ML19317H476
| ML19317H476 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1980 |
| From: | Kepford C KEPFORD, C. |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| ALAB-486, NUDOCS 8006090199 | |
| Download: ML19317H476 (9) | |
Text
'
Y
- p..
ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION ON NUCLEAR POWER Cecires ors: Mr. George Boomeme-R.D. et, Peach Bottom, Pe. t 7563 717-548 2836 Dr. Judith Johnsrud-433 Ortendo Avenue, State College, Pa.16801 7 3900 D
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM4ISSION DOCKETED 9
USNRo Before the Appeal Board k
MY 21980 > [
O!! ice of the Secretu7 S
Ddeting & Senice In the Matter of er 4
Docket No. 50-320 q,
g, MF.TROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et,al.
)
~
(-Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, )
Unit No. 2)
)
INTERVENORS' MEMORANDUM ON' AIRCRAFT CRASH For the convenience of this Board, the Intervenors will first list the major points made by the witnesses fo'. the NRC Staff and the now suspended r
licensee before the TMI Licensing Board:
1.
The radiological consequences to the publ'ic of a large aircraft (larger than design-basis aircraft) crashing into TMI-2 are conceded by all parties to exceed the unacceptable values specified in 10 CFR 100 (tr. 541-3, 659-60,709-10,727-8).
All witnesses for the St'ff and the now-suspended licensee 2.
a either alluded to or specifically stated that all large aircraft which use Harrisburg International Airport (H.I.A.)-
proceed in landings and take-off by straight line approaches; that is, approaches which followed the runway center-line-extended past TMI-2 (tr. 567, 602-3, 611.-12, 613-14, 652-3, 686-88).
3.
There are inherent uncertainties in the use of computational models for calculating large aircraft crash probabilities at TMI (tr. 562, 607,653-4).
4.
Error bands or confidence limits have no meaning as here applied to the models which the Staff and the suspended licensee used to compute the probability of an aircraft crash into TMI (tr. 562,
~
607,653-4).
5.
Staff Witness Read conceded that the numbers which are computed by the use of models are not to be used as true numbr.rs and have little credibility (tr. 654,673,684).
6..
Both witnesses agreed that the probability of a large aircraft crashing into TMI-l or TMI-2 was twice that calculated for TMI-2 (tr. 579, 708-9).
7.
Witness Vallance stated that he doubted if records were kept to indicate when aircraft have flown directly over the TMI site -
(tr. 612-13).
G
8.
Witness Vallance reported that about 70% of the operations at
{
""H.I.A. use runway 31, 30% use runway 13, and that take-offs and
?
landings are distributed evenly (prepared testimony, p. 5.)
9.
Staff witness Reid acknowledged "At present there is no agreed way of designing a rigid structure, steel reinforced structure, against aircraft impact." tr. 624).
Read further stated, when asked if there was any guar (antee that TMI could withstand impact of a 200,000 lb. aircraft (the aircraft for which the plant has allegedly been designed), that no testing of a large aircraft against a rigid, steel reinforced concrete structure has been performed since immediately following World War II (which ended August, 1945)(tr. 631).
,These references to the Licensing Board hearings are, of course, already familiar to the Appeal Board, which examined this subject in ALAB-486.
We also refer the Appeal Board to our discussion of the aircraft impact issue in our January 30, 1978, Brief in Support of Exceptions to the Initial Decision in the THI-2 case, and to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Sharfman from ALAB-486.
The issuance of ALAB-486 and the Order of the Comissioners of the NRC, dated September 15, 1978, placed both the NRC Staff and the now-suspended
{
licensee on notice that a much higher standard of analysis would be necessa resolve the aircraft impact issue satisfactorily than had been initially provided by Staff and now-suspended licensee.
In a split decision, this Board pemitted the operation of TMI-2 pending the resolution of this issue.
In December,1978, further evidentiary hearings were held before this Appeal Board.
The Intervenors will next sumarize the major points made in that proceeding.
(Transcript references are to the December 11 and 12,1978, hearings.):
~
1.
Both witnesses for the Staff and the now-suspended licensee used only i
aircraft crashes within 5 miles of the end of the runway (Vallance i
testimony, page 5 (Dec. 8,1978, revision); NRC Staff tesimony, November 17,1978, p. 6; tr. 48).
i 2.
Numerous witnesses testified as to the approaches used by large aircraft to H.I.A. (Vallance, prepared testimony, p.17; Wright, tr. 221 (see also tr. 285); Caval, tr. 250 and.260-1; Vallance.
tr. 370; Eisenhut, tr. 462,465-6).
Witness Kaplan confimed that the valuesfor the probability of a 3.
large aircraft crashing into TMI-2 that were used in his calculations are fictional (tr. di-2,178).
4.
