ML19318A754
| ML19318A754 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1979 |
| From: | Chin R NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006240112 | |
| Download: ML19318A754 (5) | |
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NOV 3 01979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Files FROM:
Robert Chin Consultant, NRC TMI Special Inquiry Staff
SUBJECT:
INTERVIEW WITH GOVERNOR THORNBURGH AND LT. GOVERN 0R SCRANTON At.1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> on 23 November 1979, Mr..Mitchell Rogovin interviewed Pennsylvania.
Governor Richard Thornburgh and Lt. Governor William Scranton in Harrisburg on certain aspects of the TMI accident. Also present were NRC/SIG members Malcolm Ernst and Robert Chin. The following, based on notes, is not a verbatim account of the interview and is presented in a colloquy form in an attempt to capture the essence of the interview.
Rogovin: The purpose of this interview is to seek your comments on a few points relating to the accident, as it could be inappropriate to publish a report on TMI without them. The first question concerns your decision not to accept the recommendation of the NRC on Friday morning to evacuate.
Governor:
It is important to remind you that from the onset of the accident, we cross-checked all information before we made decisions on emergency responses.
For example, early on we used NRC officers Higgins and Gallina to cross-check information we were getting from other sources.
I was told by Henderson at 8:45 a.m. that NRC had recommended evacuation and that the official making the recommendation was Doc Collins, I did not know Collins and neither did Henderson.
Rogovin:
But Collins,was known by reputation to Henderson as a reliable person.
Governor: Yes, but he was not known to us and we wanted to check him out before moving people. So we asked NRC officer Karl Abraham who was working outside in my press officer's space.
He equivocated and said he did not think Collins had the authority to recommend evacuation. 'Our information didn't support a need to evacuate so I put a call through to Hendrie. He didn't think evacuation was necessary, but did suggest people should stay indoors.
Rogovin:
So you think that the persen making the recommendation should be so identified. Would it have helped if Hendrie had called earlier to say if something should happen, so-and-so will be calling the stat.e?
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NOV 3 01979 Fh 2-Governon-:
It was no bother that Hendrie hadn't called earlier, but it would have helped if someone had walked into my office earlier saying, I'm so-and-so, if there is any need for emergency response, I will be calling you.
Now, if NRC called Gerusky (BRP) and Gerusky recommerded evacuation to me, I would have done so. After I talked to Hendrie, I had to go on the radio around 10:25 a.m. to scotch the rumors about evacuation.
Points of. authority for making recomenda-tions must be established, but provisions for verification should be included.
Rogovin: Your decision not to evacuate was based on the fact that radiation levels did not so warrant, but what about uncertainty of the plant condition.
Governor:
In my later phone conversation with Hendrie, I cross-examined him about what was the worst case, how much lead time. When Denton arrived,.I pushed him on the bubble.
Denton said bubble problems werc days away; even the possibility of meltdown was days off - any threshold would still give us at least eight hours to evacuate. With regard to radiation health matters, there should have been a state doctor who could speak the language and who knew the players in NRC.
Rogovin: One of our thoughts was to place a FEMA representative in the EMT to make evacuation recommendations.
Lt. Governor:
I'm not certain FEMA is qualified to make such a recommendation.
We would want someone who was a radiation and nuclear engineering expert to make the recomendation.
Governor: We would also expect that that someone would know what county Harrisburg is in.
I want to underscore the excellent supportive help we received from Adamcik (FDAA) and McConnell (DCPA).
In Pennsylvania, PEMA's role is to manage the emergency, not to recommend evacuation.
PEMA mentality was akin to being all dressed up with no place to go; leaning forward in the trenches.
We had to be careful about that attitude.
Rogovin: Were economic considerations a factor in evacuation decision-makin.g?
avernor: My paramount concern was always the health and safety of the people.
The question of who pays was never a concern; someone will pay the bill.
Rogovin: What about a declaration of emergency?
Governor: My concern was being careful not to unnecessarily raise the level of anxiety. My staff was involved with Jack Watson (WH) to ascertain if we would get all the help needed without such a declaration 'and was so assured.
Rogovin: But another governor in a similar circumstance would be in a quandry about the extent of federal help in the future.
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Governor: You are right. The question should never come up.
Even if Watson said no help without a declaration of emergency, I still wouldn't have made such a declaration at that time.
It should be recognized in a nuclear emergency, federal help 'is not dependent on a declaration of emergency.
Rogovin: What about the matter of K.I?
