ML19318A164

Forwards 800603 Fr Notice Announcing NRC Amend to Physical Protection Regulation of Irradiated Reactor Fuel During Transit.Fulfills NRC Committment Made at 800428-29 Hearings

ML19318A164
Person / Time
Site:	07002623
Issue date:	06/13/1980
From:	Hoefling R NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
To:	Hand C, Luebke E, Mark Miller Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8006180538
Download: ML19318A164 (13)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:8 'o UNITED STATES '$s [' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3s. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS g - E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 e 'l POOR QUAL.lTY PAGES / June 13, 1980 Marshall E. Miller, Chairman Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr., Director Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Bodega Marine Laboratory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission University of California Washington, D. C. 20555 P.O. Box ?47 Bodega Bay, California 94923 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Atomic Safety and Lice.ising Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 In the Macter of Duke Power Cor.pany (Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station Spent Fuel Transportation and Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station) Docket No. 70-2623 Gentlemen: Enclosed for the information of the Licensing Board members and the parties to this proceeding is a copy of the Federal Register Notice of June 3, 1980 (45 Fed. Reg. 37399 et seq.) announcing the action of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission amending its regulation in the area of physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit. This transmittal fulfills the commitment of Staff Counsel at the hearings of April 28-29, 1980 in Charlotte, North Carolina, to provide this material to the Board and perties. Sin rel, / !$b s 9 Michard K. Hoe 1 ng i Enclosure as stated Counsel for NRC Staf. cc (w/ engl.): W.L. Porter, Esq. David S. Fleischaker, Esq. J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq. Mr. Jesse L. Riley Richard P. Wilson, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Docketing and Service Section 8006180h

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45. No.108 / Tuesday. June 3,1980 / Rules and Kegulations 37399 Dated: May 27,19stL comments. After reviewing comments k

l John H. Arnemen, Assistant A dministator-Telephone. _ received from the public, and after taktng into account the experience ~ j , y,%mumung gained during the several months that ) ,c.,,, caug,,,,,, the amendments have been effective. I the Commission has decided to make a number of changes to the amendments NUCLEAR REGUt.ATORF. / and to NUREG-0561. All references to., COMMISS80Ndpa.*w. e.,. : spzinc sectims of the agulation refer - - 4.*,wtg g to the June 15,1979 version of the.;, m.- 10 CFR Part73:nsq a p%.g >k.iw ter.cl., ugulation, unless otherwise spah 'b %.Followingis a summary ofchanges s. r..

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- r Physical Protection of irradiated,g! y to the amendments.%ese changes.,,;,, ReacterFuelinTransitspQ;4 7W ;.were arcourse, accompanied bra.%:. -m...- .r Aoancv:U.S. appropriate changes toNUREC4i61.. Commi-lon.j.NiciearRegu1storf-~ L1 Smallquantityshipments.%m*4 "3 @ co(m)ments suggest that the scopenfahe.. [ AcDostEffectiveamen.$,.yj$ j.g/l.' .Mg7-i nents% rule should be revised to specify for # imdm Bnale- " t......, tre._. spent fuel a threshold quantitybelow 7 N Combin W which p~rotection requirements'would '. its interim rule for the ph sical W:~. n t apply.The Commiasion agrees.with. 3 a protection ofirradiated reactor fuel n this suggestion and has modined (spent fuel) in transit which was issued i 73.1(b)(5) and i 73.37(s) to set tl$r " ' thresholdlevelat100 grams 1 ne weight of irradiated fuel (i.e., ura[tud, ~ t on Jmie 15,1979.Materim nale and a 4 related guidance document designated - NUREG-0561 were issued in effective - plutonium and associated Basion".. products) exclusive of cladding or other form withoutthe benefit of public?. comment. Public comments were, "m. structural or pa material; thus. however, solicited on both the interim w. shipments of spent fue in quantities regulation and the guidana document. below 100 grams need not be protected. c His notice summarizes the comments, It is believed that the 100 gram threshold gives the Commission respense to each,. is in the public interest inasmuch as it and sets forth the interim amended rule ~ would simplify the transport of smaH ~ =- quantities, such as those madein~ in Snal form. --n connection with spent fuel research smenn Daft July 3,1980. activities.The calculated average-Nots-%e Nuclear Regulatory - 7-radiological consequences of successful - Commission has submitted this rule to the" ' sabotage of a shipment of100 grams of Comptroller General for review under the spent fuel even in a heavily populated Federal Reports Act, se amended. 44 U.S.C. environment are negligible. 35u. %e date on which the remrd keeping - ' The language of I 73.1(b)[5)3nd '. -- requirement of 5 73.37(bl(5) h====. 7 eri. effective, unless advised to the contrary will a t 73.3 r(a) has also been changed tdM be 75 days following publication in tbs %,/; clarify which shiprnents are covered by' Fedwamesishrmis time period reDects the amendments. Shipments ofmaterial" W I inclusion of the 45 days which the General _ which are exempt from the requirements i Accounting Office is allowed for its review of I 73.30 through I 73.36 on the basis of I (44 U.S.C.3512(c)(2]l. the external radiation dose rate I associated with such shipments, are M MWER WNMADON CWACM g Mr. L J. Evans. Jr., Chief Regulatory now referred to in the regulations Improvements Branch, Division of directly in terms of their dose rate,. Safeguards. OfBce of Nuclear Material rather than in terms of their exemption Safety and Safeguards.The telephone _ from another rule.The guida sce will number is (301) 427-4181. clarify that the dose rate measurement in the case of smaller sMpments, which j SUPPL EMENTARY INFORMADOic On June may involve multiple packaging. should V 15.1979, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory refer to.the arrangement of shipment y Commission amended 10 CFR Part 73 of f its regulations to provide immediately packages which results in the highest measurable extemal dose rate.This } effective interim requirements for the should eliminate any ambiguity which E le protection of spent fuelin transit. may arise from the possibility that the Concurrently, the NRC issued a highest measurable dose rate for a guidance document (NUREG-0561) to grouping of several different packages of assist licensees in carrying out the comprising a single shipment may "? I requirements..Both the amendment and depend on the particular arrangement the guidance document were published and orientation of the packages within ~ without benefit of public comment in the the transport vehicle. Interest of the public health and safety. (2) Transit thmugh heavilypopulated n. At the time of publication, the public creas. Some comments suggest that the 9 was invited to submit its views aad. NRC modify its.ovrent embargo of 3

l 37ese F '- 21 R y,' i / Vol. 45. No.108 / Tuesd;y, June 3,1980 / Rules cnd Regul.tions @C for its ss sh:pments through h1svily popul:ted le ds to the use cf seconday roads. popul:ted cres. runed escorts cm T'guhtion ha rrers %ese mmments contend that - Compared with interststs highw:ys, expect:d to ccrry cut their assigntd ciriccuy r' emergency procedures in case of attac S . duties, including implementation of trtch shipments should not be required these secondary roads are characterized r to the n to depart from interstate highways, even by a higher likelihood of conventional P in heavily populated areas. Some of traffic accident, bylonger times in under the same legal umbrella extendec 5ntent of the tbase comments further contend that transit, by less frequent patrolling by the all other private guards (or law P ance is t id incrstate highways are safer and faster locallaw enforcement agency (11EA), enforcement personnel,in the case O ersted,th8 than alternative routes, that police and by lengthened response times in the 11EA personnel are employed as delay movel response time is faster along interstate event that ILEA assistance is requested. escorts). hipment fo (4) Clarification ofcertain terms mmobilizat, than scandary routes, that hijacked Under the second alternative, Some comments request that certam! Performanc, ch pments would be easier tolocate on shipments would be permitted to transit troublesome phrases in the regulation be omplied w anterstates, and that interstates offer heavily populated areas under armed sahoteurs less advantage of protracted escort.%e significant advantages and clarified. With respect to i 73.37(a)(3), trailer or th ~e==t-nt. Comments noted that prior disadvantages of the first attemative are which requires that the route is guidance h to the issaance of theregulation routes interchanged in the semnd alternativa. planned to avoid, where pracurable* eppears tot were being chosen to avoid heavily In the second altert.ative, highways ars' heavily populated areas " comments it is aho populated areas and to =W=* thebestavailable thelikelihood of a request that the phrase "where should has shament time. Some comments contend conventional traffic accident is reduced. practicable" be clarified. In i 73.37(d), ingenuity 8 that shipments protected by armed total travel time for the shipment is which req *es,that " * *

• Ifit is not to best act escorts as outlined in the gnittanr=

reduced the roads are more frequently possible to avnid heavily populated Accordins areas, the Comniission may req *A immobiliz docmnent should be permitted to transit ' patrolled by the 11EA. and the 11EA heavily populated areas. response time in the event of a call foe depending on individu,al circumstances specified. of the shi nnent, additional protective The sta i Other comments suggest that NRC assistance is reduced. On the other continue to strengthen its current hand. spent fuel would be within heavil) measures, commets,, request that the might des embargo on spent fuel transit through populated areas on a planned basis phrases,'not possible and " additional immobili: heavily populated areas.ney ask that some of the time, thus satisfying one of protective measures be clarified.The any prop the "where practicable" exception in 10 the necessary conditions for successful requirements have been revised and the. will appi troublesome phrases have been adequate CFR 7:L37(a)(3) be eliminated. %ey also sabotage with potentially serious eliminated or clarified. occurnn ask that the guidance document be consequences. snanfied to elimmate extra driving time %e Comminaion has decided that co ents pres tti cern that the-def at cs a basis for exception, unless there are there is no clear advantage of the one mj 9. g f overndmg safety and safeguards altemative strategy over the other. [ " di yvi & 11EAin cnosiderations. Some comments suggest Accordmgly, the rule has been revised the event that 1. LEA assistance is that the NRC emphasize the use of to allow either protection strategy to be required.%e Commission agrees with hnstru e eye rmfes through areas ofIow population used.The revised provisions make it. y this concern.ne regulation has been

