind Hazard at the Exxon Nuclear Company Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabri-cation Plant, Vol I. Institute for Disaster Research, Texas Tech Univer-sity, Lubbock, Texas. Mercer, T. T. 1977. " Matching Sampler Penetration Curves to Definitions of Respirable Fraction." Health Physics. 33 (3):259-264.

Mishima, J., L. C. Schwendiman, and J. E. Ayer.

1978a. Identification of Features Within Plutonium Fabrication Facilities Whose Failure May Have a Significant Effect on Source Term. Features Observed at Exxon Nuclear's Mixed 0xide Fabrication Plant at Richland, Washington. Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington. Mishima, J., L. C. Schwendiman, and J. E. Ayer. 1978b. An Estimate of Airborne Release of Plutonium from Babcock and Wilcox Plant as a Result of Severe Wind Hazard and Earthquake. PNL-2812, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington i 35 i

Mishima, J., L. C. Schwendiman, and J. E. Ayer. 1979. Estimated Airborne Release of Plutonium From Westinchouse Cheswick Site as a Result of Postu-lated Damage From Severe Wind anc Seismic Hazard. PNL-2965, Pacific North-west Laboratory, Richland, Washington. Teknekron Energy Resource Analysts (TERA). 1978. Seismic Risk Analysis for the Exxon Nuclear Plutonium Facility, Richland, Wash;ngton, for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Teknekron Energy Resource Analysis, Berkeley, California. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) 1974. Final Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Mixed Oxide Fabrication Plant Exxon Nuclear Company, Docket No. 70-1257. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Direc-torate of Licensing Regulation, Washington, D.C. t t 36 i \\

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