ML19318A592

Responds to IE Bulletin 80-06, Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Reset Controls. Mod to Control Circuit of Steam Line Drain Isolation Valves Will Be Completed Before Conclusion of Next Refueling Outage in 1981

ML19318A592
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	06/13/1980
From:	Christensen S, Lentsch J PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8006230423
Download: ML19318A592 (3)

Text

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be: Mescrs. William;/Lindb1cd, Gcodwin, Durham, Haidar, Yundt, L;ntsch, Zimmerman, Christtnstn, Gsidos, Sullivan, L. Dam:n (Bschtsi), L. Cunningham (W), L. Weislogal (PP&L),

D. Axtoll (EWEB), R. Nyltnd (BPA), M. Axelecd, C. Tramm*ll, M. Malmros, LIS, Reading File, TNP: GOV REL F:NRC,IE Bulletins, Chrono

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OcnacJ SrceN Ass.s: ant Vice Presced June 13, 1980 Trojan Nuclear Plant Docket 50-344 License NPF-1 Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza 1990 N. California Blvd.

Walnu't Creek, CA 94596

Dear Sir:

Your letter of March 13, 1980 issued IE Bulletin 80-06 regarding the potential for and effects of position changes of safety-related equip-ment upon reset of the ESF actuation signal. We have reviewed the subject Bulletin and its applicability to the Trojan plant and provide the following information:

NRC Position 1 Review the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions at the schematic level to determine whether or not, upon the reset of an ESF actuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.

PGE Response 1 A detailed review of the schematic diagrams has been conducted for the safety-related equipment which receives an ESF actuation signal. The review was performed by a relay-by-relay analysis of the slave relays of the Solid State Protection System and the auxiliary safeguard relays.

As a result of this review, it was concluded that, with the exception of one case which is described in Item 3 below, all safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuation signal or manual reset of the actuation signal. Therefore, the concern j00j raised in the subject Bulletin is not applicable to the ESF systems at Trojan.

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Portland General BectricCG*r=1y Mr. R. H.-Engelken June 13, 1980 Page 2

.NRC Position 2 Verify the actual installed instrumentation and controls at the facility

'are consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conduct-ing a test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuation signal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or actuation signals. Provide a schedule for the performance of the testing in your response to this Bulletin.

PCE Response 2 4

A test to verify that the installed instrumentation and controls are consistent with the review of the schematic diagrams and to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal or manual resetting of the various actuation signal will be conducted during the next refueling outage which is currently scheduled for the spring of 1981. The necessary procedures for this test are expected to be com-plete by the end of October 1980. Since this test requires a sufficient length of time due to the large number of relays involved, its imple-mentation during the 1981 scheduled refueling outage is considered to be a most practical and feasible approach.

NRC Position 3.

If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed system modification, design change or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.

PGE Response 3 As discussed above in PGE Response 1, all safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal, except for the steam line drain valves. The steam line drain isolation valves, CV2294, CV2295, CV2296 and CV2297, will open when the steam line iso-lation signal is removed if control switch CV2294/CS is in the NORMAL af ter OPEN position. Control switch CV2294/CS will be in the NORMAL after OPEN position only when the steam line drain valves were previously in the open position. These valves are open briefly during startup of the Plant to drain moisture fran the steam line.

A design change will be made to the control circuit of these steam line drain isolation valves to require a separate positive action by the

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operator to reopen these valves when the stean line isolation signal is removed. The isolation signal will be sealed-in by adding an electric reset latching relay in the control circuit to keep the valves closed v-

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P Portland General BechicConpuyr Mr. R. H. Engelken June 13, 1980 Page 3 until the operator physically turns the control switch to the open position.

It is anticipated that this modification will be completed before the conclusion of the next refueling outage in 1981.

In the meantime, before completion of the hardware change, adequate administrative controls already exist at the Trojan plant. The Trojan General Operating Instruction, G01-2, " Plant Startup From Hot Standby to Power Operation", specifically instructs the operator to close the steam line drain isolation valves at approximately 15 percent load, which in turn will set the control switch CV2294/CS in the NORMAL after CLOSE position.

Sincerely, DJB/

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Mr. Lynn Frank, Director State of Oregon

{'J.W.Lentsch Department of Energy Director

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Office of Inspection and l

Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission S. R. Christensen Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Subscribed and sworn to before me M

this 13th day of June 1980.

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