ML19319C126
| ML19319C126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1977 |
| From: | Roe L TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 290, NUDOCS 8001310486 | |
| Download: ML19319C126 (3) | |
Text
HRCronM 195 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISSl!N ooc E T NUMg(o 3't (2?st y
NRC DISTRIBUTION Fon PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL TO:
FROM:
DATE oF DOCUMENT Toledo Edison Company 6/1/77 Mr. John F. Stolz Toledo, Ohio o47e ngegiveo 6/6/77 Lowell E. Roe R
ONOTonl2EO PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER oF COPIES RECEIVED MNCLAS$1FIE D Ricin AL CCOPv
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$ /GmA)$b OESCRIPTioN ENCLoSU RE Amdt. to OL/ change to tech specs..
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Dear Mr. Stolz:
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The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications require that all containment isolation valves be operable prior to entering Mode 4, which requires that all applicable surveillance testing be performed prior to entering Mode 4.
The Atmospheric Vent Valves ICS llA and ICS llB could be damaged when tested in Mode 5 without steam flow as described in the attached safety evaluation.
It is, therefore, requested that a footnote be added to the bottom of Page 3/4 6-22 of the Technical Specifications to apply to valves ICS 11A and ICS 113 to read as follows:
The surveillance requirements for this valve is not required prior to entering Mode 4, but is required prior to entering Mode 3.
This change is urgently requested to permit continued progression of startup testing and your prompt action is requested.
Yours very truly, s
LER.r
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l Attachment j
Safety Evaluation l
l THE TOLECC EC!SCN COMPANY ECISCN PLAZA 3CC MACISCN AVENUE TCLECO. CMO 43S52
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DB-1 i
SAFETY EVALUATION FOR t
1 REQUESTED CHANGE TO THE DB NPS UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i
i (App. A to License No. NPF-3) t The following footnote should be added to Table 3.6-2 of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications to allow valves LCS llA and ICS 11B to be tested with steam flow through the valve:
i The surveillance requirements for this valve is not required prior to entering Mode 4, but is required prior to entering Mode 3.
4 Steam flow through ICS 11A and ICS 11B is desired whenever the valve is opened to prevent particles which could be dislodged from the components above the valve from falling on the seat, thereby damaging the sealing i
surtcas when the valve is closed.
I ICS llA and ICS llB would be closed at all times in Mode 4 except for surveillance testing, which is desired to be performed in Mode 4.
The j
highest primary system temperature allowed in Mode 4 is 2800 F, which corresponds to a steam generator secondary side saturation pressure of 49.18 psia. The lowest pressure for which these valves would be opened in service is much higher (about 900 psia). Thus, containment isolation j
testing of these valves in Mode 4 would assure that their containment isolation function is operable before it is required operable for the I
safety analysis, i
l i
June 1, 1977 4
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