• ove e siensity.

clear that either (i) avoidance of heavd difi d licitl tha {opulated areas, or (ii) passage through [scorts comm %e NRC considered two'ahernative cate y wi the d eavily populated areas on approved ILEA in the event 11EA assistance is that th ' protection strategies. Under the first citernative, shipments would be planned routes employing additional protective required. to avoid heavily populated areas where measures, which are delineated in (6) Road shipments: Immobilization. nhi pra:ticable. Prelirninary analysis I 73.37(c)(1). (d)(1), and (e)(1), are Some comments are concerned with the nsii andcated that most spent fuel shipments acceptable routing altematives.The safety consequences ofimmobilization a E would move by road and suggested that Commission retains its earlier position and that inadvertent operation of the t e si cvahnce of heavily populated areas is that interstate highways should be used immobilization device could lead to a (7) generally practicable. %is alternative whenever possible. serious accident Some comments mi became the basis for the rule issued on (3) Performance objectives. Some suggest that immobilization of both the ,I june 15.1979.%e chief benefit of this comments suggest that the NRC should tractor and the trailer (rather than the trr! c!temative is that it takes advantage of provide criteria and guidelines for the tractor or trailer) should be provided. com ' ' thz fact that sabotage of spent fuel must use of force for the protection of spent Some comments suggest that the method curr tde place in a heavily populated area if fuel shipments. Another comment of immobilization should be specified anti the sedous consequences discussed in a suggests that the regulation and and approved 1,y the NRC rather than s il Samila Report (SAND 77-1927) are to be guidance be modified to clarify whether allowing the method to be specified by con obtained.ne necessary conditions for escorts have the ' doty to defend spent the licensee. Other comments suggest the 1 cuczzssful sabotage would thus entail fuel shipments or merely to detect and the NRC analysts consider strengthening the ' the adversary gaining control over the report threats to the shipment.ne the immobilization requirement while shi i s,hi; ment, moving it to a heavily ' amendments have been modified to simultaneously reducing the number of co ! po;nlated area. and then placing and include a new section, now designated escort personnel required. Finally, one A; cietanating the necessary explosive as i 73.37(a) which provides comment suggests that 11EA's along the co charge. It is bebeved that the measures performance objectives to be achieved route should be familiarized with the et s.et forth in the June 15.1979 regulation by the physical protection system for immobilization technique in the event to a e capsble of interrupting this sequence spent fuel shipments. These that the need should arise to move a cc cf events.The pnncipal disadvantage of performance objectives do not vehicle following activation of the p, tr.a protecion strategy stems from the specifically address the issue of the immobilization device. ti 1 fr. 6at the highway system is designed degree of force escorts are to use in The NRC is concemed with the to c=nnect population centers, and protecting shipments. but indicate the possible safety consequences of i 1 the efore major highways pass near or generallevel of protecti' n that is to be immobilization.The method of t: o thrt=d. the population centers. provided by the entire physical immobilization proposed by the. licensee .j Asc. dance of heavily populated areas protection sy, tem. Within heavily was intended to be reviewed by the 4 l I \\ l

Fed:ral Register / Vol. 45. No.108 / Tuesday. Junt 3.1980 / Ruhs cnd Regulstions 37401 gc f:-its safety implications. The amendments include specific shipments of other types of special [.w ' M:;on has been modified to requirements for familiarization of the nuclear material. ~g ef cc hally require that t' r method of driver and LLEA personnel with certain (12) Communications center. The a ~.e -.mobOzation be appro d by the NRC safeguards procedures, and inclusion of amendments published on June 15.1979 w

.:- to the making of shipments.De a weapons training and qualifications included requirements for calls by

e-t c! the regulation and the related program for escorts who are armed.The escorts to a " designated location." for s

r iance is to assure that, when Commission has decided that the purposes of monitoring the spent fuel -e sted, the immobihzation device will training requirements, as revised, are shipment. Further details regarding the uiar covement of the spent fuel consistent with the duties and duties of personnel at this designated , phett for at least one-half hour.%e responsibilities of the drivers and location were included in the guidance 3 un

_s:b22ation provision is essentially a escorts.

document. NUREG-0561. It was g p !3 cance requirement that can be (8) Railshipments: Route restrictions. determined that further detail regarding gy, c:=$ed with by immobihvinF the Some comments content that rail - this safeguards function would be. ailer or the tractor or both.ne transport is penahzed. compared with desirable so as to give the detailed. e. , pdance has been reviewed and truck transport, through the lack of - guidanceincludedinNUREG-0561a. 3 , a: pears to be dear on this point. - realistic alternative routes.%e w c firm regulatory basis.%e facility at the it is also intended that thelicensee regulation has been modified to permit > designated location has been termed the 'dd s:ould,have the opportunity to use his transport through heavily populated t communications center," and is nowc... g egenmty and skill in determining how. areas. One effect of that changeis tot described in the regulation.c.N' t: best accomplish the immobilization. eliminate the need for altemative raQ -B. In some instances, the enmments v ~ Axordogly. the particular method of - routes whichavoid heavilypopulated ^- showed a need formodification of the b o,, mmobibzation required has not been areas.wh* sra.u :,:.w.uj m e'. _. guidance document alone.Following is a - - a speczfied. ne staff remgnha that a l"icensee - (9)Rm7 shipments-Stops:Some C" summary of those changes: u -..d. - .,~ aw. mght develop alternative methods of - comments ask that the regulation and (1) Definition ofheorilypopulatsd e emobihzation.ne staff will evaluate guidance pertaining to planned rail # areas. A number of comments suggest-~ g stops be modified to allow for the crew that the ilefinition of a heavily the c:y proposed method of protection and w21 approve the proposal ifit provides changes that take place every100-200 - populated area be modified in various adequate protection against sabotage - miles.He comments also point out that ' ways to permit more areas to qualify. J a: curring in heavtly populated areas. rail shipment planners cannot meet the - Some point out that the present current stop criteria, which would i - - definition causes certain cities tobe. :.- 3 provisions. %ese suggestions were{,j,- excluded from the list of heavily. a, permit stops only for refueling and o anu rize I umber populated areas provided in the -.. o. o'mdividuals with the immobiliza 9n J technique, with a view toward. ad pted and the regulation and.. guidance document even though they n. 3-crnstructive use of this'information in gmdance document have been modified have populations or population densities the event that the need should arise to accordingly. ~ - - greater than some of those which were J cove a vehicle following (10) Shipments bfsea. Some,,,, included.These anomalies were ~... immobihzation. Instead, the guidance c mments suggest that the rule be.. _7 explained to arise from failures to take a:cument has been revised to suggest expanded to include requirements for into account the combined populations I that the possible need for traffic control the protection of spent fuel aboard ships of contiguous cities in the same l fa owing operation of the and boats. A review of the rule as urbanized area and the total populations icmobihzation device should be published June 15,1979, will show that of urbanized areas. Other comments 2 cznsidered by the licensee when i 73.1(b)(5). I 73.37(a), and i 73.37(d) L suggested that areas with large p paring the operating procedures for apply to shipments independent of the - temporary populations such as colleges t3. stjpment. mode of trnnsport. However,in the be included although their permanent ) (7) Roadshipments Tmining.Some interest of clarity..the rule has been populations would not otherwise qualify ) c:mmen's suggest a significant revised to include a new section. the areas as heavily populated areas. expansion of the driver and escort - specifically addressing the protection of Some comments suggested that specific tmning program. Some of these spent fuel shipments aboard vessels l_ cities be added to the list of heavily, cunmen:s suggest that the trainin, New guidance has been added in y 1 populated areas., curiculum should include training"in NUREM561, accordingly.- Reconsideration of the bases for a:'i-sabotage and in initial response to ' (11) Written log. %e original version defining heavily populated areas has led sp'ls of radioactive material. Some of NUREG-0501 contained a chapter to a broader definition which is included r c ncents suggest that clarification of describing a written log to be kept by in the revised guidance document. J th= level of proficiency needed to satisfy shipment escorts during the course of a Accordingly, the number of urbanized j tha train:ng curriculum of Appendix D spent fuel shipment. The purpose of this areas listed as heavily populated areas t sh:uld be provided. One comment log was to provide a durable record of is increased to approximately 180. cetends that some of the topics in the circumstances surrounding a given %e NRC would like to take i.:penda D are superfluous. Another shipment, to support inspection and ternporary population centers into crcen: suggests that the training enforcement functions of the NRC, and account in determuung whether an area =:ulum in Appendix D should apply form the basis for any further regulatory qualifies as a heavily populated area. 1: dnvers as well as escorts. One actions regarding spent fuel shipments, However, there are no readily available " cent suggests that the training in general. It was determined that this census figures upon which the NRC mpam should empbasize safe driving guidance needed to be given a firm presently can base such determinations. IP"S c ques. regulatory basis by specifically requiring Herefore, the NRC invites officiels of

• he d.ser and escort training the maintenance of a writterilog in the ternporary population centers to submit, We:ents have been reviewed and regulations. %ese requirements are to the NRC,information in support of W.tr.ations and guidance have been comparable to the recordkeeping including that area in the list of heavily u red accor6ngly.ne revised requirements of i 73.70, which cover populated areas.

