ML19318C422

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Submits Info Re 800624 Radiation Exposure in Excess of Permissible Limits.During Routine Containment Entry to Effect Repairs to E Drive,Repair Team Withdrew Severed Drive Cable W/Incore Detector.Contamination within Limits
ML19318C422
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/25/1980
From: Zulla S
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
IP-JJK-9089, NUDOCS 8007010452
Download: ML19318C422 (2)


Text

1 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK -

INDIAN POINT NO. 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT P. O. sox 215 8UCHAN AN. N. Y.10511 TELEPHONES 914 739.8200 8 June 25, 1980 IP-JJK-9089 lbcket No. 50-286 License No. DPR-64 '

Boyce H. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatorv Comission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

his letter is being provided to you for informaticn concerning a radiation exposure in access of permissible limits which occured at the Indian Point 3 facility on Tuesday, June 24. Subsequent investigation has determined that these exposures are below that which require 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> notification in compliance with section 20.403 of the Court of Federal Regulations.

During the tronthly incore flux inspection performed on June 17, 1980, a problem was encountered with E drive detector. Information available to the cperator indicated that the detector was stuck between the bottm of the core and the 10 path selector located at approximately the 70' elevation of containment. Ch June 24, 1980, a routine containment entry was made to effect repairs to E drive. This one week delay in repairs  !

was planned to allow the incore detector and cable ample time to decay 1 off. Upcn investigation it was determined the problem was caused by a i severed drive cable and the repair team proceeded to manually (hand over hand) withdraw the detector as they had previously done on several other occasions. As in the past the Health Physics Tectinician was mnstantly I rronitoring the radiation fields as the detector was removed. As the detector @proached the drive units, the radiation fields increased to I approximately 2 rerrVhr. his was consistent with prior experience and I l

everything appeared normal. At this point the last section of the cable and detector were renoved and the radiation fields increased rapidly.

Se detector was imediately placed in the lead storage pig and the remaining cable cut and placed in poly bags. Se Health Physics Technician determined that the radiation fields had increased to approximately 200 rent /hr. We repair personnel imediately exited the containment. Upon leaving the containment the Watch Health Physics Technician was notified of the problem. Surveys indicated that the men were internally and externally contaminated. All external contamination was removed. Internal contamination was measured to be within allowable body burden. Se film badges were imediately sent out for processing Y and the initial results are as follows:

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I & C 61 gama 4060 nrem beta 4050 mrem I & C #2 gama 4140 mrem beta 2930 mrem H. P. ganta 1290 mrem beta 2500 mrem Investigaticn into this matter is continuing and you will be kept informed of all results and developments.

S. . Zulla Resident Manager JJK:dp cc: Director of !K1 clear Reactor Regulation (2 copies)

Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, D. C. 20555 Resident Inspector T. Rebelowski i

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