The calculations used by the NRC Staff to detemine the cross-sectional area of TMI-2 which may be intercepted ' i an oncoming plane c
are based only upon assumotions about the way large aircraft fly in the vicinity of TMI (Eisenhut testimony, Appendix A), not upon fact.
5.
The calculations used by the now-suspended licensee to detemine the cross-sectional plane involve a now-forgotten angle of approach by a large (tr. 145-6).
_ _..., _,. _ _ _ ~,. _ _.
~.
3 I*
6.
The now-suspended licensee made no attempt to verify any of the information given it by the FAA at H.'I.A. regarding aircraft -
movements at H.I.A. (tr. 80-1).
7.
The witnesses for the now-suspended licensee both admitted that they did not know how accurate were the distance and angle values for the aircraft crash data which they had used in calculating' crash probabilities (tr. 127-130).
8.
Staff Witness Byers conceded that there are no rules which would prohibit any aircraft from flying over the TMI site (tr. 298).
9.
Witness Byers testified that large aircraft training flights use H.I.A. (tr. 321 ).
- 10. Witness Vallance testified that if heavy aircraft flew over TMI-2, the estimated crash probability would increase (tr. 370-1).
- 11. Witneis Eisenhut. testified'that about 65% of all landings and 35% of all take-offs from H.I.A. use the TMI end of the runway at H.I.A. (prepared testimony,'p.11-12).
' 12. Witness Eisenhut stated that the estimated probability of a large aircraft crash into either of the two reactors at the TMI site'is about twice the estimated probability calculated for TMI-2 (tr. 488-9, see also tr. 513).
- 13. Witness Eisenhut acknowledged that the crash of a heavy aircraft into TMI-2 would cause radiological consequences greater than the values given in 10 CFR 100 (tr. 493).
- 14. Witness Eisenhut admits that the NRC Staff cannot quanti.fy the inherent structural capability, if any, of TMI-2 to withstand a large aircraft crash (tr. 495).
- 15. Questions concerning< qualification testing of steel reinforced con-crete structures were disallowed (tr. 497-8).
Following the December 1978' hearings,'and with dhe pemission of the Appeal Board, the Intervenors filed a nxition and two affidavits concerning aircraft flight patterns.
The infomation presented in these affidavits was based upon conversa-tions with aircraft pilots who had flown iiito H.I.A., and was strikingly different from any information that the Staff of now-suspended-licensee had presented previously The affidavits also contradicted much of the case that the several witnesses for the Staff and suspended-licensee had tried to establish on the record.
It would ignore the representations contained in the Intervenors' affidavits because the informants who contradicted prior testimony requested that their identities remain confidential (pages 6-7), subsequent hearings held in Fe' ruary 1980 supported the b
~
major points set forth in the affidavits and undermined the reliability and credi-bility of the prior Staff and now-suspended-licensee testimony.
Aff,idavits stated that TMI is a very distinctive visual landmark that used by pilots as a measure of distance and direction for visual approac runway 31 at H.I.A.
The affidavits also stated that large aircraft previously not identified by the Staff or Suspended-Licensee, Boeing 747's, use H have flown directly over TMI on visual approach to runway.31.
~707s were said to have been flown directly over the TMI site Similarly, Boeing r.unway 31.
These facts were never even hinted at by witnesses for the Staff or suspended-licensee.
With the exception of the point made in the affidavits that larger than design basis aircraft have directly overflown TMI, every one points made in the Intervenors' affidavits was confirmed by the pilots airline flights who appeared at the February 1980 hearing.
Furthermore, although these pilots stated that they personally had not overflown TMI in large none of them indicated that such overflights were generally prohibited or r
oscur in the case of other pilots of scheduled airline flights.
The February 1980 hearing confimed that B oeing 747s, the largest c aircraft in the world, operate out of H.I.A.
That this basic fact had heretofore eluded the previous witnesses for the Staff and suspended-licensee in its suggests that witnesses for these parties either comitted perjury or else nev previously investigated the aircraft impact issue with requisite care that is necessary to protect the public health and safety.
During the several years that have intervened since this issue was first raised in 1974 and despite t which the Appeal Board and the Commissioners have shown, neither Suspended-Licensee bother even to find out which kinds of larger than aircraft actually use H.I.A.
At the February 1980 hearing, the pilots confirmed that visual take-o I
landing conditions generally prevail on runway 31 at H.I.A. Since visual landing and take-off consumes less time and lesser' amounts of fuel than land offs which rely exclusively upon instrumentation to determine flight pat pilots prefer to approach and leave the airport by visually determin I
Staff are in order.Certain observations concerning the choice of the pilots sel on a revenue producing flight (tr. 545). Captain Billie, of TWA had never flown Staff testimony, evidently not updated. airline not listed by th Ufford, page 1).