i 1

yrsee rederal Register / Vgl. 45, Ns.108 / Tuesd:y, Juna 3,1980 / Rules and Reguhtions This same m,*rmnism will be used t3 (5) Railshipments: Unanticipated Lewis pan;l's peer review of that subject to li l cssist in the corcmuous updating of the route changes. Some comments suggest document.The Lewis panel Report respect to c lis: rela *ive to twe areas meeting the that the rule and the Fuldance should be (NUREG/CR-0400) states: "The risk the release population entern modified to allow for the unanticipated from sabotage was not calculated in th inventor o ' (2) Rocd shipmen.'s: Criteriafor route changes that sometimes occur in Reactor Safety Study. The omission wa respirab e I setection of hgb ways. Some comments rail transport.His suggestion was deliberate, and proper, because it was. serio s cj, currest 1:at NFC guidance should adopted by modifying the guidance recognized that the probability of 1 pu include a priontzzmg or ordering of the document. sabotage of a nuclear power plant vcrious highway types (interstate. 4 C.The Commission also received a cannot be estimated with any j stan lane. 2 lane marked. 2 lane tmmarked, number of comments and suggestions confidence."Similarly, estimates of the protec,p ctc.) to aid licensees in the selection of which were considered but which did probability of successful sabotage of < sa tag ahernative routes. One comment not lead to changes to the amendments spent fuel shipments cannot be made 3 an siggests that routes used in the past for or to NUREG-0531. Following is a with any confidence. P'"" spent fuel shipments including routes disenssion of those mmments: In their report (NUREG/CR-0400) the ncon den used for military spent fuel shipments, (1)/ustificationforthe rule. Some Lewis panel points out that, even with re en p,; htd beapproved automatically.The comments contend that the NRC has not " realistic" risk estimates, further suurstian to pnontize route highway. pmvaded proper or sufficient basis for conservatisms must be incorporated in', the staff ne types was' adopted and the guidance, in the new ngulaten. the mgulatory pmcess. In the absence a NIIREQr,01 has been amended to (a) Some comments ask that the NRC " realistic" nsk estimates, it is even,mos g incande suitable criteria. Routes used for not wwwhfy its regulations on the basis of important to incorporate conserystisma g spent fuel shipments prior to the unproven information in draft form, such in regulatory decision making.This is W th iMerim rula, howmr,, as the Sandia report.The, Commission the approach taken in safeguards. {ints out Mb will not be automatically approved has decided that there is an adequate We know of no attempts to sabotage bas,s for interim requirements for the spent fuel shipments in a manner gg i inasmanch as those routes,hke all other g, pruposed routes, must meet arrent protection of spent fuel shipments. The leading to a significant radiological g, ded8 DM 8PP e ag, NRC continually reexammes the release. But we have conservatively (3) Roadshipments-Criteriafor adequacy of its regulations for the assumed that such a sabotane act might accept. As ment detours. Some mmments expmse protection of the public health and be attempted. Furthermore, we have the Sandia safety against deliberate acts. Part of tried to determine, logically and tours P m]s this reeramination consists of studies systematically, the characteristics of

• ('*

P d e csk that the guidance document be and research projects.One of these persons who might attempt to perpetrati u snodified to provide better criteria for studies, conducted by Sandia such crimes.*Be results of our threat versi n. pa, determinmg when detours am I.aboratories and published in draft form characterization work have been assumW h easd at "PiroPnateMese comments also in May 1978 as SAND-77-1927, published as NUREG-O(59. Generic d the cent suagest that the NRC. rather than the . concluded that serious public health Adversary Characteristics Summary licensee. should produ the guidelines. consequences could result in the event Report. ' "C'"""3 Soune n==nents am cecemed that of successful sabotage of a spent fuel Another factor in making a Commissic ena a shipment is en route, shipment in a heavily populated area. determination concerning the . I" O' I"I" transit. implementation of the detour procedures Although a later draft Sandia report probability of successful sabotage is the. set forth in the guidance document might predicts less serious consequences, a reaction of spent fuel to sabotage. it is (d) Othe eot be possible. Some comments suggest significant degree of uncertainty generally agreed among analysts that Departmn have conel th t LIE.A's should be notified at the remains that can only be resolved by the serious consequences discussed in further study.The Commission is the Sandia report could result only if premature, outset of each unplanned detour. In cunently pursuing a research effort to sabotage is carried out in or near a e mments i response to these suggestions, the resolve these issues. While awaiting the heavily populated area and only if some n t muh l Fuidance document has been modified results of this research the Commission of the nonaally solid spend fuel shipments j to set forth some new guidelines to be believes thst it is prudent to retain these contained in a massive durable cask is The Con followed in detour situations. However, and the NI reqmrements on an interim basis. When somehow released as respirable , except for theobviousinstanceof where the final research results are analyzed particles. It is further agreed among o shipment is being escorted by 11EA the NRC will either modify, continue, or analysts that the only credible way to < n t to mm, persormel. It is believed that the 11EA rescind to CFR 73.37, whicheveris carry out such sabotage is through the I"'I

• P" I neel not be notified of each datour appropriate, based on these results.

skillful use of explosives. The reaction responsM snasmuch as the agency is not expected (b) Other comments point out that the of spent fuel and spend fuel casks to and DOE t l to do anything ddlerendy as a result of a NRC should regulate on the basis of risk, explosive sabotage is subject to large "9"#'*

• detaur.

a concept wherein risk equals the uncertainty. A research program is being nc ar m; (41 Railshipments: Advance product of the consequences of an event, carried out to improve our accepts th reoMcation. Comments indicate that not such as sabotage, and the probability of understandit but the program will reasona cll of the required advance notification the event. Inasmuch as the NhC has no likely not yield useful results for what cons s tempora data can be provided in advance of a basis to specify an identifiable threat, approximately one year. rail shipment. among these data are some comments conclude that the The Commission frequently uses the p 6 agen j re tcg. specification of stops, and cask probability of sabotage is insufficient to concept of risk in its deliberations ""'M ! cenal rumbers. Some comments. justify a legitimate concern. concerning the need for new regulations [I'**d l co::end that some of the information NRC has not pursued quantitative risk and did so in this case. The Commission specified m the Fuidance document may studies for safeguards because of found that the likelihood of successful '*i IO*'" b-mierent to rail shipments.These extreme difficulty in adequately sabotage is uncertain inasmuch as the "O such as th s;pstions were generally adopted.The quantifying the various factors existence of a credible adversary gn:ance document has been modified contributing to risk. This view was organization cannot be ruled out and the discuss a ciarify advance notification expressed in the Reactrar Safety Study response of spent fuel and spent fuel rMi;irements for rail shipments. (WASH 1400) and sustained by the casks to credible explosive sabotage is adequaw r-s

1 nb e:t to larRe uncertaind.With durable cont: intra in which spent fuel ciready given strrutegic spect:1 nuclar 3 r.spect to conse92nces, it cppears that abpments cre m:de. materials is nuded. ik

w reiesse of a sna11 fraction of the

& Commluion tgrees that the Some commants suggest that NRC m f'

sente y of a speed fuel cesks es missive, durzbla casks in which spent shoufd requirs licensees to justify all nk r-spirabie parucles could produce fuel shipments are made provide a high spent fuel shipments by considering all car n.e s consequences in a heavily degree of protection against many kinds possible altematives to the making of p 7 ated area. On this basis the of sabotage including explosive shipments.

Ca::.=ission has decided to generally let sabotage.However,in view of the. One of the most frequent comments s and these requirements designed to uncertamties in predicting the response favored an embarBo of spent fuel .the, pr.>tect spent feel stupments against of spent fuel and spent fuel casks to shipments until a permanent storage rf ' sabotsp= in heavily populated amas on explosives, the Commission believes facilityis established.Thereafter spent an intan bases.The need for that it is no longer purdent to depend fuel shipments would be permitted only se per==nant requirements vill bs upon cask design alone to protect.. to that tacility. the rewamed when the moults of the against sabotage in besvily populated Some comments conten'd that the ~ tin l research prograsa become availaWa. areas. Accordingly, instil additaonal - - additionalmeasures required for... l (c) wun mspect to the Sandia esport... Information can be developed to ammolve movements through heavily populated 2 fa j tse stafinotes that the latestdraft of the some of the present uncertainties.. L areas are too weak to deter or10 e rg report progeds sebotage consespaenoes con::eming the respcstse of spend feel to provideprotachan agamst w -=- L1._ less sanous than are set forth in the May ,,panW A es.o, hasw sabotage; these ramments ask that the en regulationbe raod Bed to todicata C wa draft, and cited ty the NRCas the that spent fuel shipments should ba7 a me: additional safeguanis andlist them in ;

l basts forthe rule. Anothercomw.-

protected as specifs' ed in to GR 33.37; y detail.' ", ; '. ? ~7. ~r"~.~ asmoaiham a g.g34 eacy. One enmment'suggesh:'that for any. - 4 pomts out thet even the canaaqaa=== 3 no M ', 'iven heavDy populated area 1he J... art forth in the May wa hadam Draft 4 o are mot that rauch smore sada-a than . g,,(f) Some is tr We. g ,j g,,,,mdy-- ebch the NRC appears to be wdhas to - measures for mil emok5.w%ey pnet at. protectaan measures required shduld be ' g amose of a severe Aant-thariskof-simumr for all ab1pire nts, rather than that raR cooks are moore sabotantial than allowing vanous options for each. - at accept. e : - >. trude ed ht k e.; - shipment- . A. ~ As mentioned aboue, a later daift of. b"" '8' " Therudiad a'n h er the Sandia report issued damag """.De com of sets of m=asures for the protection of Septemmer W9. estirmales less menous casks spent fuelsMpants. One d these sets con. sequences than the May wa wrsaon. partly because the Mey warmian that there is no record of hijeckingQ of measures w uld have provided that ' w W ad W h-8 pent fuel shipmants would be protected essumed larger amounts of asa6 anal - Mkded tmin im*

