ML19318A218
| ML19318A218 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/06/1980 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8006180635 | |
| Download: ML19318A218 (28) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
MEETING WITH NRC CHAIRMAN JOHN F. AHEARNE
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3 AND OTHER NRC COMMISSIONERS s
4 Room 1046 5
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Friday, June 6, 1980 ine Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 1:30 8 p.m. before:
9 Dr. J.
Carson Mark, Presiding 10 Myer' Bender 11 Jesse Ebersole 12 Stephen Lawroski 13 William M.
Mathis (E5
-v 14 Dade W.
Moeller 15 David Okrent 16 Jeremiah J. Ray 17 Paul G. Shewmon 18 Chester P. Siess 19 Harold Eterington 20 James M.
Jacobs 21 Raymond F. Fraley 22 Richard Savio 23 24 ALSO PRESENT:
25 John H.
Ahearne
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1 PR0CEEDINGS 2
DR. PLESSET:
Let's reconvene.
There will be some
($h other members of the Commission here shortly, but there is a tight schedule, so' Chairman Ahearne has asked that we 5 proceed.
6 You all have his memo regarding some specific 7 questions on-siting and he is interested in the Committee's 8 response.
8 Before we go into general discussion, there are 10 two members who have been warned to speak.
They are Dade Il Moeller and Dave Okrent, and then we'll go to a more 12 1
disorganized session.
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Dade, would you begin?
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DR. MOELLER:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
15 For purposes of the record, the first question 16 was, "should the present policy of permitting plant-specific 17 design features to compensate for unfavorable site 18 characteristics be continued or should site approval be 19 independent of plant' design considerations?"
Well, I'll speak in a sense for myself and then, 21 as you say, Dr. Okrent will follow.
But in looking at this
- particular question, my reaction was that the favorable U conditions for operation of a facility or nuclear power
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In other words, you need both.
2 Now, of course, unfavorable site characteristics 3
can and have been compensated for through engineered safet-/
4 features but I believe there must be limits, both on how 5 many undesirable features you can have in your site and how 6 many undesirable features you can have in your plant.
- And, 7 as Dr. Okrent will say in a few minutes, we both agree and 8 believe, and most people would agree with us,'the tendency 8
of 10 CFR Part 100 went too far.
10 That'is, it permitted engineered safety features Il to be used to compensate for what perhaps should have been 12 callec truly undesirable site features which never should 13 have been accepted in any circumstance.
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34 And so I would suggest that we take an approach in 15 which we set minimum criteria for site characteristics and 16 minimum criteria for certain plant features and you might 17 even set these in such a manner that if you put the plant 18 with all of the minimum features within it on the site that 19 barely meets all of the minimum criteria, the combination 20 might not even be acceptable.
21 In other words, there would be a gray area in 22 between the two, an uncovered area in which you would either 23 have to improve the site or improve the plant in order to
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25 I think with those remarks I will cease and turn ih w
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2 DR. OKRENT:
uet me repeat the question, because
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It says,5Should the present policy of permitting 5 plant specific design features to compensate for unfavorable 6 site characteristics be continued?"
Then there is an 7 alternate part.
8 Well, I assume by that the term present policy 8 means what is required because of 10 CFR 100 and the 10 assumptions that are made in access analysis and the Il guidelines that result from this.
12 7,m against continuing that policy because l think 13
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i 15 thought to be a simple way when it was developed.
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I think it has been clear for a long time that-it 17 really is not'a suitable way to allow for differences in 18 demography, that if you're going to allow for differences in 18 demography you should do it as well as you can on some kind 20 of probablistic basis that allows for the full spectrum of 21 accidents and tries to deal with it that way.
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So I wouldn't, therefore, be in favor of 23 continuing the present policy to compensate for unfavorable
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However, I wouldn't rule out the i
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6 DR. MOELLER:
I would suggest we go ahead with 7
questions two and three and then discuss all of them, 8 because they are intertwined.
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Did you want to make your comment now, Bill?
10 MR. KERR:
I just wanted to say it seems to me Il that 10 CFR 100 does the compensation referred to primarily 12 in terms'of individual risk and does not really take into 13 account demography except in so far as it might be implied
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14 in the ability to evacuate.
15 And the compensation which permits one to trade 16 off between engineering safeguards and sites in so far as 17 individual risks it seems to me is reasonable, up to a point.
18 It is the inability to consider specifically I8 population density, it seems to me, is one of the flaws in 20 part 100.
21 DR. OKRENT:
Well, if I can comment, I think in 22 terms of individual risks, it does not do it because the 23 choice of accidents is too arbitrary.
U 24 DR. SIESS:
It only works with the DVH.
25 DR. MOELLER:
Question number two is, "In
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kI 1 consideration of acceptable risks to the public in reactor 2 siting decisions, should they be based primarily on the g-3 risks to the maximally exposed individual, or on the overall 4 risk to the expose.d population."