See also, prepared answers of Captain
(February 1980, tr. 577).
Although the pilots which were selected to testify by the Staff stated that they, in particular, do not directly overfly the plant, they did not deny that other pilots overfly the plant, nor did they indicate that scheduled airlines are prohibited from directly overflying the TMI site (tr. 548-2 566).
These pilots did, however, otherwise completely contradict the basis for the prior Staff and Suspended-licensee testimony on the aircraft impact issue.
The earlier Staff and Suspended-licensee witnesses unifomly agreed, before the Licensing Board, that all large aircraft using H.I.A. proceed in landings and takeoff by straight-line approaches, which follow the runway center-line-extended past TMI.
By contrast, in the February 1980 hearings the pilots themselves revealed'that the assumption of straight-line approaches to H.I.A. is erroneous, since they themselves, when approachiG H.I.A. from the west, fly in a U-shaped fashion amund TMI (tr. 558,570,582).
The mathematical calculations on which the Staff and now-Suspended Licensee relied are therefore irrelevant. The assumptions which they relied upon are not substantiated, and in fact are contradicted, first, by the Intervenors' affidavits, and, second, by the actual evidence of how pilots who operate into and oi[t of H.I.A. select their flight paths.
The Staff and Suspended-Licensee models, by assuming a straight-line approach, also assumed that only at one single tangential point would the aircraft j
come as close as 1 miles from the reactor site.
Since aircraft approach TMI in U-shaped configurations, however, the aircraft are close to TMI not only at one point but at every point in the U-shaped approach.
Witness Beuerlein even noted in a map (NRC Staff Exhibit No. 4) that as he ' approaches the airport he flies in semi-circular fashion around TMI using a. semi-circle with an approximate radius of 3/4 of a mile, half the distance which the Staff and Suspended-licensee wanted this Board to assune was the closest a large aircraft would ever intend to fly near TMI.
Since all three of the comercial airline' pilots who testified at the February 1980 hearing fly in a U-shaped fashion ar~tnd TMI, any previous calculations made with the Staff and now-Suspended licensee's models must be discarded as having been contradicted by evidence of the actual flight patterns used by the pilots themselves.
The pilots presented by the Staff at the February 1980 hearing should also not be assumed to be a representative sample of all pilots who fly heavy aircraft to and fmm H.I.A.
As stated in our affidavits, and as supported by the testimony of Dr. Johnsrud during the February 1980 hearing, large aircraft may directly overfly TMI on a mgular basis (tr. 607-8).
Until the Staff and Suspended-licensee determine l how planes in fact do fly in and out of the airport, rather than relying simply upon
~
self-serving assumptions, guesses, misinfonnation, or general incompetence, they are
f-6 f
calculating with imaginary numbers for the purpose of deception..Until one knows how aircraft approach and leave H.I.A., any discussion of the inethodology used the Staff and Suspended-licensee to calculate probabilities is premature.
The Staff and now-suspended licensee have chosen to ignere the actual facts that are pertinent to this proceeding for over 12 years.
The February hearings were held on February 25 1980, yet neither the Staff nor the Suspended-licensee endeavored even to obtain t
l updated informationsuch as the actual number of heavy aircraft which used H.I.A. in 1979.
Nor, despite the Comissioners' directive that they specifically investigate "whether, and if so, how often the Three Mile Island site is overflown," did the
{
make more than a feeble attempt to determine prior to the February 1980 hearing flight patterns are actually used in take-off and landings at H.I.A.
There is no policy prohibiting overflights of TMI-2.
To the contrary, as stated in our affidavits and supported by the testimony of Dr. Johnsrud, overflight do in fact occur. Furthemore, as Staff witness Read stated befom the TMI lice board, it is not even known whether the containment could withstand a design basis I
aircraft crash, since testing of steel reinforced concrete structures has not occurrid since World War II.
The present condition of the TMI-2 reactor must now also be taken into account.
Them is no assurance that the TMI-2 containment structure is equal to its pre-accident strength, especially considering uncertainties over the magnitude of the pressure spike that occurred on the first day of the accident.
Mar':h 28,1979.
The uncertain condition of the TMI-2 core geometry in the aftemath of the accident raises further serious questions about the impact of even a jolt, such as could now occur if an aircraft of any size were to crash into the containment structure.
In view of the manifold uncertainties concerning the reactor vessel integrity, as well as the lack of redundant safety systems, there remains at best..
only the external shell to protect the pualic from the potentially disastrous consequences of an aircraft crash.
In addition, the demineralizer system of EPICOR-II is located in the Chemicals Handling Building, which is not hardened at all, although it contains highly contaminated resin filters as well as radioactive water.
t Now, after thme sets of operating license hearings on the aircraft impact 1
issue, the Staff and Suspended-licensee must start over again by assembling the 4
basic raw data from which calculations can be properly made.