• l.o* P P"Iau""

equivalently to shiprnants of formula j r-leasai as a result of sabotage.Je view 4 cf the amtinuing uncertainities - ama to a high population ama wems quantities of strategic special nuclear ~u quitemmote.Cmmum aisepointout material (M wMhust also be h rebee fracrian,b. that protection measures for rail - protected meainat theft.However.10 Com== ion has decided it is purdent to, shipants hiheavDy populsted amas - CFR 718 of the CM-Ws physical

the isterim. protect spentfuelin-already include frequent, surveiBance by pmtection rules for SSNM speciDcaHy -

t ansit. . railroad police and are % ? C separable and which has a total ~-.. exempts spent fuel which is not readily [d] Oaer comments point out that adequate.' > ~ P-Department d Emergy @E) andysts } lave emcluded that the ruleis %e refemnced Sandia Report 7 - ' extemal dose rate in nemas of100 rems j rrernature and inappropriate.The indicates that simDar uncertainties. per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any comannts also pomt out that DOE does apply to possible explosives attacks on accessible surface without intervemng not require protection of spent inel both road and ran shipments. Even . eMel% Such matanala possess shipments for wbich it is responsible. though rag shipments would most Ekely intrinsic protaennn against theft and are The Commission notes that the DOE require a higherlevel of adversary. not readily usable to fabricata =nelaar and the NRC have access to the samme resources for successful sabotage. such" explosives. Nevertheless, the i_formatiosa and that DOE bee .,a.a sabotage la considered possible for both Commianmn considers it pr=dd to a rot to require protectson for the spent road and ran modes.The Sandla Report require some additional meassues td bel sh pments for which it is states in particular that attacks on rail. protect spentfuel agamstrashola6 cal i responnble. Despite the pokey ofNRC casks using shaped charges is possible sabotage. Shippers of spent Emel asust anhmit and DOE to have comparable since the requisite materials canbe - equirements for the protectional carried by men on foot.Moreover, the route information and aarnrity plans to likelihood that available rail routes the NRC for authorization to cany out

nclear matenais, the Comm-a accepts the fact that from time to time would include passages through heavily the shipment.The NRC thus has the easonable administrators will differ populated areas diminishes the opportunity to review the shipper's plan r:mporarily on the difficult questson of importance of the consideration that it for the shipment and to assure that he i

what amatitutes adequate safeguards. would be more difficult for an adversary has considered alternatins to the 5oth agenoes are developing additional to !!1icitly move a hijacked train from a making of the shipment. less densely populated area to a heavily The Commission reafGrms its = formation on the issues and are.

cordnates with one another. Itis populated area. Protection for rail judgment that spent fuel can be shrpped

eLeved that the differences in positions shipments, therefore. is still required.

safely without constituting unreasonable

! the two agencies are temporary and (2) Adequacyofpmtection risk to the health and safety of the v.li be resolved as new information.

requirements. Some comments state that public. Accordingly, the Commission such as that from the research program protection of spent fuel shipments under does not believe that it is necessary to d.s:ussed above, becomes available. the interim rule is not adequate against prohibit spent fuel shipments until a te) 0;her comments argue that terrorist action. 'lhese comments argue permanent storage facility is adequate protection is provided by the that protection equivalent to that established. I 4

1 37404 Federal Register / V:1. 45, N:.108 / Tu sdiy Jun? 3,1980 / Rul;s and R gul:tians Some requirements cf the regulitirn. license 2, but rJso 12 cny other pers:n in the revisId rule and suitable thi staff pa-:icdany regardmg transiting who m y be liable, such as a measures have been developed for road, and (4) t' crbanized areas. have been changed transporter. However, there would be no rail and water transport. Accordingly, a applicar cor.siderably in this later version. Given Price-Anderson Act protection (or limit licensee may choose the mode of informa' tnese changes.the Commission has on lisbility) under facility licensees' transportation for his shipment on the revi* ' decded that the protection level insurance policies and indemnity basis of considerations other than igcever regired reasonably protects the public agreements once a shipment was safeguards. intende estinst risk from sabotage of spent fuel highiacked and placed beyond the (6)Righ levelwaste.Some comments and, the shi;:ments.%e escort force has the control of the transporter. Extension of suggest that the scope of the rule should capability to call for assistance and in a the Price-Anderson Act protection to provide requirements for the protection Ndant bearily populated area.locallaw coverincidents occurring after a of high levelwaste shipments. @g enforcement authorities could be on the shipment has been highjacked is beyond No licensed shipments of highlevel conten scese within minutes. Within a heavily the scope of this rulemaking. waste are presently being made. Only a develo po;nlated area. the escort force is (4) ALARA Implications. One few facilities currently possess high comnu armed and therefore has the potential to comment suggests that the implications level waste. Shipments of the waste transp prevent sabotage untillocal authorities of the rule with respect to the from a facility at which it now resides to that et . arrree. Commissionpolicy of maintaining. another facility wouldinvolve the proba De Commission is seeking adeiuate - radicton exposure levels as low as amendment of one or more licenses. At, comm l protection for shipments which must reasonably achievable (ALARA) should that time, appropriate requirements trans) pass through heavily populated areas. In be examined. would be issued. doub; thi Commission's view, an adequate %e Commission has not at the (7) Test reactorfuelshipments. belor level of protection can be provided by present time extended indemnity Comments suggest that the staff by th either private guards or law enforcement coverage to spent fuel shipments on a consider relaxing protection plaos personnel. generic basis. However, spent fuel. requirements for test reactor spent fuel snuh (3) Liab5/tylimits. One comment shipments are accidentsinvolving in recognition of the fact that it contains thou suggests that no shiprnents of spent fuel radioactive material shipments are no free radioactive gases. Cort sinodd be permitted unless the shipper sufficiently small to allow continued The revised rule has not been rail - carnes private lisbility insurance shipments by all modes.Because modified to reduce the protection stal without limit.Other comments favor transportation conducted under present requirements for test reactor spent fue'l. cott infcrmmg the public of the liabuity regulations provides adequate safety to Fission gases would account for only a ' rnur hmi:s currently in force for shipments. the public, the staff concludes that no tiny fraction of the calculated health to s De Commission has not at the immediate changes to the regulations effects. Solid respirable material would the s present time extended indetanity are needed at this time.This account for most of the health effects. -" the coverage to spent fuel shipments on a determination is partly based on the (B) Distinction betweenguidance do' l pemic basis. However, spent fuel conclusion in NUREG-ot70 that the documents and regulations.Public 1< s6drents ere indemnified while in the average radiation dose to the population comments on both the amendments gat course of transportation to or from an at risk from normal transportation is a published in the Federal Register and isidemnified facuity (principally nuclear small fraction of the limits the supporting guidance document m; dt reactors}. Indemnity coverage for spent recommended for members of the (NUREG-0501) were received.Some og feel shipments to or from reactors generalpublic from all sources of ccmments apparently mistake the gj. temenates at the point at which radiation other than natural and medical guidance document for a regulation and ,1 traraportation ends. sources and is a small fraction of therefore conclude that the supposed "N provisiots of Section 170 of the natural background dose, regulation is too loosely worded. Other - 9 Atomic Energy Act of1954, as amended. The staff has examined the ALARA comments apparently reflect only the "c requie pro 3uction and utilization implications of the rule for the specific regulatory amendments and suggest that f;ciley hcmsees, Le reactors and case of spent fuel shipments by truck, the amendments alone are worded too g reptonssing plants to have and Calculations indicate that routine loosely to be effective. mairlain financial protection (e.g - exposure from shipments routed around l Following is a discussion of the acclear liabuity insurancel to cover cities would likely be about 30% highet distinction between regulations and I pcbbe liabuity claims resulting from a than the small but calculable routine guidance documents. Regulations set nuclear inddent.ne Commission is exposure for similar shipments routed forth legal requirements that licenses. also directed to enter into protection through cities.The Commission must follow.%e NRCis empowered to end fademmfy thelicensee for up to considers that this difference in such inspect against and enforce the $300 million in excess of that financial small routine exposures is not a provisions of its regulations. Regulations peetection. significant health factor and therefore without exception carry the approval of "I~ne indemnity protection afforded the not to be considered a significant factor the Commission. Guidance documents. pobbe for accidents arising during in the choice of routing. on the other hand, can be prepared and tran:portation is derived from the (5) Dunsportation mode. Some-issued by the staff.The documents are cme age provided under the insurance comments suggest that the scope of the not legally binding upon licensees. The pcuces maintained by licensees of rule should be expanded to require primary purposes of the guidance reac:ars an:! reprocessing plants and in licensees to examine alternative documents are:(1)To describe and the i:derry agreements executed by transportation modes for shipments. make available to the public the intent ti-se licensees with the Commission. The Commission agrees that and scope of application of the The :cretaga under the policies and alternative modes of transportation regulatory provisions. (2) in some cases. indemnPy areements incorporated the should be considered during the to provide alternative methods that are sc-ca"ed

