ML19320B017
| ML19320B017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1980 |
| From: | Bob Fitzpatrick NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19260E332 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-SSINS-6910 NUDOCS 8007090058 | |
| Download: ML19320B017 (2) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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Docket 50-30:
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
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et al
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(Control Buia. ling Proceeding)
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(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
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AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD J. BROEHL i
REGARDING LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 80-07 l
1.
I en employed by Portland General Electric C$mpany (PGE or Licensee) as Assistant Vice President, Generation Engineering-Construction.
I supervise the Generation Engineering-Construction Division which consists of the Generation Engineering, Generation Licensing & Analysis j
and General Construction Departments, each of which has responsibilities related to the reviews, investigations and evaluations performed by PGE in connection with Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 79-15 and 80-07.
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2.
In the course of performing evaluations related to LER 79-15, Licensee's engineers determined that the potential existed for an ambiguous interpretation of design drawing details which describe the. connection of the top of the south wall of the Auxiliary Building (adjacent to column line 55 between column lines F and N) to - the floor slab at Elevation 93 f t.
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The wall and the non-typical configuration of the top-of-wall i
interface are described in more detail in Attachment I to LER 80-07, a copy of which is attached hereto. An inspec-t.on of the top-of-wall interface in the field showed that i
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f AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD J. BROEHL June 16, 1980 Page 2 of 6 the intended connection had not been implemented.
Licensee has attributed the cause of this occurrence to a misinter-pretation of the design drawings and typical details by the construction contractor.
3.
The corrective action designed to restore the structural capability of the Auxiliary Building wall where the initial deficiency was identified, involved making a positive connec-tion between the wall and floor slab with grouted reinforcing steel, and between the wall and adjacent structural steel with through-bolts and structural steel shapes.
This corrective action was completed on June 6, 1980.
4.
Following identification of this deficiency related to the south wall of the Auxiliary Building Licensee initiated an engineering review to determine whether similar deficiencies existed elsewhere in the Plant.
The review identified from design drawings similar non-typical top-of-wall interface conditions where connection requirements were not specifically detailed in the design drawings and where application of typical details could be subject to misinterpretation.
Field examinations of all such interface conditions were then per-formed to determine whether the proper connections had been implement ed. The scope of the review was then expanded to include field examinations of the top-of-wall interface connec-tions of other masonry walls in the Plant to provide assurance that no other incomplete connections exist.
Pursuant to these reviews the top-of-wall interface conditions were examined in the field at all locations where physically possible except for specific areas of high radiation.
These examinations included both sides of the wall and in some cases involved destructive examination. Areas not specifically examined were limited to the interior faces of the filter and demineralizer compartments l
l
f AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD J. BROEHL June 16, 1980 Page 3 of 6 and the speat resin storage tank room.
Since these walls were inspected to assure radiation shielding competency prior to initial start-up, and since we examined the external faces, we determined that the additional radiation exposure to personnel to examine interior faces was not warranted in light of the very low probability that unsatisfactory conditions exist in these locations. We did not physically examine the exterior face of the north wall of the Auxiliary Building, which is not accessible due to the close proximity of the building siding, but we were able to determine that appropriate connections exist by examination of construction photographs.
In addition to the above-described reviews, Licensee requested Bechtel Power = Corporation (Bechtel) to perform a document review of Field Change Requests made during the construction of the Plant in arder to confirm that the design drawings and typical details for the Plant re flect the designs which were approved for construction. These reviews were completed on June 13, 1980. They are described in Supplement 1 to LER 80-07, a copy of which is attached hereto.
5.
These field examinations and expanded reviews identified a number of nonconformances between the connection design details and the field conditions.
The majority of such nonconformances involved minor de fects in workmanship at the top of masonry wall connections for which dry pack grouting was not fully completed. These de fects were largely cosmetic. Although such defects had no structural or safety significance, they have been corrected by the addition of grout in order to make the connection complete in accordance with the design drawings and typical details.
6.
The foregoing reviews and examination identified five walls having nonconformances of potential safety significance, as to four of which corrective action is being taken.
Three of these
f AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD J. BROEHL f
June 16, 1980 Page 4 of 6 walls are in the Fuel Building and two are in the Auxiliary Building.
7 Three of the five nonconformances related to incomplete con-struction. Two of these (Item Nos. I and 2 in Supplement 1 to LER 80-07) involved incomplete grouting from the top of the masonry unit to the floor slab, and they have been corrected by the completion of such grouting.
The third one (Item No. 5 in Supplement 1 to LER 80-07) was an approved Field Change Request that was not implemented. Corrective action for this noncon-formance, which is scheduled for completion on June 18, 1980, consists of providing steel angles on both sides of the wall and through-bolting the angles across the wall cross-section.
8.
The fourth nonconformance (Item No. 3 in Supplement 1 to LER 80-07) related to an interference between reinforcing dowels from the slab above and a steel beam supporting the floor.
The connection was found to be acceptable as constructed, but since it could be restored to full capacity with a reasonable ef fort, corrective action will be provided.
This corrective action, which is scheduled for completion on June 18, 1980, consists of welding dowels to the bottom flange of the beam and grouting the dowel pockets.
9.
The fif th nonconformance (Item No. 4 in Supplement I to LER 80-07) was at a non-typical interface on a minor shear wall in the Fuel Building where the design drawings and typi-cal details may have been misinterpreted with the result that the assumed design interface conditions were not implemented.