Until now, they have i
failed to determine the frequency with which planes intentionally fly closer than i
n 11s miles from the reactor, just as they have failed to investigate and ascertain the phenomenon and frequency of direct overflights of the reactor site.
4 A rigorous spotting program and careful questioning of all pilots who use the airport must be l
e undertaken. Belatedly, the Staff and Suspended-licensee have been forced to examine how the particular pilots who appeared at the February 1980 heaMng approach the H.I.A. runways. But the required investigation has only begun, since the Staff and Suspended-licensee have not examined how the other pilots who fly into and out of the airport actually approach the runways.
That heavy aircraft are used at H.I.A.
for training purposes (even for Boeing-747's) as was brought out during the February 1980 hearing (tr. 545-7) should be given special' attention to detEmine-whether a larger than usual probability of accidents is associated with training pmgrams.
(We note that the Commissioners' order suggested that the relevant data be analyzed "to give an estimate of the likelihood of crash by type of aircraft.")
The fundamental assumption' underlying the Staff, Suspended-licensee, Licensing Board, and prior Appeal Board conclusions on the aircraft impact issue was that planes do not intentionally approach takeoff and landing other than in the direction of a
' straight-line from the centerline of the runway. The Intervenors' affidavits and February 1980 hearing demonstrate clearly that this fundamental assumption cannot be supported in actual fact.
Indeed, the Intervenors' affidavits, confirmed by the February 1980 hearing, suggest than either gross incompetence has characterized the work of the prior Staff and Suspended-licensee witnesses in.this proceeding, or that there has been an intentional, massive, and coordinated attempt by these parties to withhold vital infonnation from the Licensir.g Board and this Appeal Board.
In any event, since the basic assumption which was used to support the granting of the operating license with respect to the aircraft impact issue has now been shown to be grossly in error, the operating license must imediately be revoked by crder of this Appeal Board. The operating license must also be withdrawn for the reasons which we advanced in our January 30, 1978, Brief in Support of Exceptions to the Initial Decision in the THI-2 case as well as because of the reasons advanced by Mr. Sharfman in his dissent from ALAB-486.
We also move that the Appeal Board consider the probability that an aircraft will crash into TMI-l in its decision in this case, as was suggested by Mr. Sharfman in his dissent from ALAB-486. We attempted to raise this issue in the ongoing TMI-l nestart proceeding (Docket No. 50-289).
In that proceeding, the Licensing Board issued a First Special Prehearing Conference Order (dated December 18,1979)(pages 44-
- 46) which refused to address the aircraft impact question as it pertains to TMI-l on the assumption that this Appeal Board had already examined or was examining this issue Furthennore, since the TMI-l reactor is equally likely as the TMI-2 reactor to be subject to an aircraft crash, and since the TMI-2 operating license was granted not in a vacuum but with full knowledge that TMI-l was adjacent to the TMI-2 reactor, this' 7-,
, Board should include consideration of the probability of an aircraft cra:hin either reactor in its decision in this proceeding.
Respect, fully submitted,
/'
,/
(
Chauncey Kepford Legal Representative of Intervenors 433 Orlando Avenue State College, Penna.16801 1
(814) 237-3900 Dated this d
day of April,1980 I
I h
s i
5 id w
CERTIFICjTEOFSERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the INTERVENORS' MEMORANDUM ON AIRCRAFT CRASH were served upon the following bt deposit in the E 5. Mail, first class, postage paid, on this 30 day of April,1980:
Alan S. Rosenthal. Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Lawrence J. m andler Botrd Counsel for the NRC Sta U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory washington, D.C. 20555 Unchington, D:: 20555 Dr. W. Reed Johnson, Member Docketing and Service Section Atcaic Safety and Licensing Appeal Office of the Secretary Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CosmLission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cossaission Washington, DC 20555 Wachington, DC 20555 Karin W. Carter, Assistant Dr. John B. Buck, Member Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Office of Enforcement Board Dept. of Environmental Resources U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cossaission 709 Health and Welfare Building W:chington, DC 20555 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Mr. Custave A. Linenberger George F. Trowbridge, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20036 Dr. Ernest 0, Salo Atomic Safety and Licensing Board N
Panel Prcfessor, Pisheries Rasaarch g Institute, WH-10 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Collage of Fisheries 8s Washington, DC 20555 DOCKETED C3 Univsrsity of Washington USNRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal saattia. UA 98195 b-W 21980 > I Panel Office of the SecretuY
-f0 p.S. Nuclear Regulatory c - 4 ston q.
Dc:Leting & Semce
' Vashington, DC 20555
//
\\
G.
~. s
/.
- .e'!.S c.d.o N
Chauncey Kepforf ' //
u