• omnibus" provisions of the development of a program for the normally acceptable to the NRC staff for P n-Ande son Act.Under the protection of spent fuel shipments implementing specific parts of the
• cmnibus' cos etage liability protection against sabotage.The characteristics of Commission's regulations. [3)in some SMe ds no: only to the liability of the alternative modes Itave been considerad cases, to delineate techniques used by t

a-- s

i f ederal Register / Vcl. 45, No.108 / Tuesday, Juna 3.1980 / Rules cod Reguistions 37405 cr g ce s:sff m cut:aating specific problems, that the rule is not cost effective in its transport of nuclear materials only once y7~, ..d g1 t2 p code guidance to present form. (United States v. New York City l d.ars concerning certain This interim rule is expected to be in (S.D.M.V. No. 76 Civ. 273)). In this case b ._:ymann needed by the staff in its eHect for a year or two. Recent figures NRC. ERDA (now DOE) and DOT hew c spphcations for permits and indicate thatif the maximum numberof sought a kdgment declaring a New York e i:f.nes Guidance documents are not potentialshipmentsoccur the Health Code provision to be m'as e-e.ded as substitutes for regulations requirements may result in a cost of inconsistent with the Federal Statutory zuhd aM. 6e efore, mmpliance with about five hundred busand dollars per scheme for transportation of nuclear , tase g-rdance documents is not required. { ear. distributed over a number of materials. On January 30.1976. a United [9]!icensee costs. Some comments censees.The additaon of protection States request for a prelimmary m88suf88I r 8 Pent fuelshipments does injunction baning enforcement of the i cmtend that the cost estimates ut han a sWcant eHect a ee lomt mdinam was deled. F0 developed by the staff are too low.One envirmunant. After takinginkaccent. rrmmera suggests that the cost for truck On August 17.1978.the Materials 6e c @ daraum,and ee absence hpm^mtion Beau of the DOT - transportation would be atleast double. 88" ""I "P"'I *" ~ s t that estunated by the NRC staff and ""I""" b"M published an advance noticeof P W ' 'W proposed rdemaking (43 FR 36492) ' pmhably much higher Another_ I. ~ 1dedded that a detailed cost-benefit - dealing with the subject ofhighway' ~ ' it e-rrmment states that truck ~... i,}y' p. study is not needed for this intamn rule. routing of radioactive materials. On - A amo E dm the i m.at by e staH eva. Although a detailed cost. benefit study t' October 28.1978; the DOTpublished in ii the notice (43 FR 50006) of its intentionto bdore the cost of safeguards reqaired and al' 4 -- c bdd a public bearing on &is subjectin, I by the rule are added in. One co== ant .A pl-cost in the range of twenty. - keg Washington.D.C onNovember2R,- co c milim dollars pes year by asseng tan spent fuel shipmenta to the pnhTic heal. tl$ r amant a th="ma nd shipments per year circa 1985. and safety. A decisionhas beein mnde proposed rule dealing with the highway &mmens orgae that staff estamates of.. that the benefits from reduc staff estranses of truck costa; these - probability of occurrence an;ing the; ini

• *** " "8 rag cuests are in even greater errae than -

d potent

1. • 9
2. 8 uences of i feel shipmeni' as "pmssehntenhn to e

moments conclude that rail shipments ge justify th cost of the publish a final rule on this subject by the mtst be made in special trains in order requirements. A detailed cost-ldnefil' to satisfy the rule and that, therefore.- study will be piepared in suppo.rt o.f any-en he aw h mnuenid.. the cost of each rail ahin=~' will be in ' permanent rule that is Issued. the range of twety to forty thonaand (11) Pnenption. Some comments tuge new Federal regulations promulgated dcGars. '~ ~ that the NRC preempt state andlocal. under the Hazardous Matenals With respect to truck shipments.our. restrictions on spent fuel shipments. Transportation Act (HMTA) or wherei lanst information indicates that as Some enmmants seek to preempt those the state in a legitimate exercise crits mny as 500 shipments might occur state and local ordinances in conflict pdice pywerimposes general.nm-dtring calendar year 1980.He munber which would ban or otherwise restrict. radiological constraints (e.g; speed.. of;ossible shipments is currently shipments or which would require hmitt I ad limits) oo all truck licrted by the number of shipment casks rerouting of shipments over secondary transplatin, seaman-on does not qtikly manufactured. allowing the, roads with an attendantincreasein; presendy contemplete achana to, avdlable.Even if new casks were -preempt the enforcement of these laws. safety hazard. nunber of shipments to double, the Some comments arguethat ;. ( - However, the Commission reserves &mmias;an notes that the interim rule preemption would lead to a more judgment on whetherit may become is designed to be in effect only until responsible national policy concerning necessary to seek sudi preemptive ab:ut mid CY81. and therefore, believes uniformity of spent fuel transport action in a limited way (e.g., where that the high cost estimates atamming regulations.Some connn nts favonng - specific route cmsideratius are at frun protection oflarge numbers of preemption suggest that the NRC should issue) prior to the time the DOT spmt fue' shipments circa 1985 are not take into account state and local e regulations become effective. Once the a;cropriate or relevant. With respect to concerns when drafting federal " DOT regulations on this subject become rar shipment costs, the Commission regulations. One comment suggests that effective.there appears a strong NRC eliminate from its rule references Possibility that inconsistent state and fhgrm to local ordinances as a basis for local rules may be preempted on a tm s ed &e ents g,r,,;3 g meats, ag rerouting shipments: this comment broader basis. p esefam. miects the high cost estimates concludes that a local community should (12)Information onioutes and not be able to prevent the use'of a route. schedules. Some comrnents suggest that 6 am band a 6e use ofspecial acceptable to the NRC.One comment the NRC adopt a liberal policy suggests that the regulations make clear concerning the informatim on routes tio) Cast-benefit study. Sonne that local ordinances with the NRC rule and schedules that would be made co=nects suggest that the NRC should would be preempted. public. 'Ibese comments suggest that pavide a cost benefit analysis in Other mmments took the opposite route information should be published in sepo-t of the regulation. Comments view of preemption.These comments the Federal Register: subsequently the ab.: suggest that the requirements of the declare that local communities have the NRC should hold public hearings (or ru;e shouki be ckarly defined and right to be more restrictive than the NRC provide some other means for public simuid be cost effective.%ey argue that in the regulation of spent fuel shipments input) on routes.These comments re; :!atices must be cost effective in which they perceive as threatening their further suggest that NRC should contact o :cr to be meaning ul and must avoid safety. state and local authorities before 8 beng artxtrary or capricious or an abuse To date, the NRC has contested a granting a route approval. Some of iscretion. Some comments suggest local ordmance that regulates the comments conclude that a local

F1406 Federal Register / V41. 45, Nr.108 / Tu sdhy. Jun3 3,1980 / Ruhs cnd Regul:ti:ns population has bett;r kn:wledge cf cf a port or route w:uld be txffIct thi ofPackage Requirements (Yallow Coke) numb r roc:es than could be dev: loped by NRC Inst popultti n in event cf sabot ge, andEmergencyResponse to comme sumi* lance teams, thereby allowing the In consideration of the Commission's Transportation Accidents. remain defects and advantages of alterna:c revised position relative to avoidance of (le) Arrangements with LLEA. Clarity; Current s-roc *es to be more adequately heavily populated areas: 1.e., that andfeasibility. Some comments request '. numb dt co:sidered. Comments 'suggest that the passage through a heavily populated that the NRC clarify its description of. nam te state and local authorities should be area, on approved routes. when what constitutes acceptable t' ved.' motfied o.' details of routes. Comments supported by additional measures such arrangements, who must be contacted. %va iunt also suggest that state and local as armed escorts. is acceptable, the and whether the arrangement or contact cuthorities should be notified in Commission does not regard ports-of. with the LLEA must be documented. that the at i::0) Roc cdsrnce of the schedule of each entry as a particular problem area with One emnent suggests that the c ncern. C sh;pment. Some comments suggest that respect to routing. ports that are also licensee *s responsibility with respect to he event etate and local authorities should take listed as heavily populated amas will this requirement be limited to {,P31,ge steps to have emersency response and require the additional protection. maintaining an up-to-date list of p law enforcement orBanizations alerted (15) Expansion ofresponse telephone numbers and contacts in our trail and on duty at the time spent fuel capabilities. Some comments propose a LLEAs. The sts shaments are made. significant expansion of capabilities for One comment points out that the case mdudint other comments suggest that the NRC responding to accidents or sabotage. f transconunental shipment, a very s haald adopt a mnservative policy with Hese comments suggest that all large number of LLEAs would have ~,- opulate nger respect toinformation on routes and emergency response units in all - Msdicuon along the route and that route of schedules.%ese comments suggest that communities along the route submit c ntacting all of them would not be feasible. to an en NRC withhold information on routes and response plans to the NRC for approval gush-hc schedules, pointing out that information Some comments suggest that all Under current practice, the NRC staff accoun' certified by the NRC would be valuable makes the initial contacts and emergency response units in all py to potendal saboteurs.uc cleo point out that it is a pn,comInentsCommunities along the route submit arrangements with LLEAs as part of the gamee nciple of ~ response plans to the NRC for approval appmval pmcess. Accordinh, ee infomu sea:rity that sensitive information c neerns set forth in the comment do not should be restricted to the minimum Some comments e uggest that these response unita should be required to 8ppear to be justified since the relevant docum j docum, "M of people. %ese comments conduct drills. Other commenta burdens have been assumed by the NRC suffici ! conclude that the NRC should restrict staff. Il7MTN"8858"f8 Ifh EEEA-highw ! dissemination of route and schedule p The r tr e de satamation to a limited number of information security concerns. Some ra I gical mleases. Some cmnments but n( cJeded and appointed state and local comments suggest that coordination