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5 Again here, I believe that -- or at least my 6 opinion is -- that the acceptable risk for the population 7 must include limits for the individual risk, of the risk to 8 the maximum individual, as well as limits in terms of the 9 population as a whole.
10 Both are important in terms of the guides.
The 11 individual limit would perhaps prevail in a sparsely 12 populated area whereas the collective dose limit for the 13 population would apply to a more densely populated area.
F 14 This leads in, though, to another aspect that in 15 order to quantify these limits -- that is, what should the 1611mit be for the individual or for ite population -- as well 17 to set the acceptable characteristics for a site, and for a 18 plant and for a combination, in oroer to do this, you need a 19 quantitative safety goal -- or, in other words, an 20 acceptable risk for the population.
21 Then.you could use this as a yardstick to evaluate Z2the acceptability of your site, the acceptability of your 23 plant, and the acceptability of the combination.
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24 In thinking through this, I found myself a little 25 bit amazed in that we already have some guides, or some help
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3 gg The current occupational dose limit is five rems 4 per year.
The old, Federal Radiation Council, the ICRP and T.
5the NCRP had always said.for a number of years that the 6 maximally exposed individual in the general population 7 should never receive more than 10 percent 'of the worker dose 8 limit, so it's a half of a rem per year for that individual.
9 And then the statisticians have told us that if 10 the maximum dose to any individual in a population group is 11 a half of a rem per year, the average to that population 12 group will come out about one-third of that value, and 13 that's where you get the old 170 millirem per year, the old
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14 Federal Radiation's Council's guide.
15 Keeping those numbers in mind, unit dose for the 16 worker,10 percent ~of that for the individual, and 3 percent 17 of that worker limit for the population as a whole, then you 18 can pick up with the latest ICRP recommendations in ICRP 26 19 which says that their goal is the risk of death to the 20 radiation worker from radiation exposure is no greater than 21 the risk suf fered by a person working in a safe industry --
22 meaning electronics, or -- or not mining, but some 23 relatively safe industry.
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2 If you say then we're going to limit the worker to 4
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5 then the average to the general population would be three 6 times 10-6 So you have risk numbers already provided to 7 you -- not that you have to accept them, but I was a little 8 amazed that we have them.
9 Now, I must point out that those numbers are for 10 routine operations, normal situation -- not an emergency --
11 and in general, as an emergency, as a matter of historical 12 policy, we've al. ready allowed a little higher risk for an 13 emergency than for a routine operation.
14 Well, let's say you don't do that.
15 These numbers, in my opinion, wouldn't be too bad 16 as a start in terms of a quantitative goal.
In other words, 17 you would design a reactor and place it on a site so that 18 the risk to the maximally exposed individually would be no 19 more than 10-5 per year and for the general population, l
20 three times 10-6, 21 DR. PLESSET:
Anyone want to add to Dade's remarks?
22 Dave, did you want to comment on this point?
23 DR. OKRENT:
Well, I agree that you should treat
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24 acceptable risks in terms of both the maximally exposed 25 individual and the overall risk to the population and I' s
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3 In other words, a large area of fertile land or a 4 major source of water, or something.
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DR. SIESS':
I really have a qu.stion to Dade as to 6 what he said.
7 Did you really mean that the risk has been taken 8 as higher for an emergency, or simply the dose been taken 9 higher?
10 You see, the emergency is less probable than the 11 certainty of routine.
12 DR. MOI.LLER:
I'm not sure of the answer to your 13 question.
Certainly the old dose numbers were higher, and 14 so I presume, in a sense, the risk for that one year, that I
15 one event, would be higher.
j 16 DR. MARKS:
Dose is a consequence; risk has got V7 probability, and emergencies aren't constant, continual.
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18 DR. SHEWMON:
I think is the same point.
19 I believe that the framework you described, Dade, 20 sounds as if it could provide something usable and in the 21 understandable range, but one is not associating the dose 22 with the maximum per year.
23 That, in itself, is 10 or so, and we really
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24 have a smaller number than the ones you mentioned.
25 DR. MARKS:
10-per year?
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DR. SHEWMON:
I just picked a number.
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MR. LEWIS:.0bviously the probabilities do have to 3 be combined with the dosages because for any dosage there is 4 some probability thgt it will come about however how you l
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6 It is amusing that in our conversation with the f
7 French last week, they said that they had a standard in 8 which they defined a serious accident as an accident 9 independent of the demography in which an individual at the 10 plant boundary received 10 rem, period.
That's the 11 definition of a serious accident and their quantitative 12 safety objective was that the probability of that accident 13 should be less than 10 per year for the reactor.
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14 That was the quantitative criterion they set.
It 151s at least straightforward.
16 We pointed out that they couldn't implement it 17 because you can.'t, ycu know, calculate the prooabilities as 18 well and they said oh, well, where we can, we do, but at 19 least they --
20 (Laughter) 21 MR. LEWIS:
At least they had confronted the 22 relationship between the dosage at the plant boundary and 23 the probability and they said they did it as well as they h
24 could, and they specifically ignored demography.