As stated in Paragraph 3d of the accompanying af fidavit of Dr. White, the wall has been evaluated and found to have l
adequate capacity to withstand SSE out-of plane loads and its own SSE in plane inertia loads, but not see the SSE in plane
AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD J. BROEHL June 16, 1980 Page 5 of 6 loads predicted by the STARDYNE analyses,which would instead be resisted by adjacent elements.
Since this wall is a north-south wall adjacent to the reinforced concrete CVCS holdup tank enclosure, any limited shear capacity that it provided (previously estimated as 204 kips) would only be a trivial addition to that provided by the holdup tank and spent fuel pool structures.
For this reason, corrective action for this wall, which would be very difficult to perform, would not be purposeful or warranted. The wall will not be considered to contribute to the seismic resistance of the Complex.
10.
In addition to the nonconformances described above, in the course of its investigation Licensee determined that a portion of the N-line wall in the Control Building that was modeled as a lintel above the doorway into the counting room at Eleva-tion 45 ft is a penetration for ventilating ducts for the counting room.
The impact of this opening on the seismic capability of this wall is described in Dr. White's affidavit.
Since the wall was constructed as designed and is capable of resisting an SSE event in its as-built condition no correction action is necessary.
11.
The results of the engineering evaluations of the foregoing conditions are described in Dr. White's affidavit which con-cludes, among other things, that the reductions in capacity are insignificant and the effects on distribution of loads and on floor response spectra, are negligible.
12.
All of the above-described corrective actions are scheduled for completion by June 18, 1980, and in any event, will be l
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r AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD J. BROEHL June 16, 1980 Page 6 of 6 completed prior to the resumption of power operations.
I, Donald J. Broehl, being first duly sworn, state that I have reviewed the forejoing affidavit, and that the statements contained therein are true an<t correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
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N Donald J. Broehl STATE OF OREGON
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County of Multnomah )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of June 1980.
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Notary Publ of Oregon My Commission Expires:
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LER 80-07 Design Descriotion of k'all on Column Line 55 The south wall of the Auxiliary Building along column line 55 and between Elevations 45 ft. and 61 ft. is of co=posite construction with reinforced concrete core between two wythes of reinforced grouted masonry. This portion of the vall, which encases the structural steel frasing systa=,
was considered as a shear wall in the original design and, accordingly, the reinforcing steel arrange =ent was shown on the Civil drawings. The upper elevations of the wall from Elevations 61 ft. to 93 ft. were not considered as a shear wall in the original design of the Control-Auxiliary-Fuel Building Co= plex and are of 12-inch thick standard weight reinforced grouted =asonry. This single wythe wall is different from other walls in the Cosplex in that it is offset with respect to the steel fra=ing system, and therefore the reinforcing steel in the wall is not interrupted at intersecting colu=n lines and floor elevations. Details on the Civil drawings show the dowels for the slab-wall connections at Elevation 61 ft. and Elevation 77 ft. along colu=n line 55.
The detail of the connec-tion on the Civil drawings does not show how the slab-wall connection at Elevation 93 ft. is to be made. To deter =ine this, one must refer to the typical details and notes on Architectural drawings which specify that all concrete block walls which extend from floor slab to floor slab shall be connected by dowels to match the wall reinforce =ent.
In the particular connection at Elevation 93 f t. this interface had an interference with a 10-in. steel siding support channel at the base of the insulated siding from above and an adjacent structural steel floor beam. The nature of this structural fra=ing detail coupled with the absence of a specific dowel detail on the Civil drawing caused the ambiguity that we believe led to the non-confor:ance.
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l LER 80-07 Attach =ent 1 Page 2 of 2 As-Suilt Condition of 12-in. Masonry 'Jall on Colu=n Line 55, Between F and N, at the Elevation 93 ft. Slab Interface The as-built configuration of the 12-in. =asonry wall interf ace with the Elevation 93 ft. reinforced concrete slab and adjacent steel ele =ents is shown in Figure A1.
The masonry wall was constructed after the structural steel fra=ing, reinforced concrete slab, and siding support framing were completed. The interference cf the 10-in. siding support channel with the continuation of the =asonry vythe is apparent from Figure A1.
Detailed inspection of the interf ace could not be perfor=ed from either inside or outside of the Auxiliary Building without special techniques because of the difficult access. However, with use of mirrors and remote camera photographs, the as-built condition at the top of the wall was deter =ined.
For
'h of the wall from about 3 ft. west of colu=n west of colu=n line F (approxi=ately 56 ft.) it was line L to about.
4.
observed that the wall casonry was terminated at the standard course dimension which is approxi=ately 3-1/2 in. below the bottom of the siding support channel. No reinforcing steel dowels were observed projecting down from the reinforced concrete slab to =atch with the =asonry rein-forcing spacing, no =asonry reinforcing projected above the top of the masonry, and no lateral ties were observed between the masonry and adjacent structural steel beam. The top-of-wall closure was finished to the underside of the siding support channel with cut sec: ions of masonry block mortared to the top of the wall and finished on the exterior with mortar.
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For the length of wall from about 3 f t, west of column line L to colu=n 4
line N (approxi=ately 16 f t.), the contain=ent airlock access slab extends I
over the =asonry wall.
In this length of wall, the existence of rein-forcing steel dowels fre= the slab into the wall was confirmed by visual I
,observation af ter removal of some of the mortar with a pneumatic chipping tool.
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