• u pl '

officials who should be requested or suggested that the shipper should with LLEAs along the route would be ptovi red to avoid mabg the provide an escort capable of handling tantamount to annoucing the route and g g,, p,g all emergency situations. Some would therefore be contrary to good ',elec 11 o, Current staff policy concerning comments also suggrst that the NRC information security practice. high infcrmation on routes and schedules is should help to develop these various During the coordination process, the seie i to penerally withhold this information emergency response units.Some NRC staffinforms LLEAs of the cha-l from pubbe disclosure. However, in one comments suggest that the shipper importance of protection of spent fuel Eui< recent specific instance. the Commission should be responsible for the and asks that the agercy not disclose ( dedded that information on staff. preparation of emergency plans,. hile sensitive information, such as routes, w cppoved routes should not be withheld. others suggest that the NRC shoud be that would be helpful to a saboteur. ne co; It noted. bowever, that the decision was nsponsible. Some comments ask that agencies have generally been in-ca. case-specfic and should not be provisions be made forlocal cooperative. Accordingly, NRC practices re considered a precedent. g vernments to appmve hcensee were not changed as a result of the e, (13) Consolidatednotice. So ne emergency response procedures and suggestion. c, cnraments note the pmliferation oflocal emergency plans. (18) LLEA capabilities. One ardmancre requiring advance notice and %ese suggestions appear to be commenter notes his experience which t ask that the NRC establish in its rule prompted at least in part, by the suggests that LLEAs in heavily g sud: that only the NRC need be notified. pmvisions of10 CFR 7317(a)(6) which populated areas are unwilling or unable The NRC could then notify state and require a licensee to develop procedures to provide the additional protection Local asencies as it deems necessary. for coping with threats and safeguard suggested by the NRC for shipments Adoption of this suggestion would emergencies. As is noted in NUREG-through heavily populated areas. imply that the NRC rule preempts local 0561, the purpose of this requirement is NRC staff experience is at variance ordmances calling for advance to provide for the development of a plan with the experience of this commenter. not-iication of shipments. As was noted to be used by drivers, escorts, licensee Staff experience is that LLEAs have ccriier. the NRC has not yet contested personnel and other individuals been very cooperative in assisting in the locz! o dmances that regulate the involved in a shipment in case of protection of shipments of nuclear tr:=sportation of spent fuel. Although threats, attempted sabotage, or other materials. Also the rule a!!rws for ] this suggestion will not be adopted at events that jeopardize the security of a private armed escorts,instead of LLEA 1 this time. it will be re+ valuated when shipment.ne larger question of personnel, to be used to protect DOT routmg rules go into effect. emergency plans, emergency shipments. For these reasons, no

64) Neef forcompehensive study.

preparedness, emergency response and changes were made in the regulation or One com=ent suggests that a the like are judged to be beyond the the guidance as a result of this comment cocprehensive study of ports of entry scope of these interm safeguards (19) Roadshipments: Alternative for i=por. of spent fuel shipments and requirements. Recent staff views on routes. Some comments suggest that cubse:;ue:t routes is needed: the these questions are available in NRC route approval policy should pxposed principal criteria for selecGon AT/ REG-G35-Review and Assessment include approval of a reasonable

Federal Register / Vcl. 45. No.108 / Tu:sday, juna 9, S980TKWmr cuuwsm_ more appropritts. Comments clso point regulstion.The suggrstion t!nt the out that the two hour call-in schedule (if t--- L>c-cf attena ite routes he requiremints of to CFR 73.37(b)(1) be carrird cur) would requira extra stopa _.3.agges that the approvzls modified to make explicit that two for telephone calls thereby making the M r, aid mdef.nitely. properly trained truck drivers satisfy the shipment vulnerable to sabotage. c.. r.t s*af po' icy is to approve a-c-c!alte-ns*:ve routes. The actual requirement was not adopted because The two-hour call-in schedule has I the original phrasing already permits been reviewed with DOT. 1 Ne. of routes that can be approved that option.ne suggestion that two Representatives of DOT found nothing ~U cc::ru. luni'ed. Once a route is truck drivers rather than one should bein the requirement that was unsafe for a --md.me approval would remain required wa:, not adopted because there lone driver to carry out while driving or iL m ni new information su;; gestssppears to be no adequate safeguards that was in conflict with DOT e a;r;rovalshould be withdrawn. justification. De provision is alloweti to regulations. Accordingly,the two-hour - j g ;Roadshipments Rush-hour stand because it allow, greater call-in reqdirement is allowed to stand. ..a-re:en Ose comment suggests that in Dexibility for the licensee in designing - The Commission reaffirms its judgment me eve =t d routing through a heavny his security arrangements and it does ' that the benefits from two-hour call-ins p,p. lated area. the Miing shouldc,s panned so as to avoid the local rusi-protection arrangements. e instances whee the vehicle must be I not sacrifice the effectiveness of _. - justify the additionalrisk of those. ma He NRC agrees with the comment e W trdc. ' i-that shipment v61cles should be@r stopped and the call-in done by f ne staH perfonns route surveys. - - 'V conventional telephone.- % l ochdmg route seveys through heav0y operated safely. However, the rule was - (25) Road shipments: Citir. ens band C ;j not changed because the subject of safe (CB) todio. Some comments suggest that-' pop lated areas, and==%e :arregesacets withIlIAs =lang the o;; driving is not within the scope of this - A there is no assurance that CB i:antacts vore of the shipments for their response physicalprotection rule changeWproceeding.9m6 e #M. canbe made and therefore therequire c'. - no as m g y or a call for assish t d' Rus-hour concerns are tak,n into e (23)Roadshipments: Escorts. Some - shipment vehicle is superBuous. Other " ctreunt darms this plaantag a r. comments suggest that the regulation 1 comments note that the designated j m l:3) Road shipments:Routeplanmng. should be changed to always require an - control location is not required to be Soce comments masend that the. escort vehicle to accompany the' : n' equipped with a CB radio and ask that inicrmatica given in the guidance - ship'nent vehicle; other commentskr F the NRC reconsider whether a potential i cocament and in the related referencecontend that an escort vehicle is O'd saboteur could gain advantage from this dcennents does not provide detail undesirable because it increases the " ' situation. ruficient to distinguish end select likelihood of an accident.Some' A requirement for CB radio is j i comments are concerned that the dutiesincluded in recognition of the fact that hig-way routea. ne sta!Iagrees with the comments. assigned to drivers and escorts in the - CB radio offers an inexpensive beck-up but notes that the Census Bureau data W P regulation and guidance would to the primary communication system. cupplemented by local road maps jointly V overwhelm the drivers and escorts for' It is true that there is no guarantee l preide a.ufLcient basis for route shipmentslonger thanone day.One 'that a CB contact can be established in - selection. Furthermore the revised rule comment proposes that the NRC should : license escorts and te ellcws greater use ofinterstate assistance.On the otherhand.the highways,which should make route Finally.some comments suggest that selection asser. Accordingly.no more than one escort might be needed' adversary is faced with a back-up communications system that he can cheges were made in the regulation or for extended stopovers. ' neither ignore nor readily defeat. The gui6-as a result of this comment. The Commissionhas decided that the - CB requirement is included because it, (2) Roadshipments: Drivers. Some current level of protection,which * - in some measure reduces an co=nents suggest that the NRC should permits a single vehicle system to be adverse y'slikelihood of success. Also, coder more closely with the DM used outside of heavily populated areas. CB radio is useful for communication ina!much as it appears that some driver is adequate. In addition. a second escort among the escort vehicles and shipment I req. ire ne=ts imposed by NRC are in or other added safeguards measures are vehicle and can be used in most heavily codlict with DOT requirements. One required for transiting urban areas.The populated areas to contact the LLEA. comment suggests that 1D CFR Commission has also decide'd that theHowever, because the transmission g 73r[b)(1) be modeed to speafy two duties of the drivers and escorts are - range of CB radio is short comparedI traned dnvers rather than one-straigh*-forward; that the training with the likely distance that shipments Comments suggest thr.t in view of ti e t program as revised (Appendix D of to, will be transported. there is no potmtial conseqeences from accidents. CFR part 73) is adequate. With respect requirement for a CB radio to be dmers should operate spent fuel. to the size of the escort force. the Installed in the controllocation. sh; ment vehicles in he safest and most regulation specifies the number. (26) Roll shipments: Special trains. reassu-ing way in order to instill public capabilites, and duties of personnel who Some comments urge the use of special codidence. are to be on duty at any one time; itis trains to transport spent fuel rail casks. With respect to the coordination the obligation and responsibility of the These comments contend that special sugzestion, the staff notes that in licensee to provide a force size sufficient trains have the following advantages: accordanz with the terms of a to provide for relief and rest periods. The requirements of to CFR 7).37(c) are Menoran:ium of Understanding, the (24) Rood shipments: Coll-in schedule. difficult for regular trains but can be laust version of which was published in ' Some comments contend that the two-handled readily by special trains. the Federal Register on july 2,1979, the hour call in schedule required by 10 CFR Special train speeds are lower and can NF.C and DM have ag eed to advise 73.37(b)(2) is not practicable: they argue be tailored to circumstances. Special crd consdt with one another before that carrying out the requirements trains are shorter than regular trains elder iss es a new regulation.This would violate DOT regulations by with the advantage that " burying" the p rcedu~ was followed before issuance disturbing the co-driver's rest period ch shipment car under other cars in the o! nis reclation.The DOT review did long trips.The comments suggest that an event of an eccident islesslikely; this ; nr reved any c llicts between DOT eight-hour call-in schedule would be re;Jatia s and C NRCinterim s e e y-