25 DR. MOELLER:
The third question was, "Is it G
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7 In response to this question, again trying to 8 express my own opinion and tne best blending of those with j
9 whom I discussed the subject, I would hope that we would be 10 able to set. measurable site characteristics and to set these 11 independent of the facility.
Again, if we have a 12 quantitative safety goal or an acceptable risk for the 13 population, this should assist us in setting criteria for a
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14 number of factors related to the sites, such as meterology, 15 hydrology, geology, seismology and so forth.
16 And we also tnink that if the site meets these 17 minimum criteria, whatever they are that we ultimately 18 develop, then that site is acceptable, again in terms of 19 being used with a plant and hopefully meeting the 20 quantitative risk goals or safety goals that you assess.
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You have to 23 consider what kind of an accident and what kind of a plant i
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Iand that the accident scenarios would include up to Class 9, 2 including core melt.
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Land use is another thing that you would have to 4 look at.
There are any other features in terms of the 5 site, just trying to expand it a little bit, and you must 6 consider the impact of the loss of the of that land in case 7 of an accident, or, vice versa, the potentiality the land 8 has to be recovered and reused.
9 MR. KERR:
Excuse me.
10 When you comment on land use, do you mean safety, 11 or are you going beyond safety?
1 12 Because the question talks about from a safety 13 standpoint.
-, {EEN-14 DR. MOELLER:
When I'm commenting on land use, 1 15 mean whether it's used for agriculture, residential, 16 dairying, farming, or what-not.
The ease with which the 4
171and could be recovered following, in our extent, would be, 181n my opinion, one factor that should be considered in 19 Siting, but not from a safety standpoint.
20 This would really probably be more property costs.
21 DR. OKRENT:
Maybe to say something in a slightly 22 reworded form.
It's hard for me to judge what constitutes a Z3 criteria for a site that makes it acceptable, if I don't 9_
24 have in mind some kind of reactor.
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Iexplicit or implicit there exists some kind of safety goal 2 or some kind of risk criteria in trying to meet, and this gga 3 can be a combination of things, of course, individuals, 4 societal and so forth.
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So at least in my own mind, I cannot separate the 6 two.
It's conceivable that one may develop what you might 7 call general design criteria for a reactor which will 8 provide it certain safety characteristics to the extent that 9 one can ascertain these, and that having this defined what 10 they say for this reactor so defined, I can now pick a group 11 of sites, or a limiting set of parameters on a site, that 12 allow me to meet, then, whatever is my set of criteria for 13 risk acceptance.
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23 On the other hand, there may be other societal (f) 24 needs which are important.
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6 that some particular design was so good it really greatly 7 reduced the probability that you could get c serious 8 accident involving core melt but it was just very expensive 9 to do and you didn't feel it was necessary to the site, or i I
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16 So I think one can, in my mind, maintain that 17 degree of flexibility.
What bothers me, I think, in answer 18 question one, I didn't think it was being treated in a 19 realistic way.
There was what I sometimes call the stylized 20 ritual.
21 MR. KERR:
The question had to do mainly with the 22 technical feasibility rather than the political feasibility 23 0f this, did it not?
That's what I assume.
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So I would then move back.
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Well, particularly since I 20 want to rely upon these two individuals at the next meeting, let i
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May I interject something?
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Yes, go ahead.
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20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I know.
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Commissioner Kennedy.
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n 20 I am trying to figure out how you set new limits.
21 DR. OKRENT:
Well, I guess my assumption is that for 22 E-all sites you need som'e acceptance limit on, this to the 23 individual unless you have some kind of overriding national 24 5e.k..
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So that remains --
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where one might reasonably set such a cutoff.
19 MR. KERR:
It seems to me that there is precedent for 20 this sort of thing, if I understand the way in which dose 21 criteria was set early on, where one was concerned primarily 22 f5 ~
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One took a doubling dose and then took a 23 fraction of that.
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Well, it has a sentence in it that 6
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21 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
In terms of a population?
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And not in the sense that 3
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That anyone would accept --
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Well, I am presumably one of 21 the authors of the risk impact panel report of the great Conase 22 ja, WMF effort, Dr. Okrent who inveigled me into that effort, and so 23 far as I know we have been in peer review since 1976.
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25 DR. SIESS:
Joe, in looking for a cutoff --
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Either that or there is a 2
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!E DR. PLESSET:
I am sorry, the commissioners have had 23 their ration of fun.
They have to go, I understand.
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Yes.
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think at least some of us, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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(A brief recess was taken.)
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N.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY -CO.*C4ISSION This is to certify that the attached proceedinES before the I
Meeting wllh NRC Chairman John F. Ahearne in the matter of:
and other NRC Commissioners.
Date of Proceeding:
June 6, 1980 Docket !! umber:
Place of Proceeding:
washington, D. C.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Commission.,
Suzanne R. Babineau Official Reporter (Typed)
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Official Reporter (Signature)
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