Governor:
I'm not an expert on KI. Our Health Secretary at the time made a very good case about not distributing the material.
I urge you to read his testimony on.the subject. My own views were that the levels of radiation had not yet arrived, there was some question of the duration of its effectiveness, it might be used up before there was a real need, aad I was concerned about the psychological ~ impact of its distribution.
Here was another unknown added to a lot of unknowns insofar as the populace was concerned.
Denton agreed to the possible pinic effect of the distribution of bottles of KI with instructions l
to take this when the cloud is over you.
By the way, some of the KI came in wrong size bottles and wrong size droppers.
I *elieve some public education is needed in this area; otherwise, its another mystery.
I also feel that KI should be available on a standby basis near nuclear plants.
Rogovin: Did you visit the plan,t?
Governor: You know that Bill Scranton visited the plant on Thursday.
I wanted him to see whether there was any panic at the plant.
He reported to me that the plant operators were going about their business in a calm manner.
I wanted also to underscore Scranton's role as the emergency manager. Of course, there was also the public relations aspect of the visit.
Rogovin:
But you didn't make the visit.
Governor:
I visited the plant on Sunday with the President.
Rogovin: Why did the President visit the TMI plan,t?
Governor:
By Sunday the situation was not serious. There was no danger to him.
His visit showed that the situation was not dangerous. Late Saturday night, the people were edgy over the bubble explosion story. My announcement that the President would be visiting the next day had a calming effect.
Rogovin:
Could the visit be seen as underplaying the danger?
Governor: No. The visit was welcome by us and was a very positive thing.
Rogovin: With regard to media, we are going only.to the water's edge and examining only what was said by the parties involved. We will not be examining the media's response. Do you have any comments on the media?
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Files 4-NOV 3 01979 Governor:
I have a lot of sympathy for the press at the time. They were in the same boat as.we were, trying to get the facts. Two stories out of Washington were very troublesome for us.
They were the meltdown story on Friday and the bubble explosion story on Saturday. We were accused of news management with the arrangement whereby Denton would talk about the technical aspects and I would talk about emergency management. We tried never to tell more than we knew and to avoid trouble with the press by checking out our facts before we met with them. When we were wrong, we said so as we did several times.
It was important that we remain credible. State agencies were explicitly instructed not to comment on plant status to the press.
From the press's point of view, we were the only game in town and it worked out 0.K.
The next time, we can't do it because the press would be more expert on nuclear accidents and would not be satisfied with a limitation on sources.
It's a reporters job to seek out as many sources as possible.
Rogovin: Were you in touch with Met Ed's management?
Governor: Met Ed lost their credibility early.
Rogovin: Perhaps it~was a guod thing that they lost it quickly.
Governor: Yes, it was better that they lost their credibility earlier than later.
I wouldn't want to lose credibility by appearing with them.
You can't have Met Ed out front in a public information situation.
Lt. Governor: There is this instinctive distrust of a utility in accident i
situation.
Governor: Credibility is very important in an accident.
In dealing with the press, you can't have a technical guy do it. Denton was one of those rare guys.
Gallina sent a shudder through us when said on Thursday night that the danger offsite was over.
Rogovin: In our inquiry, we have noted there is tension between PUC's, utilities and NRC. An example could be the matter of goldplating a valve or rush to com-pletion to meet tax deadlines.
Governor:
I'm not certain there.wasn't some implication in Met Ed's rush to complete in December 1978. However, I'm not an expert on PUC's and really can't comment..I agree with you, and your experience with the IRS would qualify you to note the artificiality of tax deadlines.
Rogovin: A final question. With the country ' facing a difficult energy situation, wouldn't you consider it appropriate to place the NRC within the administration so the President can more effectively deal with national energy strategies?
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I think I'm the wrong witness for that question.
Rogovin: What if you were Presiden,t?
Governor: Well, you know there is a sort of a defacto moratorium on new plants.
But, there's the question of those already in operation and those under construction.
We can't rule out the nuclear option, but the industry must earn back credibility.
The NRC and the industry must enhance public confidence in nuclear power.
That's about how I feel about the subject.
Rogovin: Thank you Governor and Lt. Governor for sharing your thoughts with us this morning.
Governor: Let u. know if we can be of any more help to you.
Whereupon the interview was adjourned at 12:15 p.m.
A,5 Robert Chin Consultant
.,DeYoung R.
cc:
- y. Cornell F. Miraglia R. Bernero R. Haynes W. Johnston i'. Norry M. Ernst
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