4e8 Federal Register / Vzl. 45, No.106 / Tuesday, June 3,1980 / Rul s cnd Regul:tions feature, the mmments crgue, would be n:cded for effectiva surv:ilhnce. Ona the regul: tion or the guidrnce as a result accessible ? w y signincant in the event of a fire. A comment points out that no existing of this comment. shielding. 5 s;ecial train o!Iers better observation of spent fuel rail cask car provides for an The following modifications to the or make ar 11.e shipment car.Most railroad escort within the car, as is implied by rule have been coordinated with the the proper n=idents occur in tsu yards and special the guidance document and the Department of Transportation in protection trains s;cr.d less time in rail 3 ards than regulation. Finally, some comments accordance with the Memorandum of material d ' d: regiar trains. Special trains have request that the NRC consider speed Understanding between NRC and DOT obiectives - psorry in use of track over regular restrictions for spent fuel shipments and that was published in the Federal (i) Mini! trains. IWular trains could enneaivably reconsider its decision not to require Register on July 2,1979. The Department radioIOS C I carry spent fuel together with other surveillance while the train is movine of Transportation has determined that shipments hazardous material, sudi as explosives particularly while the train is moving the NRC rule is not in conflict with ulatec p cr inflar=mables,in ddierent cars of the very slowly. current DOT regulations. ii) Fac-same train; this sittation would not One of the fundamental protection Rese amendm,nts to the interim Imal recovery oc::ur wi:h a special train. measures is that an escort should rule are being published in effective may havi Special routing is possible tc avoid always be present near the shipraent, form subject to codincation.In the unauthor ra:1 yards and heavily pgulated areas. Independent of the locatian of the train Federal Register notice issuing the (2)To' Fcally, the probability of certain classes and inAanandant of whether the train is interim finalrule(44 Mt34406). physical of train erwa% such as bsake failure moving. Accordmaly, the suggestion that comments wem requested on the rule (i) Pre or raDroad crossing -cama. is lower an escort is not needed while the train is even though it was pubhshed in essessm because special trains are sbarter than moving was rejected. effective form. It is thonecomments - unautho - - reaclar traans. One intent of the requirement is that a received that haveled to the spent fu Other comments take the opposite stopped ahipmenicar always be under amendments being made here. it is as if tii) Pr view and saggest that the use of regolar observation; it is the responsibility of. comments had been received on a appropt trains forspent fuelshipmmis is thelicensee to provide an escort forte proposed rule. Accordmgly,the fuel shi l entirely satisfactory for the fouowing sufficiently large to meet that intent. Commission for good cause finds that (iii)h j reasoanne likelihood of hi}acking a .The ob.iect of the observation further notice and public procedum is sabot,ai repubr train from a low poplatics: to a requirement is the early detection of heevd): unnecessary, high population area is remote in the -circumstances that threaten de? berate Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of illicitly erreme.Special trains have no damage to the shipment in a heavily 1954, as amended, the Energy heavdl pcheshr advantage in avmding high populated area. Lighting in heavily Reorganization Act of1974, as amended, forces population areas. Special trains, as now populated areas is expected to be and sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the (b)( proposed, would be stopped to yield sufficient for this purpose. riant-of-way to regular trains. With respect to the comment United States Code,the foHowing the Pe amendments to Title 10, Chapter 1. Code (a) oO NRC approval of altemative routes concerning the escort in the same rail of Federal Regulations, Part 73, are syster would provide adequate response to the car with the spent fuel cask, the urr.ertalaties of weather, rail damage, guidance document was written so ai published as a document subject to anan[ codification. III ~ and othe unenntroUable inDuences. not to preclude the escort from ridica in

1. Soction 73.1 of to CFR Part 73 is Wck A regular trainin a rail yard would be a rail car containing a spcnt fuel cask.

urx!er surv mance by the escort and the The staff had in mind a small cask in amended by revising paragraph (b)(5) to adva-read as foDows: accm rafh oad police. Special trains have no which slightly greater than exempted GI sdranlage in rwnmunica hnm quantities of spent fuel might be shipped $ 73.1 Purpose and Scop. circu mcreover, rail trafIic contro!Iers always rather than a typical rail cask containing + dam krmw the apprnemate location of their up to ten fuel assemblies. (b) Scope. * *

• with trains.

The Commission has recognized the (5) This part also applies to the (3 Needed protection requirements for need for surveiHance capabilities while shipment of irradiated reactor fuel in that ' ra" shipcents can be met by regular trains are moving. and has reflected this quantities that in a single shipment both pres: trrdns. Accadingly, the suggestion that in the regulation. exceed 100 grams in net weigh

• of veh the regulations be modified to require irradiated fuel, exclusive of cladding or SPe th? use of special trains was rejected.

(29) Railshipments: Strengthening of other structaral or packaging material, ad. (27) Railshipments: Arrnagements requirementsproposed. One comment and have a totsl redistion dose in the wfh LTIt. Some ocmments suggest that asserts that spent fuel shipments by excess of100 rems per hour at a shi errangements with 1. LEAS are needed road are inherently unsafe and that distance of 3 feet frora any accessible ( ody when a shipment caris stopped in shipments should be made by rail. The surface without intervening shielding exi a rail 3 a:d This suggestion was not comment contends that curres ad:pted because it would be capabilities for the safety and protection

2. Section 73.37 of10 CFR Part 73 is I

revised to read as foHows: in:casistent with the fundamental of rail shipments are inadequate and prectica measure that an escort should identifies numerous areas where he 6 73.37 Requirements for physical ag always be present with a spent fuel believes improvements are needed. protection of irradiated reactor fuel in as sh'pment and that escort should be able The Commission disagrees with the transit. to reques* and obtain assistance from view that spent fuel shipments by road (a) Performance objectives. (1) Each de the LIIA independent of the location of the shipme.nl ' are inherently unsafe. The comment licensee who transports, or delivers to a p-does not provide an adequate carrier for transport,in a single Cr Ac.7 shipments: Escorts. Some justification for the extreme measures shipment, a quantity ofirradiated a c._:.ents contend that escorts are not proposed pensining to rail shipments. .gactor fuelin excess of 100 grams in ret 8 re-ded when a train is moving. Other The Commission has no new peight ofirradiated fuel, exclusive of I cc. menu point out that more than one information to modify its current view cladding or other structural or packaging ( es:cri w.~ be needed to provide that spent fuel shipments can be moved material-which has a total external 2 sr.eCance dring extended stopovers safely on the existing rail system. radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems ani that speciallighting might be Accordingly, no changes were made to per hour at a Wstance of 3 feet from any

l Federal Register / Vcl. 45. No.108 / Tu:sdry, Juna 3.1980 / Rul:s ind Reguliti:ns 37409 8 *'# grcessib!e surface without intervening (5) Provide for maintenance of a (iii) Escorted as set forth in parageph 5-je ding. shall establish and maintain, writtenlog by the escorts and (c)(1)of this section. ge,

c. male arrangements for. and assure communications center personnel, for (3) Escorts have the capability of

..e p operimplementation of a physical each spent fuel shipment, which will communicating with the mtection system for shipments of such include information describing the communications center. locallaw hf .Esterial that will achieve the following shipment and significant events that enforcement agencies, and one another. objectives: occur during the shipment, and will be through the use of: (i) Hmmne the possibilities for available for review by authorized NRC (i) A citizens band (CB) radio P*' radiological sabotage of spent fuel personnel for a period of at least 2 year available in the transport vehicle and in U shpments especially within heavily following completion of the ' shipment. each escort vehicle: (6) Provide that arrangements have (ii) A radiotelephone or other NRC-p,pulated areas; and (ii) Facilitate the location and been made with locallaw enforcement approved equivalent means of two-way ncovery of spent fuel shipments that agencies along the routes ofsoad and voice communications available in the tr.ay have mme under the controlofr rail shipments, and at U.S. ports where - transport vehicle or in an escort vehicle esauthorized persons..~ c:/ m e vessels carrying spent fuel shi =""'* 17 committed to travel the entire toute; and P (2)To achieve these objectives, the are dar+=d.for their response to anv. <. (iii) Citizensband (CB) radio and " physical protection shalb us t9 emergency ora call for assistanr= u!. .. (7) Provide for advance approvalby~. normallocallaw enforcement agency " I' (i) Provide for early detection anil 2 i a-== ment of attempts totain v.1 the NRC of the routes used for road and, radio communicationsin any locallaw . enforcement agencymobile units used T < " usauthortzed access to, or control ove. ;r, - rails %"= cispent fuel, and of anye for escort puW'"*" " ' ' ' '.' ~ s;ent fuel shipments:o 7.ve.v. m <.. - U.S. ports where vessels carrying spent r.(4) The transport is MiulppedOith'W ~ of (ii) Provide for notiScation to the.,:r. fuel shipments are scheduled to stop.ig NRC-approved features that permit **

