ML19318C578

Forwards Response to IE Bulletin 80-06, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls. Re-review of All safety- Related Components Affected by Safety Features Actuation Sys Shows That Reset Will Not Remove Component from Safe Mode

ML19318C578
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	06/13/1980
From:	Crouse R TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8007020040
Download: ML19318C578 (3)

Text

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O TOL EDO EDISON Docket No. 50-346 RicHano P. CaouSE vce p, set

%ceae License No. NPF-3 m 92 259 seat Serial No. 1-134 June 13, 1980 Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Director, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcenent U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter is in response to IE Bulletin No. 80-06, dated March 13, 1980. The response attached addresses the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) and other Safety Related Systems reset controls as it relates to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1.

Very truly yours,

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Louis Reyes, NRC Site Inspector 2.

NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement l

Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Washington, D.C.

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db x/32 THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY EDISON PLAZA 300 MADISON AVENUE TOLEDO, OHIO 43652 8007020040 Q

h Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 i,

f S2 rial No. 1-134-June 11, 1980 ATTACHMENT 1 NRC IE BULLETIN 80-06 RESPONSE a the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions Itsm 1.

Rev.

at the schematic level to determine whether or not upon the reset of an ESF actuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.

After re-reviewing at the schematic / elementary level all safety related R:sponse:

components affected by the Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) and the Reactor Protection System (RPS), we have confirmed that a reset alone will not automatically remove any component from the required safety position.

Another safety related system is the Steam & Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS). The SFRCS is an automatic self-resetting system whose purpose is to ensure an adequate feedwater supply to the NSSS steam gener-ator to remove reactor decay heat during periods when the normal feedwater supply and/or electrical power supply to the essential auxiliaries is not available.

In the event of a main feedwater line rupture, the SFRCS will align the auxiliary feedwater system to the un-affected steam generator.

This is accomplished by suitably controlling the steam inlet valves and discharge valves associated with the auxiliary feedwater pumps (see FSAR Section 7.4.1.3).

Once the rupture condition for the affected steam generator has been corrected, the valving will automatically realign both steam generators with the associated auxiliary feedwater lines.

Item 2.

Verify the actual installed instrumentation and controls at the facility are consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conducting a test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuating signal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or actuation signals. Provide a schedule for the performance of the testing in your response to this Bulletin.

The SFAS has been previously tested during the initial system testing Rssponse:

during start up, while the RPS and SFRCS have undergone similar testing.

All tests have confirmed our findings.

Item 3.

If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed system modification, design change, or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.

As noted in Item 1 the concerns of this bulletin do not apply to the R2sponse:

SFRCS. Our review indicated that in the SFAS and RPS all safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode upon reset of the ESF or Reactor Trip Signal. From the above review no corrective action is necessary.

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'c SUBMITTAL FOR THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-3 IN RESPONSE TO A 10 CFR 50.54(f)

REQUEST DATED MARCH 13, 1980 This response is filed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f) relating to Mr. James G. Keppler's letter of March 13, 1980. This deals with engineered safety features reset controls.

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Vice President, Nuclear Sworn to and subscribed before me the 13th day of June, 1980.

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LINDA ' CN Notary Pue:2 st de j '.

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My Commission Exp'res Feb. 9 'f6L 1

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