• c;propnate response forces of any spent

-{8) Provide that shipments areD--# inebuization of de cab orwg fuel shipment sabotage attempts:and planned so that scheduled, intermedia.te - canying portion of the vehicle., ihas._ - t (iii) Impede attempts at radiological. stops are avoided to the extenbW~ - [5]The transp'ott vehicle drive sabotage or spent fuel nipments within practicable. ~ e heav0y gr pulated areas. or attempts to (9) Provide thit'at fe'ast'o'n'e escort. been familiarized with, and is capa_ble.,'of 2 e port c!e

of ilicitly move such shipments into maintains visual surveillance of the

[ heavily populated areas.until response shipment during periods when the - and g x.. other security procedures. ~. shipment vehicle is stopped, or*he ed. forces arrive. r be-(b) Generalrequirements. To achieve shipment vesselis docked." > " - .(d) Shipment.s byrod. In addition to. n the promons of paragraph (b). the. s. the performance objectives of paragraph '(10) Provide that escorts'(other than P ysical protechon system for any - h le (a)of this section a physicalprotection members oflocallaw enforcement r r rtion of a spent fuel shipment that is-arranged for, by the licensee shalb unarmed escorts) have successfully - {y rau shall provide that- - sptem established and maintained. or ' agenciesfor ship's officers serving as (1) Provide for notification of the : " completed the training required by% (1) A shipment carwithin a heavily-- Appendix D of this part. wws m Populated area is accompanied by two - Nsclear Regulatory CommI== ion in-a advance of each shipment. In. (11) Provide that shipment escorts. 4 armed escorts (who may be members of a:cordance with I 73.72 of this part. .. make cads to the communications center a locallaw enforcementagency),at (2) Indude procedures for coping with at least every 2 hours to advise of the : least one of whom,is stationed ata - ~ crcumstances that threaten deliberate. status of the shipment for road and rail locationon the tram that wul permit - Amage to a spent fuel ship sent and shipments, and for sea shipments whue observation of the shipment. car while in with other safeguards =merancies. shipment vessels are docked at U.S. . - motion. 3.t. -.s (2) A shipment car not within any (3) Include instructions for each escort ports' Shipments byiood. In addition toheavily populated area i, accompanied. that, upon detection of the abnormal s (c) p esence of miauthorized persons, the provisions of paragraph (b), the by at least one escort stationed at a. vehicles or vessels in the vicinity of a. physical protection system for any. . location on the train that wal permit s;ent fuel shipment. or upon detection of portion of a spent fuel shipment that is observation of the shipment car while in - motion.. a deliberately induced situation that has by road shall provide that:' w o r, (3) Escorts have the capabuity of the potential for damaging a spent fuel (1) A transport vehicle within a commumcating with the sEpment the escort wilh heavily populated area is:.. (i) Determine whether or not a threat (i) Occupied by at least two - communications center and locallaw Individuals, one of whom serves as enforcement agencies through the use of exists: (ii) Assess the extent of the threatlif' escort, and escorted by an armed a radiotelephone.or other NRC-ary; member of the locallaw enforcement approved equivalent means of two-way (iii) Inform locallew tafercement agency in a mobile unit of such agency; voice communications, which shallte - l caendes of the threat and request 1 or... +t ... available on the train. - - - rasistance; and - (ii) 14d by a separate vehicle occupied (e) Shipments bysea. In addition to (iv) Implement the procedures by at least one armed escort and trailed the provisions of paragraph (b), the developed in acx:ordance with by a third vehicle occupied by at leest physical protection system for any paragraph (b)(2) of this section. one armed escort. portion of a spent fuel shipment that is (4) Include a communications center (2) A transport vehicle not within any by sea shall provide that: a: a desq;nated location. which will be heavily populated area is: (1) A shipment yessel, while docked at staffed continuously by at least one (i) Occupied by at least one driver and a U.S. port within a heavily populated idvidual who will monitor the progress one other individual who serves as area,is protected by: of the spent fuel shipment and will escort: or (i) Two armed escorts stationed on c:tify the appropriate agencies in the (ii) Occupied by a driver and escorted board the shipment vessel, or stationed event a safeguards emergency should by a separate vehicle occupied by at on the dock at a location that will pe mit asse. least two escorts: or observation of the shipment vessel: 2r l

WJiL9 LSMEesister / V:1. 45. No.108 [ *nadry. June 3,1980 / Rnits e e._ (ii) A member of a locallaw P:rts 95 and 140 of its regulitions. This I 95.39 External transmisanon of ~ 6 enforcetnent agtncy, equipped with action was t Lin in regard to all other documents and material . marginal normal LIIA ridio communications, parts of the Commission's regulations on a to 10 pt who is stationed on board the shipment March 24.1980 (45 FR 18905). Parts 95 w {c) Methods of Transportation the great institute vessel, or on the dock at a location that and 140 wereinadvertently excluded will permit observation of the shipment from that previous action. These minor (2) * *

• First Class, express, or-g-ossIM !

umo@l '

vessel, amendments reflect the provisions of the certifi2d mail may be used in

- resident < (2) A shipment vessel.while within U.S. territonal waters, or while docked Panama CanalTreaty of 1977 and the transmission of Confiden'ial documents o!Tices c recently enacted Panama Canal Defense at a U.S. port not within a heavily Act of1979. Under the Act and the to Puerto Rico or any United States an evah pope'sted area, is accompanied by an Treaty, the U.S. Government territory or possession. other cri : escort whomay be an ofScerof the rehnquished jurisdiction over the determr sh.pmant vessel's crew. who will assura Panama Canal Zone to the Republic of PART 140-FINANCIAL PROTECTION and. get reserve ; that the shipment is unloaded only as Panama.These amendments revise REQUIREMENTS AND INDEMNITY liabilit2 cuthanzad by the Ir-n=== portions of the Commission's regulations AGREEMENTS per ce (3)Escarts have the capability of to reflect the sevrsed status of the Canal mmmrminating with the Zone. c.1. 5114052-140.95,141ai. [. g7FECT enmmanmatinna mnt,r and locallaw

• 'w 140. catAmsended]

for mar enforwment agencia= through the use of arrsCTwsmam ' une M980. } ,,33t, yy

1. Part 140is amsaded byrevismg the o radiotelephone, or other NRC.

Foo FURTMER INFORs4ATION CONTACn defmMan of "Unitml States" wherever ' beginn rpprovedequivalent means of two-way Joseph M.Felton, Director, Division of appears, namely in each of the followin8 margir voice - - M n= during ~ Rules and Remrds. Office of - sections: May 2 AppemAu Dof 19 CFR Part 73 1 Amended) Administraten.U.S. Nuclear Regalatory

a. $ se92. Article L paragsph10 m

b. i 140.93. Article L paragraph 10

,,,,g

3. Appendix D of10 CHL Part 73 is Commission, Washington, DC 20555

c. i140.94. Article L paargraph 9. '

Gilbet emended by adding a paragraph at the Telephone 301-492-7211. . d. I140.95. ArticleL -rm 9 Coum end, as follows: suPermirrARY LNFORMADOh:Under i the Panama CanalTreaty of1977,the

e. l 140.107, Article L paragraph 9 Pdecl s

f. 5140.108, ArticleJ. paragraph 9 0gyg

• ne Bansee ls afro mquired to assure diat territoryof the.formerPanama Canal Thedefining sentenceis revised to Igi armed indrviduals serMng as sh@ ment Zone hacame subject to the jurisdu-tinn read as follows:

D C.'*l esarrts. oever than esembers of local law of the RepublicofPanama on October 1 " United States", when used in a sUPP;I enformersia agendes. heve.

ua -

197s.The Treety, and the recently geographical sense, includes Puerto Rim Octo weapons ar-ame and W~ea program equrvalent to that rogamd of guards. as enacted Panama Canal Defense Act of. and all territories and possessions of the am,er descnbed in W and IV of Appendix B of this 1979 (P.L. 96-70) passed on September United States, to tu-part. to naa-that each auch individual is 27,1979, aUPersede all previous "P"' N legislation. Thus, all referenms in the (Sec.181 Pub.L 88-703.88 StatJD48(42 requ .. Atomic Energy Act to the Canal Zone as UAC. 2204, sec. an, as amended, Pub. L sa-bY w $73.72 (Amsededt being jurisdictionally part of the United 438. 88 stat.1242142 USEsa4211 men 4."1%e first sentenceof 5 73.721s States are no longer valid. Therefore, the Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this Zad day bE" ' of hiay1sen. Stat,j

t. mended by adding the phrase "or spent Nuclear Regulatory Commissionis fuel required to be protected under the deleting references to the Canal Zone For the Nuclear Regulatory r*==6 ban Wmiam J.h C"

pmyrsons of I 73.77,* after the words from Parts 95 and 140 of its regulations special nuclear material of moderate in Title 10, Chapter 1 of the Codeof Actig aecutive DimeforforOpemtions. W mst strategic si-nikan~". Federal Regulations. p .m %. (Secs. 53 telh.1811. Pub. L 83-703, es Stat. Since these amandments am sumo coon- "\\ suo. 94P. 949; Sec. 201. Pub. L 93-438. 88 Stat. corrective and relate solely to minor 1242-1243 (c US.C. :o:'s,2:01,584111 ' procedural matters, notice of proposed FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Dated at Washington, D.C. this 27th day of rulemaking and public procedure SC uay,1sso. thereon are unnecessary and good cause 12 CFR Part 204 Pe! For the UX Nuclear Regulatory exists to make the amendments effeche Comnussion. upon publication in the Federal Register. IReg. D; Docket No.R-0304] t Sammiel J. Ch;m, Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of Membt:r Banks; Marginal Reserve. ff Secreta.y af the Coranussion. 1954, as amended, the Energy Requirements or an ec n 52 o Ti of e AGENCY: Board of Governors of the bc United States Code, the following Federal Reserve System. le amendments to Title 10. Chapter 1, Code ACTION: Final rule. i 10 CFR Parts 95 and 140 of Federal Regulations. Parts 95 and 140 are published as a document subject t

SUMMARY

On October 6.1979, the Board Deletion of Reference to Panama codification.

of Governors amended Regulation D to a Cana! Zone; Minor Amendments establish an 8 per cent marginal reserve h PART 95-SECURITY FACILITY Commission. requirement on the amount by which the Agency: U.S. NuclearJtegulatorv APPROVAL AND SAFEGUARDING OF total of managed liabilities af member a T NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION banks (and Edge and Agreement i ACnoac Final rule. AND RESTRICTED DATA Corporations) and certain United States I muu airy: The Nuclear Regulatory 1.The second sentence of paragraph branches and agencies of foreign banks I Comnussion (NRC)is deleting (c)(2) of 5 95.39 is tevised to read as exceeds the amount of an institution's I. referen:es to the Panama Canal Zone in follows: base of managed liabilities. On March 14,1980, the Board acted to increase the .}}